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A Wuest1on of Oonstruction: Capital and Labour in Wearside 
Shipbuilding since the 1930's 
E.mriricall;; the central problernatics c;c!dressed in th:i.s study 
<'•re twofolci. i·"i_rstly, 0n accc".mt WC\S sough1: to e:,vlain the 
apparent retention of control over the division of labour by 
workers in the 1930's, and their appe~rent loss of this control in 
the 1980's. Secondly, the view of the British Shipbuilding 
Industry presented by those working within the labour process 
tradition is questioned. Such work, claiming general 
applicability, was often parti<\1 in its geograrhical focus, upon 
the Clyde and Tyne, and in its presentation of· social action at 
the point of production, focusing on issues of change rather than 
routinisation, and on the activist account of labour within the 
workplace. 
In framing a largely non - activist account of the relation-
ship be "tween Cclpi tal and ~bour on the \'ie<H from the 1930's to the 
1980's it was important to develop an adequate theoretical frame-
work. This task is addressed in Chapter One where the issue of 
the nature of structure and agency are dealt with, and <In attempt 
is made to "unthink dualism" on the basis of a "receding ontology" 
of material determination. This theory is related to the labour 
process t~adition which is demonstrated to be an unsatisfactory 
basis for the development of the empirice~l concerns. r~ather, 
the concept of the employment relationship is shown to be a more 
satisfactory focus. 
On this basis the study looks at continuity and r.han~P within 
the industry and camnuni ty on the \-~ear. Extraordinary episodes 
in the history of the industry, such as the employment of women 
during the Second l..Jorld \-var, are detailed, as well as the 1110re 
routine aspects of work in a shipyard. In relating these aspects 
to the wider community the debate engages with general accounts 
of the nature of the working clnss. The importance of a "cultural" 
perspective is developed throughout the work and control is seen 
to depend not only upon strategies of capital and labour, but 
also upon the developn1ent of rnoral l.egi timacy within relations 
of d0!1linance and subordination. 
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Introduction 
This is a study of the changing nature of the division of 
labour in the shipyards on the river Wear in the 1930s and 1980s. 
The specific way that I have constructed this object of study has 
been influenced by two general factors. One stems from my 
intellectual development as a sociologist and concerns a search 
for a "valid" or "acceptable" framework with which to analyse 
complex social forms (about which more will be said in Chapter 
1). The second is the general autobiographical development of my 
life, with both my father and elder brother being shipyard 
workers and my first job upon leaving school being in this 
industry. 
Whilst there have been few published studies of the industry 
on the Wear, it is hard to overstate its dominance within the 
local culture, and, whilst its importance as a major employer had 
declined substenti~lly in recent years. Sunderland remains a 
"shipbuilding town". If the existence of the industry gives a 
specific identity to the town, its impact on individuals within 
that town is often far greater. It is perhaps pertinent at this 
point for me to recall some of the past circumstances which have 
led to my preoccupation with this industry. They are meant 
primarily as a contribution towards a "natural history" of the 
research act, although the substance of what I have to say could 
be seen as deriving from "participant observation" of the most 
direct kind. 
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The shipyards in Sunderland physically dominate many 
panoramas within the town - this remains so even today with the 
large cranes and fabbing sheds or the covered berths of the 
Pallion and Southwick yards punctuating the skyline. As a small 
child one of several rituals to be practised during a bus journey 
to the "town" was, on crossing Wear mouth Bridge, to look for my 
father working on one or other of the ships being outfitted in 
the river below. This, on reflection, was a pointless exercise 
as they were too far away to identify individuals. However, 
there was something magnetic about the yards and the ships them-
selves, which never failed to attract the eye; for, as well as 
being excited at the flashes of welding or cranes moving huge 
loads, I always endeavoured to find out the names of the 
particular ships, especially the ones that "my dad had built". 
Shipyards prior to the days of covered in yards had the feature 
ur vl::;ibillty which i~ absc11t frvii1 fac:tcric~ ccr:8tructcd mc!:'e 
with utility than visibility in mind. From where I lived on the 
outskirts of the borough the yards could not be seen, however, 
their presence assailed the senses in another form. The rhythmic 
sound of Doxford's engines being tested on concrete test beds, 
often over several days and especially nights, is unforgettable. 
The importance of the overt physical presence of the 
industry lies in the effect of reinforcing identity. In this 
respect I remember being shocked in primary school by other 
children who either did not know where their father worked or had 
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only a vague idea of what he did. I knew both where my dad 
worked and, as importantly, that he was a craftsman and a 
plumber, on no account to be confused with "git big daft 
boilermakers". This was an important source of identity, albeit 
one that would prove constricting in the years that followed. 
Identities are complex and dynamic forms defined in relation 
to differing groups at different times. If the importance of a 
speci fie era ft identity was paramount at some times, its 
importance receded at others. For example, during the strike of 
1968 a broader identity was pushed to the fore. This I felt 
directly at school, for as craftsmen's sons and daughters we were 
placed in the unusual position of having to stand up (literally) 
and claim free meals, an onerous task usually reserved for the 
sons and daughters of "yackers" (1), In this situation our 
dignity was salvaged by sticking together as children of shipyard 
t•JOrkers 1 anrl fnr thA rltlrBtinn of thP. str.ike this even had the 
effect of altering patterns of playground interaction. 
An important point to make is that the capital/labour divide 
is not often felt by workers as a clear cut structural opposition 
on a day to day basis, it is always mediated through individuals. 
However, such relations include moral elements and the conflict 
born out of the employment relationship is experienced acutely 
when a moral conflict arises. In such a situation inequalities 
of power may preclude practical action, but events may serve to 
reinforce the validity of the "us" and "them" view of the 
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relationship. One example of this occurred during an unusual 
social event, in what was then Doxfords yard. As a reward for 
satisfactory and prompt delivery of several vessels for the 
People's Republic of China the new owners laid on a social 
evening for the workers in the yard ( Z). I recall going along to 
Doxfords canteen with my father where food and drink flowed in 
· profusion. The "price" for this free refreshment was that we had 
to sit and pretend to watch a cine film of a ballet portrayal of 
the Chinese revolution. At one point my father and I went 
outside for some fresh air (the free cigarettes were being smoked 
with dedication). At the back of the canteen the door opening 
into the kitchen was wide open and several men were loading 
crates of beer into cars. These, I was later informed, were 
managers, and this event had a significant impact upon the mood 
of the people who found out about it. With remarks such as 
"they've even get t'J teke pgrt of OIJ!' rrRRPnt frnm thP. 
Communists", and "it's the first time I've ever known managers do 
labouring work". The point was not the narrow one that the 
managers were getting some of the refreshments meant for the 
workers, but rather the way they were doing it - effectively 
stealing it out of the back door. Thus what was meant for 
collective consumption in one almighty "binge" was being driven 
off for individual consumption in the privacy of their own homes. 
A clear difference was seen between the excessive gluttony of 
some of the individuals in the canteen and the behaviour of the 
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managers. The acts of the individuals inside the canteen were 
"up front", you and everyone else knew who the "greedy ones" 
were. The managers were covertly removing the crates of beer 
whilst attempting to appear aloof from the collective consumption 
of the workers. 
In the past it was always a common understanding within the 
working class community of Sunderland that if your father was a 
craftsman in the shipyards you would stand a good chance of being 
able to get employment there upon leaving school, if he would 
"speak" for you. It should be understood however that seeking 
work in the yards is not often a positive choice for such work, 
but rather is usually seen as a realistic goal and is often 
compared favourably with other work on the basis of competing 
deprivations. Thus I remember my father suggesting that I 
applied because the job was not as repetitive as factory work and 
you were net stuck behind a desk ss in office work (pen pushing) 1 
and besides these what other opportunities were there? At the 
time I knew of none and therefore after a successful application 
I started as an apprentice plumber at the Deptford yard of 
Sunderland Shipbuilders (formerly Laings). It became clear after 
several months that I would only ever be a mediocre plumber. 
This fact coupled with the increasing realisation that I was not 
really interested in fitting pipes developed over the weeks until 
I did something unusual for someone in my position, I left. This 
act not only created friction within the family, principally 
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between my father and myself, but also had consequences wider 
than this. The response from most of my friends is hard to over-
state. "You must be f---ing crackers" was probably the most 
common remark. Giving up a craft apprenticeship is not something 
one usually does in that community. If the response of my 
friends was that of bemusement, the response of others was 
sometimes less tolerant. For example my mother, who at this time 
was working in a packing factory in Sunderland, was "sent to 
Coventry" by several of her workmates. Some of these women had 
sons the same age as me, several of whom had applied (unsuccess-
fully) to become apprentices in the yards. For me to give up 
such a "good job" was not seen as a purely personal decision, but 
in some senses as contravening an accepted moral code, an act 
which reflected not only upon me but also upon my parents both 
for allowing me to leave in the first place, and following from 
thai:. came the assullipi.ion l.haL U1t:::y cuulu 11uL 1-JUtiti.i.Lly in:tvt::: y.i.vt:::ll 
me a correct upbringing. 
In relating the above recollections I have sought to 
establish that part of my interest in the industry and 
geographical area stems from direct personal involvement. On a 
more purely academic level the industry has some particularly 
interesting features. However as an area for research it has, to 
some extent, been neglected. For example as late as 1967 R.K. 
Brown et al stated in their proposal for research submitted to 
the Social Science Research Council that: 
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"No study of shipbuilding workers has been carried out, as 
far as we know, in this country, America or elsewhere." (3) 
More recently the industry has received attention from those 
( 
I \ 
working within the labour process tradition 41 • Historically 
the British industry appeared to offer a null case to Braverman's 
"iron law" of deskilling with the retention of the craft division 
of labour and the importance of the power of the workgroup (S). 
"Because the work lends itself to self supervision the 
traditions of the industry protect the autonomy of the work-
group. It is a common feature of the industry that this 
often extends to some control over the times when the work 
actually starts and finishes. It also affects decisions 
about manning and about the allocation and distribution of 
overtime ... the extent and organisation of the craft 
content of the work has led to the emergence of a large 
number of distinct craft specialisations, each with its own 
skill, pride in work and control of much of the work 
process • " ( 6) 
Within the labour process tradition general explanations of the 
persistence of craft control within the industry have been built 
around the notion of the strength of the unions and the 
characteristic behaviour of British shipyard workers. Thus, 
"British shipyard workers have characterised themselves in 
resisting at the point of production the expropriation of 
the control they have exercised over the labour 
process." ( 7) 
In a similar vein McGoldrick has suggested that, 
"The Boilermakers in shipbuilding were able to exert 
considerable control over their work because of their 
organised strength and also because of the divisions within 
the ranks of the employers." (8) 
Both of these pieces of research address the introduction of the 
welding process in the inter-war period. We should however 
question the level to which we can generalise from them as they 
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have an overdependence upon events as they happened upon the 
rivers of the Clyde and the Tyne. The degree of specialisation 
of production on individual rivers is important as it can impose 
a particular pattern of output and can even be seen to hold 
implications for the nature of labour relations in a 
locality. The fortunes of the industry on individual rivers can 
and sometimes does exhibit patterns of development opposite to 
that of the industry taken on a regional basis. Thus whilst the 
industry in the North East of England has often been spoken of as 
a unity, 
" the three main shipbuilding rivers in the region have 
had and still have markedly different patterns of output, 
employment and types of ship built .•• the North East's 
share of British tonnage fell in bad years and rose in good, 
the Tyneside yards performed in an exactly opposite way 
within the North East's total. In good years the Tyne's 
share fell, in bad it rose." (9) 
Clearly then, generalisations about the development of British 
shipbu~ldir;y Jn:1wn from a study of one or even two particular 
rivers must be treated warily. The over-representation of the 
Clyde and the Tyne in past research further suggests the need for 
a study of a river such as the Wear, with its historical 
specialisation, until recently, on "tramp" tonnage in marked 
contrast to both the above. 
The issue of specific locality involves broader issues than 
that of product specialisation alone. The cultural traditions of 
labour and capital are clearly built up empirically within both 
space and time (10). This is especially important in the case of 
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industries whose workers are seen to belong to an "occupational 
community". The specific quality of the local culture can be 
seen to influence the nature of the social relations of 
production within the workplace, as well as vice versa. This 
again points to the importance of seeing the empirical object as 
a particular historical individual. In this connection the 
context of shipbuilding upon the Wear would seem to provide a 
cultural background not only very different from that on the 
Clyde but also in some important respects different to that of 
the Tyne. 
Moreover an analysis which consciously delineates the local 
context within the national industry has a potential which 
radiates in several directions. Firstly, as we have noted above, 
the analysis indicates the need for a more complex explication of 
the "structure" of the shipbuilding industry as it does not 
unconsciously generalise particular empirical instances as 
evidence of a general type. This does not mean that one cannot 
say anything about the characteristics of the British Ship-
building industry in general. Rather it is to suggest that our 
characterisations need to have both a wider empirical base and be 
more theoretically complex. Secondly, following from an approach 
stressing a more complex understanding of the structure of the 
industry in its localities, the importance of the social action 
of workers and capitalists can be more clearly appreciated. Any 
tendency to subsume complex developments as the unmediated 
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outcome of the struggle between the structural categories of 
capital and labour can hopefully be avoided. At the general 
level this is clearly important in the shipbuilding industry 
where conflict within both labour and capital has been almost as 
important for shaping a particular development as conflict 
between the two "classes". At another level it hopefully allows 
one to see individual workers (and capitalists) as more than 
merely bearers of the mode of production, but rather as human 
agents struggling to make their own history even though under 
circumstances not chosen by themselves. 
The above points are important and they present the 
possibility for the unification of the two sources of impetus of 
this work. The personal biographical connection which 
(hopefully) ensures that I cannot become totally insensitive to 
the meanings and actions of the individuals in the industry, and 
the more purely academic concern with the nature of the industry 
and its implications for current issues within industrial 
sociology, call for an account adequate at the levels of both 
structure and action. 
The time period involved in this study focuses primarily 
upon the 1930s and the 1980s. In these periods economic crisis 
and depression have characterised both the shipbuilding industry 
and the North Eastern region as a whole. It has been argued that 
it is during such periods of crisis, when capital accumulation 
becomes problematic, that there is the greatest pressure upon 
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Capital to reorganise the division of labour (11). If such an 
analysis is valid the periods under consideration in this study 
should present the best opportunity to witness attempts by 
capital to restructure the division of labour and possibly 
deskill the workforce. 
It is these processes, or in some cases the lack of them, 
that form a unifying problematic for the whole study. The 
analysis of the problems understood by those in the industry to 
be facing them, theoretical solutions and actual courses of 
action taken and their effects, form much of the "comparison" 
between the '30s and the '80s. An initial position adopted after 
reading the secondary literature questioned why workers had 
apparently been able to retain control over the labour process in 
the inter-war period and yet had seemingly so easily lost it in 
the '80s. Both of these summations of the periods were to prove 
overly simplistic and that realisation came to dominate the 
research process as it proceeded. The effects of this 
realisation fed not only into the empirical account presented 
here, but also informed the theoretical elaborations outlined in 
Chapter 1 and are, I hope, evident throughout the work. In this 
sense the "comparison" between the inter-war period and the 1980s 
remains a valid one. 
However it must be stated that these periods are not self 
contained, and in order to appreciate that process occurs within 
the "intersecting planes of temporality" (lZ) it will be 
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necessary to include a consideration of processes and events 
occurring at periods outside those of our primary focus. 
The structure of the work can divided into three parts. 
Firstly a section will be devoted to developing a theoretical 
approach which can facilitate an account adequate at the levels 
of both structure and agency. Secondly the inter-war and wartime 
(World War II) periods will be looked at and the developments on 
the River Wear will be assessed in the light of the available 
literature, which deals primarily with the Clyde and the Tyne. 
Finally the position on the Wear in the 1980s will be looked at 
and the continuities and the disjunctions with the position in 
the inter-war period will emerge. 
Whilst the formal structure of this thesis can be .outlined 
relatively easily, its empirical and conceptual content is more 
diverse. The sharp focus on the division of labour in the early 
chapters becomes increasingly of less importance in later 
chapters, where issues of the nature of the working class in both 
the work and non-work spheres assumes greater prominence. In a 
way this shift of focus represents the changes in the "natural 
history" of the research project. But it is also indicative of 
the changes of priorities that I as a researcher underwent during 
the course of this project. Those changes also represented a 
shift in methodolgy. From using largely historical sources and 
official documents for the inter-war period I increasingly relied 
upon ethnography and "participant observation". 
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In one sense this represented a natural widening of opport-
unity as the study moved to more recent times; however it also 
represented a shift from a detached strategy of research to one 
of attempting to get as close as possible to the subjects of the 
study (l 3). In this respect I found the strategy of using 
several key respondents superior to that of attempting to develop 
a more comprehensive coverage. Not only did this strategy allow 
for more continuity with respect to following events but it also 
gave me the opportunity to develop far greater depth to the 
study. In producing what Geertz has called "thick description" 
0 4) a reliance on key respondents admits a greater degree of 
control over the validity of the accounts. Thus for example in 
Chapter 5 one may question the extent to which "sleeping on 
nightshi ft" was a routine occurrence, and how much of the 
accounts were built on exaggeration. My response is that first 
of all I lived amongst the key respondents and would not expect 
them to exaggerate to me. But more importantly the objective 
evidence of the validity of this particular detail was that the 
men involved, including my father and brother, were around and 
active during the day (l5), These direct checks on the evidence 
were a feature of my position within the day to day life worlds 
of most of the key informants, a fact which also led me to 
appraise official documents and such things as employer and union 
minutes far more critically than could otherwise have been the 
case. 
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Such a methodology contains its own risks, and the danger of 
"going native" was obviously a potential problem in my case. 
However I believe that this research is not an uncritical 
celebration of the craft worker and I hope that I have avoided 
any tendency to sentimentalise the subjects of the research. 
How successfully I have avoided these pitfalls I shall have to 
let others judge. 
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Notes to the Introduction 
1 Given the relatively low level of unemployment at this time 
those eligible for free school meals were identifiable as 
coming from a distinct "type" of family. Typically one 
where the family was long-term unemployed and would 
supplement the family income by hewing for coal on "pit 
heaps" and railway sidings. These men were locally known by 
the slang term "yackers" - not to be confused with "pit 
yackers", another term for miners. 
2 The two vessels were built for the People's Republic of 
China in 1967 and as the Sunderland Echo commented, 
"While in Sunderland for the bui_lding of these ships the 
Chinese technical-staff and crew distributed badges, copies 
of the thoughts of Chairman Mao and were generally well 
received by the Wearsiders. To show their appreciation they 
staged a film show for the workers and their families. It 
was more propaganda, of course, but the gesture was 
appreciated." 
The Sunderland Echo, 16 June 1972. 
3 Brown, R.K. et al Orientation to Work and Industrial 
Behaviour of Shipbuilding Workers on Tyneside, January 1968 
- December 1970, Research Report 1970. 
4 Most notably McGoldrick, J. Crisis and the Division of 
Labour: Clyd_esi<!_e Shiobuildino in thA Tnt.P.r-••J:=~r Pe,.. J.'Jd 
and 
Lorenz, E.H. The Labour Process and Industrial Relations in 
British and French Shipbuilding: The Inter-war Years. 
5 Braverman, H. Labor and Monopoly Capital, London Monthly 
Review Press, 1974. 
6 Shipbuilding and Shiprepairing, Commission on Industrial 
Relations Report, No. 22, H.M.S.O. 1971, ppl09-ll8. 
7 Lorenz, E.H. Op.cit. ppl-2. 
8 McGoldrick, J. Op.cit. p66. 
9 Cousins, J.M. and Brown, R.K. "Shipbuilding", Chapter XXI 
in: Dewdney, J.C. (Ed) Durham County and City with Teesside 
British Association for the Advancement of Science, Durham 
1970, p322. 
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10 For example the characterisation of Clydeside as "the red 
Clyde". 
11 Thus for example Gordon, Edwards and Reich have stated that: 
"Our analysis begins with the observation that the present 
crisis is not the first in our history; U.S. capitalism has 
experienced at least three prior periods of sustained 
cr1s1s. We argue that the resolution of these crises 
resulted in three major structural changes in the 
organisation of work and the structure of the labour markets 
in the United States. 11 
Gordon, D.M., Edwards, R. and Reich, M. Segmented Work, 
Divided Workers, Cambridge, C.U.P. 1982. 
12 Giddens, A. A Contemporary Critique of Historical Material-
ism, London, Macmillan 1981, pl9. 
13 This, of course, also relates to the shift from the labour 
process and the division of labour as the central focus of 
the study to a concern with the nature of the working class. 
14 Geertz, C. "Thick Description: Towards an Interpretive 
Theory of Culture" in: 
Rice, K.A. Geertz and Culture, Michigan, University of 
Michigan Press 198~ 
15 During this period my father built a greenhouse and dinghy 
as well as spending his time gardening and fishing. 
CHAPTER I!JINE 
The Theoretical Underpinnings 
Part ]. 
"The weight of two and a half millenia of treating dualism 
as the obvious basis for effective thought is remarkably 
oppressive." (1) 
It is necessary to enter into the theoretical underpinnings 
of this work for several reasons. Firstly, this is a work that 
attempts to be both consciously theoretical and empirical. (Z) 
There are a series of overtly theoretical concerns which 
underlie even the "most empirical" parts of the following 
account. This leads on to the second reason why an initial 
theoretical excursion is necessary. One of the central features 
of what follows is an attempt to use a framework which can unite 
not only the concepts of structure and action but which takes 
seriously the project of "unthinking dualism". To grasp this 
point is of profound importance in relation to understanding what 
is meant in the analysis. In attempting to use such an approach 
I must confess to the adoption of what may be termed "theoretical 
opportunism". This work cannot claim an untainted theoretical 
pedigree in terms of being able to call upon the legitimacy of a 
single theoretical tradition (e.g. his tori ca 1 material ism, or 
phenomenology). Rather the eventual theoretical structure must 
be seen as an emergent property of the research itself, certainly 
as much so as any of the more "empirical" content. The reason 
for this lies not only in the wish to respect the authenticity of 
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the data but is also because, whilst the theory of the 
interaction or indeed the unification of structure and action is 
quite well advanced, the debate has not so far been too 
successful in terms of specifying particular approaches through 
which to operationalise these concerns. (3) However, having said 
this, it is perhaps useful briefly to review the structure/action 
debate in order to develop some of the features of the 
theoretical scheme to be adopted. 
The first point to make is that the issues now dealt with 
under the heading of the structure/action debate are in no way 
new discoveries. These problems were wrestled with by the 
classic masters of sociology in their time: 
"Durkheim, Marx and Weber each broke with the evolutionary 
theories of their contemporaries in their effort to develop 
an analysis of history which could identify pattern and 
tendency ... without spilling over into a trans-historical 
teleology which discovered possibility and probability in 
the interaction of purpose and structure without 
transforming the structure of action into a supra-historical 
davelo~~antal prcc0sa go~zrning beth ctructurc 3nd octicn 
with law like necessities independent of human agency." (4) 
Whilst these concerns are evident in the work of the best 
sociologists, the development of the debate in a reflexively 
self-conscious manner is a relatively recent phenomenon. It is 
important to realise that the structure/action debate as 
understood in this connection cannot be reduced to a duality of 
micro and macro approaches or the debate over the question of 
societal-individual priority. For as Zygmunt Bauman has noted 
this is to some extent a "phoney" question: 
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"Whatever factor sociological theory L'llill eventually select 
as its central analytical concept, it will be well advised 
to beware of choices innate in the irritatingly barren 
argument over societal-individual priorities. It must be a 
factor operative on both levels. It must account for both, 
inextricably interwoven facets of human existence subjective 
and objective, determining and determined, creative and 
created, socialising and socialised. Then and only then can 
it be utilised in building models at once syn and 
diachronical, and bridging the so far isolated levels of 
individual situation and social structure in a way which 
does not beg the phoney question of the "priority" of one of 
the two modalities of human existence." (5) 
Arguably such a movement towards a potential "central 
analytical concept" was well underway by the time the above words 
were written. The 1960s had seen a re-emergence and development 
of theoretical traditions which for some time had been in a state 
of relative neglect. Two of the most important of these, for our 
purposes, were the increasing influence of phenomenology in its 
sociological rather than purely philosophical guise, and the 
"flowering" of a wide variety of approaches claiming some point 
of allegiance to Marxist analysis. In the first of these 
developments two of the most able proponents, Berger and Luckman, 
began to sensitise us to the "social construction of reality" in 
which, following Schutz, the inter-subjective nature of the 
social world is emphasised. This intersubjectivity demonstrates 
that our understanding of the social world is not uniquely 
individual, but rather through the "reciprocity of perspectives", 
meaning is seen as an irreducibly social phenomenon; the 
abstraction of the "individual" from "society" becomes absurd. 
However Berger and Luckman did more than demonstrate this point -
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they emphasised the importance of two phenomena which for later 
structure/action theory was to become indispensible, viz. the 
notions of language and temporality. Whilst much of their work 
amounts to a "popularisation" of Schutz, their real achievement 
was to grasp the implications of the Schutzian approach for wider 
sociological theory and thereby allowing the potential for a 
cross fertilisation of ideas to take place. ( 6 ) Whilst their 
book is structured around two main chapters entitled "Society and 
Objective Reality" and "Society and Subjective Reality", in the 
conclusion they state the essentially inter-related nature of 
these two abstractions: 
"We are suggesting .•. that the integration of the findings 
of such (their) analyses into the body of sociological 
theory requires more than the casual obeisance that might be 
paid to the "human factor" behind the uncovered structural 
data. Such integration requires a systematic accounting of 
the dialectical relation between the structural realities 
and the human enterprise of constructing reality in 
history." ( 7) 
SimilDrly, Dt Dnothor point they produce a statement ~hich 
in many ways prefigures the "developments" occurring in 
structure/action theory in the 1980s when they argue that 
sociology should be seen as a distinctly humanistic discipline: 
"An important consequence of this conception is that 
sociology must be carried on in a continuous conversation 
with both history and philosophy or lose its proper object 
of inquiry. This object is society as part of a human 
world, made by men, inhabited by men, and, in turn, making 
men, in an ongoing historical process." (B) 
The last sentence encapsulates several of the main features 
of Giddens' "theory of structuration". The recursive character 
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of social life is clearly grasped, as is the fundamental 
importance of temporality and process. Here then we have a work 
which is, at the very least, attending to some of the same 
concerns which later became identified under the heading of the 
structure/action debate, and as will be argued later the 
contribution from such phenomenologically informed work has great 
potential as part of an approach to the "paradox of agency". ( 9) 
A second major influence upon the shaping of the 
problematics that became the structure/action debate has been the 
work of Marx and later scholars working within a broadly defined 
Marxian tradition. Marx himself was, as Abrams has pointed out, 
centrally concerned with the problem of agency. As one of the 
most quoted passages from "The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" 
makes clear: 
"Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as 
they please; they do not mak~ it under circumstances chosen 
by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, 
;iven 2nd t:cnnsmitted from the ped _" (10) 
In another passage in the "Grundrisse", the concerns of 
agency are located within a framework which overtly recognises 
both the recursive nature of social reality and the necessity of 
temporal process: 
"Everything that has a fixed form, such as the product etc., 
appears as merely a moment, a vanishing moment in ... (the) 
movement •.• (of society). The direct production process 
itself appears only as a moment. The conditions and object-
ifications of the process are themselves equally moments of 
it, and its only subjects are the individuals, but 
individuals in mutual relationships, which equally reproduce 
and produce anew ... in which they renew themselves even as 
they renew the world of wealth they create." (11) 
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Perhaps of more influence for the emerging shape of the 
structure/action debate of the 1980s than individual passages 
from Marx was the post war development of a variety of forms of 
"Marxist" theory, and in particular the emergence of "western 
Marxism". One of the catalysts in this development was the 
rediscovery of some of the works of Marx himself. "The Paris 
Manuscripts" (Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844) 
were published for the first lime in 1932 1 and the "Grundrisse" 
was effectively first published in its original German edition in 
1953. Both these works were of considerable importance and 
fuelled the debate as to the "true" nature of Marxism. Much 
debate centred around the question as to whether or not there was 
an epistomological break in the work of Marx considered as a 
whole. The argument of those who support the notion of such a 
"break" suggests that in his early work Marx was concerned with 
uli:lll ii-, tht. abstr;Jct, ;Jn ov:::rly p!iilo::::ophiccl viei."J in t•Jhich thP 
legacy of Hegel dominated, producing a concern with alienation, 
whereas the mature Marx aspired to scienti fie socialism and a 
concern with political economy. The 1844 manuscripts were seen 
as the turning point between these two phases and as such were 
the spur to the debate. The "Grundrisse" on the other hand 
seemed to present evidence to back up those who denied that such 
a break took place. As Istvan Meszaros pointed out, within the 
"Grundrisse" there are many examples of the concerns which were 
supposedly those of the young Marx: 
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"(It shows) not only how wrong they are who assert that 
"alienation" has dropped out from Marx's later works, but 
also that his approach to the discussed problems is 
essentially the same as in the Manuscripts of 1844 .•. Here 
(in the "Grundrisse") we even have the "anthropological" 
notions of the early Marx, together with the conception of 
the supersession of alienation as the transcendence of the 
abstract mediated character of human activity." (12) 
It is not our concern at present to enter into the details 
of this debate; rather what is to be noted is the importance of 
the "Grundrisse" as outlined in the above quotation (ref.ll) and 
the contribution of both this document and the "Paris 
Manuscripts" as "cannon fodder" in the developing schism between 
the "two Marxisms" of critical and scientific Marxists. It is in 
the practice of the confrontation of these two opposing 
tendencies that some of the most useful accounts (for the 
developing structure/action debate) have been produced. 
One such confrontation was the debate between E.P. Thompson 
and Louis Althusser concerning the nature of history and the role 
of human agency. Althusser, the structuralist, proclaiming that 
"History is a process without a subject" (13), whilst Thompson 
insists that history is to be seen as "Unmastered human 
practice" (14). The position taken by each of the authors would 
seem to be the exact polar opposite of that taken by the other 
with the status of structure being seen to be of central 
importance. Thus for Althusser: 
"The structure of the relations of production determines the 
places and functions occupied and adopted by the agents of 
production, who are never more than the occupants of these 
places, in SG far as they are the "supports" of these 
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functions. The true "subjecls" (in lhe sense of the 
constitutive subjects of the process) are therefore not 
these occupants or functionaries, are not, despite all 
appearances, the "obviousnesses" of the "given" of naive 
anthropology, "concrete individuals", "real men" - but the 
definition and distribution of these places and functions." 
(15) 
Thompson's view of structure and agency is very different 
and he widens his attack from "Althussers orrery" to include 
other non-structuralist approaches which comprise: 
"The sociological section: the elaborate differential rota-
tions within the closure of the orrery; the self-extrapolat-
ing programmed developmental series; the mildly disequilib-
rated equilibrium models, in which dissensus strays unhappi-
ly down strange corridors, searching for a reconciliation 
with consensus; the systems analyses and structuralisms, 
with their torques and their combinatories; the counter 
factual fictions; the econometric and cleometric groovers -
all of these theories hobble along programmed routes from 
one static category to the next. And all of them are 
Geschichtenscheissenschlopff, unhistorical shit." (16) 
For Thompson and Althusser there can be little agreement, 
the authors inhabit different universes of discourse and as such 
the gulf between them cannot be bridged. (l7) In this context the 
emphasis upon structure or agency is exclusive and both positions 
are predicated upon opposite ontological and epistemological 
bases. The debate would appear to be sterile in relation to the 
further development of the structure/action debate. However, 
this is not the case because of the secondary comment that 
Thompson's attack upon Althusser provoked. In this connection 
Perry Anderson has raised several points, one of which is of 
particular importance for our purposes and this concerns the 
potentia 11 y heterogenous character of human agency. Anderson 
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suggests that Thompson does not distinguish between "agency" 
directed at different types of goals: 
" ... if agency is constructed as conscious goal directed 
activity, everything turns on the nature of the goals. For 
it is obvious that all historical subjects engage in actions 
all of the time, of which they are "agents" in this strict 
sense. So long as it remains at this level of indeterminacy 
the notion is an analytic void." (18) 
The author sees a three part distinction of "types" of goals 
pursued by agents. Firstly, "private goals" - these are the 
goals pursued by the majority of the people for the majority of 
the time: 
" (the) cultivation of a plot, choice of marriage, 
exercise of a skill, maintenance of a home, bestowal of a 
name. These personal projects are inscribed within existing 
social relations and typically reproduce them." (19) 
Secondly there are goals which are "public" in character. 
These for example would include such things as religious 
movements, political struggles, military conflicts, diplomatic 
transactions, commercial explorations and cultural explorations. 
Here: 
"Will and action acquire an independent historical 
significance as causal sequences in their own right rather 
than as molecular samples of social relations ... However 
these (goals) too in their overwhelming majority have not 
aimed to transform social relations as such - to create new 
societies or master old ones; for the most part they were 
much more limited in their (voluntary) scope." (20) 
Finally, according to Anderson: 
" ... there are those collective projects which have sought 
to render their initiators authors of their collective mode 
of existence as a whole, in a conscious programme aimed at 
creating or remodelling whole social structures ... 
essentially this kind of agency is very recent indeed." (21) 
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The author goes on to suggest that in this sense the Russian 
revolution represents the beginning of a new kind of history 
founded upon an "unprecedented form of agency". The importance 
of this formulation for the confrontation of structure and agency 
in the dispute between Thompson and Althusser is that the former 
conflates the three types of agency, appealing, the vast majority 
of time, La types 1 and 2 in order to make Allhusser's claims 
about structure look silly. The result of this conflation by 
Thompson can be seen to be ironic: 
"The conceptual error involved is to amalgamate those 
actions which are indeed conscious volitions at a personal 
or local level but whose social incidence is profoundly 
involuntary with those actions which are conscious volitions 
at the level of their own social incidence, under the single 
rubric "agency". The paradox ica 1 resu 1 t of Thompson's 
critique of Allhusser is thus actually to reproduce the 
fundamental failing of the latter, by a polemic inversion. 
For the two antagonistic formulae of a natural human process 
without a subject and "ever-baffled, ever-resurgent agents 
of unmastered practice" are both claims of an essentially 
apodictic and speculative character - eternal axioms that in 
no way help us to trace the actual variable roles of 
different types of deliberate venture, personal or 
.-.nllc:.,-,f-;11<> ;n h;<:>tnr\1 II (??) 
.._ -'- ..._ ,_ -. L. ....._ .. ..__ '/ ~, • i • ._ -1 ~ ._,. J.. i " "> _. _ _._ 1 
Whilst one may agree with Anderson's conclusions upon the 
positions adopted by Thompson and Althusser, the question now 
becomes how far does his own formulation of the three-fold 
differentiation of goal-directed agency escape the charge of 
being essentially apodictic and speculative? At first sight the 
division seems sensible enough; however on closer inspection 
several problems become apparent and in general these are rooted 
in the taken for granted dualism between structure and agency 
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which Anderson accepts uncritically from the polar positions of 
Thompson and Althusser. 
Firstly, his opposition of "private" and "public" in the 
first two "types" of agency seems overly simplistic. Consider 
several examples given by the authors of the private goals which 
are pursued by: 
" the overwhelming majority of people for the 
overwhelming major part of their lives." (23) 
These include: the cultivation of a plot and choice of 
marriage. In the first example the cultivation of a plot may be 
seen as a private goal if the plot concerned is a garden or 
allotment cultivated as a hobby or pastime. However, where that 
cultivation is the source, either totally or in part, of 
subsistence of an individual or group its social significance can 
take on distinctly "public" dimensions. For example Perry 
Anderson himself has outlined the significance of the 
stabilisation of agrarian settlement in the passage from 
"Antiquity to feudalism": 
"Once agrarian settlement was stabilised, and military 
campaigns became longer-range and lengthier, the material 
basis for a social unity of fighting and tilling was 
inevitably broken. War became the distant prerogative of a 
mounted nobility, while a sedentary peasantry laboured at 
home to maintain a permanent rhythm of cultivation, disarmed 
and burdened with provision of supplies for royal armies." 
(24) 
Whilst it may be objected that such developments are the 
unforseen consequences of action and therefore are not part of 
agency "consciously goal-orientated action", nevertheless the 
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goal will vary with the context, in terms of both the absolute 
orientation (i.e. cultivation as a pastime, provision of 
subsistence or for the production of a surplus product) and 
relatively, in terms of the "slippage" that can occur between the 
"private" and the "public", for example in times of changing land 
use ( 25 ). The second example of a private goal given by 
Anderson, that of choice of marriage, also fits rather 
uncomfortably under the heading of "personal projects". For as 
anthropologists have shown there are differences between cultures 
in relation to the "rules" governing who can or will marry whom. 
Thus prescribed marriages may be the norm in some societies, 
whilst the lesser defined preferential marriage may characterise 
others. When other complications such as rules relating to 
endogamy and exogamy or formally arranged marriages are 
introduced the notion of the choice of marriage partner as an 
example of "private" goals involving purely personal projects 
beccr.:es i~c:ceesi~gly ~:cable~~ tic, The "pubJ i r" P 1 PrnP.nt involved 
in the "choice of a marriage" should be clearly understood: 
"Since the obverse of any system of marriage prohibitions is 
the necessity of finding a spouse from among those 
permitted, this system itself results in the formation of 
tiers running in every direction through the society, what 
Fortes has called the "web" of kinship and others call a 
network ... It has been remarked of the Nuer that the 
prohibitions on marriage which they recognise, taken 
together, have the effect that a young man looking for a 
wife is pretty well obliged to find her in some other 
village than his own. The advantage of this is not that he 
brings in "new blood", but that every marriage creates a new 
link between the small village groups ... It is no accident 
that in French the word "alliance" still refers to marriage. 
Often marriages form the bond of peace between groups that 
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would otherwise take hostility for granted; many peoples, in 
Africa and elsewhere say "we marry whose with whom we 
fight." (26) 
Again, the slippage that exists between the public and 
private domains is evident. In this sense what Anderson fails to 
realise is that the very notions of the "private" and the 
"public" are socially mediated and therefore the position of an 
individual act can be variously located depending upon the type 
of society which we are discussing. 
Greater problems are evident in Anderson's differentiation 
between the two "public" types of agency the one in which "the 
goals pursued have been characteristically inserted within a 
known structural framework", and the other in which the goal is 
that of "creating or remodelling whole social structures". Such 
a division implies an overly simplistic notion of structure and 
is to a large extent idealist. Thus Anderson appears to suggest 
that the action of agents either reproduces the given form of 
soci2l rel2tionships (in his view the 
or in the third type of agency aims to smash them. This view 
assumes an extreme polarity (either reproduction or revolution), 
thus agency that is not directly orientated towards the overthrow 
of the existing structure of social relationships is seen merely 
to reproduce them (27). Not only could such a position lead to 
insensitivity in analysing differing forms of civil society (e.g. 
Fascism or Democracy) built upon the same mode of production 
(e.g. Capitalism), but it also trivialises the role of 
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institutions such as trades unions which in the absence of 
revolutionary goals could be seen in this way as "functional" for 
the reproduction of the social relations of capitalism. Such a 
position has indeed been adopted by some orthodox Marxists, who, 
following Lenin's insistence that there is a rigid dichotomy 
between trade union consciousness and revolutionary socialist 
consciousness, have sought to portray the effect of trades 
unionism as leading to the institutionalisation of industrial 
conflict and thereby becoming the "junior partners of capitalist 
enterprise" ( 28 ). Others who have developed a more thorough going 
historical analysis of trades unions (as institutions involving 
rank and file members as well as leaders) often adopt a more 
historically contingent conclusion. Thus as Tony Lane has 
suggested of the trades union movement in Britain in the late 
1960s and early 1970s: 
"That the trade unions proved an integrative force did not 
mPBn th~t they h-2d bcon tot:::lly c.b.;orbad a11J iflCOL'f.JUt'aLed 
into the Slate - despite appearances to the contrary and the 
implications of the slandpoints of some right wing trade 
union leaders." (29) 
Lane goes on to show how rank and file pressure effectively 
frustrated agreements between the T.U.C. and the governments of 
the period on incomes policy, thereby ensuring that the unions 
could not be used as "instruments of State policy" (3D) The 
point to be made here, then, is that the importance of the trades 
union movement cannot be reduced solely to the level of 
Anderson's first type of public agency, characteristically 
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serving to reproduce existent social relations, neither is i l 
totally orientated towards the transformation of those relations; 
rather it has potential to be active on either level both as an 
agency of reproduction and disruption, a "double tongued sign" 
indeed, to use E.P. Thompson's phrase. In other words the 
extreme dichotomy between the reproduction of existent social 
relationships or their transformation (one is tempted to write of 
factors functional or dysfunctional for the maintenance of social 
order) cannot hold - there is historically and empirically little 
evidence for the existence of such "pure" forms of agency. 
A final problem with Anderson's typology concerns his second 
type of public agency - that which "sought to render their 
initiators authors of their collective mode of existence as a 
whole in a conscious programme aimed at creating or remodelling 
whole social structures". Anderson suggests that the Russian 
Revolution is the "inaugural incarnation" of a new kind of 
history founded on this unpre~edented form of Agency. However he 
goes on to note that: 
"Notoriously, the results of the great cycle of upheavals it 
initialed have to date been far from those expected at their 
outset." ( 31) 
The problem with this kind of analysis defining agency 
purely in terms of conscious goal orientation is that it is 
idealist. Given the unanticipated consequences of the social 
action which were initiated in the Russian Revolution the 
question must be how different is this "recent form of agency"? 
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The efficacy of this "unprecedented" form remains unproven 
(although still a potentiality). It would be possible to analyse 
what Anderson is talking about not as a new form of agency but 
rather as a form of ideology. 
Anderson's project of detaching different levels of agency 
wi 11 not necessarily further our understanding. Indeed it may 
lead to the trivialisation of the everyday life worlds of 
individuals and groups predicated upon an overly simple 
conception of the processes of reproduction of social 
relationships; one which sees conflict and consensus as mutually 
exclusive rather than as a processual dialectic. However, the 
debate between Thompson and Althusser and Anderson's comments 
upon it have been useful in ensuring the development of the 
structure/agency debate within the Marxist tradition. But to 
some extent within that tradition this problematic remains 
marginal and is usually subordinated within the wider concerns of 
i·ictrx.i::;u,. Pe:u:Lly uecauoe ul i..it.i::; i..itt LettJe11cy Lu v.itw ::;LrucLun~ 
and agency as two mutually exclusive categories remains. To 
address the problematic of structure and agency in a more 
reflexively self-conscious form we need to look at developments 
outside specifically Marxist social theory. 
One starting point for this project is the work of Alan 
Dawe ( 32 ). His analysis locates the origin of the "two 
sociologies" as a response to the problematics raised during the 
enlightenment, the French and the industrial revolutions: 
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"There are, then, two sociologies: a sociology of social 
system and a sociology of social action. They are grounded 
in the diametrically opposed concerns with two central prob-
lems, those of order and control. And, at every level, they 
are in conflict. They posit antithetical views of human nat-
ure, of society and of the relationship between the social 
and the individual. The first asserts the paramount necessi-
ty, for societal and individual well being, of external 
constraint; hence the notion of a social system ontological-
ly and methodologically prior to its participants. The key 
notion of the second is that of autonomous man, able to 
realise his full potential and to create a truly human 
social order only when freed from external constraint." (33) 
Dawe goes on to suggest that underlying both sociologies is, 
in fact, the notion of human agency, in the sociology of social 
system such a view predicates the destructive nature of agency, 
in the social action approach the view is of creative energy 
(34). Ironically in attempting to transcend the division between 
the two sociologies the author has merely replicated the problem. 
Because his vision of these two opposed doctrines is built upon 
other dualities such as those of the individual and the social 
(despite the disavowal of this very duality), and his view of 
structure and system is one that emphasises constraint, Dawe's 
"solution", in his later work, is to opt for a naturalistic 
methodology suited primarily to situations of co-presence. His 
concern with the "appropriate communal foundation of genuine 
moral individuality" has led him in the end to emphasise only one 
side of the duality as authentic. Thus he quotes Martin Buber 
with approval: 
"The fundamental fact of human existence is neither the ind-
ividual as such nor the aggregate as such. Each, considered 
by itself, is a mighty abstraction ••• The fundamental fact 
of human existence is man with man ••• All real living is 
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meeting." (35) 
The appeal to naturalism to overcome the increasingly 
theoretically complex problematic of structure and agency (or 
system and action) is tempting. However, in this case it is also 
limiting for instead of achieving a synthesis Dawe has merely 
opted for one side of the duality and thereby locates agency in 
what Anderson referred to as "private goals". The result is not 
only that "structure" is ignored, but in seeing sociology 
metaphorically as conversation the potentially wider contexts or 
"reach" of agency is restricted. Thus: 
" ... peoples' 1 i ves reside in the details. So, there fare, 
does human agency. Peoples' lives are the details, the 
fundamentally communal details, the materials with which 
they weave their lives, strand upon strand. So, therefore, 
is human agency: 
"All over the great round earth and in the settlements, the 
towns, and the great iron stones of cities, people are drawn 
inward within their little shells of rooms, and are to be 
seen in their wondrous and pitiful actions through the 
surface of their lighted windows by thousands, by millions, 
little golden aquariums, in chairs, reading, setting tables, 
:::a~11ing, playing csrd:::, not t:Jlking, t:Jlking, laughing 
inaudibly, mixing drinks, at radio dials, eating, in shirt 
sleeves, carefully dressed, courting, teasing, loving, sedu-
cing, undressing, leaving the room empty in its empty light, 
alone and writing a letter urgently, in couples married, in 
separate chairs, in family parties, in gay parties, prepar-
ing for bed, preparing for sleep; and none can care, beyond 
that room; and none can be cared for, by any being beyond 
that room." (36) 
Such an approach may retain its grounding in and 
articulation of human social experience - the sour and weary 
modern experience of isolation and privatisation (3 7), but in 
resonating to and affirming as authentic such experience there is 
a risk that the approach will become merely the mouthpiece of 
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this inevitably particular (historically and geographically) form 
of experience. What started as a reflexively self-conscious 
statement of the problematic of structure and agency (system and 
action) has in the end retreated into a concern with detail and 
is thereby restricted to a single modality of human agency. In 
order to avoid the "sociology of the single vision" and affirm 
the authenticity of (modern) social experience Dawe has almost 
prescribed the level and (metaphorical) "type" of approach and 
therefore even while pronouncing the importance of ambiguity the 
author is producing a single vision of his own: 
"So it is the prime imperative of the sociology of the 
conversation that we ceaselessly listen to and converse with 
the voices from everyday life, wherever and however they are 
to be heard, including our own: that we listen for detail, 
for every nuance, every inflection, every change of tone, 
however slight, in the myriad ways in which people make 
their lives, in order to recognise and understand and artic-
ulate human agency at work. There is no other way." (38) 
Others however have suggested that there is perhaps another 
way, and to this end Anthony Giddens has expanded great energies 
in order to go beyond a celebration of the tension between 
structure and agency and rather to look towards the mutual 
dependence of the two concerns based upon his "theory of 
structuration" (39). As Giddens puts it: 
"The concept of structuration involves that of the duality 
of structure, which relates to the fundamentally recursive 
character of social life, and expresses the mutual 
dependence of structure and agency. By the duality of 
structure I mean that the structural properties of social 
systems are both the medium and the outcome of the practices 
that constitute those systems. The theory of structuration, 
thus formulated, rejects any differentiation of synchrony 
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and diachrony or statics and dynamics. The identification 
of structure with constraint is also rejected: structure is 
both enabling and constraining." (40) 
Here then, the imperialism of structure is dealt a severe 
blow: the emphasis placed upon the productJOt"\ 1 reproduction of 
structure understood as a duality, the medium and outcome of 
agency, ensures that structure is seen to have only a virtual 
existence. In other words structure is only existent in its 
instantation and can have no independent ontological status <41 ). 
Crucial to the duality of structure is the concept of agency, 
which does not consist purely of intentional action. As one 
commentator has noted: 
"Agency ••. "cannot be defined through that of intention, as 
is presumed in so much of the literature to do with the 
philosophy of action; the notion of agency as I employ it, I 
take to be logically prior to a subject/object differentiat-
ion." Formulated in this manner "agency" undercuts or trans-
cends the customary bifurcation between subjectvely intended 
conduct and externally stimulated reactive behaviour." (42) 
This provides an expanded account of agency, and as Giddens 
suggests, one which for the individual actor will include 
elements of "practical" and "discursive" consciousness. However 
such an approach does not deny the existence of the unintended 
consequences of social action, indeed agency as defined in the 
theory of structuration is inclusive of such unintended 
ramifications because it is situated in the matrix of differing 
time space paths within locales and regions. As Giddens states: 
"Human agents always know what they are doing on the level 
of discursive consciousness under some description. 
However, what they do may be quite unfamiliar under other 
descriptions, and they may know little of the ramified 
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consequences of the activities in which they engage. The 
duality of structure is always the main grounding of 
continuities in social reproduction across time-space. It 
in turn presupposes the reflexive monitoring of agents in, 
and as constituting the duree of daily social activities. 
But human knowledgeability is always bounded. The flow of 
action continually produces consequences which are 
unintended by actors, and these unintended consequences may 
also form unacknowledged conditions of action in a feedback 
fashion. Human history is created by intentional activities 
but is not an intended project; it persistently eludes 
efforts to bring it under conscious direction. However, 
such attempts are continually being made by human beings, 
who operate under the threat and the promise of the 
circumstances that they are the only creatures who make 
their "history" in cognisance of that fact." (43) 
This then is the crux of the structuration theory, that 
continuities (and discontinuities) in social, as opposed to 
system, reproduction across time-space are present only in the 
"moment of their instantation", the medium and outcome of social 
action. The apparent solidity of "structure" in some social 
theory appears as a function of distance in time and space and of 
the disjunction between actors, their action and the "sediment 
ectic'l" of differing time-space matrices, In nt-hAr !Mnrrls the 
reification of structure is often a product of a view predicated 
upon a static and unitary view of time and space, the implicit 
"1 o cat i o n" o f such v i e w s i s al w a y s the v i e w fro m "here" ( 4 4 ). 
However, once a determined attempt is made to incorporate the 
"problem a tic of time-space di stancia ti on", or to put it mare 
graphically "the stretching of social systems across time-
space" (45), the potential to understand systems as sedimented 
social action and social action as implying the mutuality of both 
agency and structure is possible. 
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Giddens' theory of structuration is clearly an intricate one 
and could not be otherwise given the task with which he is 
grappling. For as one reviewer puts it: 
"According to Giddens, the endeavour to avoid the twin 
pitfalls of idealism and the genetic fallacy points up the 
need to develop an adequate theory of human agency or a 
"theory of the acting subject". "The pressing task facing 
social theory today is not to further the conceptual 
elimination of the subject, but on the contrary to promote a 
recovery of the subject without lapsing into subjectivism. 
Such a recovery, I wish to argue, involves a grasp of "what 
cannot be said" (or thought) as practice, a grasp of which 
in turn depends upon stressing the importance of the 
"reflexive monitoring of conduct" as a chronic feature of 
the enactment of social life." (46) 
So then, this would suggest that the problematic under 
consideration lies inevitably at the boundaries of our language 
(and thought). Giddens' attempt to deal with these issues should 
be applauded; however it may be that his scheme is in some ways 
overly formalistic. The detailed interlinking scheme he outlines 
in his book "The Constitution of Society" may be an attempt to 
develop a series of "sensitising concepts"; however in so doing 
he may risk losing "the sense" of what he means. In some ways 
his theory is too tight and indeed by outlining (prescribing) the 
nature of the linkages between social action within locales, 
regions and systems he has constructed a "grand theory", which 
for some observers seems to distance the theory from the study of 
empirical aspects of social reality (47). To some extent this is 
perhaps inevitable given the limitations which are built into our 
common language, and it is indeed a tortuous route to move 
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towards "what cannot be said". The attempt to recombine the 
dualism of structure and action behind the cumbersome term of 
"structuration" and the "duality of structure" bears witness to 
the uneasiness that is produced when dualism is rejected. This 
indeed constitutes the horns of the dilemma upon which Giddens is 
impaled - the problem of structure and action is only one of the 
dualities underlying the sociological endeavour. 
"Thus modern society is condemned to exist within a world 
defined by a series of abstract dualisms which reflect the 
inadequacy of its foundations but which nevertheless 
structure sociological debate: structure-action; object-
subject; positivism-humanism; holism-individualism; society-
individual; explanation-understanding; order -conflict; 
authority-consent. " ( 48) 
A recognition that such dualistic thought patterns 
constitute much of the problem in relating a recombined account 
of structure and action was advanced by Philip Abrams. Whilst he 
suggested that the task facing us is to make a "determined effort 
to un-think dualis~', he did not underestimate the problems that 
such a move would involve: 
" ... although I find the call to abandon dualism (a call 
social scientists have been making to each other since the 
time of Marx) quite comprehensible, sensible and persuasive 
in principal, I must admit to finding it almost impossible 
to accomplish in practice. The weight of two and a half 
millenia of treating dualism as the obvious basis for 
effective thought is remarkably oppressive." (49) 
So then, the attempt to conceive of a unification of 
structure and action and other pervasive dualities amounts to 
attempting to "grasp what cannot be said" and is "almost 
impossible to accomplish in practice". However Abrams and 
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Giddens are united in their advocacy of attempting the almost 
impossible. If for Giddens this involves the production of a 
formal theory of structuration, for Abrams the sensitising 
concepts are more empirically based as evidence in some of the 
work of classic sociologists. The endeavour is seen to involve 
the 11 problematic of structuring" and the constitution of an 
11historical sociology 11 which is seen as: 
11 
••• the attempt to understand the relationship of personal 
activity and experience on the one hand and social 
organisation on the other as something that is continuously 
constructed in time. It makes the continuous process of 
construction the focal concern of social analysis. That 
process may be studied in many different contexts: in 
personal biographies and careers; in the rise and fall of 
whole civilizations; in the setting of particular events 
such as a revolution or an election, or of particular 
developments such as the making of the welfare state or the 
formation of the working class." (50) 
This concern is not a new one, then, but what is new is that 
the "problem 11 that the above authors address can no longer be 
seen as an implicit concern, whispered at in the work of "good" 
sociologists. We can now no longer ignore the problem; to 
conceive of the essential unity of social processes must be one 
of our consuming aims. 
The question of course remains how do we set about this 
task? If we are to "unthink dualism" are we not left with little 
purchase upon social reality: how can we proceed once we renounce 
the "reality" of concepts such as subjective/objective, 
structure/action etc.? In order to avoid losing our foothold 
altogether we need to address the problem of ontology, the 
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question of existence in its most basic form. Here perhaps is a 
starting point, but again one in which we must be careful to 
avoid the invocation of a solitary absolute, thereby structuring 
a duality in absence of "the relative". In other words, the 
question becomes how we envisage the relativity of the absolute. 
This question is perhaps best addressed through the concerns of 
other theorists and a useful point of departure is the notion of 
the material basis of reality, an issue which is central to the 
work of both Marx and Weber. What this involves is, according to 
Weber, part of the very essence of the concept of the "social 
economic": 
"Most roughly expressed, the basic element in all these phe-
nomena which we call, in the widest sense, '~ocial econom-
ics" is constituted by the fact that our physical existence 
and the satisfaction of our most ideal needs are everywhere 
confronted with the quantitative limits and the qualitative 
inadequacy of the necessary external means, so that their 
satisfaction requires planful provision and work, struggle 
with nature and the association of human beings." (51) 
SimilArly, fnr MRrX the "first premise of human existence" is 
that: 
" ••. men must be in a position to live in order to be able 
to "make history"." (52) 
In both accounts the importance of reproducing human physical 
existence is seen as a "fundamental condition of history". The 
appreciation of this "fundamental condition" is apparent in 
Giddens' attempts to promote a "recovery of the subject". This 
theme is demonstrated in his approach to semiotics and his 
repudiation of the Cartesian cogito: 
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"t~e must actually repudiate the cogito in a more thorough-
going way than Kristeva does, while acknowledging the vital 
importance of the theme that being precedes the subject-
object relation in consciousness. The route to 
understanding this is not to be found through a sort of 
reconstituted cogito, but through the connection of being 
and action." (53) 
At another point Giddens stresses the importance of being in a 
way reminiscent of Marx and Weber, referring to existential 
contradiction as: 
" •.• an elemental aspect of human existence in relation to 
nature of the material world. There is, one might say, an 
antagonism of opposites at the very heart of the human 
condition, in the sense that life is predicated upon nature, 
yet is not of nature and is set against it. Human beings 
emerge from the "nothingness" of inorganic nature and 
disappear back into that alien state of the inorganic. This 
might seem to be an unabashedly relgious theme and as such 
to be the proper province of theology rather than social 
science. But I think it to be in fact of great analytical 
interest ..• "(54) 
This is perhaps an understatement as the notion of "being" in its 
various guises, as "existential contradiction", "the fundamental 
premi-se of history" or the confrontation of physical being with 
·~uantitative limits and qualitative inadequacy of the necessary 
external means", is arguably the central pivot of the 
perspectives developed by these theorists. Here then is the 
absolute: the physical existence of humankind understood both as 
the survival of the species and of the "individual"; the 
ontological basis of existence is to be found in "being" itself. 
This "reality" has, as we have seen, exercised a profound 
influence upon the form of social theory advanced. The 
limitations of the struggle with nature are seen to exercise a 
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greater or lesser determination upon the form of human social 
organisation. It is perhaps Marxian theory which has suffered 
most from the "vulgar" application of such determinations 
mediated through the "means" and "relations" of production and 
the wider base/superstructure debate itself. 
Perhaps there is a need for a reconceptualisation of the 
problem. It may be that the determinant force of the "fundamental 
premise of history" is in itself historically contingent. No one 
can deny the potency of effect of the needs of physical survival 
when available resources are critical, although the idea that the 
satisfaction of such needs "requires planful provision and work 
•.• and the association of human beings" would seem to be a 
rationalisation of the "rise of civilisation" C55 ). However, il 
could be argued that once the productive system has advanced 
beyond satisfying the basic physical requirements of existence 
the importance of the ontological base (i.e. being) recedes and 
thereby the degree of determination of human social organisation 
by the struggle with nature is lessened. In other words, the 
absolute is rendered relative by the praxis of human activity, 
being retains its absolute status however and becomes relational 
only to the extent that its fundamental requirements are 
fulfilled unproblematically. Understood in relation to one of the 
Marxian problematics (defined by Engels), whilst human physical 
production and reproduction is accomplished "unproblematically" 
the "moment" of "the lasl resort" is never reached. In other 
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words the unchanging scheme of the materialist conception of 
history which argues that: 
" •.• the ultimately determining element in history is the 
production and reproduction of real life." (56) 
needs to understand that the pattern of ultimate causation is 
itself historically contingent. In these terms the vast import-
ance of the production and reproduction of real life, to which 
· Marx and Engels rightly drew our attention, achieves, through the 
increasing mastery of nature and increasing production of 
surplus, the increasing negation of the determining links of '~he 
economic factor". The "success" of the productive system in over-
coming the basic "existential contradiction" of the struggle with 
nature serves progressively to uncouple the degree of determinat-
ion that this contradiction exercises over social organisation. 
Quantity is indeed transposed into quality, the ontology recedes 
as far as phenomenal determination is concerned. One is tempted 
tc echo the sentiments of ~!ietzsche thet "God is dewl :mrl IMP. hRvP. 
killed him". It is here through the relativisation of the 
absolute, the partial transcendence of existential contradiction 
via the routinisation of the potential satisfaction of the 
physical requirements of being, that the historical rise of 
agency must be located. It is in this way that the potential for 
an integrated view of the idea of agency encompassing all of 
Anderson's three "types" arises. The importance of the rise of 
the potential of agency is the outcome of the relativisation of 
the absolute, the receding ontology, as the upshot of material 
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processes, not, as in Marx, Engels and Anderson, the idealistic 
grafting of imputed socialist (true) consciousness of classes in 
conflict. This potential is evidenced not in grasping the "truth" 
of scienti fie socialism in its (static) determinate prophesies 
(as an ideology) but rather through a more materialist 
understanding of the "material struggle for existence". 
Again, dualistic concepts such as "determinism" and "free 
will" are emphatically rejected as static absolutes. The single 
"absolute" category is that of being, and as we have seen that 
ontology recedes as the determining factor. Our analysis remains 
materialist but is increasingly less happy with ultimately 
determining factors. Following from this we can see that 
"unthinking duality" need not lead to a surrendering of all 
useful concepts, but rather to the rejection of all static 
determinate accounts. This holds true when the level of analysis 
labour in an individual shipyard. 
The implication that such a "material ontology'' holds for 
epistemology is that it preserves the potential for a kind of 
"reflection theory" C57 ). Here the emphasis is placed not upon 
the identity of "external object" and object of thought; neither 
is the idealist position, which sees the external world as being 
constituted by mind, acceptable; rather the external materiality· 
of being is grasped by and through concepts. However this 
"grasp" of the world is never simply to be equated with the 
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"concrete in thought", for several reasons. Firstly, the 
ontological basis of reality is most forcefully expressed in the 
existential contradiction, to use Giddens' term; as we have 
already seen this absolute is rendered relative by the historical 
praxis of humans. Therefore the access to the external world 
must take account of the drift of the absolute towards the 
relative; the external itself is contingent upon the asymmetrical 
realisation of the unity (past and present) of conception and 
execution, thought and action, in other words the effectiveness 
of praxis itself. Secondly, the idea of thought itself is again 
to be seen in its historical contextuality, thought is never 
totally empty but is always "about" something; however as with 
language it is not the individual thought which totally imparts 
meaning but rather its relationship to other concepts and words 
in either their co-presence or absence. Such a view of "meaning" 
represents an established position within linguistic philosophy 1 
that what is implied by invoking a word is not merely contained 
"within" that word but rather also implies a set of relations 
which that word conjures up in relation to our view of the world. 
This is not meant to imply that we have to know everything before 
we can know anything, but rather that meaning is a relational 
problem as well as a nomenclative one. As Jost Trier suggested: 
"It is not a single sign which says something but a system 
of the totality of signs which may say something in view of 
single signs." (58) 
This relational view of meaning is not only applicable to the use 
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of language systems, but also represents the apprehension of 
meaning through praxis in the world. Not only is this relational 
"problem" applicable to the concepts of "thought" and "language" 
but it is also evident in relation to the "individual" thinker. 
In this sense the Cartesian dictum "I think therefore I am" does 
not point to an existential truth but rather is the source of 
much of the later confusion over the individual and society 
duality. In this sense the "I" of Descartes could have gained 
from an infusion of the "me" of Mead. The point to be remembered 
is that the "individual" thinker thinking the individual thought 
not only implicates an historically contingent system of concepts 
in terms of "presences" and "absences", but in doing so he or she 
implies the social self. In this sense the unitary form of 
language and thought (the difficulty of saying or thinking more 
than one word/thought at one "moment") can only grasp meaning 
8equontiDlly DS presence end absence and this inevit2bly implies 
the problem of the expanding content. 
Nowhere is the problem better stated than in the work of 
Weber: 
" ... as soon as we attempt to reflect about the way in 
which life confronts us in immediate concrete situations, it 
presents an infinite multiplicity of successively and co-
existently emerging and disappearing events both "within" 
and "outside" ourselves. The absolute infinitude of this 
multiplicity is seen to remain undiminished even when our 
attention is focussed on a single "object", for instance a 
concrete act of exchange, as soon as we seriously attempt an 
exhaustive description of all the individual components of 
this "individual phenomena", to say nothing of explaining it 
causally. All the analysis of infinite reality which the 
Chapter 1 - 32 -
finite human mind can conduct rests on the tacit assumption 
that only a finite portion of this reality constitutes the 
object of scientific investigation, and that only it is "im-
portant" in the sense of being "worthy of being known 11 • (59) 
Again this suggests that there can be no identity between thought 
and an 11external object 11 , for it cannot be grasped in its 
totality. Furthermore, efforts to overcome partially the finite 
nature of the human mind by adopting an eclectic approach to any 
one phenomenon, and thereby accepting the principle of cumulative 
knowledge as an attempt to 11fill in the gaps", again introduces 
the potential for further "distortion" (or refraction). For all 
these reasons, then, the reflection theory of knowledge is 
superior either to an identity theory or idealism. It can 
accommodate the materialist (receding) ontology as outlined above 
whilst not denying the impact and non-neutral effect of the 
concepts and language which we use to gain purchase on 11reality". 
In this way the status of concepts and more formal theory is 
s e e il a s t h a t o f v~ o r k i r. g ~ ::; ::; L: m p t i o n 8 ( n c k ~ c w l C! d g e d a r-
unacknowledged) which whilst they are not identical to a 
"reality" external to the individual thinker and the 11 thought" 
are nevertheless anchored ultimately in the ontological basis of 
the existential contradiction and processually within modes of 
temporality and intersubjectively held paradigms. In other words 
such "working assumptions" are constrained (and enabled) in their 
view of reality (the content of the thought) both existentially 
(that is ontologically) and phenomenologically. Such a view 
makes a nonsense of the debate over the primacy of the 
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theoretical or empirical, for our grasp of any social reality 
should inevitably involve both of these aspects. 
A final point to be made in this section concerns the 
problem of closure (60 ). It should be apparent from the 
foregoing discussion that the point at which closure of study is 
affected is to some extent an arbitrary decision made by the 
researcher. The approach taken here is that to some extent the 
boundaries of closure must be left as permeable as possible. and 
potential interconnections should be indicated even as they trail 
off into the void of unstudied reality. This presents stylistic 
problems; however, to be true to our theoretical approach of 
following the multiplicity of contexts involved in "unthinking 
dualism", an effort to sustain the view that no study is ever 
finally and absolutely complete must be made. The eclectic 
approach adopted here is then grounded in the (receding) ontology 
of human "being", its range attempts to span the 11 rea11ty 1' of 
"the small life-worlds of modern man" (61) to that of "the world 
system" (62) In so doing, the specific form of the 
interconnections of these various levels will be indicated 
without attempting to develop any static hierarchical scheme of 
interdependence. Again it must be stressed that these 
theoretical underpinnings are "alive" in the "empirical" body of 
this work and must be understood as such if the meaning intended 
by the author is to be recovered. 
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Part 2 
The relationship of the theory to more empirically 
substantive content is a particulary thorny problem in what is 
perhaps the most developed approach to the study of the changing 
division of labour and work organisations, namely the labour 
process debate. In reviewing some of the main pubications within 
this debate I shall highlight some of the problems and advantages 
associated with this approach, and show how some of the more 
useful insights can be developed. 
Since the publication of Braverman's "Labour and Monopoly 
Capital" in 1974 there has been much interest stimulated in the 
labour process. Even the most elementary introductions to 
industrial sociology now being published mention either Braverman 
directly or the labour process more generally. Therefore whilst 
Paul Sweezy could claim, in the foreword to Braverman's book, 
that the work filled a gap in the literature in which there was: 
" .•. an almost: total neglect of a subject which occupies a 
central place in Marx's study of capitalism: the labour 
process." (63) 
this is perhaps no longer the case. However, it must be said 
that the success of most: formulations of the issues dealt wilh 
under the heading of the labour process has been strictly 
limited. Indeed one may fairly address Braverman's comments 
dealing with the literature that existed before his publication, 
at later formulations of labour process work: 
"In the course of a fairly extensive reading of this 
literature, I was particularly struck by the vagueness, 
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generality of working, and on occasion egregious errors of 
description of the concrete matters under discussion. It 
seemed to me that many widely accepted conclusions were 
based on little genuine information, and represented either 
simplifications or outright misreadings of a complex 
reality." (64) 
This is indeed a damning comment, and in order to evaluate 
whether it is a justifiable summation of much that goes for 
labour process theory and substance we must look at individual 
contributions. However, before we go on to that I will explicate 
a general framework within which I suggest much labour process 
work can be situated. The central problem is that there would 
seem to be no agreement as to what the labour process actually 
consists of. As Jim McGoldrick has suggested: 
"In the Marxist theory of the labour process there is no 
unified position which states exactly is meant when the 
labour process is being discussed." (65) 
Whilst this is true, it is perhaps an understatement. For as the 
idea of the study of the labour process has gained popularity it 
has been grasped by those workinq in non-Marxist traditions. In 
many of these works a specific notion of what the labour process 
involves is either only implied or is left completely 
unspecified. In other works the labour process is presented as 
the empirical content of industrial sociology, it is seen purely 
as the physical work done within an organisation. 
Within the Marxist tradition there is equal confusion over 
the matter of what the labour process is. This is compounded by 
the insistence of its central importance, and whilst this was 
given fresh impetus by Braverman it is by no means a new phenom-
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enon. For example, as early as 1941 Marcuse was proclaiming that: 
"The labour process, which shows forth as fundamental in the 
Marxian analysis of capitalism and its genesis, is the 
ground on which the various branches of theory and practice 
operate in capitalist society. An understanding of lhe 
labour process, therefore, is at the same time an 
understanding of the source for the separation between 
theory and practice and of the element that re-establishes 
their interconnection. Marxian theory is of its very nature 
an integral and integrating theory of society. The economic 
process of capitalism exercises a totalitarian influence 
over all theory and all practice, and an economic analysis 
that shatters the capitalist camouflage and breaks through 
its "reification" will get down to its subsoil common to all 
theory and practice in this society." (66) 
It is because of this central importance held by the labour 
process in wider Marxian theory that its precise definition has 
become crucial. This has given rise to a self-perpetuating debate 
as to the nature of the labour process. And so, then, if the non-
Marxist appropriation of the notion of the labour process shows 
in the main a marked empiricist leaning, many "Marxist" 
formulations show a tendency towards formalistic abstraction to 
the almost total lack of substantive content. Coupled with this, 
many of the reviews are wholly negative in terms of their 
critique, content to condemn errors rather than suggesting useful 
amendments. However, we are running ahead of ourselves - it is 
perhaps useful to begin by looking at "Labour and Monopoly 
Capital" itself. Working within a Marxist framework Braverman's 
argument bemoans the rece~t lack of attention which has been paid 
to the labour process. This situation, he suggests, arose because 
within the Marxist tradition in particular: 
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11 
••• the critique of the mode of production gave way to the 
critique of capitalism as a mode of distribution. 
Impressed, perhaps even overawed by the immense productivity 
of the labour process, baffled by its increasing scientific 
intricacy, participating in the struggles of workers for 
improvements in wages, hours and conditions, Marxists 
adapted to the view of the modern factory as an inevitable 
if perfectable form of the organisation of the labour 
process. 11 (67) 
Braverman seeks to question the inevitablity of the modern 
factory by: 
"Recognising that there are very few 11 eternal 11 or 
"inevitable" features of human social organisation." (68) 
Having made this point the substance of the book is concerned 
with charting historically the development of the processes of 
production and of labour processes in general in capitalist 
society. That Braverman's study is of labour processes in 
general is of particular importance, a point not grasped by many 
of his critics who point to speci fie labour processes to 
"disprove11 the relevance of the analysis. The conclusion of the 
study is that there exists within capitR}iRt 1ebour processes n 
deskilling dynamic: the fragmentation of work processes is 
accompanied by a shift of knowledge about those processes away 
from the shop floor and towards management: This movement is 
formalised primarily in the adoption of the organisational form 
of scienti fie management. The increasing degradation of work is 
seen, then, to have both technical and social organisational 
forms, the repercussions of which transcend the boundaries of the 
factory and suggest an increasing homogeneity of condition for an 
increasing number of employees. 
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Whilst, on the whole, Braverman's book was received with a 
good deal of enthusiasm it has also been criticised. That critic-
ism comes in may forms, from a general critique of the perspect-
ive suggesting that it is based upon a "philosophical anthropol-
ogy of humanism" and is therefore less than scienti fie (69), to 
specific objections to the deskilling process based upon studies 
of individual industries at particular historical junctures <70). 
It is possible to argue that many objections raised to 
Braverman's work, based on particular examples which do not 
conform to a deskilling model in the labour process, miss the 
point of the work. His analysis was not a summation of 
deskilling tendencies deduced from all individual labour 
processes, rather, as he says in his introduction: 
"In this book, we will be concerned with the development of 
the processes in general in capitalist society." (71) 
Indeed at a later point the author denies that subordination of 
labour will be fully realised, and in as far as it is, it will be 
unevenly achieved between specific industries: 
"The displacement of labour as the subjective element of the 
process, and its subordination as an objective element in a 
productive process now conducted by management, is an ideal 
realised by capital only within definite limits and unevenly 
among industries." ( 72) 
So then, we can see that the relationship of Braverman's thesis 
to empirical situations is more complex than some think. It. 
cannot be "tested" with reference to single situations or even 
individual industries. The level of its relationship to the 
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empirical world is at a higher level than individual examples; it 
attempts to speak of a general dynamic tendency expressed within 
the capitalist labour process as a whole. Braverman acknowledges 
his intellectual debt to Marx and seems to suggest that his own 
project is to update Marx's writings on the labour process in 
Capital. However it would appear that many of the problems 
associated with Braverman's analysis are centred upon his partial 
and illegitimate use of Marx's methodology. For Marx in 
"Capital" a study of the labour process is only part of the 
articulation of the capitalist mode of product ion, whereas 
Braverman's study seeks to address the labour process as a 
theoretical object in itself. Here is the source of many of the 
problems with what is otherwise a stimulating work. 
Firstly, however, we must look at the objections which have 
been raised to the Braverman presentation. Here I will deal with 
criticisms which are more generalised than those which refute the 
argument citing individual examples. Many of these critiques 
have a central theme in common, which is that Braverman's account 
has on the one hand an over-structural bias, the corollary of 
which is an over-conspiratorial view of the working of capitalist 
agency, and in this sense his account is seen not to balance the 
problematic of the structure/action dichotomy in an acceptable 
fashion (73), Thus as David Stack argues: 
"It is not unfair to argue that Braverman portrays the 
capitalist class as veritably omniscient and the working 
class as infinitely malleable." (74) 
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The work of Braverman has however an elusive quality about it. It 
has been claimed that it is in some respects in a similar 
tradition of Marxist humanism to the Frankfurt school (75), 
' 
whilst on the other hand it is suggested that the study relies 
heavily upon Marxist functionalism and structural dynamics (76). 
Nowhere more so than in relation to this problem of the 
omniscience of capital and the malleability of labour is the 
tension more apparent. It may be helpful to attempt to simplify 
the problem by looking at Braverman's conception of the working 
class and the capitalist class respectively. 
Firstly, his view of the working class. Perhaps the most 
criticised feature of the whole analysis is his limitation to the 
"objective" content of class: 
"This is a book about the working class as a class in 
itself, not as a class for itself." (77) 
However the author's view of the nature of class seems at points 
to be ~ore complc~ than the advocacy of a puraly obj~cLiv~ 
structure. For example, in a number of passages reminiscent of 
the views of E.P. Thompson (78) Braverman argues that: 
"The term "working class" properly understood never 
precisely delineated a specific body of people but was 
rather an expression for an ongoing social process ... We 
are dealing not with the static terms of an algebraic 
equation, which requires only that quantities be filled in, 
but with a dynamic process ••• " (79) 
However, at a further point he notes: 
"To make this a little more concrete: I have no quarrel with 
the definition of the working class, on the basis of its 
"relationship to the means of production" as that class 
which does not own or otherwise have proprietary access to 
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the means of labour and must sell its labour power to those 
who do. But in the present situation almost all of the 
population has been placed in this situation so that the 
definition encompasses occupational strata of the most 
diverse kinds, it is not the bare definition that is 
important but its application." (80) 
It is indeed the application of the definition that is important 
and it is here that Braverman's analysis is not up to his 
theoretical standards. His account of the existence of the 
working class given in Part I of "Labour and Monopoly Capital" 
through to Part V does give a passive view of the working class, 
outlining a progressive deskilling dynamic at work within the 
labour process and emphasising a shift in control of these 
processes away from labour towards capital. And yet in Part V of 
the book the author seems to acknowledge the possibility of an 
"active" working class: 
"This working class lives a social and political existence 
of its own outside the direct grip of capital. It protests 
and submits, rebels or is integrated into bourgeois society, 
sees itself as a class or loses sight of its own existence, 
in accordance with the forces that act upon it and the 
muudti, t..:Uiij~::cl.uret~ and conflicts of social and political 
life. But since in its permanent existence it is the living 
part of capital its occupational structure, modes of work 
and distribution through the industries of society are 
determined by the ongoing processes of the accumulation of 
capital. It is seized, released, flung into various parts 
of the social machinery and expelled by others not in accord 
with its own will or self activity, but in accord with the 
movement of capital." (81) 
It can be argued that this bracketing of spheres of life 
contributes to an over passive view of the working class and an 
over emphasis of the efficacy of capitalist agency. The problems 
of restricting the analysis purely to the productive system are 
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considerable and we can say that as far as any conception of the 
11agency 11 of the working class is concerned, this restriction, 
coupled with the 11objectivist 11 view of the nature of class, is 
treated mechanically in order to 11fit 11 within the twin concepts 
of the ••formal 11 and 11 real subordination of labour 11 • The 
discourse has successfully rendered class as a structural notion 
and therefore more conducive to use in a generalised analysis. 
This, together with the level of analysis has unfortunately 
succeeded in rendering a 11 subjectless subject 11 in the 
structuralist sense. The other side of the coin, so to speak, is 
the conception of the nature of the capitalist class portrayed in 
the analysis. Whilst there is not as much time devoted to 
defining the capitalist class as there is to the working class, 
the view that is portrayed is that in the aggregate form the 
capitalist is the human embodiment of capitalism. This view, 
because of the insufficient theorisation of the 11 moments11 of the 
production and reproduction of society as a whole, leads to the 
apparent omniscience of capital. Where the working class does 
not move in accordance with its own will or self activity, 
capital is seen to do just that in pursuance of its aim of 
accumulation. It is easy to overstress the dominance of capital, 
however it is also easy to underestimate it. The formal 
subordination of labour based upon the very social relationships 
of capitalism do ultimately imply an imbalance in what are seen 
as legitimate power resources. As Jean Gardiner has suggested: 
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"Variation in relative control as between capital and labour 
must always be seen in the context of the ultimate power 
capitalists have to close a plant or divert investment 
elsewhere." (82) 
In Braverman's analysis the "ultimate power" of the capitalist 
based within social relationships is projected upon the "real" 
subordination of labour within the labour process. In 
restricting his analysis to the objective aspect of the working 
class at a generalised level and yet still attempting to say 
something useful about the changing labour process he is forced 
into adopting an undifferentiated concept of agency. And as his 
starting point is the antagonistic social relationships of 
capitalism the cant inued existence of these relations hips 
inevitably implies the ineffectiveness of working class agency. 
In order to have avoided this problem Braverman would have 
needed to look at what he referred to as the subjective aspects 
of class consciousness and ideology. In considering such 
features a more realistic view of the relationship between the 
formal and real subordination of labour can be developed, one in 
which the formal subordination of labour, or the structuring of 
social relationships does not imply the total progression to the 
real subordination of labour in the labour process. Obviously in 
this respect notions of ideology and legitimacy become of prime 
importance. Just what is seen by workers to be within the 
legitimate sphere of negotiation and/or resistance? In this 
sense the continued existence of capitalism need not necessarily 
imply that the working class does not move "in accord with its 
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own will or self activity" but rather that its own will or self 
activity is not conceived as the overthrow of capitalist social 
relationships. This then is precisely the issue and is centrally 
a problem of consciousness, and as such is left untheorised in 
Braverman's account as a subjective element of class. 
Furthermore it is this oversight which projects the formalised 
social structuring of relationships into the patterns of change 
within the labour process, giving the contradictory position of a 
dehumanised working class structure which is directed by a 
consciously conspiratorial group of capitalists. In other words, 
in Braverman's analysis structure totally dominates action. 
Capitalist social relationships are the structural embodiment of 
the subordination of labour and therefore deny the possibility of 
the self activity of the working class. However in as much as 
Braverman remains true to his assertion that: 
" ... there ara very ft::w '!t::Lt::lTtal': or ''inevitable" features 
of human social organisation" 
he posits the continued existence of capitalist social 
relationships in the dominance of capitalist agency. In this way 
Braverman can be seen to be advocating a type of Marxist 
functionalism in which the dominant form of social relationships 
is equated with the total dominance of the agency of the ruling 
class. 
So far then, what we have criticised in Braverman's 
presentation is not the generalised level of his endeavour but 
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its partial theoretical framework in as far as this is evident in 
his adoption of an objectivist view of social class. We must now 
turn our attention to another theoretical closure made in "Labour 
and Monopoly Capital"- that of the over-emphasis given to the 
primacy of the "moment" of production. Whilst it is Braverman's 
concern to redirect attention away from an over-emphasis on 
issues of distribution and towards production, his focus does 
seem in this respect to be rather narrow. In this way his 
analysis is unlike that of Marx for, whilst Marx often asserted 
the primacy of production, this was in terms of a logical 
preliminary "moment" in the reproduction of society as a whole -
as he wrote in "Grundrisse": 
"The conclusion we reach is not that production distribution 
exchange and consumption are identical, but that they all 
form the members of a totality, distinctions within a unity 
.•. production predominates not only over itself but over 
the other moments as well. The process always returns to 
production to begin anew." (83) 
At a later point, however: 
" ••• production is itself determined by the other moments. 
For example if the market, i.e. the sphere of exchange, 
expands, then production grows in quantity and the divisions 
between its different branches become deeper. A change in 
distribution changes product ion, e.g. concentration of 
capital, different distribution of the population between 
town and country etc. Finally the needs of consumption 
determine production. Mutual interaction takes place 
between the the different moments. This is the case with 
every organic whole." (84) 
This is a point of importance, for Braverman's analysis 
predicates a general deskilling dynamic within the labour process 
as the outcome of capitalists seeking capital accumulation. 
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However he does not attempt to theorise the linkages between the 
moment of production and the other moments. It can be argued 
that this factor contributes greatly towards the over-
simplification of the real movements within the labour process. 
For example, the development of the labour process in the British 
Shipbuilding industry cannot be made sense of in terms of both 
structure and action unless the market demand for ships and the 
existence of the "business cycle" is taken into account. In 
terms of such examples it is not enough merely to state that the 
deskilling effect will be uneven amongst industries, or more 
importantly in the above case amongst national industries. The 
possible reasons for such anomalies may not lie within the moment 
of production. 
The above problem also indicates another inadequacy in the 
analysis. Not enough consideration is given to national 
specficity. And whilst Braverman's supporters may again point to 
his general level of analysis to suggest that the object of study 
is the capitalist labour process irrespective of purely national 
considerations it is clear that his own conception of the changes 
taking place refer in certain respects to uniquely American 
features. The importance of recognising particularly national 
features in analysing social formations was superbly demonstrated 
by Antonio Gramsci in his "Americanism and Fordism" (BS), in 
which he suggested that the American example was extreme and in 
some respects foreign to European traditions. Indeed it is this 
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reliance upon the American example which (wrongly) leads 
Braverman to extol Taylorist scientific management as the form of 
control within the developing labour process. That management 
control strategies in different countries can and do vary in 
response to common pressures has been demonstrated in the volume 
edited by Howard Gospel and Craig Littler (86). 
We are now in a position to attempt to draw together the 
above criticisms into a unified whole. Firstly, we can say that 
the shortcomings of the Braverman analysis are clustered around a 
unilinear simplistic conception of the deskilling tendency as a 
dynamic existing within the capitalist labour process in general. 
This follows from his central reliance upon a perspective based 
on the notion of a structural dynamic drawn from the labour 
theory of value. In as far as this dynamic is grounded in actual 
social relationships it is seen to be expressed in the commodity 
status of labour <87). The commodity status of labour, which is 
the articulation of the formal subordination of labour, is 
transformed, in this work, through the use of a purely 
objectivist conception of the working class into a developing 
real subordination. The structural over-emphasis thus gives on 
the one hand a totally passive working class structure 
manipulated on the other hand by a conscious, cohesive and active 
capitalist class. Had Braverman been a structuralist this 
problem would not have arisen. It is only because he attempts to 
relate the theorised structural tendencies within the 
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"empirically real" development of the labour process that over-
active capitalist and totally passive working class becomes a 
problem. It is here that it is apparent that the 
structure/action problematic is left untheorised in his analysis. 
The second feature of Braverman's analysis which contributes 
to its demise is the insularity given to the labour process. 
This would again seem to stem from the adoption of a structural 
dynamic developed upon the labour theory of value; the idea that 
the necessary features of successful accumulation are contained 
solely within the "moment" of production. This again contributes 
to an overall impression of a unilinear development within the 
labour process. This is understandable given that fluctuations 
in market demand are only treated in as far as they concern the 
demand for labour and the constitution of its "reserve army". 
The problem is again seen to be purely one of the control of 
"variable capital" within the labour process. We are given no 
appreciation that the operation of the business cycle may 
militate against the rationalisation of the labour process in an 
attempt to retain the flexibility of variable capital in the face 
of a constantly changing market demand for goods (88). 
In Braverman's formulation, then, the conception of the 
labour process presented starts off looking like an incredibly 
wide sweep over the terrain traditionally dealt with, in a 
piecemeal fashion, by industrial sociologists on the one hand and 
orthodox Marxists on the other. To the former he presents the 
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stance that in order to study industry effectively the class 
basis of the organisation of production has to be recognised, 
both in a formal and real sense. To the latter he brings the 
suggestion that the actual process of the transformation of raw 
materials into use values must not be conceived merely as a 
"black box". However, whilst in one way this does widen the 
areas of debate within both industrial sociology and more 
generally within Marxist theory, in another way his presentation 
is unnecessarily restrictive. As Thea Nichols suggested in a 
review of "Labour and Monopoly Capital": 
"The job, and control over the job, is not the whole story 
and to understand the different things which are happening 
in and to the labour process, it is necessary to encompass 
more than Braverman does." (89) 
It is in attempting to achieve this that some of the more 
interesting work within the labour process tradition has been 
completed. In many of these attempts the tensions of the 
original formulation have been replicated. In others a more one 
sided approach, tending either towards a totally structural 
account in general or towards ethnographies of individual work 
places, have relieved some of these tensions only at the cost of 
again restricting the area of debate even further. 
Whatever our reservations with Braverman's formulation may 
be, one cannot deny the immense impact that "Labour and Monopoly 
Capital" had on all those interested in industrial sociology. 
However, the fortunes of the labour process approach have been 
various and after a relatively brief explosion of interest, which 
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saw the boundaries of the debate moving outwards apparently 
towards infinity (9D) the pop~larity of the approach has begun 
to collapse: 
"It is not perhaps an exaggeration to claim that the labour 
process bandwagon has run into the sand. Indeed the 
catalogue of amendments and criticisms attaching to labour 
process theory has led a number of critics to call for 
little less than the abandonment of labour process theory. 
It has served a useful purpose but it is now holed and 
patched beyon~ repair." (91) 
That. this situation should have arisen is unsurprising given that 
"In the Marxist theory of the labour process there is no 
unified position which states what exactly is meant when the 
labour process is being discussed." (92) 
Many formulations exaggerated the original tensions in 
Braverman's work, concentrating wholly on the structural 
tendencies of the productive system (93) or producing more 
particular accounts of the individual work place (94 ). It is not 
that such studies are in themselves unsatisfactory, but rather 
th8t they preclude the 8i-JI·H·oach which is latent in Braverman's 
work to see the physical labour process as an activity situated 
in a specific set of social relations, the potential for an 
analysis which can integrate many levels of social reality. It 
would seem that to some extent the most outstanding examples of 
empirical accounts or work processes, such as that of Burawoy 
<95 ), are flawed by unnecessary limitations, in this case the 
stress placed upon generation of consent at the point of 
production. So then, whilst the boundaries of labour process 
theory have been moving inexorably outwards, it is rarely the 
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case that empirical accounts have been able to operationalise 
these widening concerns. To some extent the basis of this 
problem lies within the tension already outlined, between 
structure and agency as traditionally conceived within Marxist 
theory. Not only is there a tendency for the "moment" of 
production to dominate in an absolute sense, but also where the 
notion of agency is developed it is often done so in a way in 
which its efficacy is structurally located and given an over-
homogenised form, therefore producing an over~simplistic outcome. 
In other words episodes are represented as mutually exclusive 
events, and whilst, as we shall see in a later section, this 
moves away from the view of capital as omnipotent, it does so 
merely by inverting the equation. In such accounts it seems 
obvious that the alternative outcome of a victory for capital 
(strong capital- weak labour) is a victory for labour (weaker 
capital- stronger labour). RecRnt.ly t.hRrp. have ho~'.'ever been 
moves to bring about a cross fertilisation of the labour process 
debate and the structure/action debate. 
In one essay Giddens draws our attention to what he calls 
the "dialectic of control" <96). In criticising Braverman's over 
passive view of the working class Giddens suggests that it is the 
very nature of human agency which militates against such a 
passive representation: 
" Braverman's study is about "alienated labour" ... 
although he barely mentions the term itself. In my 
terminology the connection of alienation with the "humanness 
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of man's species being" can be expressed simply and 
coherently in a single sentence. The more a worker comes 
close to being an "appendage of a machine" the more he or 
she ceases to be a human agent. As Marx puts it, "The 
animal becomes human and the human becomes animal". The 
interest of this analysis for a philosophical anthropology 
of labour, however, should not make us forget that, 
precisely because they are not machines, wherever they can 
do so human actors devise ways of avoiding being treated as 
such." (97) 
Coupled to this criticism, Giddens applauds the work of Friedman 
<98 ) for realising that the management strategy is itself the 
outcome of situated agency and is not merely directed towards one 
solution to the problems of accumulation. Similarly, as Thompson 
has stressed: 
" ... the point about human agencies is that they are never 
ciphers and they make choices within structural constraints. 
Indeed the contestation involved in the capital-labour 
relation, and the dynamic and varied nature of capital 
accumulation, create many of the conditions for diversity in 
managerial behaviour." (99) 
More than this Thompson argues that the "greatest task" facing 
labour process theory is the "construction of a theory of the 
missing subject" (100). A task which he acknowledges cannot be 
accomplished "within" labour process theory itself. 
In this connection one final criticism of much labour 
process work concerns the arena within which this "missing 
subject" can be sought. Thompson rightly criticises what he 
refers to as the tendency of the ultra-left to reduce all 
activity to struggle. However all too often studies have been 
concerned with the "frontiers of control" situations in which new 
technologies are introduced or management strategies produce 
L 
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activist resistance. Too often access to the workers' experience 
of the labour process has been through the trades union movement 
or through activist workers. Whilst such "frontiers" are 
important and an activists' viewpoint is often a crucial one this 
should not be taken as the whole story. Largely because of the 
Marxist origins of the labour process debate attention is paid 
solely to the "sharp points" of the capital/labour relationship, 
a relationship which all too often is actively invoked (as a 
structural contradiction) and only imperfectly theorised. 
Another attempt at relating the concerns of structure and 
agency to the labour process debate is a paper by Neimark and 
Tinker (lOl). Here the authors outline their theoretical attempt 
to deal with agency and structure on the basis of Ollman's 
reading of Marx, as the "philosophy of internal relations" (lOZ). 
In criticising Giddens they appear to be preparing the ground for 
a more thorough going conception of the essential unity of agency 
and structure: 
"The concern with the relative importance of agency and 
structure (or individual and society) and the solution 
suggested by Giddens are motivated by analytical premises. 
Although Giddens recognises the dependence and reciprocity 
between the individual and society (or agent and structure) 
the category pairs are conceived as ontologically distinct. 
For the philosophy of internal relations, however, such a 
distinction and the concerns it raises are without meaning; 
so deeply do individual and society inter-penetrate each 
other." (103) 
However, their apparent willingness to use interchangably the 
notions of agency and structure with those of individual and 
society should lead us at once to be wary of their summation of 
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the work of Giddens, who, as has been argued earlier, sees 
fundamental ontological categories as a product of a basic 
existential contradiction and not as lying within a cleavage 
between the individual and society. On a more substantive level 
the paper is disappointing in its attempt to introduce dialectics 
into the labour process debate by way of: 
" .•• illustrating the use of a dialectical framework that 
is grounded in the philosophy of internal relations by 
examining the origins of the current crisis facing U.S. 
labour with particular emphasis on General Motors and the 
automobile industry." (104) 
The account produced amounts to a "traditional" outline of 
industrial relations at General Motors since the 1930s to the 
present. Primary sources of data are the annual reports of G.M., 
and the specific consciousness of the "workers" is gauged by the 
"type" of strike action undertaken or wider references to "the 
new social consumption norm" ClD 5). References to the labour 
process at the point of production are sparse and where such 
issues are mentioned they are often skipped over in a "shopping 
1 ist" fashion. Thus in explaining the issues at stake at a 
strike within the Fisher Body plant in December 1936 the authors 
suggest that for the union the issue of recognition was 
paramount, whereas: 
" ••• the workers on the other hand, were more concerned 
with the pressures of line speed-ups, wage cuts, unsafe and 
unsanitary working conditions, the lack of steady work, the 
capricious power of foremen, and the absence of any control 
over workplace conditions." (106) 
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Whilst this is a fairly comprehensive list, its object is 
unfocussed and the use of phrases such as the "absence of any 
control" again renders any potential agency of the workers 
impotent, the dialectic of control has vanished and the 
apparently total "real subordination of labour" irons out the 
complexities of the individual workplace. 
It would be unfair however to attack this paper alone for 
· these failings. Indeed as we noted earlier many labour process 
studies share the same problems and failings, but what makes this 
paper particularly disappointing is that the problematic of 
structure and agency is, in a conscious fashion, related to the 
labour process debate in the theoretical introduction and then 
largely ignored in the empirical study. This failing is perhaps 
not only the responsibility of the individual authors, but also 
includes a problem of using the "labour processes" as the 
starting point for analysis. The transformation of raw materials 
into products having use-value consisting of three simple 
elements: 
1 Purposeful activity of man, directed to work. 
2 The object on which work is performed, in the form of 
natural or raw materials. 
3 The instruments of that work, most often tools or more 
complex technology. (107) 
can indeed be construed as a social process, but all too often 
can lead to a rei fied abstraction of a collection of physical 
tasks situated in time and space between the monolithic 
structures of labour and capital. In order to avoid such a 
I __ 
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failing it is perhaps useful to redirect our attention towards 
the employment relationship. Focussing upon this relationship as 
a starting point for analysis is useful as it can be seen to 
imply the embodiment of structure and agency within the "moment" 
of the production process. Moreover such a focus escapes both 
the failing of a labour led theory and an over-emphasis upon the 
physical concept of the mode of production whilst not neglecting 
an investigation of how industrial capital is organised. The 
importance of such issues has been well brought out by Theo 
Nichols in another connection: 
" it might well be said that both productivity 
researchers and students of the labour process have much in 
common - at least in the sense that neither of them have 
typically made much of an attempt to marry an analysis of 
the ("vertical") capital-labour relation to a serious 
analysis of organisation forms (including "horizontal" 
aspects). Just as C~p ... P cannot be reduced to cL 
P, nor L reduced entirely to a question of the intensity of 
lai.Juui·, so ~::Veil C~p ..• P is only Lhe beginning of the story 
when international differences are considered. Any adequate 
comparison has to take in not only possible differences in 
organisational capacities on the side of wage labour (in 
particular different trade union structures and strategies) 
but differential organisational capacities and qualities on 
the capital side as well. F~f g~is a literally physical 
concept of MP is of no help." 0 
The focus on the employment relationship gives at once an 
undeniably social character to the production process without 
legislating its actual form on the basis of an unchanging 
imminent law. It therefore admits the problem of the dialectic 
of control as an empirical question without prejudging the extent 
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to which the formal subordination of labour can or will be 
translated into real subordination. Moreover because its 
"substance" is the relationship between employee and employer, no 
matter what the level of analysis it should be obvious that it 
would be absurd to speak of the working class (or indeed the 
capitalist class) only in its "objective" aspect. The 
relationship must imply both objective and (inter) subjective 
dimensions understood as a totality and as such this approach is 
unavoidably outward looking. Others have suggested a similar 
approach: 
"The central characteristic of work in industrial societies 
is that by far the largest proportion of it is carried out 
by employees. The employer - employee relationship is a key 
social relation in such societies and in my view it is on 
investigating this relation, and all those social relations 
which surround and arise out of it, that industrial 
sociology can and should focus as its distinctive field of 
competence. An analytical starting point for industrial 
sociology can be found in the employment relation, and from 
thAt rnint t.hP. in\IPSti_g8t:!on CE!n Rncl ShouJ.d leed OUt!.'!8rds tc 
consider the whole complex of social relations within which 
it is situated. (109) 
The strength of this approach then is that it can accommodate and 
indeed necessitates the inclusion of the concerns dealt with 
within the labour process tradition; the details from within the 
"hidden abode" of the workplace cannot be treated in a cursory 
fashion. Neither however can the wider systemic features of 
(ultimately) the world system be neglected, for it is through 
this multiplicity of contexts that the employment relationship is 
created and reproduced anew. The relationship is the social form 
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of the activity which not only meets the material needs of the 
existential (humankind and nature), but within the industrialised 
nations also goes beyond the provision of mere physical 
subsistence towards an increasingly indeterminate determination 
of material need. This implies not only a receding ontology but 
also holds out the possibility of receding determination by 
factors other than human agency. To understand the limits of the 
possibility of such potential we need a sustained effort to 
sketch the existing dilemmas caught in the vortex of structure 
and action. This is why the following "empirical" account cannot 
be understood apart from these theoretical foundations. The 
interpenetration of agency and structure is the principal axis 
through which to grasp the unfolding dimensions of the employment 
relationship in all of its complexity. The theoretical task I 
have set myself is a hard one; the relevance of this approach 
however is to be judged with reference to the following sections. 
I--
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CHAPTER 2 
Wear Shipbuilding in the Inter-War Period 
l?art I 
In all shipbuilding communities the inter-war period and 
more specifically the 1930s are remembered as times of hardship. 
Very few standard histories of shipbuilding centres or individual 
yards would be complete without their chapter upon "The Grim 
Thirties" (l). Lack of orders, record levels of unemployment and 
the accompanying material hardship have tended to dominate such 
accounts. The intractability of the economic crisis gives a 
picture of workers bowing to the inevitsbility of the 
circumstances bestowed upon them, or as in the case of the Jarrow 
march (2), appealing to the powerful for help. However, in 
recent years an alternative account of shipbuilding in the inter-
war years has been emerging. Such analyses look at the labour 
process in shipbuilding and far from confirming the impression of 
the powerlessness of the workers within the industry in the face 
of mass unemployment, they suggest that a great deal of power was 
exercised by the workers in: 
" resisting at the point of production the expropriation 
of the control they have exercised over the labour process." 
(3) 
Indeed, so successful was this resistance seen to be that one 
author has felt justified to conclude, after a study of the 
inter-war period, and more specifically the fate of the Ship-
building Employers Federation (S.E.F.) welding plan that: 
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" ... the U.K. Shipbuilding industry represents an example 
where "deskilling", as Braverman defines it, did not take 
place." (4) 
A common thread running through the work of both Edward 
Lorenz and Jim McGoldrick is the emphasis placed upon struggle at 
the point of production over the introduction of new technology 
(particularly welding) and the retention of control (by the 
workers) of the craft basis of production. The work of both of 
these researchers is a valuable contribution in understanding the 
shipbuilding industry in this period; however both accounts 
appear to share some common problems. Firstly, whilst both 
authors make programmatic statements which appear to recognise 
the heterogeneity existing within the British shipbu iding 
industry, their empirical focus is largely restricted to ship-
building on the Clyde, with the odd mention of the situation on 
the Tyne. Indeed as McGoldrick slates, his study: 
" takes the Clydeside area as representative of the 
types of problem the industry faced and the types of 
snl11ti nn it. '181"0 to resolve them." (5) 
However, this claim should perhaps be treated warily for several 
reasons. Firstly, the very heterogeneity of the British ship-
building industry ensured that the type of product produced on 
the Clyde, primarily a "specialised" class of liners and cargo 
liners, could not be seen as typical for other areas such as the 
North East coast and particularly the River Wear, which relied 
almost exclusively upon the production of "tramp" tonnage. The 
importance of this lies not only in the differing technical 
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requirements of the different types of product, but also to some 
extent the different patterns of demand for each type of ship. 
Thus in the 1920s and 1930s the industry in the North Eastern 
region was hit harder by the effects of slump than any other 
area. Not only were the effects of the slump more deeply felt, 
but also any "recovery" was slower in coming. It should be 
apparent already that to treat the Clyde as representative of the 
industry as a whole is perhaps a risky business. This view is 
reinforced when one considers the employment relationship and the 
actual form of the constituent groups of "capital" and "labour". 
If we are to avoid a structurally over-deterministic account the 
importance of the "local factor" within class culture must be 
taken into account (6). Such an approach then needs to formulate 
a study of the labour process as situated in its specific 
environment and realise that the full implications of a labour 
process analysis can be grasped only if such wider contexts are 
considered ( 7). 
If the work of McGoldrick and Lorenz can be faulted for not 
paying enough attention to the specificity of the wider context, 
there is also to some extent an opposite problem. That is their 
level of analysis rarely "descends" to the point of production in 
other than aggregate terms. We are told of workers '~esisting at 
the point of production", but are given little evidence of the 
complexity that such an assertion implies. All too often the 
"action" is seen to lie at the level of the formal stances taken 
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by the unions and the employers, and one feels that in the end 
little knowledge is gained of the doings and attitudes of the 
non-activist worker. This problem is compounded by an over 
emphasis upon the issue of welding and in particular the defeat 
of the S.E.F. welding plan, so much so that one is given the 
impression that 11boilermaker 11 becomes the substitute for 118ritish 
shipyard workers11 • This over emphasis upon the issue of welding 
is understandable given the apparently clear-cut division between 
capital and labour over the issue; however, and this is more true 
of the work of Lorenz than McGoldrick, we are left with a mere 
inversion of Braverman. The tendency towards deskilling (as an 
orientation of capital) is left intact, if the process is 
frustrated it indicates strong labour and weak capital. To this 
extent then the neglect of the specificities of the wider context 
and the details of 11action11 at the point of production has led to 
a neglect of the social relations of the workplace and the 
community. An understanding of these elements is vital if one is 
to appreciate the contours of the apparent paradox of British 
shipbuilding, the retention of the craft division of labour, and 
the absence of widespread 11 deskilling 11 even in the face of the 
high levels of unemployment within the industry in the inter-war 
years. Furthermore, it is important to understand this period in 
all its complexity and uniqueness in order successfully to 
compare and contrast that time with developments in the present 
day. 
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In order to develop such an analysis, this study restricts 
itself to the industry on the River Wear as an example which in 
some respects contrasts l.'lith the Clyde (and to a lesser extent 
with the Tyne). The aim in this chapter is not to undermine the 
conclusions of Lorenz and McGoldrick, but rather to complement 
their work with an infusion of issues and problematics arising 
from different levels of analysis and a different geographical 
(and therefore technical and cultural) location. Hopefully this 
will contribute to an enlargement of our understanding of the 
complexity and heterogeneity of the British shipbuilding 
industry. 
Part II 
In attempting to situate our object of study in its global 
context the overwhelming feature of the inter-war years needs to 
be grasped, that is the existence of economic crisis. In order 
to appreciate the centrality (and perceived inevitability) of 
this background to the industry we need to make what may appear 
as a slight diversion to consider the nature of developments in 
the inter-war economy. 
In any consideration of the British economy of the 1920s and 
1930s, the notions of depression and slump inevitably play a 
large part (B). Nowhere is this more true than in relation to 
the shipbuilding industry. Thus in Sunderland, a town heavily 
dependent upon shipbuilding, unemployment had by 1923 reached a 
Chapter 2 - 74 -
level of 14,000. By 1926 Lh.is figure had grown to 19,000, and 
whilst it improved in the late 1920s, by the early 1930s it was 
worse than ever (9). The general pattern to these developments 
was as follows. Britain experienced a short boom after the first 
world war and then slump particularly in the export field. Thus 
in the early 1920s the volume of British exports was only two 
thirds of that exported in 1913 (10) 
The collapse of demand came at just the point where the 
capacity to supply had been enlarged, as A.J. Youngson suggested: 
"In cotton, coal, iron and steel, and shipbuilding capacity 
was increased when money costs were high in order to meet a 
demand which was very largely temporary." (ll) 
Following the fall in demand between 1920 and 1923, average wages 
and prices fell by one third (1 2). The Government responded in a 
typical fashion, pursuing a policy of deflation following 
directly from adherence to the marginal productivity doctrine 
which, combined with the return to the gold standard at a pre-war 
parity in 1925, ensured that Britain's economy did not recover in 
the late 1920s to the same extent as those of some of her 
competitors. In this then the Government attempted to reduce the 
costs of production without devaluing the currency. This: 
" •.. helped to keep unemployment high in British export 
trades in the later 1920s when other countries enjoyed an 
industrial boom. It exposed Britain more nakedly to the 
effects of the crash on Wall Street in 1929." (13) 
The return to gold at the pre-war parity seems at first a rather 
strange thing to do, as it resulted in an over-valuation of the 
pound in the region of 10%, adding further to the problems of a 
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British export industry already struggling with relatively high 
costs. This seems especially so given that France could return 
to gold well below the pre-war level, and whilst avoiding any 
inflation supposingly following under-valuation, raise its 
exports from 32,549,000 metric tons in 1926 to 41,128,000 metric 
tons in 1928 0 4). The reason for this move springs directly 
from the position Britain occupied in the World system. 
Furthermore the dominance of the fraction of finance capitalists 
over industrial capitalists, expressed through the interests of 
"the city", were more concerned that the balance of payments 
stayed in reasonable equilibrium rather than the fact that the 
balance of trade was highly unfavourable. Therefore, as David 
Thomson noted: 
"It was a decision of the city, not of industry. The Bank 
of England, to prevent loss of gold, had to keep up high 
interest rates. This, in turn, kept up the burden of 
national debt charges, and so of taxation. It hampered 
enterprise. It ignored the structural changes brought about 
by the events of the previous decade." (15) 
Similarly, Ron Smith suggested that: 
"The return to gold at the pre-war parity was a City policy, 
based on their international financial interests; on their 
desire to discipline the working class; and on their 
political perception of Britain's world role. The cost of 
the policy was domestic stagnation, great damage to British 
industry, and high unemployment." (16) 
We can see then that dominance of the interests of finance 
capital over industrial capital led directly to the policy 
pursued by the Government in the mid 1920s, and in this sense 
only is the return to gold at the pre-war parity understandable. 
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But, as E.J. Hobsbawm has argued, the outcome of relying too 
heavily upon finance capital was to become apparent. 
" by the middle of the 1920s British overseas 
investments earned more than ever before and so, even more 
strikingly, did her other sources of invisible income -
financial and insurance services and so on. But, the inter-
war crisis was not merely a British phenomenon, the decline 
of a former industrial world champion, all the more sudden 
and sharp for having been delayed for decades. It was the 
crisis of the entire liberal world of the nineteenth 
century, and therefore British trade and finance could no 
longer regain what British industry lost." (17) 
That Britain was enmeshed in the international financial system 
cannot be denied. The nature of this involvement was to prove of 
critical importance when following the Wall Street crash in the 
autumn of 1929, a period of world slump was initiated. In this 
respect Britain had two associated problems. Firstly, during the 
post !Mar period Britain continued to build up long term 
investments overseas. However these were financed largely by 
short term borrowing from abroad. Thus a problem of liquidity 
was to arise once the demands upon the gold supply rose during 
the period of the crisis of confidence in the soundness of paper 
money beginning in 1929. A second related problem which grew as 
the 1920s progressed was that mentioned by Henry Pelling: 
"Britain ... though a creditor of her allies to the extent 
of some £1,740 million (of which £568 million had been lent 
to Russia, and was now irrecoverable), in her turn could not 
afford to be very generous to her debtors without serious 
danger to her balance of payments." (18) 
Similarly: 
"By 1924 new lending had approximately made good the sale of 
overseas assets during the war. But whereas Britain's debts 
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were owing to sound creditors like the U.S.A., many of the 
new loans were made to countries whose willingness and 
ability to repay were at best dubious." (19) 
We can see then that the basis of Britain's finance capital, 
for which so much was sacrificed, was not as solid as it may have 
seemed. Moreover the fact that it ~as necessarily enmeshed 
within the world financial system meant that when the U.S.A. 
retreated from its aid obligations to the defeated powers in 
order to attend to its own problems at home, the system of 
international debt and credit collapsed, and all the sooner in 
the first instance for currencies being tied to gold; Britain was 
bound to be affected. 
Looking back over the twenties we can see that the 
performance of the British economy was affected both by external 
conditions and internal policy. Perhaps of central importance is 
the notion that the world system in the post World War I period 
had changed. Britain had emerged from the war with a weakened 
economy facing a world in which the powers not centrally involved 
in the conflict had developed their economies at a startling 
rate. For example, from 1914 to 1920 the industrial production 
of the U.S.A. and Japan had risen by 20% and 75% respectively and 
the U.S.A.'s share of world industrial production was to rise 
from 36% in 1913 to 45% in 1928 (ZO). The conditions for British 
hegemony over the world system had passed, failure to appreciate 
this led to the attempt to retain sterling as the predominant 
trading currency - an attempt which was ultimately bound to 
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fail, and result in further injuring British industry, 
particularly exports. Thus Britain was to enter the world slump 
of the 1930s with an industry which had already taken a battering 
throughout the previous decade (21). 
The events surrounding the Wall Street crash of 1929 
reverberated through the finance and credit systems of the world. 
There was a flight from paper money to gold, and once started it 
was inevitable that this movement would gather momentum and put 
further pressure on national currencies. By 1931 that pressure 
had become almost intolerable, and in May with the failure of the 
Creditanstalt, a large Vienna bank, a new twist to the crisis was 
underway. The failure of the Austrian bank had a profound effect 
on the already faltering German economy and increased the sense 
of panic in all European financial centres. The demand for the 
only truly international currency, gold, increased. Thus France, 
which had avoided any large financial involvements in central 
Europe, but did have large foreign exchange holdings in London, 
increased their withdrawals demanding gold. In order to attempt 
to counter this flight from the pound, and in order to recover, 
to some extent, gold reserves, Britain and the U.S.A., which was 
feeling similar pressure, began a large scale withdrawal of their 
short-term claims lodged in central European banks. This of 
course increased the problem to such an extent that by September 
21st 1931 legislation was enacted in Parliament suspending the 
Bank of England's obligation to sell gold. The effect on the 
Chapter 2 
- 79 -
pound was that it began to fall against the dollar, falling from 
4.8665 dollars to 3.14 by 1932. The upshot of these movements, 
which tilted the balance of trade slightly in Britain's favour, 
was that by 1933 the U.S.A. devalued the dollar returning the 
balance back to what it was before Britain effectively abandoned 
gold. A further consequence of these moves firstly by Britain 
and then the U.S.A. was to ensure that world demand remained low 
because the external depreciation of both currencies discouraged 
imports, and as the prices of primary products continued to 
decline there was already a diminishing level of effective demand 
exercised in this quarter. 
The real consequence of the financial crisis of 1929-1931 
does not lie in the shifts of gold and currency across frontiers. 
Rather what is of importance is that the money form is the 
relationship through which the general form of commodity exchange 
is universalised (22). 
"Money, by expressing all com modi ties as values expresses 
u,e dunic:iln uf capital - the social r::::lation3 :.'Jhich mokc nll 
use-values into commodities." (23) 
It was not then merely a financial crisis but also a crisis of 
the social relations expressed through the commodity form. Thus 
the shifts of currency had real effects upon the production and 
exchange of use values throughout the world. Whilst these 
disruptions were represented as direct consequences of the 
problems of financial management, the manipulation of tariff 
barriers and non-equilibrium in exchange rates, they had real 
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effect upon the lives of millions of people. The exchange 
dealers and speculators had by their actions encouraged and 
stimulated the cycle of depression and whilst it may have seemed 
that: 
"The economic depression, like the two great wars, had a 
quality of fatality - an impersonal calamity as if it were 
not of human creation - which bred despair and intensified 
fears." (24) 
it was nevertheless a result of social action past and present 
which creates and recreates anew the social relationships through 
which men and women live. 
Perhaps the most important consequence of the withdrawal of 
credits and the raising of tariff barriers was the collapse of 
world trade. It declined from a total of 5352 million U.S. gold 
dollars in January 1929 to 1788 million in January 1933 (see 
Figure 1). With the decline in world trade came the decline in 
production especially within the export industries. So that 
whilst the index of production in Britain using a base line of 
1929 as 100, fell to 84 in 1931 and was 93 in 1933, the tall in 
the amount produced by the export industries was a far greater 
percentage especially given the growth of the "new industries•• 
which for the most part dealt within national boundaries: 
11 While imports were maintained, exports declined making for 
certain "depressed areas" where industry was especially 
dependent on the export trades, even when other industries, 
such as the building trades, stimulated by the housing boom 
were flourishing. 11 ( 2 5) 
If in the 1920s many of Britain•s problems had been self 
inflicted, or at least worsened by the maintenance of sterling at 
APRIL 
Er9i 
The contracting spiral of world trade 9 month 
by month, January, 1929, through June, 1933, in millions 
of United States gold dollars. (Source: World Economic 
Survey, 1932-1933 9 Geneva, The League of Nations, 1933) 
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an over-valued level, in the 1930s those same export industries 
were hit again by the collapse of trade, and as Pelling noted: 
" ... the only fully effective path to recovery of world 
trade lay through genuinely world wide agreements. It was 
unfortunate, however, that the crisis had encouraged in so 
many countries, including Britain a spirit of economic 
nationalism. This was demonstrated in the spring of 1933 at 
the War ld Economic conference in London, sponsored by the 
League of Nations but also attended by the U.S.. The new 
American government of Franklin Roosevelt, intent upon its 
own internal problems and experiments, was unwilling to 
support any effective measures to initiate the recovery of 
world trade. Consequently little was done except to 
introduce some international schemes to restrict the 
production of primary commodities. Henceforward relaxations 
of international trading barriers were largely the result of 
bilateral agreements between governments. Long term inter-
national lending like international migration became a thing 
of the past and multilateral trade seemed to be growing 
obsolete." (26) 
Underlying the crisis was the loss of Britain's role of 
exercising hegemony over the world economic system and the 
refusal of the only power which could then have assumed that role 
of dominance, namely the U.S.A., to do so. This effectively 
meant, for a short time at least, an attempted retreat from the 
expansion of the modern world system, a change in relative 
importance of industries producing for export and those catering 
for demand internal to national boundaries. The crisis, as well 
as expressing a change in the relative importance of particular 
countries in relation to world wide economic activity, also 
further developed those changes. 
The relevance of this outline of the economic background can 
be seen in that, firstly it serves as a general context in which 
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to locate the industry. However of more importance are the 
direct effects that the events outlined had upon the industry. 
The fact that the shipbuilding industry is an export industry is 
obviously important here. Moreover of all the traditional export 
industries it is perhaps most sensitive to changes in the general 
level of its own commodities (ships) traded in themselves, but 
also those commodities are the primary medium through which other 
commodities are transported. Also the level of demand for the 
products of the industry profoundly affects the balance of power 
within the industry. Of importance here is the level of 
unemployment created through lack of demand, more generally what 
arises is: 
" an environment which favours one side or other of 
industry." (27) 
Specifically in relation to the British shipbuilding industry, 
the overwhelming dominance of the world depression meant that the 
problems facArl hy the indust~i were seen as lying almost solely 
within the disjunction between the capacity for supply and the 
level of demand for ships. This being the case, there was less 
emphasis paid by both employers and government to the nature of 
the division of labour than perhaps would otherwise have been the 
case. An example of what is meant is the approach of the 
Government (shared indifferent ways by both the employers and 
unions) which stressed aid to shipowners in terms of the ·~crap 
and build" scheme of 1935 rather than direct aid to shipbuilders 
to modernise production in order to compete in the international 
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market for what orders were available. As will be argued, if the 
dominance of the problem of demand had the effect of diverting 
the attention of the employers and the Government away from the 
production process and the division of labour, it had the 
opposite effect upon labour within the industry. The existence 
of extremely high levels of unemployment necessitated the 
struggle to ensure that what work was available was available to 
you! At the level of the production process this meant asserting 
your right to a particular type of work. The agency through 
which these assertions were made in the shipbuilding industry 
were predominantly the craft unions. Thus in confronting the 
problems that faced them: 
"Workers in a trade found it easier to combine to strengthen 
their individual labour power than to establish a sense of 
common self-interest with other workers in the same 
industry, let alone workers in general. The primary 
struggle of workers was not for the establishment of 
Socialism but for control of authority in the work-place." 
(28) 
Although this was written of workers in the 1800s it 
remained true of shipyard workers faced with the problems of the 
1930s. Finally the need to understand the specific nature of the 
slump of the 1920s and '30s suggests itself at another level. 
There is a sense in which history is a totality, in this way 
there are real connections between the Wall Street crash, the 
failure of the Creditanstalt, and children of unemployed fathers 
begging any uneaten "bait" from men leaving Doxford's shipyard on 
the River Wear (29). The contexts are different, as are the 
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primary actors in the different situations and perhaps the extent 
of agency each can effectively initiate may be different, and yet 
they exist as they do because of their relationships within the 
world system at a particular historical point. Hopefully I have 
demonstrated some ways in which a consideration of the nature of 
the depression of the 1920s and '30s is relevant to a study of 
the shipbuilding industry on the Wear. Now we must look at some 
of the features of the industry itself to understand why the 
economic climate had such a devastating effect in general and on 
the River Wear in particular. 
Part III 
Given that we have already established at a theoretical 
level the importance of the inter-relationship of the moments of 
production and consumption, we nnr_•J r:eed to turn our ai..Lention 
towards some of the general features of the shipbuilding industry 
in order to locate these concerns in an empirical context. The 
first point to note is the construction nature of the industry in 
whicA: 
" ... nearly two thirds of the final costs of a ship 
represent bought in materials and components." (30) 
This clearly has implications for the analysis of the strategies 
of capital within the industry in as far as these attempt to 
maximise accumulation C3l). One would expect concerns with 
external costs to feature largely in the preoccupations of 
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management. Also as the shipbuilding process lies as it were at 
the end of several labour processes, relative inefficiencies in 
these industries will have an effect upon the competitive 
position of shipbuilding itself. As one author has suggested: 
"The shipbuilder assembles in his yard the finished products 
of many other industries - the steel-rolling mills, the 
foundry, the forge, the coppersmith, the engineering 
industry, the boat builders, the instrument makers, and so 
on." (32) 
It is because shipbuilding in its totality is such an amalgam of 
other industries that some authors (even up until the late 1960s) 
have claimed that the health of the industry is indicative of the 
more general health of the economy. As House has noted: 
" ••• shipbuilding in Britain is one of the best indicators 
of our general industrial competitiveness." (33) 
Whilst this may be an overstatement, it is undeniable that the 
British industry has in the past been closely tied to the role of 
Britain as a world power. However historically, with the 
increasi~g decline of Imperialism in its specifically politicel 
form, the industry has seen the removal of the "buffer" of Empire 
consequent upon the loss of British hegemony within the World 
System. 
On a more general level however, the industry has always 
been very responsive to shifts in world trade. 
"It has long been recognised that the fluctuations of 
industry and trade, known as the trade cycle, have probably 
a more marked effect on the shipbuilding industry than on 
any other of our staple industries." (34) 
Indeed as Parkinson has observed, the world output of merchant 
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ships during the period of 1886-1939 has fluctuated wildly: 
" ... before the First World War output might fluctuate in 
an extreme case from 50% below its trend to 5m~ above its 
trend in 2 years, while swings of 50% from slump to boom and 
back again were usual. In the inter-war period, output fell 
from the post-war peak of 150% above the average to 80% 
below in 1933, and there were considerable variations in 
other years." (35) 
In some senses then, fluctuations in world trade are exaggerated 
in the demand for ships, entering the equation in two respects 
(relatively between national industries) as a capital good in 
itself and (absolutely) as the medium of transport of other 
commodities. As one other author has remarked: 
"Shipbuilding is particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in 
world trade. Shipping capacity cannot be rapidly adjusted to 
changes in demand and fluctuations in world trade are immed-
iately reflected in the level of freight rates. Moreover, 
since the volume of new mercantile tonnage produced each 
year represents only a small percentage of the tonnage in 
existence, ship construction tends to fluctuate far more 
than in proportion to the changes in war ld trade." (36) 
Here then the very scale of the product, and consequently the 
time taken in producing an individual unit, serves to ensure a 
disjunction between supply and demand: 
"When during a period of booming international trade rates 
rise, shipowners place new contracts for ships; but as soon 
as the peak in rates has been passed and a downward trend 
sets in, the orders fall off very steeply. As the period of 
ship construction is long, however, the response of output 
to these changes in demand cannot be immediate. Both 1921 
and 1930, years in which international trade, freight rates 
and new orders declined, were years of high activity as 
measured by the tonnage launched; for the shipbuilders were 
then engaged in dealing with orders placed during the 
preceding boom. This, a large number of new ships becomes 
available just when the demand for shipping space is ebbing 
fast; and this intensifies the depression in freight rates 
and increases the reluctance of shipowners to place new 
orders." (37) 
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One point to note however is that fluctuations in demand stemming 
from rising and falling freight rates do not hit all shipbuilding 
centres with the same severity. This is due to the nature of the 
specialisation of centres towards the production of different 
types of ship. Firstly one would not expect the demand for 
warships to follow the same pattern as that of merchant tonnage. 
Secondly, however, there is considerable variation within the 
merchant sector with various patterns of demand applying to 
passenger liners, cargo liners, tankers and tramps. In the 
inter-war years it was the North East's "specialisation" upon the 
general cargo vessel, the tramp, which ensured that when 
depression hit the British industry it was the region that 
suffered most. Thus for example whilst the relative share of the 
British market averaged 42% from 1919 to 1929, in 1926 the North 
East region held only 28% of the market share (38). Again the 
importance of the heterogenous nature of the British industry is 
underlined even in the face of the common problems facing the 
industry in the inter-war period. However the point to be 
emphasised is the essentially interlinked nature of the 
relationship of the industry to wider issues of world trade, and 
in the case of Britain the historically specific conditions of 
its retreat from world hegemony. 
If the defining characteristics of the market demand for 
ships in the inter-war period can be seen as generally involving 
cyclical fluctuations of the whole world market, then the 
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organisational and technological characteristics of British 
shipbuilding can be seen to be more speci fie. The key to these 
features of the industry is the reliance upon a craft technology 
and administration 0 9). In this context the importance of craft 
skills has been seen as paramount: 
"The two essential features of the technology of ship-
building are that the product is not standardised and that 
mechanisation and rationalisation have not proceeded to any 
great extent. For the most part each ship is individually 
designed, programmed and constructed. Lack of 
standardisation of product and the fact that shipbuilding is 
a construction industry have limited the extent to which 
there can be standardisation, rationalisation and 
mechanisation of the production processes. Even though a 
great deal of equipment is supplied by outside sub-
contractors, the building of a ship depends essentially on 
the manipulation of tools and materials by men who have 
acquired craft skills over a period of years." (40) 
In outlining these general features of the industry we must 
beware of the tendency to reduce a complex process to a 
simplistic overly static and technologically determined account. 
Whilst it is undeniable that the technology used in shipyards has 
a determining effect, within limits, upon the degree of 
"standardisation, rationalisation and mechanisation" of the 
production process, such technological determinism is not however 
a quantitively uniform phenomenon. The specific form of the 
level of "standardisation, rationalisation and mechanisation" 
cannot be formulated purely as a function of the level of 
available technology or the non-standardised nature of the 
product. Rather, the nature of the production process in any one 
national industry is the result of complex mediations at both 
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local, national and international levels. In order to address 
these complexities we must shift the focus a way from the general 
characteristics of the industry and towards the empirical 
context. In doing so we must locate our concern with the 
division of labour in its wider social context of the employment 
relationship which in turn necessitates an investigation which 
'~eads outwards to consider the whole complex of social relations 
within which it (the employm.ent relation) is situated" (4l). In 
looking at the shipbuilding industry on the River Wear in the 
inter-war period the aim is to produce an "account" which in 
apprehending the industry in its context as an historical 
individual can nevertheless contribute towards an increased 
understanding of the complexities of the wider national industry 
and also provide a benchmark with which to assess the 
continuities and discontinuities within the industry on the Wear 
.in Li1e 1980::;. 
Part IV 
In the previous section it has been suggested that there is 
a difference between shipbuilding centres, and one important 
feature of this difference is the type of product (i.e. ships) in 
which particular centres specialise. However, for our purposes, 
of at least as much importance as the type of tonnage produced 
are other differences relating to the specific nature of both 
capital and labour and the cultural traditions within which both 
of these groups interact (and create and recreate anew). In this 
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connection it is worth quoting at length one comparison made by 
the Reverend C.H.G. Hopkins, of the shipbuilding centres on the 
Wear and Mersey: 
"During the seven years before I came to Pallion, I had been 
working at St. Luke's, Tranmere, a shipyard Parish in 
Birkenhead. From the streets of the parish you could see 
growing, day by day, on the stocks, such great ships as the 
"Mauritania", the "Ark Royal" and the "Prince of Wales". 
They were launched in the Mersey in Tranmere Bay, at a point 
where the river was a mile wide. On arriving in Pallion, to 
work in Sunderland, "the largest shipbuilding town in the 
world", I was amazed to see how narrow the River Wear looked 
at Pallion, in comparison with the Mersey at Tranmere. It 
seemed hardly credible that the fine ships for which 
Sunderland is famous, could be launched into such a small 
space ... However, that was by no means the only difference 
one noticed between the Wear and the Mersey. Immediately I 
was struck by the difference in the atmosphere of the place; 
in Sunderland there were eight shipyards of varying size, 
whereas in Birkenhead there was the one enormous shipyard -
though there are, in addition, several repair yards. In 
Sunderland, nearly all the yards and allied engineering 
industries are family firms, of a size which makes personal 
contact between employers and workmen an everyday factor. 
As a result, the general tone of industrial relationships 
has been harmonious over a long number of years. Men who 
work in the various yards have mostly been in the same yard 
for a great many years; they are proud of it and of its 
achievements and tradition~, an c! they 1·e fer to 1 t as "our 
yard"." ( 42) 
This draws our attention to issues which are often overlooked by 
sociologists, namely the importance of the physical context of 
communities. Certainly in the case of Sunderland several authors 
have commented upon the physical location of the town, as lying: 
"eccentric to the axial routeway of the North-East from Tees 
to Tyne." (43) 
The importance of this is seen to lie in the contribution that 
such "isolation" has made to constituting the clearly demarked 
"character" within the town, 
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"Unlike the conurbations of Tyneside and Teeside Sunderland 
is a unitary compact city, one of the largest county 
boroughs in Britain ••. Although only some 7 miles from 
South Shields and the Tyne ... Sunderland has kept a strong 
town character and individuality ..• the dependence of the 
local economy on shipbuilding and repairing has 
traditionally been greater than on Tyne or Tees. In some 
respects overshadowed by Newcastle as a regional service 
centre and capital, Sunderland is more strikingly a Northern 
industrial town, with many of the legacies of industrialism 
writ large in its townscape •.• " ( 44) 
Others, whilst being equally guilty of an anthropomorphic 
portrayal, have attributed even greater importance to the 
sedimentation of the past in the character and attributes of the 
town, and more importantly the real sense in which the past is 
still ''alive" in the attitudes of the present population. As one 
author writing in 1969 put it: 
"Sunder land is a town which is living on the dwindling fat 
of its Victorian expansion. The legacy of the Industrial 
Revolution is apparent in its appearance, its industrial 
structure, its population growth and in a host of social and 
economic characteristics. Even attitudes are coloured by 
its past heritage. The Depression years, the final death 
spRsm nf thp nineteenth century in a pre-Key~si2n era, arc 
still a real memory amongst much of the town's population 
and impinge upon the attitudes of the working population. 
This imprint of the past, rooted in a continuing dependence 
on heavy industry, is found to a much greater degree than in 
the towns of the Midlands or even Lancashire, since the 
spread of light manufacturing has had only marginal effects 
in the North East." (45) 
The town of Sunderland as clearly demarked from other urban 
centres with a degree of dependence upon shipbuilding uncommon in 
other large towns was seen by one author to be largely a "closed 
community": 
"Sunder land in 1926 was by no means a one industry town, but 
the fortunes of shipbuilding had for so long been the major 
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indicator of economic and social conditions on Wearside ... 
The rope making and pottery industries did not employ a 
great number, and coal mining was not as prevalent in the 
Borough as in the rest of the county. This separated 
Sunderland from the county town of Durham City, the focal 
point for miners within the Durham coalfield. Lacking the 
communications, prestige and diversity of Newcastle, only 
twelve miles away, Sunderland was very much a closed 
community, forever in the shadow of these two centres. 
Shipbuilding was at the heart of the industrial and everyday 
life at the mouth of the Wear." (46) 
Here then we can see that the "character of the town" cannot be 
deduced solely from its physical location but rather location is 
one feature in a complex which includes past history and 
industrial structure. In order to unravel some of these 
complexities it is perhaps worthwhile to look at the early 
history of shipbuilding on the Wear (the coming together of the 
specific location and the historically specific forms of capital 
and labour) in as much as this legacy bestowed a character upon 
the culture of the local population. 
For some authors the location of the industry is merely a 
function of the proximity of certeir. n::.1tural r:::sou~ccs. Thus L. 
Jones has suggested that the shift in the imparlance of ship-
building centres from the Thames to the North of England was 
consequent upon the change from wooden to iron steam ships and 
that: 
"New materials also involved a shift in location. The 
Solent and Thames, near the sources of timber supplies, and 
with excellent launching facilities, were flourishing 
centres of wooden shipbuilding. The change from wood to 
iron, and sail to steam, in propulsion, had the effect of 
localising the industry principally in the North." (4 7) 
Such a purely technical functional view of the shift in the 
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location of the industry would seem to be lacking in several 
respects. Firstly the move Northwards began before iron and 
steam were significant factors in shipbuilding. Indeed as early 
as 1835 Lloyds Register recognised that Sunderland was: 
" .•. the most important shipbuilding centre in the country 
nearly equalling as regards number and tonnage of ships 
built, all the other ports together." (48) 
This was some ten years prior to the launch of the river's first 
steam powered ship and seventeen years before its first iron 
ship; the dominance of Wear shipbuilding was first established in 
the days of "wooden walls" <49 ) Secondly, such a view neglects: 
" .•• the point that it was not the location of coal and 
iron deposits under the soil that was crucial, but the 
development of local organisations of capital and labour 
capable of extracting and processing these raw materials." 
(50) 
This approach, then, redirects our attention back towards the 
social processes involved in the development of industry. The 
sCJpe:- ior it y of ~uc~ :::n :::ppr o<>ch is under lined llJhon liW turn a ur 
attention towards the growth of the shipbuilding industry in the 
North East region, where a purely technical functional approach 
can in no way account for the rise in the importance of the Wear 
shipbuilding industry relative to that of the Tyne and the Tees. 
Rather the explanation must be sought in the specific nature of 
capital and labour on that river understood as a complex 
historical individual. 
The growth of the importance of Sunderland as a shipbuilding 
centre was a relatively sudden one, going from an output of some 
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3,951 tons in 1790-1, with such ports as Hull and Whitby 
launching considerably more, up to an output of 14,330 tons in 
1814 as the premier shipbuilding port out-producing its nearest 
rival, Newcastle, by some 5849 tons (51) (see Appendix 1). The 
timing of this expansion owes much to the demand stimulated by 
the Napoleonic Wars, but the reason for the pattern of relative 
growth owes more to the peculiarities of Sunderland (or its 
rivals). One thing is certain however, the growth of Sunder land 
as a shipbuilding port was not predicated upon economies of scale 
of large yards. For an 1805 Admiralty survey provided a 
comprehensive overview of the structure of the industry in 1804 
when: 
" ... 24 shipyards on the Wear employed 667 shipwrights, 60% 
of whom were apprentices and 6~~ over fifty years old. Two 
yards employed 7 and 9 men respectively and the three 
largest yards were those of Laing (53 men), Hall (52) and 
Robson (49). On Tyneside there were many much larger yards 
and these included ... R. Bulmer (li:H), J. Craster (!..>tj), 5. 
Temple (121), Nicholson, Horn and Co. (70) and N. Fairies 
with 54 workers ... Thus, clearly the Wear shipyards were 
much smaller units than those on her sister river, which she 
was soon to lead in output." (52) 
The importance of the role of the small(er) firm for "nineteenth 
century industrialisation" has been noted by Sabel and Zeitlin -
they suggest that a concentration of small firms in an "indust-
rial district" could and did lead to "flexible specialisation -
one of the defining characteristics of which was that: 
"Firms were not enduring units of production but rather 
temporary combinations of machines and skills directed to 
the achievement of particular tasks ... " (53) 
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Such a characterisation was true of many of the enterprises 
building ships on the Wear where according to the 11 Corder 
Manuscripts" there were approximately 68 cases of enterprises 
building only a single ship between 1790 and 1849 (54). That 
such enterprises were possible owed much to a lack of effective 
institutional barriers to starting such a business, and similarly 
little in the way of barriers to mobility within the labour 
market. Indeed it would seem that such a position was 
characteristic of the Wear rather than other centres. Thus for 
example the access to the shipbuilding industry on the Tyne was 
restricted in its formative period by the power of the freemen of 
Newcastle. Thus Robert Wallis had to fight hard to establish the 
first shipyard in South Shields: 
"For in shipbuilding as in everything else connected with 
the River Tyne, Newcastle's freemen claimed and enforced a 
monopoly. The Corporation thus did everything in its power 
to hinder the construction of Wallis's first ship and he had 
to fight two legal actions, as well as ward off physical 
intimidation, before he succeeded in breaking Newcastle's 
power." (55) 
The absence of such a restrictive power block on the river Wear 
not only meant easier access for individuals to a shipbuilding 
enterprise but it also tended to blur, to some extent, the 
division between capital and labour. This had implications not 
only for the structure of the industry but also for the 
development of trade unionism. For whilst: 
"Many ports had well organised shipwrights' unions and, 
while Thomas Brown, a Tyneside businessman, regarded the 
absence of "combination" on the Wear as contributing to the 
port's success, he added, "a large proportion of the 
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shipbuilders are generally satisfied with mere wages; these 
shipbuilders being more of the character of operative 
builders for the wood importer." Since many ships were 
built "by persons ••. barely above the position of artisans 
..• " he could "certainly" obtain cheaper terms than if the 
shipbuilders "had been capitalists". (56) 
Similar appraisals of the nature of shipbuilding on the Wear were 
forthcoming from other sources. Thus in 1848 one Sunderland 
ship-owner commented that: 
" ... a great many of our shipbuilders are working men, 
perhaps they have very limited education, and ... are 
employed as shipbuilders by the Timber merchants ... (they) 
are men of small capital." This view was restated by the 
Lloyds surveyor, himself a shipbuilder for two years. "The 
shipbuilders in the Port of Sunderland are not generally Men 
of Capital." (57) 
This form of industry would appear to conform to Sabel and 
Zeitlin's form of institutional framework described as 
"municipality". In this form the boundaries of the employment 
relationship are relatively fluid: 
"Typically the movement of work in progress was co-ordinated 
by a merchant who supplied credit and raw materials." (58) 
The importance of this "form" for the characterisation of social 
relationships lies in the lack of social distance or permanence 
between employer and employee: 
"Aside from encouraging innovation the scope given to 
competitive ambition in these regions contributed to their 
survival by reinforcing in a roundabout way the solidary 
sentiments that kept the struggle for advancement within 
safe limits. Because those on top had often risen from the 
ranks and could fall back into them, they were less likely 
to mistreat their subordinates, both out of a knowledgeable 
sympathy for their situation and out of a fear that after an 
unlucky year they might again share it." (59) 
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In this view then, there is congruence between the specific form 
of social relationships and the regulation of relationships at 
work. Indeed it may be further suggested that such relations 
between employer and employee whilst not finally or absolutely 
sundered represents the source of many of the attitudes which 
were to persist regarding the responsibility of the individual 
worker for ensuring the quality of his own work. 
Here then is the source of the Wear's peculiarity (and 
success), the legacy of which was to remain important in the 
inter-war period. An open labour market and the lack of any 
institutional power bloc or strict regulation of entry into 
business ensured that: 
" ... working carpenters, who had been frugal and careful, 
and had saved a few pounds, found little difficulty in 
commencing in shipbuilding." (60) 
The lack of social distance coupled with the relative 
isolation of the borough from other urban centres interacted and 
helped in the development of what one researcher has referred to 
as the "politics of local loyalties" rather than the politics of 
class (61), Clearly in a sector such as shipbuilding with an 
historically increasing demand upon the mini mum level of fixed 
capital viable for an individual enterprise, such "free11 entry to 
business was likely to be characteristic of the early history of 
the industry in the era of competitive capitalism (62 ) In 
relation to the Wear the rise of monopoly capitalism from 1880 
onwards came as the last wooden ships were being built. The 
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force of these two trends, towards monopoly capital and iron, 
ensured that the days of the worker employer were largely over. 
Many of the remaining shipbuilders by the turn of the century 
could claim several generations of their family as Wear builders. 
However, even by the inter-war period many of the attitudes of 
earlier times and in some aspects even the structure of the 
industry itself on the river still bore the imprint of those 
ear 1 ier days. 
In terms of the yards themselves, those on the Wear remained 
smaller than those in the Tyne or Tees. Thus the largest yard on 
the Wear in 1931 (Wm. Doxford and Sons Ltd.) had a total of six 
berths, whilst the biggest individual berth (at Sir John 
Priestman's yard) could accommodate vessels up to 600 feet in 
length. The corresponding figures for the Tyne were 20 berths 
(Swan, Hunter and Wigham Richardson Ltd.) and a berth for vessels 
up to 1,100 feet in length at Vickers-Armstrong Ltd.. On the 
Tees the largest yard of the Furness Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. had 12 
berths in which vessels of up to 750 feet could be built (63). 
Whilst Wear yards were relatively small in comparison with 
those on the two other principal rivers in the North East of 
England, it was nevertheless the case that the absolute and rel-
ative cost of opening a "shipyard" had grown enormously since the 
mid nineteenth century and therefore an identifiable ·~apitalist 
class" had coalesced. However it is important to understand the 
context and the historical continuities that persisted even with 
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the emergence of this class, in order to gauge the specifics of 
the interrelationship between the employers and workers within 
the yards and the community. Even with a largely working 
class/lower middle class population of around 160,000 in 1926: 
" ... the political bias of the town up to that time was 
more a reflection of traditional loyalties than of adherence 
to a particular party line ... Local loyalties ensured that 
men such as Tory shipyard owner Sir W.T. Doxford, and Samuel 
Storey, proprietor of the popular "Sunder land Daily Echo" 
were elected (to parliament)." (64) 
Moreover such local loyalties were to some extent maintained as a 
consequence of the employers devoting some of their fortunes to 
doing "good works'' within the town. Such local beneficence again 
0 had a long history within Sunderland. For example one 
shipbuilder, John Hutchinson, in the mid nineteenth century was 
renowned for: 
" ... the number and extent of his public charities. His 
name figured invariably at or near the head of subscription 
lists for philanthropic purposes, whether the Sunderland 
Infirmary, soup kitchens, or other similar objects. He was 
one of the best friends of s11ch inst".it11tions as The RBIJ!JP.d 
School, to the children attending which he gave a dinner 
once a year, besides other donations in the shape of clothes 
etc." ( 6 5) 
This "tradition" was maintained in the inter-war period, thus for 
example, Sir John Priestman owned: 
" ... a prosperous well managed and profitable yard out of 
which a considerable fortune has been made which the owner 
is now spending over church, hospital and charitable works 
ooo II (66) 
The importance of doing "good works" in the locality cannot be 
understood in terms of direct paternalism, a concern of an 
employer with "their" employees, but rather must be seen as an 
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essential contribution to the politics of locality. It should not 
be thought that what is being argued is that the Wear employers 
were parochial. One of the enduring myths about shipbuilding 
employers is that they were men of little education with only 
practical knowledge; this may have been true in the early years 
of the "artisan builders" but by the inter-war period that had 
changed. Most of the employers and directors of yards had some 
form of higher education. Thus for example, R.C. Thompson, 
Managing Director of J.L. Thompson's, was educated at Marlborough 
College and gained an honours degree at Cambridge reading 
mechanical sciences (6 7) Henry Short, Chairman of Short 
Brothers, was educated at Haileybury and Trinity College 
Cambridge, gaining a B.A. in Law (68). Mr. F.W. Dugdale, from 
1929 Managing Director of the Wear Dockyard of S.P. Austin and 
Son Ltd. was educated at Welling-borough and then read for a 
B.Sc. at Durham University. Mr. A.J. Marr, Director of Laings in 
the 1930s, obtained a B.Sc. from Durham University and Mr. R.A. 
Bartram, Chairman of Bartram and Sons was educated at Armstrong 
College Newcastle (69). In business as well as education the 
horizons of Wear shipbuilders extended far beyond the borough. 
Many had connection with shipping lines as in the case of the 
Chairman of J.L. Thompson's, Sir R. Norman Thompson, who was also 
Chairman of Silver Line Ltd. of London <70). Sir John Priestman 
was Chairman of two shipping companies, two coal mining 
companies, a Director of Phoenix Assurance Company and had also 
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built up very considerable investments in South African gold 
(7l). The importance of such other business interests, especially 
in shipping lines, in the early inter-war period, was seen in its 
potential as a source of demand for ships. Thus for the period 
after the first World War, up until 1931: 
" it has been suggested to us by one authority that the 
Wear has maintained her proportion of North-East tonnage 
because of the existence of family connections between 
owners and builders." (72) 
To the extent that this was true it was managed largely, and to a 
far greater extent than on the Tyne, within the corporate form of 
the private firm rather than the public joint stock company C73 ). 
Such family connections have been described by Sabel and Zeitlin 
as constituting a pattern based on the "federated family firm". 
The importance of such alliance lies in its flexibility, in that: 
" ... firms often found markets outside the family; but 
their financial and emotional ties to the lineage made them 
dependable partners even in difficult times." (74) 
We can see then that in education and business interests the Wear 
employers often had connections extending far beyond Sunderland 
itself and often in the empirical case spanning the "fractions" 
of industrial and financial capital. In the face of these class 
attributes and the social distance they imply as between employer 
and employee, the question becomes how were the politics of 
traditional loyalties maintained, and more intriguing is the 
question as to how this paradox represented itself within the 
employment relationship in the individual yards? 
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So far the focus has been upon the continuity of the 
families representing the "personification of capital" within the 
industry on the Wear and the stability over generations of the 
"family firm" ( 75 ). It was not only the families of the 
employers who had a long history in shipbuilding however, as 
generations of workers also lived and worked in the area. The 
pattern of settlement was of particular importance here, with a 
stable band of working class housing emerging around the 
ship y a r d s i n the nineteenth century • Such dis t r i c t s w ere not 
comprised of homogeneous units of housing, however, and artisan 
housing of the type still visible today at Raker, Fulwell, 
Pallion and Millfield consisted of small cottages rather than the 
larger subdivided houses which were the homes of many of the 
poorer sections of the working class (76), It was in these 
districts that the shipyard workers lived, in "stable" 
communities whose boundaries (visible and invisible) were 
preserved in opposition to other areas in the town. Indeed 
patterns of locality and the networks established within them 
were often important in relation to securing employment at a 
particular yard. 
The quality of the relationships between employers and 
employees, each with their "own" local traditions and loyalties, 
is often elusive. For, by the inter-war period, the industry on 
the Wear had acquired many of the wider characteristics which 
were notable by their absence in the early years of shipbuilding; 
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comprehensive trade union representation, and as we have seen 
shipbuilders who could be seen unequivocally as capitalist, the 
employment relationship had hardened into a structural 
relationship (77). In this situation some observers have put the 
retention of a non-radical workforce down to the quality of 
personal relationships in the yards, facilitated by the small 
size of each unit. Thus, as late as 1954 one author was claiming 
that: 
"In Sunderland, nearly all the yards and allied engineering 
industries are family firms, of a size which makes personal 
contact between employers and workmen an everyday factor. 
As a result, the general tone of industrial relationships 
has been harmonious over a long number of years." (78) 
Explanations of harmonious industrial relations based on the 
small size of firms should be treated warily and as recent 
research suggests there would seem to be little reason to think 
that size of firm in itself is any guarantee of such a situation; 
indeed in some ways the opposite may be the case (79), The 
s.iLuaLion is more compiex than Hopkins suggests. The lack of 
social distance between employer and employee, characteristic of 
the early years of the industry, was retained in some yards as 
late as the turn of the century. In these situations the 
employer is often remembered as a "character". Thus one plumber 
interviewed during the course of this research had written down 
some stories told to him by other workers, during his apprentice-
ship in the 1930s. One concerned "Jacky Crown" and his personal 
supervision of the "coming of age" ceremonies of his apprentices: 
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"On their 21st birthday they were escorted down to the 
slipway at high tide and thrown in, with Jacky Crown lending 
a willing hand ••• On his 21st birthday (the original 
storyteller) during the dinner break, he knew his mates were 
preparing to carry him out so he slipped into the store and 
slipped off his clothes, but before he could pull on an old 
pair of overalls Jacky and the mob appeared, and he was 
carried out stark naked and thrown into the slipway •.. as 
ill luck had it, he was thrown in above the cradle and found 
himself under the hauling cable, head down and his backside 
up. The water was only about 5 feet deep, but he had 
swallowed half the water in the dock before the onlookers 
realised that he was in trouble, with the heavy cable over 
his neck. His legs and backside were above the surface. 
His version of it was that when he was dragged out half 
drowned old Jacky gave him the customary sum of money from 
his waistcoat pocket, a small tip to denote the end of his 
training, then said "You took your time about getting out." 
To which he replied, "So would you if you were held down by 
your head like I was." Jacky retorted, "My mistake, lad, I 
didn't realise that was your arse sticking up, I thought it 
was your head - you look better that way up" and then walked 
away laughing his head off." (80) 
This account of the initiation into journeyman status in the 
1890s with the help of the yard owner as "one of the lads" is 
replaced by the author's own account of initiation in the late 
1930s. This particular "rite" involved immersion in a barrel 
filL:::.::! IIJith filt:ly WC!ltr, buL l11 lhiti caoe the circumstances 
surrounding the "event" were very different: 
"All this, of course, was done with one eye out for the 
foreman who was, in his turn, always mindful of the fact 
that a manager might witness the struggle. He knew what 
went on, but had to stop the skylarking and threatened 
suspension or other dire punishment for the sake of 
discipline and appearances." (81) 
A general feature of the accounts given by the men interviewed in 
connection with this research who worked in Wear yards in the 
1920s and 1930s is not the lack of social distance between 
employer and employee, but rather the reverse. Moreover a 
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deferential attitude is observed in some of the accounts given 
which stress the importance of acknowledgement across the social 
divide. Thus for example one plater began his account of working 
in a shipyard stressing the fact that he became known to the 
owners personally: 
"I worked at Laings and Thompsons ..• I knew Victor Thompson 
••• I've been at meetings ••• different discussions I've had 
with him .•. he thought the world of me." (82) 
A similar account was produced by another boilermaker describing 
how he "knew" Cyril Thompson: 
"Now then, that man never walked past me anytime in the 
shipyard, he always stopped to talk to me- always." (83) 
From these and other accounts there emerges an overall impression 
of the importance of being known by a "significant other", in 
most cases this being the owner of the yard. However the view of 
the employers produced in such accounts approximates more to the 
modern media portrayal of Royalty than to any notion of the 
employer as "one of the lads". Tltt:: essence of tnese views, which 
also betray a moral order, is summed up in the much heard phrase 
used to describe shipyard owners - that these men were "gentle-
men". It is this phrase rather than any more precise description 
such as paternalism which captures the quality of the 
relationship between the workers and the owners of lhe Wearside 
shipyards in the inter-war period. To some extent the social 
distance between the workers and the "gentlemen" who owned the 
yards excused the latter from being seen as implicated in the day 
Chapter 2 - 106 -
to day conflicts which arose in the workplace - like Royalty they 
were almost "above all that". 
Such a view was often true in a literal, geographical as 
well as an organisational sense. The day to day issues of lhe 
regulation of employment was the preserve of the foremen and 
managers, and this was the level at which most of the potential 
conflict would be articulated. Again here, the importance of the 
"occupational community" and the small size of the yards could be 
considerable. Thus one worker explained how he was able to move 
from one yard to another because of the similar movement of 
foremen and managers: 
"They all passed (from one yard to another) the managers, 
the foremen they all passed, even the manager went down 
there, the foreman plater went down there - that's how I 
walked in you see." (84) 
Even where supervisory staff did not physically move they could 
still assert their influence through an active social network: 
"It was essential to try to keep a good personal reputation. 
Foremen did know each other, and passed men around from one 
yard to another. ~all raul at one toreman and a tradesman 
could find himself frozen out." (B 5) 
In such a situation with the foremen as the hirers and firers of 
labour one can appreciate how the owners could in some senses be 
seen to be above the conflicts on the "shop floor" and remain as 
a significant other in the eyes of the worker - a "gentleman" who 
"thinks the world" of his workers as individuals. Back at the 
level of the production process however, the "harmony" in 
industrial relations was perhaps less the product of goodwill 
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between persons, but rather the pragmatic result of the balance 
of forces between workers and foremen articulated through the 
networks of the work and community situation. Clearly at this 
level "harmony" is often in the eye of the beholder, for as Weber 
has noted: 
"Obedience will be taken to mean that the action of the 
person obeying follows in essentials such a course that the 
content of the command may be taken to have become the basis 
of action for its own sake ••• Subjectively, the causal 
sequence may vary, especially as between "submission" and 
"sympathetic agreement". ( 86) 
Being "obedient" to a foreman meant more than doing a 
satisfactory job at work - it meant also keeping a '~ood personal 
reputation" in a wider sense: 
"You couldn't afford to have an argument with a foreman, 
what! If you upset one of them that was it, you were 
finished." (87) 
Here again what is important is the physical concentration of the 
yards on the Wear and the relatively "closed" nature of the 
community; in a sense the physical density and structure of the 
occupational community served to produce a particular "moral" 
density. The importance of the "respectable" working craftsman 
was highlighted through both the pragmatic considerations of a 
very effective social network amongst foremen (in the face of a 
loose labour market) and was also encouraged by the moral density 
of the occupational culture stressing the politics of local 
loyalties <88 ). The importance of "respectable" (i.e. non 
radical) status was pointed to by the "carrot" of identification 
with the "gentlemen" owners and the "stick"- the power of and 
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the effective network between the foremen. This produced a 
situation in which those in exercise of the economic power of 
hiring and firing (the foremen) were because of community 
position very effective bulwarks against the potentially activist 
worker. However on the other hand, as will be shown later, the 
importance of the foremen in the recruitment and organisation of 
labour was dependent upon and refracted through their own 
backgrounds as craftsmen. This factor was one of several which 
was to serve as a retarding force in relation to any radical 
views of reorganising and/or deskilling the production process. 
It is within the contexts outlined so far - the interaction of 
physical and social locality and distance, the persistence of 
cultural continuity and the historically speci fie forms of the 
employer/employee relationship that the problems and 
opportunities of the shipbuilding industry on the Wear in the 
inter-war period were enacted. We must now look at some of the 
issues which became important during this time in order more 
fully to understand the specific content of the employment 
relationship. 
Part V 
It was argued in an earlier section that a major 
characteristic of the British economy in the inter-war period was 
that of crisis and slump, the effects of which were unevenly 
distributed across industries, with the traditional export 
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industries and shipbuilding in particular being the worst hit. 
However it has been argued by some that shifts in the level of 
world trade do not primarily define the notion of crisis and what 
is of more importance is the idea of the falling rate of profit 
and the devaluation of capital (89). This may be so if one is 
attempting to understand the large scale structural tendencies 
within the capitalist mode of production. What it cannot do is 
provide a link between these movements and the active initiatives 
undertaken by capital in its (personified) attempts to deal with 
the problems that they (individual capitalists) saw as facing 
them. In other words to reject the validity of analysing 
movements in the levels of world trade as a problem in itself is 
to render unintelligible the preoccupations of capitalists, and 
by and large those of the workforce also, who saw these very 
movements as comprising the central problem with which the 
industry had to grapple (i.e. lack of demand for ships). What 
this suggests, then, is that in order to deal adequately at the 
level of meaning with the actions of agents one must give a 
validity to their way of seeing the problems that confront them 
regardless of whether we see that approach as residing within the 
realms of mere ideology (90), To do otherwise and force "our" 
particular problematic wholly with little concern for the actions 
of the agents orientated towards "their" problematic is to risk 
distortion in our analysis. Whilst we may see "their" approach 
as residing in the realm of ideology we must nevertheless 
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appreciate, along with Gram sci 7 the "materiality of ideology" 
( 91) So then, the starting point for the investigation of the 
inter-war period has to be the contours of demand, the point at 
which the general moves in world trade and the historical 
specifics of Britain's position interact with respect to the 
shipbuilding industry. The details of the amount of tonnage 
commenced, launched and under construction are tabulated in 
Appendix (2); what is important for present purposes is the view 
of the nature of the "crisis" as understood by those in the 
industry. It is in that sense that the fluctuations in demand 
are to be seen as important. 
During the first world war 13 million gross tons of merchant 
shipping were lost due to enemy action, of which over 8 million 
tons were British (92). Given this state of affairs and the fact 
that many yards had been working solely on naval work during the 
war, it WRA expPrted that demand for new tonnagE ~auld be greal 
in the post war period, so much so that many new shipbuilding 
firms were created. For example on the Wear work started in the 
early part of 1918 on two new shipyards, the Egis yard at 
Pallion and the Wear Concrete Building Company. As Smith and 
Holden noted, 
"By the end of the summer three keels of cargo ships had 
been laid at the Egis yard, and the keels of two ocean-going 
tugs at the concrete yard." (93) 
Similarly in shipbuilding centres throughout the country new 
berths were being created to produce for a demand which, as soon 
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became evident, was of a temporary nature. The rate at which new 
tonnage was built throughout the world was nothing short of 
staggering, so that by 1919 the tonnage in existence was 1.8 
million tons greater than in 1914. The high level of demand did 
not last however, and freight rates began to decline in February 
1920. That year represented the peak of the boom with British 
yards launching 2,040,000 gross tons, and even into 1921 tonnage 
under construction was 3, 800,000 tons compared with a pre-war 
maximum of 2,600,000 gross tons. However when we look at the 
quarterly returns we can see how drastic the drop in demand was, 
as the tonnage commenced in the last quarter of 1920 was 506,000 
falling to 393,000 in the first quarter of 1921, and then to a 
disastrous 69,000 by the second quarter. In Sunderland the 
effects of the fall in demand were felt immediately. 
"Output in 1921 fell to less than half the figure for 1920; 
the position worsened in 1922, and in 1923 the figures 
dropped to 17 ships and 56,5222 gross tons. By July 1923, 
J..l!,OOO mon i."Jere out uf wurk in Sunderland ..• Wage 
reductions caused several strikes in the shipbuilding and 
engineering industry." ( 94) 
The severity of the collapse of demand was such that many 
people in the industry saw that it was not due solely to the 
operation of the business cycle but was also caused by the 
changed circumstances consequent upon the end of the first world 
war. Thus William Lorimer, the General Secretary of the Boiler-
makers Society, suggested that the depression in the industry in 
1921 was: 
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" ... mainly due to the conditions laid down in the Peace 
Terms with Germany, under which thousands of tons of the 
best of her merchant tonnage were handed over to the Allies 
and the further condition imposed upon her that they would 
each year for a number of years build ships to be also 
distributed among the Allies as part of the payments under 
the Reparations Agreement." (95) 
It is true that the transference of tonnage as reparations 
was considerable. Between the years 1919 and 1922 slightly over 
2 million tons were transferred, an amount equivalent to one and 
a half years of "normal" post war output (between 1919 to 1931) 
(96). Of more importance than this however was the increase in 
shipbuilding output from countries not centrally involved in the 
conflict, most notably the U.S.A., whose output rose from 228,000 
tons in 1913 to no less than 3,580,000 tons in 1920, although 
this quickly fell back to an average of 95,000 tons between the 
years 1922 to 1926 (97). 
Whichever factor one takes to be of greater importance, the 
result is nevertheless the same - the problem is defined first 
and foremost as one of overcapacity. This problematic was to 
remain the dominating theme throughout the inter-war period. The 
reaction to this situation on behalf of individual British ship-
builders was to enhance competitiveness by cutting costs and a 
traditional element in such a strategy was that of wage reduct-
ion. The declining level of demand in the industry was matched by 
rounds of wage cuts implemented by the employers. From the point 
of view of the workforce the withdrawal of recent awards provoked 
more outcry than the rescindment of special bonuses. Thus the 
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joiners' strike on the Wear, which began on December lst 1920, 
was precipitated by the withdrawal of a 12 shilling a week 
advance which had been awarded as late as May 1920. The strike 
lasted until August 22nd, 1921, a reduction of 9 shillings a week 
to be phased in in two instalments. In other cases however wage 
reductions were accepted, however grudgingly by the workforce. 
"By April 1921 the industry's new difficulties were 
beginning to emerge clearly. So too were the employers' 
demands that the workmen should play their part in trying to 
retrieve the position. They asked for a 6 shilling a week 
reduction in time rates and for a 15% reduction in piece 
rates to take effect from the end of April. The unions 
agreed as long as the reductions could take effect in two 
instalments on May 7th and June 4th ... (and) ... in the 
face of an almost total absence of orders employers gave 
notice that they were going to abolish the Ministry of 
Munitions war bonuses of twelve and a half per cent to time 
workers and seven and a half per cent to piece workers in 
three instalments from November 1921 to January 1922. Harsh 
though these measures must have seemed, the men agreed to 
accept them in a ballot." (98) 
As well as reducing wages, as the slump continued the 
employers sought to gain greater flexibility with respect to 
their "variable capital". Thus by 1922: 
" .•• the shipbuilding firms on the Wear ended their time 
honoured custom of their working by the day and established 
the new method of working by the hour." (99) 
The importance of all these initiatives was that they were aimed 
at reducing costs, in these cases wage costs. Efforts were also 
made to obtain more favourable terms with suppliers, although by 
1922: 
"Costs remained high, despite cut-throat prices quoted by 
builders to obtain orders. Ships plates which cost £7 a ton 
before the war were now costing £24; coal had risen from 10 
shillings to 40 shillings a ton." (100) 
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The concern with costs and the level of absolute demand dominated 
the concerns of builders on the Wear (and elsewhere), and the 
years of 1925 and 1926 saw the demise of two of the yards on the 
river: those of John Blumer and Co. and Sunderland Shipbuilding 
Company. Demand remained at a low level throughout the middle 
years of the 1920s (lOl). A rise in freight rates increased 
demand in 1927, especially for replacement tramp tonnage (102), 
and on the Wear demand rose up until 1930. 
Changes in the production process throughout the 1920s 
tended to be piecemeal. On the Wear there was an extension in the 
use of pneumatic riveting, and in some yards the introduction of 
plate punching machines 00 3). The earliest mention of the 
existence of a welding squad on the Wear, doing primarily non-
structural work, was during 1928: 
"The first welder was a bloke called Sollie French, and he 
started that in Laings." (104) 
The issue of welding will be considered in greater detail at a 
later point. The main thing to grasp here is that during the 
1920s it was issues other than those concerned directly with the 
production process which were uppermost in the minds of the 
employers. This did not mean however that no questions were asked 
about British building techniques as part of the wider industry. 
Indeed during 1926 when a substantial order of five ships, for a 
British shipping line called Furness Withy, was placed with a 
German yard there was a public outcry. Suggestions in the Times 
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were that it had as much lo do with the overall organisation of 
German industry and the prevalent corporate form as to any 
specific phase of the organisation of production. 
"It is probable that one of the factors which makes for the 
ability of the German yards to compete is the complete 
"trustification" of material, from the mine to the fitted 
plate, from the financing bank to the sale of tickets. This 
system is not without its effect on wages, and the cost of 
living. When all these forces are turned into the same 
direction the margin for reduction in costs becomes very 
considerable." (105) 
Commenting on the same event Leon Trotsky, writing on the British 
economy, drew a similar overall conclusion: 
"There are, it is true, indications that the order for ships 
was placed with the Hamburg yard for the special purpose of 
frightening the trade unions and thus preparing the ground 
for bringing pressure to bear on them with a view to lower-
ing wages and lengthening hours of labour. Needless to say, 
that manoeuvre is more than likely. But that does not in 
the least weaken the force of our general considerations on 
the irrational organisation of British industry and on the 
overhead expenses arising out of that organisation." (106) 
It would indeed seem to have had the effect of "frightening the 
trade unions", tor they agreed to participate with the employers 
in an inquiry into the nature of foreign competition. The inquiry 
found that workers in Dutch and German yards worked longer hours 
than the British workers and often foreign yards had more 
advanced equipment. The conclusions drawn from the inquiry 
differed markedly. The unions called for international influence 
to be asserted to restrict "unfair competition". The employers 
made more detailed recommendations and in as far as these related 
to the production process they called for a greater element of 
"elasticity" and "interchangeability", but importantly these 
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recommendations, amounting to some 11 fi fty flexible practices 11 , 
were to be achieved 
11 without infringement of the broad principles of 
craftsmanship. 11 (107) 
This indeed would seem to be the hallmark of the approach of 
the employers throughout the 1920s, considerations of the 
organisation of the division of labour were subordinated to the 
concerns of overcapacity and external costs. These issues were 
viewed through a perspective which stressed the normalcy of 
fluctuations in trade; to this extent the problem was seen as the 
absolute decline in demand rather than the chang_ing pattern of 
what demand there was. In the face of such resignation to the 
inevitability of recurring slumps the owners did little to change 
production techniques. The complex of reasons as to why this was 
the case can best be outlined in consideration of the 1930s, and 
in particular in the case of welding. 
The ~lump of th~ 1930s bore many similarities with the 
1920s, but there were also significant differences. The severity 
of the collapse of world trade was all the more notable because 
it was not consequent upon the dislocations of production and 
consumption following a war, as in the 1920s. Again the nature of 
the product of the industry was such (the medium of transportal-
ion of world trade) that the effects of the decline in world 
trade were felt quickly, and on the Wear these effects meant that 
by 1932 there were only two ships launched. 
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"In these tragic years the depression was really 
unprecedented. Two small colliers in one year made the 
slump of the 'twenties look like a time of comparative 
prosperity." ( 108) 
What is striking about contemporary commentaries of the develop-
ment of the slump in the industry is the rapidity with which 
these changes took place, and also the shifting quality of the 
accounts from buoyant optimism to despair. It is perhaps useful 
to outline these developments as they relate to the industry in 
the North East, and particularly the situation upon the Wear. 
The year of 1930 began bright enough with the output in the 
North East district being the best for nine years (109) 
Furthermore it was estimated that: 
"The shipbuilding outlook on the Tyne, Wear and Tees for the 
current year is very bright, by reason of the large number 
of foreign orders secured towards the end of 1929." ( 110) 
Only one week later the same observer introduced a note of 
caution into his earlier estimation. 
"The middle of the first month of the year has not disclosed 
much new business locally in the placing of orders for new 
ships." (.111) 
It was noted that this was particularly true of tramp tonnage 
which "could not easily be made to pay". By March the 
seriousness of the situation was becoming apparent, and it was 
noted that in the North Eastern region as a whole: 
"There have been very few orders placed this year and soon 
there will at least be some empty berths once more. Leading 
yards are better off than the smaller ones, but there are 
instances where firms are getting uncomfortably near the end 
of present contracts." (112) 
By May, the feeling of crisis in the industry was largely 
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confirmed. The work in hand had dwindled to a very low level and 
the outlook for the rest of the year was black. 
"In the course of the next few months there will be a marked 
change in the shipbuilding position on local rivers. Some 
yards are very near the end of present contracts and no 
fresh orders are being received. The Wear is worse off than 
the Tyne or the Tees. One Sunderland firm has put its last 
ship into the water." (1.13) 
The position of the Wear continued to deteriorate, and a changed 
atmosphere on the river was seen to exist. 
"Just now ship launches on the river have a significance 
rather different from those of normal times. They mark 
stages towards greater unemployment for shipyard men because 
fresh orders are so hard to get. At the present time there 
are less than a dozen vessels on the stocks; four yards are 
without work, and the remainder are getting very near the 
end of their contracts. (114) 
It was becoming clear that the problem of orders would continue, 
and if the outlook at the beginning of the year had been "very 
bright" it was now catastrophic, especially in Sunderland, with 
"armies of workless" within the borough (115). Moreover, 
"The winter outlook for shipbuilding on the Wear is worse 
than on the Tyne or Tees. A very few yards on the Tyne have 
sufficient work to carry them well into the coming year, and 
the Tees has some tankers, cargo boats and whalers to build; 
but on the Wear the contracts in hand appear to have 
dwindled to seven steamers and two hoppers. Five yards out 
of about a dozen on the banks of the river are without any 
work, and before the year ends there will be very little 
shipbuilding going on at all. As far as is known, no new 
orders have been booked for a considerable time." (116) 
The crisis of the 1930s hit the Wear earlier and harder than 
the Tyne or Tees. But in the absence of a single large yard 
closing down in one catastrophic event the river gradually, but 
over a relatively short time period, ground to a halt. It is not 
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to be wondered then that it was the closure of Palmers at Jarrow 
that produced that most fabled event in inter-war working class 
history: the "Jarrow March", for if Jarrow was "the town that was 
murdered" (ll/), Sunderland appeared to have died of natural 
causes. 
The shipbuilding employers however appeared to have learnt 
that the inaction that was characteristic of the previous decade 
had not helped the industry, and the free play of market forces 
had not resulted in the successful "rationalisation 11 of the 
industry. For as Sir Frederick Pyman, a Director of William 
Gray's yard at West Hartlepool, noted in a speech in October 
1933: 
11 Shipbuilders die hard. They hang on in the hope that 
competitors may go under and that things will get better. 
In the privately owned yards, which must constitute a 
substantial proportion of the capacity of the industry, it 
is common to find the third, fourth, or even fifth 
generation at the helm. Family pride and prestige are at 
stake .•. So there are forces at work which are pulling .in 
oppoaite dlreclion lo economic forces. For nearly a decade 
the old shibboleth of laissez faire reigned and what 
happened? A mere handful of yards went into liquidation, 
and of these the best were picked up at scrap prices and 
reconditioned." ( 118) 
Again the central problem of the industry was seen as over-
capacity, and therefore as lying outside of the division of 
labour (119), The response of the employers to the developing 
slump was the formation of National Shipbuilders' Security LTD 
(N.S.S.) in February 1930. The aim of the company was to reduce 
shipbuilding capacity through buying up and dismantling redundant 
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yards. The company was formed of shipbuilders themselves, with 
capital of £10,000, and borrowing powers of up to £2.5 million, 
plus a 1% levy, paid by members, of the price of new tonnage. On 
the board of directors of N.S.S. were two people with direct 
interests on the Wear: Sir Alexander Kennedy, Chairman of William 
Dox.fords, and Mr. R. Norman Thompson, Director of both J.L. 
Thompsons and Sir James Laing and Sons Ltd 0 20 ). The official 
statement of policy of N.S.S. made it clear that the problem 
which the firm was addressing was one related to "financial 
stability" rather than rationalisation of production as such. 
"The British shipbuilding industry during the last two years 
has been steadily consolidating its position in world 
shipbuilding, in the face of unprecedented and subsidised 
foreign competition. It is now building over 50% of the 
world's tonnage. To enable shipbuilding to recover and 
maintain financial stability it has become imperative to 
secure a greater concentration of work available, thus 
obtaining considerable savings in the overhead and adminis-
trative costs and in rates and taxes." (121) 
In this view the "rationalisation" would improve cost-
effecthtfmess s:od not Li1erefore lead to greater unemployment 
amongst "shop floor" workers. 
"We do not think, when the new proposals are carried out, 
that there will be any additional unemployment in the ship-
building trades. It is hoped that at least the same number 
of ships will be turned out each year, and it is possible 
that there may be even more ... Such reductions as will be 
inevitable are more likely to take place in the higher 
grades of staff and managerial departments." (122) 
Similarly Sir Alexander Kennedy reported in a speech at 
Fairfields on the Clyde that: 
"He had noticed that the fear had been expressed in certain 
quarters that the activities of the new corporation might 
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lead to the closing down of yards which formed the principal 
nucleus for employruent in their respective areas ••. He had 
no doubt at all that the correlation of producing capacity 
to the possible market demand could be accomplished with 
little or no disturbance to any particular shipbuilding 
area. Indeed if it was true, as he thought it undoubtedly 
was, that considerable saving could be effected by greater 
concentration of production than existed at present, then it 
should mean more work for shipbuilding and thus more 
employment. (123) 
However it became apparent in the operation of N.S.S. that 
with the deteriorating level of demand such ''rationalisation" 
would bring higher levels of unemployment for tradesmen. Its 
activities began to resemble solely the payment of redundancy 
money to employers. As one worker put it: 
"I remember N.S.S. came up and we discussed it. "Oh," I 
said, "that's very good, and what percentage do the retired 
men that have been thrown on the scrapheap get? Is there any 
fund to recompense some of them?" Only the employers were 
getting the benefit, you see. The workers were getting 
nothing." (124) 
Furthermore the form that the "rationalisation" took seemed to be 
rather arbitrary and based purely upon who was willing to sell 
out. On the l~e 3r fer exam plt: Lhere seemed to be 1 it tl e 
consideration of the technical efficiency of the yards closed. 
"The loss of Gray's shipyard was particularly resented. It 
was the most modern - in point of time on the river ... " 
(125) 
At the same time that builders in Britain, with the encouragement 
of the Government and the Bank of England, were attempting at all 
costs to reduce capacity, the French Government was giving direct 
aid to their builders. By May 1930 the French Government had 
concluded that supplying maritime credits to shipowners was not 
Chapter 2 - 122 -
the best way to help their own shipbuilders as orders were placed 
abroad, primarily in Britain and Germany. So whilst they 
required the employers to launch a committee to formulate a 
program of concentration and rationalisation they also offered 
direct aid to builders in order to match foreign prices. In the 
mid '30s, when the British Government decided that the ship-
building industry needed assistance, it was given directly in the 
form of the British Shipping (Assistance) Act of 1935. The scrap 
and build scheme enshrined in the act encouraged British shipping 
owners to place orders by scrapping old tonnage and subsidising 
the building of new. What the scheme did not do was subsidise 
British Shipbuilders directly; clearly the problem was not seen 
to lie in inefficiencies within the yards. The efforts of the 
N.S.S. were similarly orientated towards reducing capacity 
(building capacity rather than shipping capacity directly) and 
the establishment of market equilibrium at a lower level. The 
most pressing problem was clearly seen as lack of demand, or to 
put it another way, over-supply. 
Given this situation the issues pursued inside the yards 
were orientated towards the reduction of costs in order to 
survive until market equilibrium returned. Moves were being made 
nationally in this direction by the Shipbuilding Employers 
Federation ( S.E.F. ). In a letter to the Wear Shipbuilders 
Association ( W.S.A.) the S.E.F. stated that: 
"At a recent meeting of the federation central board it had 
been agreed that, in view of the depression in the industry, 
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and the increase in foreign competition, it was essential 
that everything possible should be done to secure the most 
economical level of costs." (126) 
Each local district was instructed to produce reports, the 
contents of which: 
" .•• should cover local agreements, arbitration awards, 
district and yard practices, and also the provisions of 
existing piecework price lists either for district or 
individual yards." (127) 
The list is a comprehensive one; however it became apparent that 
the most important items on this list were not "district and yard 
practices" but rather aspects of wage rates. Again the concern 
is primarily with issues other than those arising directly from 
the division of labour. Another important feature of this S.E.F. 
initiative was the tension that arose between the W.S.A. and the 
national body. This was eventually resolved by the W.S.A. 
attempting to act unilaterally. It is perhaps useful to indicate 
the dimensions of these issues as recorded by the W.S.A. 
On receipt of the district reports the S.E.F. wrote to the 
W.S.A. noting their concern about the piece rate prices, specif-
ically the platers• list, on the river. The W.S.A. wanted to 
start local negotiations to reduce the rates. But the S.E.F. did 
not want them to pre-empt the forthcoming national negotiations 
with the Boilermakers. However the W.S.A. disagreed and recorded 
their view that: 
" ... there was nothing to prevent the Association from 
instituting negotiations at once." (128) 
Negotiations began early in December and the secretary of the 
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W.~A. was instructed to write to the federation advising them of 
what was being done, and asking them if they approved of the act-
ion. Mr. Bartram, the W.S.A. delegate to the S.E.F., reported in 
March 1931 that the federation had reaffirmed its position that: 
" ••• no questions should be raised by local associations 
which would lead to a dispute with the Boilermakers Society 
while national questions were under consideration." (130) 
At the same meeting a letter from the Tyne Shipbuilders 
Association was presented which supported the S.E.F. position and 
asked the W.S.A. to cease negotiations. Ironically it was 
eventually the representatives of the workforce who put a stop to 
the local negotiations. Both "piece" prices and payments for 
"walking time" were being discussed, but the position adopted by 
the trades in the Federation of Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Trades was that: 
"They had stated that they could not proceed with 
negotiations until they knew what was to take place on the 
national wages negotiations." ( 131) 
On the other h3nd the Builermakers were not party to the 
national discussions and would only deal with wage questions 
locally. The position adopted by the W.S.A. shows the tensions 
that existed between lhe employers born out of the different 
circumstances that prevailed upon different rivers. However 
there were also division within the W.S.A. during this period, as 
the resignation of W. Pickersgill and Sons from the W.S.A. in 
March 1931 demonstrates. The meeting of the W.S.A. on March 5th 
of that year noted that: 
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"Messrs. Pickersgill's resignation was particularly 
unfortunate in view of the present position of the industry 
when the need for complete unity among employers was 
absolutely imperative. Disunity among employers at the 
present time was tantamount to handing over the industry to 
the trade unions." ( 132) 
The situation in which employers could not agree a national 
approach towards the unions had a long history in the industry 
where owners were proud of the individual standing and 
achievements of their own yards. The minutes of the W.S.A. 
during the early 1930s were predominantly concerned with wages 
and other cost issues, notable by its absence was any detailed 
debate over production techniques. Even the many entries in the 
minutes of 1931 and 1932 under the heading of "Revision of 
Onerous Agreements and Practices" refer primarily to altering 
rates of payment and removing the payment of extras (extra pay-
ments) for certain kinds of work. They do not refer to changes 
in the way the work is to be carried out. ThP theme of cads drH.J 
wages is continued in one of the other issues to loom large 
during this period, and that is the concern with wage rates in 
other industries, particularly local authority workers. 
On this issue the employers on the Wear followed the lead of 
those on the Clyde, who had begun to petition local councils in 
order to get them to lower their wage rates for manual workers. 
The disparity between workers in the "protected sector" and those 
in shipbuilding was thought to exercise upward pressure on wage 
rates in the industry. The W.S.A., finding that in 1931 a 
disparity of 7/6d existed between the wages of unskilled 
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municipal workers and unskilled shipbuilding workers on Wearside, 
initiated a letter to be signed by other firms in the town and 
then sent to the Council urging them to cut their rates (133). 
ihe absence of any significant discussions in the W.S.A. 
minutes about changes in the production process within yards 
suggests that such issues were not seen as dominant, or, at the 
very least, were held to be the responsibility of the individual 
employer and not a suitable issue for a joint approach. It is 
with these factors in mind, the dominance of the issues of cost 
and wages and the apparent lack of concern with the direct 
production process, that we must now turn to a consideration of 
the introduction of the S.E.F. welding plan and the development 
of welding as it happened (or didn't happen) on the Wear. 
The importance of the S.E.F. welding plan as outlined by 
Lorenz was that: 
"The scheme 
determinP- in 
upon which 
industry 
marked the first attempt by employers to 
edvanc9 thrc~gh nntional nciyotiaLions Lhe terms 
new techniques would be introduced to the 
II (134) 
The defeat of the welding scheme was taken as evidence that the 
British shipyard workers have indeed "characterised themselves by 
resisting at the point of production the expropriation of the 
control they have exercised over the labour process". The 
importance of the resistence which could be exercised by labour 
was also seen to be "the" factor restraining the employers from 
advocating a more "radical" scheme. 
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"After an initial, and misinformed, assessment that welding 
on the flat might require as little as two weeks training, 
the committee decided that between one and two years were 
required to train the average worker as a fully qualified 
welder. The S.E.F.'s final proposal however called for a 
five year apprenticeship and the training of welders with a 
general knowledge of shipyard practice. Any other proposal 
would have provoked a crisis in industrial relations, as it 
would have challenged the control the unions had been able 
to exercise over entry to the skilled trades through 
apprenticeship; the employers were evidently unwilling to 
confront the unions on this general principle." (135) 
Furthermore the failure of the employers to act on the potential 
which it was seen that the welding process had, to facilitate a 
restructuring of the division of labour has been explained in 
terms of a conservatism among the owners themselves. 
" the industry ignored the significance of the 
importance of prefabrication and large scale sub-assembly, 
which welding rendered possible in the development of a 
basic "factory" system. An explanation for this perhaps can 
be found in the basic conservatism of the employers." (136) 
The problem with these types of analysis as far as the 
introduction of welding on the River Wear was concerned, is that 
the whole issue did not appear to be as important on the Wear as 
on the Clyde or Tyne. The first mention of "Electric Welding on 
New Shipbuilding Work" in the W.S.A. minutes appears on July 18 
1933, some three months after the presentation of the S.E.F. 
scheme (137). Moreover it becomes clear that there was a good 
deal of confusion amongst individual employers as to the 
potential for savings that could be extracted from the welding 
process itself, its technical efficiency and the desirability of 
greater amounts of "fabrication" which the process could make 
possible. So far as the Wear is concerned then, it would seem 
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that Lorenz's assertion that, 
"The scheme marked the first attempt by employers to 
determine in advance through national negotiations the terms 
upon which new techniques would be introduced to the 
industry,an apparent indication of their unity .•• " (138) 
is somewhat of an exaggeration as the W.S.A. formally agreed to 
support the scheme at a meeting on the 12 September 1933, not 
only five months after its presentation but also after several 
unions had also rejected it! It is not an incidental piece of 
information that the S.E.F. welding scheme was fourth on the 
agenda at this meeting, being preceded by two separate problems 
relating to piecework rates. 
Before looking in more detail at the reasons why this 
"precedent setting" scheme was neglected on Wears ide it is 
perhaps useful to address some of the more general elements of 
"confusion" surrounding welding at this time. In an earlier 
reference it was noted that the skill content involved and 
therefore the required t;:ra.i ni.ng pAri nd tn unrlP.rt::~kp '"'Fll rli ng IMOrk 
was by no means self evident. In the previous decade however it 
had seemed obvious that welding was a skilled business. Thus in 
1926 it was thought by one authority that: 
"The reason why welding is not used to any great extent in 
shipbuilding is probably due to the fact that in the minds 
of most people it is generally regarded as being an 
operation carried out by hand and which ... cannot be 
economically employed on repetition work. Moreover, since 
it is performed by hand, to be successfully accomplished it 
requires skilled men and thus the semi-skilled or unskilled 
labourer cannot be employed on welding work ... in other 
words, the labour costs of the job are high." (139) 
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Even as late as 1930 it was still being suggested that welding 
involved a higher degree of skill than riveting. 
"We have frequently drawn attention to the possibilities of 
using welding in place of riveting in the construction of 
ships, but while the advantages of the former system are 
recognised the fact must not be lost sight of that its 
success depends to a greater extent upon the skill of the 
operator than does the latter, and hence particularly for 
strength portions of the the hull, riveting is still 
generally preferred." (140) 
The process did have its advocates however, and at this time 
Major James Caldwell of the Institution of Structural Engineers 
was clear as to the prime inhibiting factor: 
... it is not so much that naval architects who would not 
adopt welding in ship construction as the classification 
societies who would refuse to authorise such methods until 
they had convinced themselves by long and repeated 
experiments that they could give their consent to such 
without any misgiving." (141) 
It was not only the classification societies who were urging 
caution (142); it was felt by some shipbuilders and shipowners 
to be a more costly process if it was to be done correctly and 
rt••::~l ity g•t8ranteed, Thus in reply to ::t suggsction thd Brit;:;in 
was being left behind in terms of the application of welding to 
ship-building, the "Shipbuilding and Shipping Record" of August 
20 1931 offered the opinion that: 
" ... This question of cost is of course a factor which has 
decided shipbuilders and shipowners in this country against 
the extensive use of electric welding in spite of the 
obvious saving in weight which can be obtained. 
The necessity of employing skilled workers has often 
been stressed, but one of the greatest difficulties of 
electric welding, and one which is responsible for a large 
part of the increase in cost, is the necessity of providing 
most careful supervision and inspection during the process 
of welding. This point is covered by the requirements of 
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the classification societies, who recognise that it is quite 
possible to produce a weld which is apparently satisfactory 
and the unsoundness of which cannot be detected unless the 
joint is tested lo destruction •..• There is no doubt that 
the application of electric welding to the construction of 
the entire ship is quite practicable, but the course our 
British shipbuilders are taking in developing the usefulness 
of welding slowly, rather than undertaking the organisation 
required for what would at best be a costly experiment, is 
wise • 11 (143) 
The article went on to quote research undertaken in the aircraft 
industry which showed that only 25% of welded joints tested 
proved to be satisfactory. The technical efficiency of welded 
joints, undertaken in the less than ideal situation of the ship-
yard, remained problematic throughout the period of the 
negotiations over the S.E.F. welding plan. 
Indeed up to twenty years later ships were still being lost 
due to the failure of welded joints. 
"Between 1942 and 1952, about 250 welded ships suffered one 
or more brittle fractures of such severity that they were 
lost or in a dangerous condition, and 1200 more suffered 
small brittle cracks dangerous but not disabling. 11 (144) 
The point is then that a question mark hung over the welding 
process both as to its technical efficiency and its cost 
efficiency. This question mark had by no means been dispelled by 
the time of the S.E.F.'s struggle with the labour force over the 
introduction of the process. Indeed it was perhaps the case that 
in relation to the early use of welding in shipyards the owners 
were faced with a choice which was similar to the one confronting 
employers thinking of introducing Taylor's scientific management, 
where: 
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" ... it became apparent that in the face of an uncertain 
outcome his methods required initial increases in cost." 
(145) 
So it was with welding, for it necessitated investment in plant, 
reorganisation of plating procedures, the development of new 
training programmes for returns which were anything but precisely 
known. The decision of the S.E.F. not to pay piece rates would 
suggest that they were unsure as to how far their estimate of 
12ft per hour for "downhand" welds was realistic, and as far as 
weight saving on the final product was concerned estimates varied 
between the 30% of deadweight displacement made by the 
manufacturers to the less substantial 7% estimated by naval 
architects. This uncertainty coupled with the heterogeneous 
"specialities" of different centres and the concerns of 
individual yards would suggest that a situation of less than 
absolute unity was likely to prevail, with individual yards being 
unwilling to risk disruption for the sake of a formal agreement 
over a process which may have remained of marginal interest for a 
number of years to come. 
It is exactly these kinds of issues that must be borne in 
mind when considering the attitudes and behaviour of the Wear 
Shipbuilders Association towards the S.E.F. welding plan. The 
general impression given by the W.S.A. minutes during the period 
covering the introduction of the S.E.F. welding plan is that the 
"action" happened elsewhere. Furthermore the statements of unity 
in relation to such things as the prices to be paid for plating 
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work stand out as statements of principle rather than of 
practice, and many are qualified by reservations anyway. It has 
already been mentioned that the W.S.A. first showed interest in 
the welding plan a considerable time after it was first 
presented. However as the minutes record that Mr. Gebbie, the 
delegate to the S.E.F., went into the provisions of the plans in 
considerable detail it is possible that not all the employers at 
this meeting were aware of the details involved <146). Further-
more it is interesting that his main concern was with the prices 
to be paid for plating work under the scheme, 
" for unless a lead was given by the W.S.A. or the 
federation, British yards would find themselves at a serious 
disadvantage compared with foreign builders." (147) 
Even in the midst of this "precedent setting" scheme the concern 
of the W.S.A. as articulated by Mr. Gebbie would appear to focus 
on wage rates. As we have seen the meeting of 12 September gave 
rather belated support to the plan, and also noted anxiety that 
piecework was being operated by some warship yards. Furthermore, 
"It was suggested that as none of the firms in this district 
had had much experience in welding, it would be advisable to 
have some suggestions and advice for the firms drawn up as 
to what they should do in the way of organising yard 
operations for welding, and as to what they should pay for 
the operations that would be altered by welding ... Whether 
it would be possible to make new prices which would suit 
every firm on the river was another matter, (in relation to 
plating) some firms might shear and others might burn. And 
further some firms might desire to put semi-skilled men on 
certain work, if so it would obviously be better for all the 
firms to employ semi-skilled labour on that work, so as to 
preserve uniformity as far as possible." (148) 
Again what is striking is the "tone" of these statements 
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implying that unity is fragile and can only be sustained '~s far 
as possible". This meeting agreed to the setting up of the 
W.S.A. welding sub-committee to advise on the questions raised. 
The sub-committee met for the first time on October 17 1933, and 
it reported to a full meeting of the W.S.A. on 29 January 1934. 
It had completed half of its task but it is clear that its advice 
was not invested with legislative power. The committee 
" .•. had drawn up a statement showing the class of workmen 
to be in charge of each operation on the all-welded ship. 
This was intended for the guidance of firms when work of 
that nature had to be done." (149) 
In relations to the pricing of work it was recorded that: 
"As far as possible it would be desirable to observe 
uniformity with regard to these matters though it might be 
difficult to do so." (150) 
The question was raised as to whether the welding committee 
should advise on pricing, but the Chairman 
" ••. thought it was perhaps rather early as yet to deal 
with the matter. As the process developed, the committee 
should meet frequently with a view to keeping in touch with 
the work in the yards and seeing that it progressed along 
the right lines." (151) 
It is clear from this meeting that the deliberations are about 
practice some time in the future, and the exact details of the 
conditions for the implementation of the plan had not been 
concretised before the next notable meeting of the welding sub-
committee on July 17 1934 where: 
"Reference was made to the federation welding scheme which 
in the opinion of the committee had largely broken down 
owing to the fact that in the yards where the strikes had 
occurred on the introduction of the 60/- rate, the trouble 
had been got over by putting the men on piece. The 
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committee was however strongly of the op1n1on that the work 
on the Wear should be done as it came along at the time rate 
of 60/- with the appropriate rates for trainees, and that 
piece prices should not in any case be arranged without 
prior consultation with the association." (152) 
That this assertive statement was more a statement of 
principle than practice did not become obvious until 1935, for 
that is when this type of work first "came along" on the Wear. 
In a meeting of the sub-committee on April 12 1935 it was noted 
that Doxfords and J.L. Thompson's were contemplating the 
introduction of piecework on welding as the situation was 
developing at Doxfords where workers would not accept. the 60/-
rate when men were getting paid more elsewhere 0 53 ). It is 
clear that when faced with the possibility of industrial action 
individual yards on the Wear capitulated on the issue of piece 
rates and indeed it would be difficult to see how they could have 
maintained the position outlined in the S.E.F. plan when other 
areas had already conceded the applicability of such rates. 
On the other issue of denying the Boilermakers Society to 
represent welders as a class the W.S.A. were still reiteratively 
stating the formal position, even though the piecework issue had 
been conceded. Thus in reporting the current views of the S.E.F. 
on the proposed introduction of piece rates at a Wear yard in a 
W.S.A. meeting on 10 May 1935, 
"It was reported that the question of piecework on welding 
had recently been considered by the Federation conference 
and works board, whose view it was that yards using 
different plant and electrodes must necessarily have 
different piece prices; each yard would accordingly have to 
arrange its own list. The Federation also agreed with the 
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firm and the Association welding committee that firms should 
negotiate only with their own workmen and not with any union 
or unions, as no union could, of course be taken to 
represent welders as a class. 
After discussion the meeting agreed that in the 
introduction of piecework firms would have to proceed 
individually and the proposal of the firms concerned to 
introduce piecework was applauded." (154) 
Again the statement about not recognising any union as 
representing welders as a class was largely a statement of 
principle, as the welders in both yards concerned, Doxfords and 
J.L. Thompson's, were all members of the Boilermakers Society. 
Given this situation any attempt to act in accordance with the 
statement could prove difficult as became clear at the W.S.A. 
meeting on July 22: 
"On the question of piecework, one of the members stated he 
had arranged prices with their own men but the Boilermakers 
Society (of which all their welders were members) had 
prevented the men from working on piece. It appeared that 
the Society took the view that they should have more time 
and experience before going on to piece." (155) 
The issue of representation was already settled then, and it was 
only a matter of time before the employers had to concede the 
point. In this sense the eventual solution of the issue would 
seem to vindicate the "strategy" taken by the unions. 
The unions undertook to conduct the struggle yard by yard. 
Thus a direct national confrontation was avoided. It was 
left to individual employers to precipitate any disputes. 
Trade union members continued working normally so long as 
existing arrangements were maintained." (156) 
However this view is, in some senses, a post hoc rationalisation 
of the strategy pursued which was the only possible course of 
action given the depleted funds of the Society; it is unlikely 
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that a national confrontation could have been sustained by the 
union. Furthermore with reference to the Wear there were, as we 
have seen, instances where Boilermakers did agree piece rates 
with employers; even if they obeyed instructions from the Society 
not to operate on these rates the point should not be overlooked 
that in the absence of instruction individual workers were less 
than consistent in their advocacy of the union's position. 
In another sense it would seem that the S.E.F. welding plan 
was never forcefully applied in practice by the W.S.A.. Indeed 
from October 17 1933 until July 1935 the welding sub-committee of 
the W.S.A. only met six times. In terms of the training of 
welders the most important problem was not seen to be the 
potential union resistance, but rather the external state of 
trade. 
" .•• there is no lack of potential labour supply, but the 
difficulty arises from the present state of the industry 
which it is considered will right itself in due course as 
the industry revives." (157) 
It is the case then that the shipbuilders of the Wear paid 
less attention to the welding process than those of the Clyde and 
the Tyne. There are several reasons for this. Firstly the 
"specialised" product of the Wear was tramp tonnage which was not 
deemed to benefit from the use of welded joints as much as the 
larger liners or warships. Secondly, McGoldrick's assertion that 
" ••• the concern with costs drove shipbuilders towards 
welding" (158) 
must be treated warily as the specific structure of Wear firms 
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and the effect that the slump had upon them must be taken into 
account. That the introduction of welding meant an initial 
increase in cost (investment) cannot be denied. Given this 
situation, interest in practically adopting the process on the 
Clyde and the Tyne began in 1934 when the industry in these 
locations was reviving. 
On the Wear, as we have seen, the slump began earlier, but 
also showed signs of improvement later: 
"In 1932 the County Borough of Sunderland topped the 
unemployment league table for areas of high unemployment 
with a figure of 36.6~6. The Commissioner for special areas 
lamented the fact that while unemployment figures for the 
whole of Durham and Tyneside area had shown a steady, if 
slight improvement since 1932, by 1934 the number of 
unemployed in Sunderland was 1, 773 more than the previous 
year." (159) 
Moreover, the Commissioner for special areas went on to note in 
1934 that: 
"Special attention should be paid to the case of Sunder land. 
The industrial area at the mouth of the Wear is in fact 
isolated from the rest of the North FHst c:ocst, and iia::> not 
shared in such measure of revival as has already come to the 
Tyne." (160) 
In fact the industry revived very slowly on the Wear until 1936 
where, with orders placed under the scrap and build scheme, 
output rose from 31,396 gross tons in 1935 to 138,791 gross tons, 
representing 8 and 36 ships respectively. Furthermore given the 
depth and duration of the slump, the scope for new investment was 
small: 
"Wear firms, still privately owned, found difficulty in 
raising the capital necessary for ••• re-equipment and re-
organisation." (161) 
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Under these conditions it was not a concern with the relative 
costs of construction that dominated, but rather, in absence of 
orders, it was the absolute cost of overheads that mattered. On 
the Wear a concern with costs served to postpone initiatives for 
the introduction of welding. 
The "struggle" over the introduction as envisaged in the 
S.E.F. welding plan was largely fought elsewhere. Nevertheless 
on a national scale the unity of the employers was in the main 
lheoretical - a desire for the best outcome without considering 
the realities of the constraints operating in their situations. 
They were, as we have noted, divided by product specialisation 
which most importantly represented itself as a difference in 
timing for the projected introduction of welding. Thus the time 
that any individual employers were willing to sustain a strike, 
with only the theoretical backing of all the employers, and 
whilst remaining in direct competiUnn '.'!ith th::: sar.i~:::, was 
limited. 
In the areas that did experience strike action over the 
introduction of the scheme, the diffuse concerns of the employers 
must be contrasted to concentration of those of the labour 
organisations. The only claim of the (primarily craft) workers 
to a share of available work was within the recognised 
"structure" of the craft division of labour. It was only the 
specific identity of occupation which gave one an improved chance 
in the (literal) labour market. In this sense craft status which 
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includes exclusive union organisation of a recognised trade 
underlay both the division of labour and to a large extent the 
local communities. However even in the national context it would 
be wrong to concentrate solely upon the "conflicts11 in the yards. 
Rather a notion of the dialectic of conflict and co-operation is 
the important point. Up until the 1930s there was little 
evidence of consciously formulated managerial plans for the 
future development of the division of labour in the industry as a 
whole. The notions of traditionalism and self supervision of the 
squad system had a long history and were not going to be 
immediately exterminated by one technical change, especially 
when the details of its introduction were not, and, because of 
its inevitably uneven effect, could not be unanimously agreed in 
its practical application. That the employers had not before 
this time raised issues concerning the overall development does 
not mean that, in an inversion of Braverman, labour was 
omnipotent. For the existence of the labour intensive craft 
division of labour gave the employers considerable benefits as 
well as implying certain costs. 11 lnflexibilities 11 in the 
structures and practices within the division of labour were for a 
long period more than compensated for by flexibility of local 
labour markets, in the absence of alternative employment, and 
given fluctuating wage levels. In these circumstances the 
employers as well as the workers were, to some extent, willing to 
work within an ideology of era ft (162). 
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To return to the Wear, then, it is clear that there were 
considerable pressures existing which militated against employers 
taking the S.E.F. plan too seriously as an immediately practical 
issue. Other issues were more important to them, primarily 
securing orders, reducing external costs, and ensuring that wages 
remained as low as possible. In this sense Tomlinson's concern 
(163) that much of the work done within the labour process 
tradition sees managers and owners as "monomaniacs" can be seen 
to be valid, and McGoldrick's assertion made in his study of 
interwar shipbuilding that: 
"The central argument is that the solutions which 
capitalism will seek to the problem of crisis are to be 
found in production." (164) 
can be seen to be overly simplistic. Moreover such an analysis 
of the "struggle" of capital and labour produces an over 
structural account and cannot accommodate the complexities 
arising where there is a disjunction between membership of 
"r.J 8ss" orgEJni.:::ation::; Ciild mur~:: particular concerns, such an 
approach produces a stereotype rather than an "ideal type" of 
worker and capitalist which if not handled carefully can flatten 
the complexities of an historical individual. This can lead to 
assumptions about the behaviour that will be followed by workers 
and capitalists because of their "essential nature", the wider 
questions of specific context can then be overlooked and the 
behaviour of individuals and groups is reduced to the posturing 
of "their class organisations". Unfortunately (or fortunately) 
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history is never this clear cut. 
An example of the importance of the context of issues, and 
incidentally of not developing the tunnel vision of monomania, is 
available in considering several issues which arose around the 
status of the apprenticeship in inter-war shipbuilding. One of 
the reasons stated by McGoldrick for the degree of union 
opposition to the S.E.F. welding plan was that: 
"The shipyard unions generally defined the welding scheme of 
the S.E.F. as an attempt at dilution, with its conditions 
allowing labourers to become tradesmen after only two years 
training . . • " ( 165) 
This was indeed true; however in another context there was almost 
an inversion of the positions adopted by the employers and the 
unions in this case. Ironically the period under consideration 
is the same as that for the introduction of welding, as the issue 
was a direct consequence of the practical problems encountered in 
the face of the depression. It concerned the status of workers 
returning to work after their apprenticeship had been interrupted 
for several years by unemployment. In these cases the problem 
arose when the returning worker was over the age of 21 years. If 
they were over 21 the unions considered that they should be 
treated as a time served craftsman, the employers on the other 
hand were of the opinion that they should continue to serve the 
period of their apprenticeship albeit on a slightly higher rate 
of pay than that of an ordinary apprentice. Furthermore, 
"It was agreed that this scale, when approved by the 
Association should be circulated and put into operation by 
all the firms when they reopened, and that there should not 
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be any consultation with the unions, in view of the attitude 
which had always been observed by employers that the unions 
were not entitled to interfere in any way with apprentices." 
(166) 
This would seem a curious position - the unions arguing that 
these men should be seen as journey-men in spite of, in some 
cases, only completing two or three years of apprenticed 
training, and the employers insisting on the necessity of serving 
the five year apprenticeship. At first sight if one only 
considers the control dimensions of these positions they seem 
nonsensical, for the two year training period, for men with ship-
yard experience, was precisely what the unions objected to in the 
welding plan. However we can understand the position of the 
employers when once again we emphasise the notion of costs. For 
the employers the insistence on completion of the training period 
had more to do with a wish to save on the wages bill by not 
paying the full journeyman's rate than any great belief in the 
efficacy of the five year apprenticeship. The implications of 
the stance of the unions on this matter was more complicated. 
Their case was that once a man was engaged as an apprentice he 
would, by the age of 21, become a journey-man. This view was 
tied to a wider perspective based in the community. It was 
widely held that 21 years was the time of "coming of age" - the 
point where the boy finally became a man and would then be 
legitimately entitled to take on marriage and family respon-
sibilities. Plus, within the yards the pressures of the 
skilled/unskilled division made themselves felt, as the unskilled 
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workers automatically came on to the "man's rate" at the age of 
21. Furthermore the revival in trade led to a special campaign 
by the Boilermakers in 1935 to recruit apprentices, for: 
"During the slump very few apprentices entered the 
boilermaking trades in shipbuilding and the organisation of 
apprentices inside the society declined." (167) 
The Society's potential to attract apprentice members would have 
been damaged by dogmatically pronouncing the sanctity of the five 
year training period. Moreover to accept such workers as 
journeymen after only two years of apprenticeship did not 
compromise the status of the craftsman, as the two year training 
provision in the S.E.F. welding plan did, for these workers would 
have become era ftsmen if unemployment had not stopped their 
training. This clearly points to the importance of the social 
status of the craftsman and the non-technical content of 
apprentice training. 
As with many other issues in shipbuilding there was no clear 
resolution to the problem, and the unions continued to take up 
individual cases of apprentices returning to work. In some cases 
the employers agreed to shorten the length of training period to 
be worked before journeyman status could be claimed. The 
advocacy of the position adopted by the unions was potentially 
problematic. However, they made clear that these cases developed 
in exceptional circumstances due to the severity of the 
depression and therefore could not be interpreted as any 
weakening in their defence of the craft apprenticeship. 
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The attention given by labour process theorists to the 
importance of craft and the problematic of the skilled worker, 
and the socialised identities of the latter as expressed through 
craft trade unionism, should not lead us to subsume the 
importance of individual workers under the focused concerns of 
the union. Again the issue of the movement from apprenticed to 
journeyman status can illustrate this point. At the empirical 
level the processes affecting the conferring of the status of 
craftsmen were negotiated and not always automatically assumed. 
For one worker in the Laings yard the boilermakers lockout of 
1923 led to his accelerated recognition as a journeyman: 
"We built two small ships (during the lockout) the "Don" and 
the "Dee" I think they were called. I had to do expansions 
and everything for frame bending ... Then they started back 
again and they still sent me working in the squad. Then I 
was about 20 years old. I was working in this man's place, 
he was taken bad you see •••• There was one man complained 
about an apprentice boy doing a man's job - I didn't take no 
notice of it, I wasn't interested. Anyway there was another 
man, MacAlpine was his name, he said, "How old are you 
Davey?". I said, "nearly 21", and he 8aid, "sr2 you i~ the 
boilermakers?". I said "oh aye, I've been in since I were 
sixteen years old." He says, "Right, ha-way with me." .. So 
he took me to the delegate of the Union, he was a plater. 
He says, '~eordie if I let this boy go on to the Journeymans 
job and he gets paid in the first class membership of the 
next months meeting will it be OK?" He says "By all means -
get him in", that's how I became a Journeyman." (168) 
The informality of the approach by MacAlpine, the foreman, to the 
boilermakers delegate and the reply received show the non-
bureaucratic nature of relations at the point of production. The 
importance of the membership of foreman in the relevant union is 
shown in this case by the lack of scrutiny given to the request 
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by the union delegate. 
The informality was facilitated on a wider scale by the lack 
of any strict and comprehensive rules governing terms of 
apprenticeship. An enquiry by the Ministry of Labour in 1926 
into apprenticeship and training in the shipbuilding industry 
found that out of a national sample of 217 firms the average 
ratio of journeymen to apprentices was 6.7/1 and whilst 50.59~ 
were apprenticed under indentures or other written agreements, 
48.69~ were apprenticed under verbal agreements, with 1.9% being 
classified as learners (169) Furthermore it was the case that: 
"There were no collective agreements in the shipbuilding 
industry which included any regulations governing 
apprentices, the employers' associations regarded the 
conditions of apprenticeship as being a matter of individual 
arrangement between the employers and the apprentice and his 
guardian." (170) 
The 1926 report found that the usual age of commencement of 
apprenticeship was 16 years old, but a significant number started 
bebJee~ l't ond 16 years, The length of the apprenticeship ~·!as 
five years, although an appreciable number of driller apprentices 
served for a period of four years. Whilst there was no specific 
period of probation for apprentices admitted under a verbal 
agreement those who signed indentures were usually required to 
serve a six month probation; such arrangements were particularly 
prevalent amongst platers, riveters, shipwrights, joiners, 
electricians, fitters, plumbers, sheet metal workers and 
draughtsmen. As for training, 
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11 Apprentices generally received their training by working 
with, or under, the supervision of a journeyman for about 
two years, subsequent to which they worked independently 
under the supervision of a foreman. Of the firms supplying 
information to the enquiry, only four employed a person 
exclusively charged with the duty of training apprentices. 11 
(171) 
Again, this points to the non-bureaucratic nature of 
apprentice training during this period. Such a method of 
training puts at a premium the social relationships both at work 
and in the wider community. That apprenticeship cannot merely be 
equated with technical instruction is clear, and even in later 
studies of shipbuilding researchers have found that: 
11 Apprentices not only acquire skills during their training 
they also internalise certain standards of work and come 
to accept and cope with the far from easy working conditions 
of a shipyard. 11 (172) 
More recent work undertaken at Lancaster University similarly 
points to the importance of normative content of the socialisat-
ion into skilled identities, emphasising the close interaction 
between the older craftsmen and the younger apprenticed learner. 
11 This socialisation takes a strongly normative form and is 
cemented by the close interpersonal relations of craftsmen 
and apprentices. However, ... socialisation occurs prior to 
entry into the apprenticeship system at around the age of 
sixteen. This is because skilled craft work is highly prized 
within the manual working class ... Apprenticeships are often 
filled by word of mouth and routinely involve sponsorship of 
a fifteen-year-old boy by an existing skilled worker. These 
informal structures lead to the selection into appren-
ticeships of a certain kind of boy - one who has a close 
relative in skilled work ••• This familial process of recruit-
ment means that the apprentice will already know a consid-
erable amount about the normative aspects of craft work. He 
will have heard discussions of fellow workers, various types 
of other workers and, of course, the nature of industrial 
management at home and in the wider community. 11 (173) 
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The view of the importance of the wider community is especially 
applicable to the shipbuilding industry on the Wear in the inter-
war period. As a Plater recalled, finding a job very much 
depended upon family. 
"I went to McCalls and Pollacks, the boilershop and my Uncle 
was the boilersmith there, making the boilertops. After a 
few months he told my father to get me out, because they 
were going to close down, and sure enough they closed down, 
but I got out before they closed down. That was when I was 
about sixteen ... My brother was a plater in Laings, and he 
got me the job in Laings." (174) 
These family connections at the intersection of community and 
industry were seen as particularly important by Marshall in his 
accounts of English industrial districts: 
" ... the mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but 
are as it were in the air, and children learn many of them 
unconsciously." (175) 
In Sunderland in the inter-war period such socialisation 
into the skilled identity was often overlaid with specific 
loyalties to local yards, or aversion to other yards. The basis 
of this was not only A wi.sh tn t-!0!'k amongst friends but also L.u 
work with foremen who would not demean the individual craftsman 
by allocating jobs beneath the "skill", and therefore dignity, of 
the individual worker. As a worker speaking of the late 1930s 
put it, 
"I was forced to go to Shorts. I never wanted to go but I 
was forced to go by the Labour Exchange ••• So I went to the 
foreman's cabin to see the head foreman - he was standing 
there - important with a plan under his arm - everybody 
thought you were the eat's whiskers if you had a plan under 
your arm - and he said what did I want? I said that I'd 
been sent from the Labour Exchange, - and then I find out 
he's only the foreman and he says have you got your green 
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card, so I gives him me green card and asks what he's gonna 
do and he says "I'm gonna give you a job "jobbing"- that'd 
be little bits of jobs y'know, tidying and straightening 
little bits up, - and I told him I didn't want that. He 
says "what do you want?". "Have you got a job marking the 
shell off or marking the deck off or something like that?", 
that was the top job. He said "Whaat! Do you think I'm 
gonna take one of my men off to give you a job?" and I said 
"No I don't but that doesn't mean I can't do it." He told 
me to see the Head Foreman and I said "I'm seeing no Head 
Foreman." So I went back to the Labour Exchange and they 
said "you haven't had your green form signed", and I said 
"I'm not straight with the Boilermakers - I owe the Boiler-
makers that much money they won't let me start till I get 
squared up." (176) 
This statement illustrates several important issues: the 
importance of specific yard locality has already been mentioned; 
here we see however that in the absence of the direct knowledge 
of the individual worker the foreman attempted to assign the 
individual to the "skilled job" requiring the least skill. This 
draws our attention to the idea of the division of labour within 
an individual craft, typically this division arises spontaneously 
on the "shop floor" and is the product of a status hierarchy 
which is negot.i aterl beh·H~en the indi'Jidusls liuithir, tiH:: era ft and 
the immediate work group. The notion of the skilled worker then 
does not imply a totally homogeneous grouping (177). To some 
extent the possession of "skill" has been seen as inevitably 
involving a moral connection. 
"A lifetime spent plying a particular trade will very much 
influence a man's personality and his approach to life, and 
it will be reflected in the cast of his countenance. If you 
talked to some of the middle-aged men who work in the ship-
yards of Pallion, you would see at once that an intelligence 
and alertness, along with a sense of judgement and 
discernment, is reflected in their faces .•• It would not do 
simply to butter people up, and I know that there are many 
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people to be found in shipyards - as there are anywhere -
who are not particularly useful or ornamental; yet the fact 
remains that in Pallion 9 in the yards, you will find many a 
plater and shipwright and plumber, to mention only three of 
many shipyard trades, who are highly skilled men. They know 
they are skilled, and feel that the public is inclined to 
look down on these as mere shipyard workers." (178) 
Whilst cast in rather "romantic" terms this account nevertheless 
alerts us to an important feature of the workplace that is often 
overlooked in much labour process writing: the fact that work is 
not merely the accomplishment of the aggregate categories of 
capital and labour, but also everywhere and at every time is the 
production of actual human beings with their own particular 
abilities and concerns. We need to realise that the aggregate 
category of "skilled worker" is only ever an "ideal type" and in 
"reality" it is (in this case predominantly skilled) workers 
acting nt the point of production that determine (within limits) 
and express the concerns that are important in the labour 
process, conceived not only in its "objective moments" but also 
in its particular ccmmunal inta~subj~cllve form. We should ask 
what were some of these characteristics which defined the 
industry in the inter-war period on the Wear? 
Firstly it is worth making the point overtly that accounts 
given by workers of their experiences in the shipyards do not 
distinguish between the technical and social aspects of 
production. Such a point may seem obvious, and yet is often 
overlooked in studies of the introduction of technologies, so 
that we are presented with a structural account of the positions 
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of capital and labour. So then, use of labour, machines and raw 
materials is never independent of the specific quality of social 
relationships (structure and action) at the point of production. 
This is what gives the production process not only a technical 
structure but also, for the individuals directly concerned, a 
moral significance. These factors, in oral accounts, must not be 
dismissed solely as "surface disturbance", but rather must be 
understood as part of a cohesive (if not always coherent) view of 
the experience of work. For example, when asking about the 
introduction of welding, usually the first piece of information 
imparted is which individual in the yard was associated with the 
process. This should not be interpreted as a lack of knowledge 
of the technical aspects of the process by the interviewee, but 
rather it speaks something about the priorities of this 
individual in relation to the experience of work. Thus, 
"The first welder was a bloke called Sollie French (turns to 
wife : "You know who I 'm t a 1 king about? 11 - 11 Yes 11 ) So lli e 
Frenr.h and he st:Jrtcd that i;; Laings." ( 179) 
The point is then that the experience of the labour process at 
the point of production needs to be understood in all its 
complexity, including the personal relations of actors insofar as 
this qualitative feature has a bearing on the social relations 
surrounding the employment relationship. This is an important 
feature in relation to a differential potential for "management" 
control as exerted through the agency of particular foremen. One 
worker outlined the situation in the 1930s: 
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"The market (was) outside any shipyard gate, where there was 
work of any kind. All the tradesmen gathered there until a 
foreman came out and pointed at the men he wanted, then they 
followed him in for a day or two of work. I've heard it 
said that when some foremen were laid off for lengthy 
periods (they) ... tried to get their own dole queue so as 
not to rub shoulders with their former employees ..•• (The) 
old shipyard foremen were all powerful and almost like kings 
in their power over the men who worked under them. An 
apprentice today can never imagine what it was like to work 
in a society with no rights at all. Most of the foremen on 
the river had been at the same yards for years. All of 
them, basically , were hard men, and ruthless, although some 
were just and fair, and if their men worked hard and well, 
left the running of the job to their chargemen and in 
general kept things ticking over quietly ... Other foremen, 
perhaps without the flair or organisational ability, relied 
on driving their men." (180) 
The difference between the approach which allowed things to "tick 
over quietly" and "driving" the men cannot be understood fully in 
terms of the difference between direct control and responsible 
autonomy, for if the rate of work was controlled the exact way 
the work was to be executed was not. The squad system ensured 
that it was the tradesmen who decided how exactly to go about the 
work. A plater described the squad he joined when he started in 
the 1920s: 
" ... when I served me time everything was priced, every-
thing was priced. You couldn't serve your time till you 
were sixteen but I was what you call a "marker boy" at 
fourteen. You worked with a Plater - wherever he went you 
had to be beside him to mark the walls and you had to tie 
the plates down ••• you were learning your trade you see and 
you marked all yours and the plater - the platers in them 
days had to work three in a squad. You used to have a 
"marker" and a "puncher" - a man who punched holes in the 
plates, another man marked them and what you call a 'hanger-
up", he used to take the stuff down to the ship and hang it 
up you see, and put it on straight - it wasn't all 
prefabricated like it is now, it was every item was 
individually ••• it wasn't put together - it was put up 
individually- even each frame of the ship ••• the ribs ... 
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and everyone of them was put up single - shipwrights used to 
put the frames up, the platers used to build them ..• there 
was no welders in them days, no welders" (181) 
Within this division of labour the hierarchy existing between 
workers was of as much importance, and in some ways more, as the 
divide between "management" and workers. A plumber explained: 
"A foreman would expect a full days' work from man and boy. 
If he saw lads larking about he would come down hard on the 
tradesmen for not keeping the boys employed. Today it's 
unheard of for a tradesman to abuse an apprentice. In the 
old days a boy was literally at the whim of every adult in 
the department with a thump or a kick from his mate if he 
was not up to his work. In between boy and tradesman was 
the labourer. Usually a hard working family man, and to a 
tradesman in the old days a good labourer who knew his job 
was irreplaceable. The difference between getting a job 
done quickly and correctly and taking longer over it and 
thus earning the displeasure of the chargeman." (182) 
The "moral" nature of the hierarchy is apparent in the 
estimation of the "worth" of a "good labourer" to the tradesman. 
Similarly the worth of a good tradesman to a labourer could mean, 
within the metal trades, the difference between receiving the 
standard unskilled rate or a supplement of "blood-money" from the 
tradesman if a decent piece rate had been achieved. Our plater 
explained how the rate was worked out: 
"When you were in the yards in them days you didn't wait 
until the buzzer started because if you didn't go to work 
.•. you had to put a bill in for everything that you worked, 
everything that you done you wrote down. See you got a bill 
on Monday and you wrote every job down ••• You had a "piece 
clerk" ... and he used to get these bills. Now everything 
in a shipyard, when it comes in, everything's weighed ••• 
all the materials, I mean shell plates, thick see, 30 foot 
by 6 foot wide ... and you were paid by the weight of the 
material you were working with and that was so much a 
hundredweight that you got •.• "(183) 
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The management of the squad was left largely to the individual 
craftsman, who not only had to ensure that the job would pay but 
also that the work was performed safely; sometimes these two 
requirements came into conflict. 
"I always remember when I first started to hang the deck up, 
you as the plater used to go down and stand in the market 
long before the plans were drawn up .•• then as time got on 
the plater went down and he used to pick his own squad 
because he was paying them part of his wages out of his 
piece work you see ... Anyhow I was hanging up these plates 
on the deck - it was hard work with a block and tackle so I 
said I was going to try and make it easier for them all 
the derricks had a big iron ball on the top and a winch that 
takes the wire and everything - and I got a lot of plates 
that I wanted up to the top of the ship, and I swung the 
iron ball back and fastened the wire - I told them to heave, 
and they aren't moving and I looks down ••• and when I 
looked he had the bloody ball off the other derrick (the 
wrong one) so I thought I'll have to go up and get the other 
bloody wire. And the next day they were heaving and I 
shouted "stop" I thought they had stopped, and then the ball 
passed my ear by about 2 inches, they were still heaving you 
see, - like a catapult and I thought that's it I'm not 
taking any more chances, we'll pull it up with the block and 
tackle." (184) 
The point is then that the individual craftsman was at liberty to 
attempt 8 "rh8nge of ~rgctice" in relation Lu his uw11 way of 
working as long as the work was done. This area of discretion 
over the physical process of work was in part the resource which 
both evidenced and reproduced the "skilled" status of the era fts-
man, and as seen in the last example which changes could not only 
lead to a drop in take home pay for other members of the squad 
but could even place people in life threatening situations. 
That this discretion existed during the period, coupled with 
only very basic capital machinery (derricks rather than cranes, 
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furnaces and hammers rather than cold bending machinery) ensured 
to a great extent that innovations in the production in 
particular yards were more likely to flow from adaptations made 
by individual craftsmen or foremen to the particular problems 
that faced them, rather than by individual innovations developed 
more formally. In this sense the labour process did develop from 
"below" as suggested by Lorenz; however this was not just 
"through the resolution of conflicts in the yards" 0 85 ) To 
some extent such a view underestimates the scope of individual 
craftsmen to initiate change and the willingness of management to 
let them do that. In other words change did not only result from 
(or initiate) conflict in the labour process but rather given the 
extent to which the process developed from "below" such 
initiatives often had the implicit blessing of management as well 
as serving to remind the skilled workers of their 
responsibilities based on their "stewardship" of the industry. 
The extent of this latter attitude helrl, AS l•!e shall sec st a 
later point, unfortunate implications for the maintenance of a 
united position of workers in the yards and the community in the 
face of the decline of the industry in the post war period. To 
return to the point in hand however, the extent to which workers 
in the industry held (largely unproblematically) "control" over 
the labour process should alert us to the dangers of reducing 
"all activity to struggle" (187). 
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The point is that in the face of widely fluctuating demand a 
division of labour which was highly labour-intensive suited the 
employers, who in times of slump did not have to bear high capit-
al overheads. Underlying such a division of labour was the notion 
of the skilled workforce with the knowledge for self-organisation 
and discipline being in many ways an integral part of the "call-
ective worker". Given that the employers in the industry were 
far from parochial, and were aware of such things as "scientific 
management'' 0 88 ) it would seem that their lack of practical 
initiative to change the existing division of labour amounted to 
more than an implicit acceptance of it and in some cases bordered 
on enthusiastic advocacy. As Professor Hallsworth noted in 1932, 
"There is ••• a general impression among shipbuilders 
in this country, based on visits abroad, that foreign yards 
are, if anything, over equipped- in roofs, floors, tools 
and machinery, the upkeep costs of which will tend to be 
excessive .•. 
Their method of working also differs from our own. An 
extensive use nf ~·Jhat is c2lled "F8brication'' or !'Exf.JB• ll::l.i.unt: 
work allows much work to be done by semi-skilled or un-
skilled labour which in this country would be done by 
skilled era ftsmen. Fabrication work in this country is 
increasing to a certain extent but the method in some cases 
involves slightly more expense ... It is probably true, too, 
that the administrative staff in British yards is smaller, 
and better organised, than in most continental yards; and 
that in the practical applications of science, in the 
facility of preparing new and better designs, in the more 
rapid construction of ships, and in the craftsmanship of the 
workers, this country is still ahead even of the best of her 
competitors." (189) 
Again the belief that British yards could out-perform all 
competitors on the criteria of both technical and cost efficiency 
leads one to doubt that a sense of urgency existed in the period 
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as regards any radical re-organisation of the production process. 
The existent division of labour was seen to be both flexible and 
efficient 9 and "the" prime asset was seen to be the skilled 
workforce which included: 
" ... the aptitude of the British Workman for doing his job 
with the smallest number of tools and the least equipment." 
(190) 
Here then the perspective of British shipbuilders meshed to 
some extent with the belief of the workforce in the value of 
their own skills, and this is where the ingenuity displayed by 
individual workers, outlined below, fits in with some of the more 
structural concerns of retaining a "flexible" low capital 
division of labour in the face of widely fluctuating demand. 
In one sense then the immediate problems facing the 
workforce in the inter-war period parallelled those of the 
employers, the lack of demand for ships which closed down so many 
yards on the Wear resulted in unprecedented unemployment both in 
total numbers and in the duration that R!!rh Llnemployment lasted. 
The problem of unemployment struck deep into the occupational 
community and its effects, as we shall see later, ensured that 
the political culture, as represented in the "politics of local 
loyalties", would not continue unchanged. 
The slump brought home to workers in a dramatic way that 
local loyalties could not always sustain the community, and any 
pretentions of paternalism were flattened in the face of 
"objective" economic circumstances 0 91 ). The most important 
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feature of this was the outflow of population from Sunderland. 
" ••. for the first time on record Sunder land's population 
began to fall, dropping from an estimated 188,200 in 1932 to 
182,500 in 1939." (192) 
These figures probably underestimate the total figure of 
temporary migrations from the town during this period. Shipyard 
workers who left sometimes attempted to work within the 
boundaries of their trade, although sometimes this could mean 
taking labouring work. Such a status was not naturally assumed 
by most craftsmen. As one worker explained in relation to the 
job he secured in Scotland, erecting structural steel work: 
"I was off about three or four years (from the yards). I 
went away to work •.. I was supposed to be doing labouring 
and I nearly got the sack the second day. Well, they were 
building a section over a section, it was a pit plant, the 
section was going to go up a height, and the steeplejack was 
going to go up - putting his tools in the bag- and I says 
to him, "If you're going up there to bolt that up you're 
wasting your time" and I didn't know the boss was standing 
behind me. He says "What do you mean by that?", I says 
"Just what I've said Mr. Holland, if you're trying to put 
that section up there you're wasting your time, the section 
you tMRnt is do~·Jn there" - and the iJl3i1 was laid ouL Eli1d I 
said "There, there's the section you want. That section 
belongs over there", and somebody gave him a dig ..• Well 
the next morning when I went in he says "Come here I want 
you, you're too good where you're going to" he says, 
"there's a plan for you - go and do that job", and from then 
on I was practically leading hand on the job •••• I went 
from there to Nottingham and then back to Scotland ••• all 
structural steel work." (193) 
Other craftsmen took any job they could find: 
"I went away, I went to Skegness, I worked as an ordinary 
cellarman in a public house." (194) 
For the workers that stayed "at home" the situation was often 
serious: 
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" ... things were very very bad. We were absolutely poverty 
stricken, destitute. I was on the dole. It was very little 
then. It may have been fifteen bob, maybe not." (195) 
Unemployment had always been a feature of the shipbuilding 
industry but the depth and duration of the slump in the '30s 
emphasised the different social impact of the depression: 
"The shipbuilding managers could live off their reserves or 
family fortunes accumulated in better times. The 
unemployed riveters and platers, joiners and plumbers were 
not so well placed." (196) 
·That this was the case on the Wear seems to be substantiated by 
the attitude of one owner: 
"Sir John was fond of recalling with a chuckle how, in 
periods of depression which caused him to close down 
temporarily •.• he and his manager used to play tennis in 
the empty shipyard much to the amusement of officials in a 
yard on the other side of the river who watched the games 
through opera glasses." (197) 
For workers the reality was different: 
"You got dole money for up to thirteen weeks after you lost 
a job, then you had to go on the parish. For a start you 
got less on the parish, and sometimes all or part of what 
you got was in vouchers which you could only use in certain 
shops. To get anythina At All you had to go before Tho 
Committee on Monday nights and tell them everything about 
your family and what you had or didn't have. They'd come 
round and stick their noses in everywhere, sometimes 
literally, they'd smell your jugs to see if you'd had a 
drink in them." (198) 
Such contrasts, and physical dislocation of the settled 
community, did serve to raise questions about traditional 
loyalties and, as will be seen in the next chapter, the apparent 
necessity of war to guarantee full employment shook these 
loyalties even further. However the point about the lack of 
demand for ships and the consequent unemployment is that it 
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served to direct the attention of capital and labour in different 
directions. For labour the unity of occupational identity (as an 
individual master status) with community interests represented 
itself through the traditional channels of craft exclusiveness 
and demarkation boundaries. In other words unemployment was seen 
to be best resisted by adhering to particular parts of the work 
process so that when work was available your particular trade was 
guaranteed a share in the activity. There was nothing new in 
this and what must be emphasised is that in this sense the 
position remained as it had done through other slumps in the late 
nineteenth century; thus to over-emphasise the assertion of craft 
control is to underestimate the degree to which this control 
represented an accepted status quo within the industry. 
This is especially so given that the slump directed the 
attention of Capital to the crisis of profitability, producing a 
concern with all aspects of costs. This over-riding concern with 
costs became the filter through which all other questions were 
viewed. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
In order to answer the first part of the central question, 
as to why during the inter-war period there was no radical re-
organisation of the division of labour despite the apparent 
presence of the technical means to do so, in the form of the 
welding process and the potential that that implied for the 
extension of "fabrication", many things have been taken into 
account. The context that the industry had to work in included 
the severity of the slumps of the 20s and 30s. Whilst the first 
of these can be explained in part by the dislocation of 
production consequent upon the effect of the first world war, 
ultimately of greater importance were the more long-term changes 
in the capitalist world system. Of particular note here was the 
decline of Britain as the nation exercising hegemony over the 
world system and the resistance of the U.S.A. to assume that 
role. These tensions were consirlRr8b!y exaggerated by the 
reluctance of Britain to relinquish its former role and the rise 
of economic nationalism in most first world countries. 
The exacerbation of the downturns of the trade cycle during 
the period must not be understood merely as "background"- its 
effects were present at all levels, as much in the qualitative 
aspects of the "micro politics" of production as in the more 
structured opposition of capital and labour. It is in this 
context that the particularities of the developments on the River 
Wear must be situated. Understanding this historical individual 
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necessitated the development of an approach which simultaneously 
situated the industry in its specific occupational community. 
In this setting it was argued that the early onset of the 
slump in the 1930s and its severity did not lead to a 
radicalisation of the working class at the point of production or 
elsewhere. Rather the issues were refracted through the 
"politics of local loyalties". Sunder land was not the "town that 
was murdered", it appeared to be dying of natural causes. This 
view prompted a spirit of resignation which saw the effects of 
depression as the result of an impersonal force, largely to be 
endured until a revival came along. 
At the level of production such resignation was largely 
shared by both capital and labour alike. The necessity of 
adaptation to these circumstances meant that for Capital issues 
other than changes in the divisions of labour were paramount, 
primarily reducing overheads to a minimum and seeking reductions 
in A:de:rnel costs. The concsrr. •·Jith co3ts C:id r.ut leaJ Lu Lhe 
early adoption of welding, as others had suggested, for several 
reasons. Firstly the severity of the slump as experienced on 
Wearside, and the relatively late recovery ensured the attention 
of management was focused on other issues. This is particularly 
so given that the speciality of the river was "tramp" tonnage, 
which did not benefit from the application of welding to the same 
extent as larger vessels. Also given that such changes in 
technique, welding and prefabrication, had not been experimented 
Chapter 2 - 162 -
with to any great degree on the river it was indeed the case that 
any move in these directions would involve an initial increase in 
cost for uncertain returns. Furthermore the reliability of the 
welded joint could not always be guaranteed as the number of 
ships which suffered from brittle fracture demonstrated, and as 
we have seen some authorities were still urging caution in 
relation to the wisdom of adopting welding quickly. Finally, 
given that the maximum benefit from welding was to be realised 
ultimately through the wider use of fabrication techniques, what 
was being questioned in the final analysis was the "British way" 
of building ships. Many owners were of the belief that the 
British system was superior in terms of both technical and cost 
efficiency. Added to this was the "sedimentation of the past" 
not only in the physical work process but also in the 
organisational and managerial spheres; there was not an obvious 
alternative managerial structure to the craft administration of 
the divisinn nf labo~r. 
All of these factors come together on the Wear in a 
particularly extreme form, so whilst the Wear Shipbuilders 
Association "supported" the S.E.F. welding scheme in theory, in 
practice they were almost indifferent to it. This is why on the 
Wear the "defeat" of the scheme is not to be equated with the 
workers '~esisting at the point of production the expropriation 
of the control they have exercised over the labour process". The 
employers themselves did not take the scheme seriously as a 
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practical issue of imminent importance, and in fact drew some 
benefit themselves from letting the craft workers exercise 
control over the labour process, the "flexibility" of variable 
capital in the face of fluctuating demand, associated with lower 
overheads incurred through using less fixed capital. In such a 
situation employers were less than likely to make a practical 
stand on the issue of acceptance of the formal scheme, for 
practice sometime in the future, especially in the face of 
existing corporate structure and the need for individual firms to 
capitalise on any competitive advantage. The issue of the S.E.F. 
welding plan cannot be seen to involve above all else a clash 
between capital and labour. Rather as this study shows there 
were also technical and organisational questions which had not 
been answered, and above all the issue of costs served to ensure 
that on the Wear at least the issue remained of marginal 
importance during the period. 
The IAiirler. j mrl icBtions of these factor::: have several 
dimensions. Firstly, the structural tendencies in labour process 
theory deduced from the sphere of production do not operate 
irrespective of the "moment" of consumption (i.e. demand). The 
invariant determinacy of the "marxist" model in relation to the 
increasing organic composition of capital is unacceptable. For 
not only is it the case that one cannot deduce the empirical 
orientation of the personification of capital and labour from 
such structural tendencies, but also one must beware of seeing 
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the relationship of capital and labour as identical with their 
aggregate class organisations. The rhetoric of unity and the 
"fact" of aggregation must not be seen as the total "reality". 
The analysis developed in this chapter points to the 
importance o f "taking apart" the solidity o f the cat ego r i e s o f 
"capital" and "labour". Thus the importance of the category of 
"capital" in this study is expressed at a number of simul-
taneously existing levels: the geo-political location in the 
world system, the "fraction" of industrial capital, the corporate 
form and the federated family firm, the changing status of the 
employer seen through the refraction of the "politics of local 
loyalties", the "delegation" of the control function to foremen 
and the "moral" hierarchy of the occupational community. For 
"labour" similarly the speci fie national and regional location, 
the industry subculture, the social and physical location both at 
work and in the community, the formal and informal hierarchy both 
with respect. t.n inter- e!"'!d ir.tr8 trGdo c:!iffcrence::. i::IIIU 
accessibility of social networks are important. 
Such concerns are complex not only in their range but also 
because of the non-uniform temporality which underlies them, and 
such temporal dislocations tend to transmute "action" into 
"structure" as the sedimentation of distance in both time and 
space. For these reasons the "labour process" in shipbuilding or 
elsewhere cannot be characterised through the study of one 
"typical" centre, nor can "it" be grasped by looking solely or 
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even partially at the leading edges of technology, or the '~harp 
points" of the class struggle. 
For these reasons this chapter has been concerned to, in 
some ways, "go behind" the formal stances of the Unions and 
employers' organisations and attempt to begin an examination of 
the "micro-politics" of production as well as the wider setting. 
In doing so issues of routine take on as much importance as 
change, for both are dynamic properties. In order to develop 
these concerns further, as well as test some of the conclusions 
already formed in relation to the inter-war period, the next 
chapter will examine the situation as it developed during the 
period of the second world war and in its immediate aftermath. 
The importance of this period lies in the relatively abrupt 
changes brought about through the exigencies of war including the 
acceleration of technical developments and application, and 
problems consequent on the dislocation of the workforce. Also 
however the period nf the sec0~d ~·Jorld w3r rc:preseHLeJ a 
watershed in relation to the development of the world system, and 
the importance of Keynesian economic management techniques 
ensured that the situation which confronted the industry on the 
Wear (and elsewhere) in the aftermath of the second world war 
proved to be profoundly different from that which developed in 
the 1920s and 1930s. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The War and After 
Part I 
Harmony and Conflict 
The revival in demand for merchant tonnage which began in 
the mid 1930s showed signs of faltering by 1938. Whilst output 
in this year exceeded a million tons, tonnage commenced only 
amounted to 500,000 tons. 
11Consequently, 1939 opened with the possibility of being one 
of the worst years in the experience of the industry. 11 (1) 
On the Wear, 
11 At the beginning of 1939 there were 
hand and only four of the yards 
Thompsons and Crowns - were open. 
desperate again. 11 (2) 
only nine contracts in 
- Doxfords, Laings, 
The position became 
However, given the tension increasingly developing in Europe the 
Government was unwilling to allow a decline in the British mer-
£2.75m a year for five years to subsidise tramp shipping and £10m 
for loans to shipowners to encourage them to build new ships in 
British yards. The response to this aid was immediate. Within six 
weeks, nationally, orders were received for 144 ships with a 
total gross tonnage of over 700,000 tons. The Wear got its share 
of this demand. 
11 The shadow of Hitler was over Europe: the safety and 
existence of the nation was felt to be in danger, and there 
was an immediate response to the Government's announcement. 
Orders began to flow in to the shipyards. Six were placed 
with Wear builders in the first week; 28 in a fortnight; and 
40 in less than three weeks. The orders continued to come. 
Chapter 3 - 184 -
There was a great trek back to work in the shipyards and 
engine shops." (3) 
Whilst the above statement underlines the importance of patriot-
ism in the face of the "shadow of Hitler" it was only after the 
material incentive from the Government that orders began to flow. 
Similarly, amongst those that began the trek back to the 
yards any enthusiasm for a patriotic cause was blunted by the 
recognition of other realities. As one contemporary observer 
noted, the view of the workers was coloured by past experience. 
"Aye", they said, "we're back - you're only wanted when 
there's a war on - after this lot we'll be back on the scrap 
heap again." (4) 
In the initial phases of the war the belief that nothing really 
ever changes was reinforced by traditional recruiting methods, 
and the power of locality remained. One worker explained how his 
father's return to employment was facilitated: 
"Me father was a Priestmans' man, Priestmans closed down 
altogether around the 1930s. With them closing down it 
didn't leave him an opening anywhere else. The result was 
he was off right until 1939, Pickersgill's got an order, as 
it happens the chap that got the Foreman's job - he knew 
him, he was the same age as him, he went to school with him, 
and of course that was the magic connection. So when he 
went down he got a start and after doing one ship he was now 
a Pickersgills man." (5) 
Another feature which served to re-emphasise the traditional 
vulnerability of shipyard employment was the persistence, until 
the end of 1940, of pockets of unemployment within the industry. 
Two factors contributed to this. Firstly, despite the growing 
level of demand for ships the effect of the technical 
requirements of the shipbuilding cycle still made itself felt in 
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fluctuating demand for particular trades at different times. 
Secondly there was a substantial number of unemployed ship-
building workers who, because of age and/or physical condition, 
could no longer be usefully employed in the industry. 
Nevertheless the existence of unemployed shipbuilding workers 
served, as we shall see at a later point, to introduce a 
retarding effect upon the willingness of the trades unions to 
accept widespread dilution. However, 
"By November 1940 .•• only 4,000 skilled and unskilled ship-
building workers were unemployed and many of these proved 
unsuitable for re-employment in the industry. The reserve 
was now very nearly exhausted." (6) 
The importance of issues of both continuity and change is vital 
in an understanding of the effect of the war upon the ship-
building industry. Thus the national emergency did not instantly 
put an end to unemployment nor could it escape the limitations 
of both the physical and organisational status-quo which had been 
the legacy of the inter-war depressions. The relevance of this 
sedimentation of the past is particularly important if we are to 
avoid an analysis which errs to the extreme of either an account 
which is overly self-congratulatory, manufacturing a view of 
total harmony within the relationships at the point of 
production, or an account which over-emphasises the degree of 
inefficiency and conflict. Both of these simplifications project 
the concerns of the "present" onto the past, ironing out the 
complexities of the empirical situation. 
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An example of the first approach is available in the 
standard history of shipbuilding on the River Wear in which we 
are informed of "a remarkably fine performance which it is hardly 
possible to overpraise", and furthermore, 
"During the whole of the period of the Second World War 
no major stoppage of any kind took place in any of the yards 
on the river. The amount of time lost by any trade dispute 
was quite negligible. 
In this respect the shipbuilding industry at Sunderland 
maintained a proud record which was perhaps not excelled, or 
even equalled, by any other industry or district engaged in 
war work during those six years of unremitting effort on the 
industrial front as well as on the battlefronts." (7) 
Such a view has been worked up into a kind of folklore in Sunder-
land, where memories of the wartime working are often subjective. 
Accounts are produced of how men and women used to practically 
live in the yards for days at a time, working "all the hours that 
God sent". These stories and Lhe claims of extraordinary levels 
of production which usually accompany them have achieved almost 
the status of legend. Moreover, whilst these claims are usually 
framed in a local context, in that one yard produced more than 
another or the Wear produced more than the Tyne (8), they never-
theless usually include a general assessment of the state of the 
nation. A spirit of "togetherness" is often stressed, as is lhe 
pride in being able to rise to the "test" that was imposed during 
the war (9). These features of wartime experience often tend to 
overdominate accounts of the period leading to such statements as 
"there weren't any strikes during the war" (lO). 
Such statements seem irreconcilable with the general picture 
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of wartime industrial relations which can be taken from other 
sources. As Allen Hutt notes in his book on British Trade 
Unionism: 
"In the first three months of war there were forty local and 
factory strikes; and in 1940, the number of days lost in 
industrial action disputes was a low record, the total 
number of disputes was the third highest for ten years -
strikes were small and short, in fact, but there were a lot 
of them." (11) 
That strikes did take place cannot be denied, even though 
after July 1940 they were declared illegal under order 1305. In 
relation speci fica 11 y to shipbuilding Hem y Pe lling has noted 
that demarcation disputes continued throughout the period. 
"The worst trouble was as usual in the shipbuilding industry 
and at times during the war it seriously interfered with the 
efficiency of the shipyards." ( 12) 
Strikes and disputes were unofficial in nature, the trade 
union officialdom having given their assent to such things as the 
"suspension of trade practices act" of 1942 as well as generally 
exhorting the workers to give maximum output in order to execute 
a successful "people's war". However as the war drew on and 
victory became more probable the incidence of disputes rose, so 
that by 1944 working days lost through disputes was in excess of 
any year since 1932 0 3). 
These observations go some way towards countering the more 
extreme versions of accounts of wartime production dwelling upon 
a perfect internal harmony. Divisions still existed at the point 
of production. Thus for example, February 1945 saw 500 boiler 
makers at Vickers Armstrong Ltd. strike over the use of semi-
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skilled labour to operate a new gas cutting machine, and in 
another dispute on the same issue at the Walker Naval Yard in 
December 1945, 125 boiler makers were fined for taking part in an 
illegal strike. In the latter case the dispute dragged on for 
some time in which there were several sympathy strikes of small 
duration; the issue was finally solved only when the management 
withdrew the new machinery (14). 
Such evidence has led one recent writer to conclude that the 
wartime shipbuilding industry represented "the Fossilisation of 
Inefficiency" (15) 
' 
in which the "real culprits" could be 
identified. 
" ••. for all the weaknesses of dim, old- fashioned and often 
elderly managers, it was the unions and their members who 
continued to be the real culprits in losing potential 
production." (16) 
This then is the opposite account to the one stressing harmony. 
It still takes harmony in the face of war as the norm, however it 
concentrates on the "inefficiencies" in production and condemns 
the agency of working people for not achieving that "norm". What 
has happened in this account is that the very valid data drawn 
upon to suggest that the situation was more complicated than the 
harmony myth suggests is taken to characterise a polar opposite 
position. Again to concentrate upon only the sharp points of the 
class conflict is to risk distortion. For example the widespread 
use of the same strikes of boilermakers, mentioned above, by 
several authors to demonstrate the general problems of the 
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industry must be treated warily. Thus the trouble with the flame 
planing machine on the Tyne is used by Pelling to support his 
conclusion that "the worst trouble as usual (was) in the 
shipbuilding industry" (17), by Pagnamenta and Overy (18) and by 
Barnett (19) himself. The use of this same example over and over 
again suggests that perhaps such disputes were not as widespread 
as these authors would have us believe, and given that this 
dispute took place in late 1944 to early 1945, when victory 
seemed to be only a matter of time and more generally when: 
"Fear of the many consequences of the transition (from war 
to peace) is the predominant feature of industrial life from 
the autumn of 1944 until well into 1946, but it is hardly 
mentioned in the official history as an industrial relations 
problem." ( 20) 
it seems unfair to characterise the abovementioned event as 
typical of the behaviour of workers in industry throughout the 
war. 
Barnett's condemnation of the Unions, and to a lesser extent 
the management, in the industry does not focus solely upon strike 
activities but also upon "inefficiencies" in the craft division 
of labour. The tone of this criticism is evident in his 
evaluation of the Restoration of Pre-War Trade Practices Act. 
"This act of Parliament, by which the state formally under-
took to restore all that overmanning and those absurd inter-
union demarcations throughout all industries which had 
already done so much to hasten British industrial decline, 
was the price extracted from the wartime national government 
in 1940 by the unions for their kind consent, often enough 
dishonoured in the event, to the removal of these brakes on 
productivity while the nation was actually fighting for 
survival." (21) 
Chapter 3 - 190 -
This, then, is the alternative view to that stressing 
harmony and achievement in the industry during the period. Its 
reference is selective and irons out the complex of interests on 
either side of the employment relationship, casting the issues in 
a monolithic concern with the "national interest" as projected 
from the era of "post- Thatcherian populism". In neglecting the 
historical legacy of shipbuilding this author seeks to render the 
behaviour of those connected with the industry as irrational, if 
not downright treacherous: 
"The record of the Second World War thus demonstrates 
Britain's great traditional industries to have indeed 
suffered from the same kind of weaknesses that brought about 
the collapse of the French Army in 1940, from outdated 
technology and doctrine to poor leadership and to morale so 
low as sometimes to verge on the mutinous." (22) 
Somewhere between these two partial views lies an account which 
is not merely a "middle way" but is one that can deal with the 
data drawn on by both sets of authors. Such an account does not 
iron out the contradictory tendencies existing in the industry 
during the period but recognises both short and longer term 
continuities and changes and as such can serve to unify concerns 
of both structure and action. It is to the development of such an 
account that we must now turn. 
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!Part II 
Continuity and Change 
As mentioned above, the workers who returned to the 
shipyards to meet the initial demands stimulated by the onset of 
war were often confronted with an organisation which had changed 
little since the depressions of the inter-war period. Recruiting 
strategies were the same, the position and indeed the personnage 
of the foremen were very often the same, and, as we have seen, 
the uneven demands on labour of the shipbuilding cycle remained 
the same. The physical structure and conditions of the yards had 
in some cases remained largely unchanged from the nineteenth 
century. As an electrician beginning his apprenticeship in 1939 
graphically described: 
"When I started in 1939 the yard had been closed, and 
Pickersgills ... was very basic, and it depended purely on 
physical effort and manpower to get anything done. The 
cranes were all in fixed positions. There was no roads 
whatsoever in the yard~ it was simply all d.i.rt And in the 
winter the mud was over the top of your boots. The bogies 
that they used in them days, with iron wheels just churned 
everything up ••• The steel was all brought into the yard on 
horses and carts." (23) 
Moreover the neglect and decay of some of the yards in the inter-
war years meant that the return to production could only proceed 
slowly. 
"I started in the April, and yet my father didn't start 
unti 1 around about the June. It had just opened out and of 
course it had to gradually build up, I mean we didn't launch 
our first ship until well into 1939, you know, in spite of 
the war." (24) 
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Not only does this speak of the objective limitations involved -
the "gearing up" of production, but also, despite much naval 
activity during the period of the "phoney war", a lack of 
urgency. The point to understand is that the declaration of war 
did not completely obscure the material interests of individuals, 
the yards were still privately owned and in the business of 
seeking profit, the "free" labour market was still in existence 
and therefore, not unnaturally, workers driven away from the 
industry during the depression years had little desire to return, 
especially when higher wages could be had elsewhere: 
" in the early years of the war wage rates were 
relatively unattractive and people were not anxious to 
return to or to enter an industry where present conditions 
were unattractive and future prospects poor .•. Even the 
recruitment of Ministry of Labour and Admiralty staff with 
the knowledge of the industry was limited by the shortage of 
technical and managerial staff." (25) 
Initially however it was not an absolute lack of labour 
supply that was the problem, especially on the North East coast, 
but rather now many of those registered as unemployed 
shipbuilding workers could be usefully reabsorbed into the 
industry, and indeed as late as July 1939 some 20% of the 176,000 
insured workers in the industry were unemployed. These then were 
some of the contradictory pressures exerting themselves upon the 
industry at the beginning of the war. Technical barriers to the 
production of maximum output as a direct legacy of the inter-war 
years combined with persisting unemployment, even in the face of 
projected labour shortages, and owners who were largely unwilling 
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to expand capacity without firm guarantees of profitability. 
This was the context in which the Admiralty and the Ministry of 
Labour had to set about the task of encouraging the development 
of maximum output from the industry. 
This task was tackled in several ways, with changes being 
sought not only in the supply of labour but also in the 
organisation and operation of the division of labour. The first 
point to emphasise is that the yards were not organised for the 
mass production of tonnage. The division of labour and physical 
plant were organised to meet the needs of a bespoke product in 
what was normally a widely fluctuating market. In such a 
situation a premium was put upon the craft skills of the 
workforce and the cost effectiveness and flexibility of variable 
capital. The experience of the normal market conditions led 
owners as well as workers to doubt the "efficiency", both in its 
technical and cost dimensions, of a highly capitalised division 
of labour and lesser skilled workforce, even if orientated 
towards mass production. It will perhaps be useful to indicate 
some of these issues with reference to the industry on the Wear. 
Firstly the technical changes sought by the Admiralty were 
designed to increase output with a labour force characterised by 
less skill than would be normal in peace time. To this end they 
sought to increase the extent of welding and prefabrication, a 
move further encouraged by a severe shortage of riveters on the 
Clyde, but not on the North East Coast (26) The rate of 
Chapter 3 - 194 -
adoption of the technique of welding proceeded very differently 
in different districts and individual yards. The crucial factor 
here was the supply of riveters. Where that supply was plentiful 
the adoption of the newer technique was slow, suggesting that the 
impetus to the change was the "push" factor of too few riveters 
rather than any "pull" effect of the inherent attractiveness of 
welding and prefabrication in themselves. 
On the Wear, where there was a relatively plentiful supply 
of riveters, welding generally, and hull welding in particular, 
had not proceeded to any great extent. Returns gathered by the 
Ministry of Labour compiled in June 1942 (Table l) show that in 
yards on the Wear a greater percentage of the skilled workforce 
were involved directly in hull construction. Thus when we look 
at the percentage of platers expressed as a proportion of the 
total skilled workforce we find that the average for the main 
yards on the Tyne and Tees was 1~9% (1533 Platers out of a total 
skilled workforce of 13,988) and 13.32% (423 Platers out of a 
total skilled workforce of 3174) respectively, whereas on the 
Wear the average was some 19.05~o (968 Platers out of a total 
skilled workforce of 5090). To some extent the nature of the 
products produced on the different rivers can explain some of 
this difference. Thus the intense specialisation upon tramp 
tonnage on the Wear ensured that a greater demand existed for 
labour producing the ship's shell rather than a heavy demand for 
outfitting labour as was the case where more internally complex 
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ships were built, such as the warships and passenger liners which 
formed part of the traditional output of the Tyne. 
However when attention is directed towards the numbers and 
types of riveters on the three rivers it becomes obvious that the 
Wear and the Tees were using more traditional techniques than the 
Tyne. Thus whilst hand riveters only accounted for 2.95~~ of the 
total skilled workforce (410 hand riveters out of 13,988 skilled 
workers) on the Tyne, the figure was greater on the Wear at 6.81% 
(347 hand riveters out of 5090 skilled workers), on the Tees the 
percentage was higher still at 7.62~~ (242 hand riveters out of 
3174 skilled workers). However these averages conceal wide 
variations between yards on the rivers, and when such variations 
are taken into account individual variations between rivers can 
be greater. Thus on the Tyne Hawthorn Leslie and Co. Ltd. 
employed the greatest proportion of hand riveters, 5.6% of the 
total skilled workforce, amounting to 3.4% of the total 
workforce. On the Tees the Furness Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. 
employed hand riveters to the extent of 9.7% of the skilled 
workforce, 5.4% of the total workforce. On the Wear at Bartrams 
Yard 18.6% of the skilled workforce were hand riveters, amounting 
to 10. 7~~ of the total workforce. 
Given this concentration of hand riveters it is little 
wonder that workers on the Wear at the time can remember 
graphically the scene where: 
"Right through the war you went to a shipyard, you could 
hear the noise miles away - and you looked along the deck 
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and all you could see was men - not pneumatic, but the hand 
hammers kneeling, squads of men kneeling, hundreds of them 
along the deck, bang, bang, bang, bang all the time." (27) 
The corollary of such dependence upon less technically advanced 
processes was a disinclination to invest in and adopt newer tech-
nology. Thus in the case of welding, the percentage of welders 
as a proportion of the skilled workforce amounted to 5.22~~ (730 
Welders out of a total of 13,988 skilled workers) and 5.79% (184 
Welders out of a total of 3174 skilled workers) on the Tyne and 
Tees respectively, whilst on the Wear it was only 3.55% (181 
Welders out of a total of 5090 skilled workers). Again the 
difference between individual yards on the three rivers with the 
highest proportion of Welders is considerable. On the Tyne and 
Tees Welders made up 8.5% and 9.3% of the skilled workforce at 
Swan Hunters Neptune yard and the yard of the Stockton 
Construction Co.. On the Wear at J.L. Thompsons Yard 5.4% of the 
skilled workforce were Welders. 
With the inherent possibilities of the technique of welding 
clearly being insufficient an incentive for its widespread 
adoption, certainly on the Wear at least, the Admiralty attempted 
to push employers into increasing their welding capability. Thus 
a letter from the Admiralty of 13 November 1942 to J. Ramsey 
Gebbie, managing Director of Doxfords Yard, raised the issue of 
welding: 
"I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty 
to direct your attention to the instruction of the Director 
of Merchant Shipbuilding that by the end of March 1943, "all 
butts throughout the ship and all seams of tank top plating" 
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must as a minimum be all welded as normal practice 
thereafter, it is thus intended by concentration of your 
riveting labour force on other parts of the ship to speed up 
the output of merchant ships." (28) 
In June 1942 Doxfords had the third highest concentration of 
welders, in their yard, on the River Wear. Nevertheless Gebbie's 
reply to the Secretary of the Admiralty of 16 November 1942 made 
it clear that these rather modest minimum requirements were 
unlikely to be met: 
"Sir, 
We are in receipt of your letter of the 13th ... with 
regard to Electric Welding and the training of Welding 
labour. 
We are afraid we shall not be able to carry out the 
minimum recommendations of the Director of Merchant Ship-
building by the date given, as we do not see any prospect of 
increasing our welding facilities sufficiently by that time. 
We are however preparing a scheme to increase our welding 
facilities, and we expect to have no difficulty in training 
all additional Welders necessary in our own yard." (29) 
An important point to note about the Admiralty's approach is 
that it is orientated towards using welding as a method of 
freeing riveters to concentrate their efforts and thereby raise 
output. Welding is thus seen to be useful in as much as it is a 
partial solution to the perceived labour supply problem rather 
than for the technical efficacy of the process itself. In the 
empirical situation then the cost and technical efficiency of any 
new process is always to be related to labour supply and the 
conditions of the wider market demand. The importance of labour 
supply in relation to welding was pointed to by a worker from 
Pickersgills who remembered that in 1939: 
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" ... there was three small welding machines, that was the 
total number that they had in the yard. Then the Admiralty 
allocated, about 1943, a certain amount of money and we 
jumped up to twelve six operators, 72 plants. They realised 
they had to get the welders (welding machines) in because 
you only had three, and you had more men trained for 
(them)." (30) 
However overall the relatively good supply of riveters on 
the Wear ensured that the increased use of welding proceeded 
rather slowly. This cannot be reduced solely to conservative 
management and the "retarding effect" of the trades unions, as 
Barnett would have it. But rather it owes much to the 
constraints and continuing resource endowment of the industry in 
its empirical setting which, unlike some of the American yards, 
predated the onset of war. This point was well grasped by Smith 
and Holden when speaking of the Wear in wartime: 
"Welding had been making steady progress as a new method of 
construction, but it was in nothing like general use. 
Riveting remained the principal method of putting a ship 
together, and it would have been worse than useless to have 
qiven up riveting and wasted the services of many thousands 
of skilled riveters while at the same time having to train 
them, or other men, as welders." (31) 
If the exhortation to introduce elements of the welding 
process owed much to labour supply issues as a feature of both 
the continuity and change as between the pre-war and wartime 
situations, so too were the larger capital developments initiated 
during this time. In explaining the course of developments here, 
explanations based on employer conservatism explain little. 
Rather, what is important is the grounds for such conservatism 
involving both absolute objective limitations and perceptions of 
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the limitations of such developments in both the short and long 
terms, and particularly insofar as these relate to the expected 
disjunction between wartime and peacetime demand in terms of both 
type and quantity of product required. 
An example of the issues involved can be seen with reference 
to the modernisation, including the provision of a new berth, at 
Bartrams Yard. Negotiations began between the yard's owners and 
the Admiralty during the summer of 1942 with various 
possibilities being suggested and casted, but Admiralty approval 
not being secured unti 1 10 October 1943. One problem was the 
amount of money that the employers were prepared to invest, with 
several letters to the Admiralty in the course of the year 
reaffirming their original estimation that they could afford to 
spend no more than £17,000 on modernisation. Even to raise this 
amount they had to secure a loan of £15,000 from Lloyds Bank. 
The grounds on which Lt.Col. R.A. Bartram attempted to "sell" the 
idea of the loan to the Manager of Lloyds Bank are interesting: 
" ••• You will no doubt realise that the reason for our 
preference for this scheme is that it is first of all 
essential for us to keep abreast of modern shipbuilding 
improvements in practice, and quite apart from a wartime 
angle, which of course is the Admiralty's concern. From the 
point of view of meeting post-war competition, and possible 
difficulties in connection with the future supply of 
riveters, it is essential that we should be in a position to 
tackle (a) large scale welding and (b) the erection of pre-
fabricated material, and this involves larger lifting 
facilities. The opportunity given to us now, of putting 
this work in hand with the advantage of a 60% grant from the 
Admiralty, as against having to meet 100% of the cost after 
the war, is of course obvious." (32) 
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Not only is the overt reference to a possible shortage of 
riveters worthy of note, but also the advantage of keeping 
abreast of modern shipbuilding improvements in practice did not 
apparently encourage the o~~ners to attempt to raise more than 
£17,000. The reason for this lies firstly in the poor financial 
condition of the yard, the overdraft on working capital of 
£25,000 was fully extended. Therefore the Bank Manager required 
written evidence of future Admiralty orders to the yard, 
whereupon he agreed to advance the sum of £15,000 on the 
condition that a new account was created in order to deal with 
the money earmarked for the modernisation program. Secondly at 
that time it was by no means as clear as the letter to the Bank 
Manager suggested that pre-fabricated construction would be the 
cost efficient way to build ships after the war. As late as 1947 
Mr. R.C. Thompson, a leading member of the Wear Shipbuilders 
Association and Managing Director of Thompsons Yard, proclaimed 
pre-fabricated construction an expensive method of building 
ships. Similarly a worker remembered the attitude of Mr. 
Pickersgill to the method of pre-fabrication by which the 
American "liberty ships" were built: 
"He said about what was happening in America, he said, "It 
will never come here." He says "They'll never pre-fabricate 
here." That's what he thought at the time." (33) 
Clearly the owners of other yards on the Wear had great 
doubts about the commercial viability of pre-fabricated 
construction in peacetime; we will return to this issue at a 
Chapter 3 - 201 -
later point. As Bartrams were only prepared to contribute 
£17,000 towards modernisation, considerable negotiation went on 
with the Admiralty before they sent a letter to the yard on 20 
October 1943 approving a modernisation scheme casted ot £163,151 
(34). The arrangement was that the Admiralty agreed to pay 100% 
of the cost for certain items, most notably a new berth and shed, 
which were then to be leased to Bart rams. The final settlement 
of account was to be decided by assessment after the war. One 
other condition was that the Admiralty should hold legal 
entitlement to the ground upon which these developments were 
built. The lease of the land from Sunderland Corporation was 
duly transformed from Bartams to the Admiralty. The negotiations 
involved in this modernisation went on for over a year, not due 
to the conservatism of the employer or the retarding effect of 
the unions, but rather because the firm and the Admiralty were at 
pains to agree the right financial package; private ownership and 
the criteria of profit were not to be subordinated to the demands 
of war. 
Again it must be emphasised that the leading edge of 
technology is not necessarily the best focus in order to under-
stand the general nature of any particular division of labour. 
In the case of hull welding and pre-fabrication it was by no 
means obvious at the time of the Second World War that, when 
considered from the point of view of both technical and cost 
efficiency, such methods were superior to more traditional 
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processes. Not only were there doubts about the techniques as 
construction processes, but there was also concern about the 
product they produced. 
Thus an all welded hull was thought not to be as strong as a 
riveted one. Experience of the American built "liberty" ships 
did little to change this view as an ex-Plater, who had done 
repair work on several of these ships, noted: 
" They made it across the Atlantic but that was about 
all. Because of brittle fractures we had to burn sections 
down the hull and put riveted plates in to allow some 
flexing to take place." (35) 
In a similar connection, F.A. Fox noted that: 
"Between 1942 and 1952, about 250 welded ships suffered one 
or more brittle fractures of such severity that they were 
lost or in a dangerous condition, and 1,200 more suffered 
small brittle cracks dangerous but not disabling." (36) 
That the all welded hull was to prove viable in the future owed 
much to improvements in welding equipment, and the British 
development of the coated electrode should mentioned in this 
connect1on. ~ut whatever the potentialit1es of such new develop-
ments, at the point of production things rarely conveyed the 
impression of unproblematic progress: 
"There was problems with it. I remember a problem wilh 
Admiralty work with the armour plating they were trying to 
weld. They didn't have the right rods. The parts that they 
were welding over were just literally dropping off." (37) 
That technical progress was made during the war cannot be 
denied. Not only were production techniques developed but also 
the product, the ships themselves were subject to more 
concentrated development, and there was a substantial increase in 
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top speeds of vessels. However whilst there were other technical 
develop-ments during this period, as a general conclusion upon 
the rate and nature of technical change the Shipbuilder and 
Marine Engineer in 1945 pronounced these cautious words: 
"Such has been the emphasis on wartime progress in plant, 
and methods of construction that there is, perhaps, too 
great an expectation of ''things to come" by many outside the 
industry itself. What is perhaps overlooked is that such 
developments have, in some instances, been undertaken with 
less regard for cost than performance, and with a number of 
labour customs modified or suspended as a wartime measure." 
(38) 
The impetus to technical change initiated by the Admiralty 
was then only one strand in a wider attempt to raise the absolute 
output of the industry, in the context of labour shortage. As 
far as changes in labour practices themselves were concerned the 
two most important attempts at change were in relation to 
dilution and interchangeability between crafts. In the case of 
the former there was a direct relationship to some of the 
technical changes occurring: the substitution of welding for 
riveting, with consequently shorter training periods, has already 
been mentioned in this connection. 
However, given the experiences of the inter-war period, the 
Unions were anxious to ensure that such changes were initiated 
only where genuine labour shortages existed. The maintenance of 
demarcation boundaries was suggested by Barnett to be one of the 
mechanisms by which workers practised the 
" skilled and dedicated avoidance of tiring activily." (39) 
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Such a glib characterisation is hardly worthy of serious 
research; however it is true that considerable effort had to be 
expended in order to secure agreements upon interchangeability 
between the unions and the S.E.F .. Moreover such agreements were 
often limited in scope and could be rather bureaucratic in their. 
(theoretical) operation. A memorandum by the Ministry of Labour 
in October 1943 dealing with interchangeability suggested that it 
was: 
" ••• only permissible in existing circumstances in so far 
as it is expressly provided for in agreements which have 
been reached between the shipbuilding Employers' Federation 
and certain of the principal shipbuilding unions ..• This 
method, however, is cumbersome and it is arguable that if 
the skilled labour force in each shipyard is to be kept 
continuously employed to the best advantage, a much more 
flexible method should be adopted whereby craftsmen could, 
where necessary, be transferred to skilled work in another 
craft where they are more urgently required even though it 
be only for a short period of a few hours at a time." (40) 
Although it is possible to sustain a view which shows the unions 
as the main force retarding more flexible interchangeability 
between trades with reference to detailed National agreements, at 
the local level things were often more complex. Thus on the Wear 
in October 1939: 
"(an) agreement was signed between the Wear Shipbuilders' 
Association and the Boilermakers', Shipwrights' and Joiners' 
Societies, by which it was agreed that for the period of the 
war there would be no stoppage of work through demarcation 
difficulties. The unions also agreed that where necessary 
labour should be interchangeable in different trades so as 
to avoid delays in production through acute shortage of 
labour in any particular trade." (41) 
This agreement also formed the basis for the setting up of a 
joint committee of employers and union representatives, known as 
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the Labour Supply Committee. It was at a meeting of this 
committee on 9 July 1940 that the issue of interchangeability was 
a g a i n r a i sed b y M r . W. L. Ba r k e r , the We a r d i s t r i c t secret a r y o f 
the C.S.E.U., and as the W.S.A. minutes recorded: 
"It was also suggested from the men's side of the committee 
that greater use could be made by firms in some cases, of 
the local agreement made in October last year providing for 
interchangeability between members of the Boilermakers, 
Shipwrights and Joiners Societies, and it was agreed that 
firms should be reminded of the facilities provided by the 
Agreement and encouraged to make use of them where 
necessary." (42) 
Here, then, it is the unions who raised the issue and actually 
advocated the greater use of interchangeability. 
However of more importance than interchangeability as the 
war progressed and labour shortages became acute was the issue of 
dilution. Here again the experience of the past ensured that 
both sides of the employment relationship moved with initial 
caution in this direction. For the Ministry of Labour this could 
be frustrating, as one official put it: 
"Whenever dilution is raised we seem to be brought up short 
against a ghostly army of unemployed boilermakers." (43) 
Again it must be stressed that it was not solely the unions that 
frustrated early attempts to dilute the workforce, for: 
"Nor was there much support from the shipbuilding firms, 
each of which was more interested in preserving its own 
skilled labour force at maximum strength than in providing 
surplus labour to be transferred to its rivals, and all of 
which (like the Admiralty itself) preferred to put up with 
existing practices rather than risk trouble with the 
unions." (44) 
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The reticence of the employers and the Admiralty was not based 
solely on fear of the unions, but was also predicated upon their 
belief in the efficiency of the skilled worker and the craft 
division of labour. This can be evidenced with reference to a 
correspondence which took place in 1942, on the interpretation of 
productivity figures, between the Managing Director of Doxfords 
Yard and the Admiralty. The publication of productivity figures 
appeared to show that output per man was lower at Doxfords Yard 
than other yards on the Wear. Stung into action by this, J. 
Ramsey Gebbie attempted to put forward a reason why this should 
be so. Without knowing the ratios of skilled to unskilled 
workers in other yards he suggested that the explanation of lhe 
low output per man perhaps was to be found in this ratio, and 
therefore asked the Admiralty if they could confirm this? Their 
reply of 8 May 1942 seemed indeed to support Gebbie's hypothesis: 
" it is true that your total of semi-skilled and 
unskilled labour represents a larger proportion of the 
tradesmen than is the average condition throughout the 
yards. This may have the effect of reducing your average 
output per man somewhat, but it is because of this type of 
feature that we are anxious to stress that the tests taken 
out here are a first diagnosis. Whilst you may suffer to 
some extent from this comparative condition of a high 
proportion in the semi-skilled and unskilled classes, I 
think this is a matter upon which you are entitled to 
receive congratulations at the present time. 
The logical ultimate result of a drive to increase 
output by taking on more men - recognising that the only men 
likely to become available will be unskilled, would be a 
falling off in output per man, but what we are after in lhe 
long run is tonnage, and it is that that is important." (45) 
That this "logical ultimate result" of falling output per 
man should be accepted perhaps bears witness to the unsuitability 
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(and given other wartime constraints the near impossibility) of 
substituting on any large scale capital for labour. An added 
dimension to the debate over dilution was the move taken at first 
hesitantly to introduce women into the industry. This develop-
ment is worth studying in detail, not only for the questions it 
raised in terms of the operation of the division of labour, but 
also because of the light it can shed upon issues of social 
relations at work as well as producing valuable insights into the 
nature of the occupational community. 
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IPart III 
The Case of b.mnren Hn:rkers ( 46) 
In his book published in 1894 entitled "Sunderland Notables" 
William Brokie noted that s shipowner named John White was: 
" ... a wonderful man for looking after others, for their 
benefit as well as his own ••• Having a number of workmen in 
his employment in various capacities, he took a pleasure and 
made it a practice to visit them all at their homes at least 
once a year, to see if their wives kept everything clean and 
nice." (47) 
The perception of women as wives and homemakers was a view that 
lived on in traditional shipbuilding centres. So much so that at 
the beginning of the Second World War there seemed to be a ·~on-
spiracy" between the owners and the working men to bar the entry 
of women from the shipyards. Thus: 
" .•• in September 1939, the shipbuilders put on record the 
view, which was said to represent the consensus of opinion 
at the end of the First World War, that women could only be 
employed usefully in the yards in so far as they could be 
segregated within four walls and provided with a separate 
entrance. It would serve no useful purpose to employ them 
in open shops or in ships for, apart from their 
unsuitability for the work, any increased output obtained 
would be more than offset by loss of output from the men 
already employed." (48) 
Similarly the unions were opposed to the widespread employment of 
women in the yards. This position was maintained as late as 
April 1940 when, in a meeting of the Admiralty on the 30th of 
that month, 
" various suggestions were put forward including 
proposals to speed up the design and construction methods of 
shipbuilding. But while they were ready to consider and 
implement many suggestions, the unions were opposed to the 
greater use of women. They felt it was "a drastic departure 
from custom and practice"." (49) 
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However as the demands on labour power grew these positions were 
considerably modified; in the case of the unions only a month 
after their initial opposition was voiced to the Admiralty they 
accepted, in conference, the extension of women's employment in 
the yards, "subject to adequate safeguards being inserted". 
This demonstrates an important disjunction between 
management and unions underlying their initial opposition to the 
extension of the employment of women. The management position as 
outlined in "The Shipbuilding and Shipping Record" focuses upon 
the supposed physical limitations of women. 
"In the ordinary way there seems to be little scope for 
women labour in the shipyard .•• It is true that the 
introduction of new tools and revised methods have reduced 
the amount of heavy manual labour, but nevertheless, 
shipbuilding is a heavy industry. It has been suggested 
that rather than employing women in the shipyards men 
engaged in lighter industries might be transferred to 
shipbuilding and their places taken by women." (50) 
Here then the objection is primarily based upon a stereotypical 
view of women as the "weaker sex". 
In the case of the unions, whilst they may have shared some 
of the reservations of management such gender based consider-
ations were not the prime reasons for opposition to extending 
women's employment in the yards. Rather the issue of women 
workers was seen as one particular form of dilution and therefore 
was seen as a threat to the existing workforce. As an 
unpublished study of labour in the wartime shipbuilding industry, 
written for the Cabinet Office Historical Section, put it: 
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" .•. the expansion of the labour force was primarily at the 
discretion of the employers, some of whom were reluctant, 
partly because of the opposition of the unions, to dilute 
their labour force ... it is true to say that the yards were 
never quite as full as they would have been if all employers 
had been prepared to make the best use of what labour was 
available, including women, and the unions to agree fully to 
dilution." (51) 
The importance of the differing concerns underlying the 
hesitance of management and unions to the employment of women is 
further demonstrated once such employment was accepted. The 
position for the unions was particularly difficult, for there 
were two contradictory concerns uppermost. Firstly, as we have 
seen, the unions were wary in case the employment of dilutee 
labour was used to attempt to undermine the position of the 
"skilled" worker. In order to avoid this situation the tendency 
was for the unions at local level to agree with management to a 
number of exceptions which women could not perform. However on 
the other hand insofar as women did perform skilled work the 
unions had to try and ensure that they were not employed as cheap 
labour, and were in principle paid the going rate for the job. 
The latter position prevailed in national negotiations between 
the unions and employers, with the unions putting forward the 
principle of "equal pay for equal work". The question was how 
should this principle be evaluated? 
"On the face of it this sounds fair enough, and we hear that 
in principle no great objection may be made to it, so long 
as it is clearly understood that the work done by a woman is 
the same, both in quantity and quality, and is performed 
under the same conditions as that done by men. Indeed, the 
unions claim seems to be that it should apply to work which 
women can do equally well with men - whether it be skilled, 
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semi-skilled or unskilled - and that they should undertake 
the whole duty without additional assistance. The employers 
have pointed out, however, that as a rule, women would be 
unable to carry out the whole duty of the men, and a 
suggestion has been made that at first, at any rate, there 
should be a probationary period for new-comers at a lower 
wage, and that the full wage should only commence when the 
woman is able to undertake the full duties." (52) 
The eventual agreement between the S.E.F. and the C.S.E.U. 
on 17 July 1941 enshrined the principle of equal pay for equal 
work but also specified a probationary period of 32 weeks before 
a woman over 21 years could be paid the "skilled" rate. The 
agreement between the S.E.F. and the C.S.E.U. was followed by 
agreements, all very similar in content, between individual 
unions and the S.E.F.. Thus for example the agreement between 
the S.E.F. and the National Painters Society reaffirmed the 
position in the earlier agreement: 
"Women employed on work normally done by skilled painters 
shall be paid rates of wages in accordance with the 
agreement between the Shipbuilding Employers Federation and 
the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions of 
17 July 1941." (53) 
However the statement of principle on wages at a national 
level cannot be seen as a guide to what happened at the local 
level, for the preceding point in the above agreement stated 
that: 
"Arrangements for changes of practice shall be made between 
firms and their workpeople in consultation with the local 
Association of the Employers and local Officials of the 
Society." (54) 
When one focuses on the local level it becomes apparent that the 
agreements between management and unions involved more complex 
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concerns than were enshrined in the reasonable demand of equal 
pay for equal work. On the Wear the final agreement between the 
W.S.A. and the Painters Society of February 1943 stated the 
position that women shall do all work that skilled painters do 
with the exception of: 
" jobs of a dangerous nature such as masts and jobs on 
high staging ••. In crews and officers quarters women do 
only the undercoats. Where there is two undercoats and one 
enamel, women do the first undercoat only; where there are 
three undercoats and one enamel, women do the first two 
undercoats only." (55) 
The concern to include exceptions from the normal range of a 
given skilled occupation was accepted by the workforce as an 
extra guarantee that dilutee labour could not be used as a 
comprehensive substitute for skilled labour. The need for all 
available guarantees was clearly perceived by Ernest Bevin in a 
letter to the Minister of Production on 15 August 1942: 
"I think ... it is quite visionary to think that any 
prejudice against dilution will be removed by further 
discussions between both sides of the industry. Prejudice 
against dilution exists, in my opinion, because the men 
remember what happened to them after the last war and do not 
trust the employers or the Government to prevent the same 
thing occurring after this one." (56) 
The point to grasp however is that once the unions were 
prepared to accept, and indeed require, limitations and 
exceptions on the range of the processes that women could 
undertake within a given occupation, the objective basis upon 
which equal pay for equal work could be claimed no longer 
existed. An example of this situation was recorded in the 
minutes of the Tyne Shipbuilders Association on 13 February 1945. 
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In t h i s c a s e a c 1 a i m m ad e by the Bo i 1 e r m a k e r s Soc i e t y was p u t 
forward demanding that the adult male welders time rate plus 
bonus should be paid to all female welders over 21 years of age 
who had served the 32 weeks probationary period. The employers 
replied that such women welders were not skilled as they were 
restricted primarily to "tack welding". The union argued that 
·this restriction represented the formally agreed situation 
between the T.S.A. and themselves, that was, that women should do 
the tacking in order to free men for other work. Whereupon the 
employers offered to pay the time rate for individual women 
judged "efficient" by a foreman. The unions did not accept this. 
arguing that women should be paid the full time rate unless 
judged "not capable", the employers rejected this and a 
conclusion of "failure to agree" was recorded (57). 
The importance of this "background" is to be seen in 
relation to the pru,nineiiL:e y.iven to the wages issue in other 
accounts of women workers in the Second War 1 d War, and t.he 
suggestion that such wage differentials were in themselves the 
main butress of gender division in industry C58 ). What is being 
argued here is that from the point of view of the unions the main 
problematic was that of ensuring that in the longer term dilutee 
labour could not be substituted for skilled workers. This 
predominant concern became enshrined in local agreements on work 
procedures which effectively undermined the potential for the 
realisation of the principle of equal pay for equal work. 
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Inevitably such a situation helped lo ensure the maintenance of 
inequalities in levels of earning. Thus figures produced by the 
Ministry of Labour in July 1943 showed average earnings per hour 
in shipbuilding were 30.5 pence for men, 11.4 pence for boys, and 
18.1 pence for women (59). 
For the employers the local agreements provided loopholes 
through which wages lower than the full skilled rate could be 
paid. For the unions this presented problems, but not of such 
great magnitude that they were willing to risk the sanctity of 
the technical and social status of the craftsmen. Where unions 
represented unskilled women workers their advocacy of equal pay 
for equal work was often stronger, as in the case of unskilled 
women workers at Barrow Naval construction Works, who were 
successfully represented by the A.E.U. at a national arbitration 
tribunal in 1944 (60). 
The point is then that the appearanee ur CUIISIJiracy belween 
management and workforce against women in order to "preserve 
patriarchal authority" was nevertheless shaped by the enduring 
conflict between capital and labour in the industry which 
predated the expansion in the numbers of women employed. It is 
the dimensions of this conflict which operated in an ironic way 
to give the appearance that both capital and labour were united 
in attempting to exclude women from the industry. 
It was against this background then that women were to enter 
the shipyards in the north east. Their introduction was a slower 
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affair in this region than in others with more acute labour 
shortages, and similarly between the rivers in the region they 
were introduced later and in lower numbers on the lNear than on 
the Tyne. Moreover in individual yards employers often had to be 
constantly badgered by the Admiralty to initiate the recruitment 
of women. Thus in the case of Doxfords several letters passed 
between Amos Ayre for the Admiralty and J. Ramsey Gebbie 
regarding the employment of women before Gebbie acted, and in a 
letter to Ayre on 22 July 1942 somewhat vehemently stated: 
"I have provided accommodation for about 7~6 employment of 
women and ... we are starting to employ them next Monday." 
(61) 
The reservations of the employers were slowly abandoned, 
being based iargely upon unreal expectations as regards the 
disruptive effect and sexist dogma which led them to believe they 
would not get a good return for their outlay in wages. The 
cut,Jt:::H.:t::nu.ing tone remained however: 
11 
... The modest figures of a year ago have doubtless grown 
appreciably, for the adaptability of women in industries 
previously thought to be beyond their physical capacity, and 
indeed, unsuited to their mental powers, has been among the 
striking discoveries of the war period.lt (62) 
For the unions the worry over dilutee labour remained, but 
they realised that the best way to deal with the "threat'' was to 
"represent" the women concerned and thereby ensure that they 
could not be used by the employers as a wedge of dilutee labour 
to be driven between the existing craft division of labour. If 
these represent the formal positions of capital and labour, the 
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empirical situation in any locality was often less clearly 
structured. The relationships between men and women workers 
inside the yards were often less subject to reservations based on 
sexist dogma or suspicion over potential functionality for 
management schemes. Rather these relationships were at once both 
personal and structural, the meeting of persons but in the 
context of both the workplace and the community, involving 
structured power inequalities stemming from both the employment 
relationship, gender division, and more "localised" social 
statuses. In order to grasp the subtlety of these experiences we 
need to turn to the accounts produced by the women workers and 
listen to them speaking for themselves. 
Perhaps one of the most important differences between the 
employment of men and women in the war-time munitions industry 
and the shipyards was that in the latter industry the vast 
majority of women wol.~kei·::; were rec:1·ulleJ frurn lhe local 
community. The effects that living in a close knit occupational 
community had on social relationships within the workplace are 
hard to overemphasise, and to a large extent the moral order of 
the community spilled over into the workplace. This could be 
important not only for the regulation of gender boundaries within 
the yards, but also could be crucial in explaining why work was 
"sought" within the shipyard in the first place. For some women 
it was the case that relatives objected to the possibility of 
their going away, as a sign-writer at Greenwells Dock explained: 
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"My father wouldn't let us join up, he says "you're too 
little to join up", and he says "I'll get you a job where 
you'll not be called up", and this was how I came to get 
in." (63) 
For others the decision to go into the shipyards was made on 
different grounds: 
"Me father's mate, Charlie Ruskin, I used to say to him, "Ye 
I would love to be working in Doxfords - I would love it." -
"No no, it is no place for you, tis no place for you." I 
thought God, there is a there place for me, and that's why I 
went .•. and I thought I only want to work down Doxfords ..• 
it was great, aye I loved it." (64) 
For some women, especially where a husband was in the forces, the 
incentive was definitely the wage: 
" for more money ••• well I mean at that time when you 
only had your army pay, I was sort of glad of the wages to 
help with the bairns, 'cos- I mean, army pay you only got 
£2 odd a week you know." (65) 
Whatever the initial reason for seeking such employment 
there were several channels through which women joined the 
shipyard. The importance of family ties has already been 
evidenced in the above quotations: fathers, brothers, uncles and 
in the later years of the war even mothers could "speak" for 
women wishing to enter the yards: 
"You had to, more or less, have somebody to speak for you to 
get in, you know, which I thought was quite good, because of 
course my Dad ..• was there for years and years." (66) 
As time went on and the demands on labour became greater the 
more formal channels of local labour exchanges were used for 
recruitment. 
"I went from the labour exchange because at the time you had 
to work - you had no family, so you had to work. So that is 
how I came to be in the shipyards .•• I was sent as a 
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trainee electrician, a dilutee - a dilutee that's what they 
were called." (67) 
The Ministry of Labour envisaged that employers would have 
to initiate changes in the way that some jobs were performed in 
order to realise the full benefit that the employment of women 
could bring. As a pamphlet published in 1942 suggested under the 
heading of "Jobs Needing Modification": 
"Changes may be necessary in the case of heavy jobs where 
the physical effort required may be reduced by providing 
lighter equipment or lifting tackle etc.. In some cases two 
women may be substituted for one man, or more usually three 
women for two men. Certain jobs can be broken down so that 
the heavy skilled work is done by men and the finishing by 
women. In other cases men need give only temporary 
assistance or exercise general supervision. Subject to 
proper safeguards women have tackled really heavy work, 
especially in loading vehicles, trucks and machines." (68) 
As we have seen the concerns which historically had 
dominated the division of labour in the industry made it unlikely 
that jobs would be "broken down" to facilitate the "efficient" 
employment of women. Indeed, <JS noted earlier, where sucl1 
breakdowns were evident they were far more likely to be aimed at 
limiting the scope of dilutee labour rather than attempting to 
ease the application of female labour. What then were the jobs 
that women were allocated and how did they go about them? 
It is perhaps useful to make a distinction between the women 
who attended a period of training in order to undertake '~killed 
work" as a dilutee and the far larger group who were to undertake 
unskilled work. It is important to note that such a division, 
whilst following naturally from the existing division of labour, 
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is often overlooked as an aspect of women's work in the yards. 
For women who were to undertake skilled work there were two 
avenues through which training could be undertaken, government 
training centres and centres inside the yards. 
In relation to the Government training centres the general 
issue of women was confronted in the early years of the war. The 
official position was that there was to be no difference between 
the training of men and women. However as a letter from the 
Secretary of the Ministry of Labour to Divisonal Controllers in 
December 1940 made clear, such an official position was not 
necessarily representative of the actual position: 
"As the Deputy Secretary said, we are making no difference 
between the courses for men and women, which means that in 
all cases, it will be long term training I am not 
anxious to interpret this too strictly .•. if a u·seful job 
can be done by training women in aero detail fitting, say, 
for 8 or 10 weeks at a minimum, I think we should be 
prepared to do it." (Letter dated 18 December 1940 held in 
P.R.O. ref: LAB 18/66) (69) 
It is clear then that the official view prepared to be flexible 
in the case of women trainees. Thus a later letter from the same 
source indicated the willingness of the training centre to meet 
the demands of employers with respect to women trainees: 
"There will be no general distinction between the training 
given to women and that given to men. The considerations 
... dealt with (under) our general training policy will, 
however, apply here as elsewhere. Thus if in any area there 
is a demand for the training of women to be modified in 
certain respects in view of the work which they will be put 
to when placed, which does not apply to men, we should of 
course be prepared to introduce such modifications in the 
case of women." (16 January 1941: P.R.O. LAB 18.66) (70) 
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From the evidence gained in the oral histories it would seem 
that there was not such a close relationship between individual 
firms and the general training centres, indeed some women were 
directed to the training centres and trained in a skill unaware 
of where that skill would be practised. In this situation women 
often did receive a "comprehensive training". 
"I went over to Wallsend •.. that morning there must have 
been about 300 young girls and men, and a number of elderly 
people in a line and they counted "1, 2, 3 - you're a 
joiner; 1, 2, 3 - you're a fitter; 1, 2, 3 -" and I was a 
welder. It was as simple as that ... We learnt how to braze 
and how to weld zinc, ordinary welding, copper brazing, 
aluminium, you know - the whole range of everything that 
covered the whole lot. " ( 71) 
As with most forms of training there was a difference between 
theory and practice: 
" ••• I was rather amused about some of the early days; they 
would tell you: "now you have to be able to weld to a 
thousandth of an inch", which meant, good heavens, that you 
just got on with it, and did the best you could. I wasn't 
willing to try to work that out." ( 72) 
On passing a series of practical tests the dilutee was then 
allocated to a particular firm. In some cases women who sought 
employment at a particular firm were then sent to the training 
centre at Wallsend. For women from the Wear the journey to and 
from Wallsend was often remembered as more difficult than the 
training itself, especially as shift work was operated: 
"It was just getting there and coming back - that was the 
worst bit ••• I forget what time you started - about 10 
o'clock and you finished at 6 o'clock in the morning." (73) 
As far as the course of training itself was concerned, much 
could depend upon the availability of instructors, as a welder 
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from Swan Hunters remembered: 
"So we went to Wallsend training centre - we had a hilarious 
time there - it was great ..• it was laughable actually 
because we started off with bench fitting you see. \.<Jell I 
got on like a house on fire. But they said the instructor 
was leaving so would we go into the welding thing. So I 
said "oh well I don't know that ... we' 11 try it.'"' (74) 
Once the employment of women became a more routine 
occurrence individual yards started to do their own training. In 
these cases there was less standardisation than at the government 
training centres. Some women were given a formal training 
period: 
"I was sent as a trainee electrician, a dilutee that's what 
they were called. And six weeks training in the shop first, 
and then down onto the ship." (75) 
Similarly, 
"I was the first caulker burner for the shipyard you see. 
So they started me off as an apprentice - they showed me how 
to light my cutter, and put the gauges right, you know, for 
the oxygen and that. And he showed me for about six weeks 
and I was on burning scrap. And then after six weeks he 
says, 110h, you've got to go on a ship at the sut 11 ,il (16) 
In other instances a less formal training was deemed 
sufficient, as in a case at Palmers where a cleaner who had 
worked in the Plumbers shop since 1939 was deemed to have learned 
enough to do "skilled work": 
"Mr. Wright, me Foreman, asked us if I would like to ... he 
says "they're bringing a ship in, m•od you it's badly 
damaged - the "Kelly"." He says, would you like to go on 
it, you've learned a lot of plumbing. I says "who's on it?" 
He says "Lord Louis Mountbatten". I says "who is he?" and 
he says "well he's something to do with the royalty." ... I 
was a plumber!" (77) 
On other occasions also women picked up skills without a formal 
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training period. A rigger at Doxfords was taught splicing at 
home by her mother who worked at the yard, prior to her own entry 
into the workforce. 
"Only me mother showed us. So I just went down there, and 
just walked in, you know, and started. I did the splicing 
with me mother." (78) 
Having been "trained" for skilled work or just launched into 
unskilled work the women started working in what for many was a 
new working environment. For those practising "skills" many 
were, due to local agreements, restricted to only partial 
operations such as tack welding. However there were exceptions 
to this which could be the source of some conflict between 
individual skilled men and women. 
"Well there was this one particular fellow ... I don't want 
to sound big headed, but I was rather proficient at my job, 
and I remember this fellow coming out, and I was going 
towards my work, and it was a rudder stem ... And this 
fellow came over and he says, "that isn't your job, that's 
mine", ! said "oh no, I've been told to do it." "I tell 
you that is mine - there's no woman ever allowed to do that 
sort of thing." So I just looked, and I thought oh well 
honey you're 6'2", or whatever, and I'm not going to argue, 
so I merely walked over to our foreman and I said "Would you 
t e 11 me what I have to do." And he said "Yes, that's your 
job." So I said, "Well you tell this gentleman that it is 
my job - that I'm capable of doing it, and just let him know 
this" you see. And he was furious - he was furious .•. he 
was the only one that really ever quibbled." (79) 
The role of the foreman was clearly of great importance in 
interpreting the actual operation of local agreements. Moreover 
for the women the foreman could be as important an authority as 
for the men. To fall foul of a foreman and incur his wrath could 
have serious results. As one fitter from North Eastern Marine 
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recalled: 
"One day I actually fell out with the gaffer. So he said 
'~ight - you get no help, you set the job up yoursel~', took 
me half a day. The gaffer wasn't very nice to me you see. 
He used some nasty terms. I reported him to the Lady 
Supervisor in the "ladies shop". And of course she went up 
to the offices. And, of course, he stopped the men helping 
me to set a job up. And I mean the machine ... was a 
massive thing. And I had to stand on it with my two feet, 
and hold the top, and jump like that ... to shift it." (80) 
In.most other cases however the women could call upon their 
male colleagues for help or advice. Thus a lathe operator from 
Greenwells dock noted that: 
"You sometimes found it a bit beyond you at times, you know 
doing the difficult jobs and that, on the lathes, but 
however I managed. And somebody would help, yes they would 
always help you." (81) 
Most importantly such help from the male workforce could provide 
a guide to the actual standard of work that was required, rather 
than the theoretical standards given in training. Thus a burner 
was questioned ~s to whathcr she had to be very precise about hGr 
work: 
"No ••• well I did at first. I thought all the work had to 
be perfect until one of the caulkers came along - he says 
"oh don't be fussy - we do that" he says, "don't be fussy". 
Of course I thought everything had to be perfect with being 
on a ship." (82) 
Learning acceptable standards of work and "short cuts" which can 
be taken to finish a job are, of course, part of the mysteries of 
craft that apprentices learn in their time spent with journey-
men. For the dilutees such elements of the job had to be learnt 
quickly, and in most cases relied upon the goodwill of the 
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skilled men in the yard. As one electrician remembered: 
"I was given a partner to work with. He was a qualified 
electrician, we worked on the "Diadem" - wiring Junction 
boxes •.. He showed me what to do - he kept me right all the 
time." (83) 
If the "tricks of the trade" had to be learnt quickly, so 
too did the other ''rules" governing the social division of labour 
in the yards. In this respect the women faced similar issues as 
did men who were new to the yards. As one woman commented in 
relation to working at North Eastern Marine, 
" .•• when I first went in they asked me what religion I 
was. And, of course, I said "Church of England". He said, 
"well don't open your mouth in here 'cos they are all 
Catholics". And that was the way I was taken in." (84) 
Some women interviewed appeared to have accepted 
unreservedly the perception of the skill hierarchy between trades 
from the point of view of "their" trade. Most importantly this 
represents itself as an enthusiastic advocacy of the skill 
content of their trade coupled w1th a denigration of others. In 
seel"\ 
this situation gender identity was often~as secondary. For 
example in the estimation of one sheetmetal worker from Swan 
Hunters, 
"Yes, there was no skill with women welders." (85) 
Similarly a splicer from Doxfords was of the opinion that her 
work was very highly skilled whereas other women working in the 
yard: 
" ••• couldn't do it, so they did the little jobs, like 
stick a bit of paint on or something. Aye, I wouldn't have 
bothered painting or owt. To me that would have been nowt." 
(86) 
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If loyalty to a particular trade was one aspect of the 
socialisation of women into shipyard life, another was learning 
the use of the "jungle telegraph" as an alert of approaching 
management. 
" ••. if she (the women's supervisor) came on the deck ... 
she used to come on the deck now and again and the lads 
would pat their heads and say "hi-up, she's here" - well 
there was me standing gossiping like." (87) 
The lack of direct managerial control and relative freedom 
of movement was one aspect of the work which several women 
mentioned as being particularly surprising: 
" ... of course we had a freedom, you know, you weren't sort 
of tied down, it was a freedom of getting on with your work. 
And funnily enough with welders, if you couldn't get on with 
that, or you felt you needed a break, then you were at 
liberty to move off the job and pull yourself together or 
whatever, you know." (88) 
Another welcome feature of the labour process in the yards 
was seen to be the control that individual workers could exercise 
over the rate of work and application of machinery. This was 
particularly so where women had experienced other types of war 
work: 
"I worked in Dunlop's factory in Birmingham •.• but we were 
only in lodgings you see so I came back and started at the 
shipyard ... It was a bit dangerous in Birmingham ... I got 
me fingers jammed one day ••• You see the difference between 
the sawmill (at Doxfords) and the factory - well in the 
sawmill when you are sawing you can ease off, when you are 
in the factory where they are cutting the rubber, well you 
can't ... you're not in control of the machine. A few 
narrow escapes there." (89) 
As well as an appreciation of the specific nature of the control 
features of the division of labour the women also shared with the 
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men a degree of pride in their work: 
"Dh, and the first time they said there was a launch •.• I 
went down, I was so excited .•• I was standing beside the 
platers, and all the men clapped •.• "Oh," I said, "Tommy, 
look at all our work" - it had grown up they were going mad 
..• I thought "my God, look at that work and it's going into 
the sea," and it was away. Dh, if I live to be a hundred I 
shall never forget or feel anything like it." (90) 
So far the importance of the continuities between the work 
done by the women and the men in the wartime shipyards has been 
stressed in order to point out how little the division of labour 
was altered in order to accommodate this new source of labour. 
The importance of skill, loyalty to a particular trade and the 
lack of tight controls over the rate of work and the physical 
movement of workers are elements which dominate most accounts. 
As far as more social elements of the employment of women in the 
yards were concerned there is considerable evidence of the way in 
which the moral order of the local community spilled unproblem-
atically over into the workplace. This is one of the reasons why 
the "disruption" effect of employing female labour, expected by 
management, did not materialise. Unlike many of the munitions 
factories in the Midlands and elsewhere, the women workers 
recruited into the yards were local and given the importance of 
ties of kinship mentioned below, this helped to ensure that 
appropriate behaviour in the presence of the opposite sex was 
maintained. The unprompted mention by a majority of the women 
interviewed of the moderation of language used by the men is 
perhaps one example of this. 
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"The men •.. you never heard them using any bad talk when 
the women was around." (91) 
The unproblematic meshing of the values of the local 
occupational community and the workplace was one reason why the 
demobilisation of women working in the yards took place 
relatively smoothly, a majority of women interviewed leaving 
before they were required to by the restoration of pre-war 
practices. Most emphasis ed the resumption of domestic 
responsibilities as husbands returned or as marriage was 
undertaken; in some cases choice of spouse was a direct result of 
working in the yard. 
"I left in July 1945, to get married ••. and of the five 
girls that worked in the boiler shop they all married men 
out of the boiler shop. One got married in 1944 and I think 
there was two married before me, and we were married in the 
July; the other two got married shortly after that." (92) 
The exigencies of war required that untapped sources of 
labour were called upon to work in the yards, and it was to meet 
this "emergency" situation that dilutee labour both male and 
female was called upon. Patriotism alone was never enough to 
ensure that the particular interests of capital or labour were 
totally subordinated to the task of maximum output. Moreover 
during the period both capital and labour shared the view that 
the abandonment of the strengths of the craft division of labour 
would not be the best way to raise production, and given that 
view and the legacy of recent past, dilution and inter-
changeability were almost bound to be problematic. During the 
war then, the labour supply problems were solved largely through 
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calling once again on the local communities, "industrial 
districts" in which the realities of shipbuilding were readily 
known by both men and, as this account makes clear, women as 
well: 
" •.• it was part and parcel of my life, and living on the 
riverside - well ships, shipyards and rivers - well that was 
all part of my upbringing. But to get into a shipyard 
seemed the most natural thing in the world in war time. It 
wasn't like a girl from London going into a shipyard. Well 
I knew all about shipyard work all my life. You see I knew 
all about rivets and heaters and platers, and all the 
different trades." (93) 
With the restoration of pre-war practices after the 
conclusion of hostilities, dilutees, both men and women, left the 
yards. Although there were exceptions among the male dilutees, 
as one worker remembered: 
"I can remember about three that shouldn't have been kept in 
(the boilermakers). They had relatives who were secretaries 
of the union ... Oh it was flexible enough for that to be 
done. I even knew a lad that came out of the army and he 
got in the boilermakers, yet according to their rules you're 
supposed to start as an apprentice you know." (94) 
Other than for those with the right personal connections the 
return to pre-war practice was accomplished soon after the war. 
The question that remained however was whether the wider economic 
conditions that were characteristic of the inter-war period would 
return? For, as we have seen, it was in relation to the pattern 
of demand characteristic of this and other periods, that of 
widely fluctuating booms and slumps, that the labour intensive 
craft division of labour was seen to hold advantage over that of 
a more capital intensive nature. That the answer to this 
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question was not obvious at the time is apparent when one looks 
at the immediate post-war period. 
Whilst there had been no "quantum leap" in the principles 
underlying the division of labour in the shipbuilding industry 
during the war, it had; nevertheless, proved possible to build a 
large number of ships using a workforce who had less experience 
of shipyard work than would have been the case in peace time. 
Also some of the smaller yards and several of those left derelict 
after the inter-war depression had been used to assemble 
prefabricated units and therefore this technique was no longer 
only of theoretical interest to British builders. However the 
possibility of technological and organisational innovation was, 
in the minds of most builders, ultimately tied up with the 
question of demand, both in its quantitative and qualitative 
aspects. Would the fluctuations in demand characteristic of the 
inter-war period return and would shipownP.rR rnntinue to demend 
bespoke products rather than standard vessels? In some ways 
these questions were linked in that if high demand was maintained 
there was more possibility of a growing importance of the 
standard vessel in the situation of a rapidly expanding merchant 
fleet, whereas if demand did not remain strong, owners would be 
more specific and demanding over the specifications of ships that 
they did, on occasion, order. In this sense then the prospects 
for change within the division of labour were limited by the 
market and the perception of its future course. It is important 
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therefore to understand that in the immediate post-war position 
the effects on the industry of the war are not to be seen in the 
objective changes initiated during this period 1 but rather in the 
questions that these changes could pose if the wider post-war 
environment proved to be fundamentally different from that of the 
inter-war period. Thus in looking at the post-war position we 
need to look at various dimensions of the wider context in both 
its political and economic aspects. 
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Part IV 
The Post-Har Position 
Alistair Reid in a paper on "The Division of Labour and 
Politics in Britain 1850-1920" has argued that the nature of lhe 
division of labour must not be studied in isolation from the 
state, and that: 
" more attention (should) be paid to the internal 
dynamics of the state, and of politics in general." (95 ) 
If this conclusion can be drawn from the period 1850-1920 then it 
should contain as much, or even more, validity for periods after 
1945 with the extension of direct state intervention in industry. 
The State influences industry in several ways, however not all of 
them direct (96), As Stephen Hill suggests, the creation of a 
particular "envirortment" is of some importance: 
" the state may have an effect on the structure of 
social relations and the balance of power within individual 
firms themselves. The totality of government's economic and 
social policies creates an environment which favours one 
side or other of industry, while policy in the specific area 
of industrial relations has a more direct influence on the 
manner in which conflicting interests are resolved." (97) 
The importance of the creation of a particular environment is 
indeed great in the immediate post-war years. The Labour 
"landslide" victory at the polls, according to Peter 
Calvocoressi, represented the belief of the electorate: 
" ... that the Labour Party would make great strides towards 
the elimination of absolute poverty and excessive 
inequality." (98) 
The election of the Labour government is then usually seen as a 
change in the "mood of the country", as David Thomson put it: 
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"What was undoubtedly new ••. was the change of national 
outlook and of popular resolve: and the spirit of the Labour 
party government, rocketed to power in the summer of 1945, 
chimed with this new mood •.. men looked forward, damning 
the recent past perhaps too completely, and shunning so 
vehemently the errors of the past that they were apt to 
commit an entirely new set of errors of their own. 
Uppermost in their minds was the desire for fuller social 
justice, a lessening of class differences and greater 
security and peace." (99) 
The theme is a common one in discussions of social history at the 
end of World War Two, people running at all speed from the past 
impatiently striving to embrace the future. However, more recent 
evidence suggests that this view is perhaps an overstatement. As 
Bill Williamson states in his book "Class Culture and Community": 
"The dominant mood was one of relief •.• However, there was 
no sense of a new world to be built. "Not in this village" 
said Bill when I asked him about the high expectations that 
sorne historians described. And Mary ••• was more emphatic: 
'~here was nothing to be optimistic about; we were making do 
and mend, making coats out of blankets. My mother says that 
she expected a major economic depression after the war." 
The result of the First World War had been depression; they 
did not think this one would be any different." (100) 
Whilst this account is produced from a mining community there is 
no indication that such expectations were atypical, indeed a mood 
of pessimism, certainly in medium and long term economic affairs, 
was more prevalent in shipbuilding communities, predicated on 
earlier experience, than was a mood of optimism. As one worker 
recalled, the view in the yards was not one of optimism: 
"They were worried definitely, and by 1947 quite a lot of 
the yards were very short of orders so things were looking 
pretty black by then." (101) 
After the war, then, certainly amongst ordinary working people, 
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there was little evidence of: 
" heightened popular expectations that the state can 
provide political solutions to economically generated 
problems; for example, that the state can abolish 
inequalities of wealth and income or restore the control 
that people lack at work." (102) 
If there was continuity of expectations in relation to the 
economic sphere then there was discontinuity in the make up and 
political programme of the state. It is within this juncture of 
continuity and change of expectations and political forces 
respectively that the study of the change and the division of 
labour is to be situated. Of particular importance here is the 
changing role of Trades Unions and perception of that role held 
within the official trade union structure. For, with a labour 
government and the legacy of wartime consultation by government 
the trade unions had to some extent "come in from the cold". As 
one commentator has put it: 
" for the two decades following the last war, the 
national lea-dership of almost every union remained ~nmmitt.P.rl 
to the same aims of "moderation" and "responsibility" and 
was, in general, successful in preventing any serious 
challenge to stable capitalist development." (103) 
Walter Citrine placed a different emphasis on the changes 
when he spoke at the 1946 T .U.C. Conference. He suggested that 
the trade union movement had: 
" passed from the era of propaganda to one of 
responsibility." ( 104) 
This emphasis on responsibility manifested itself in some, at 
.• 
first sight, surprising ways. As Henry P~lling noted speaking of o/ 
If 
the trade union movement during the period 1939-51: 
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It became deeply committed to many of the processes of 
management, at the end of the period its representatives, 
who under Marshall Plan auspices had the opportunity of 
examining the best American practice, came back advocating 
union cooperation in the introduction of "scientific 
management"." (105) 
So far I have attempted to outline "the climate" within the 
country after the Second World War as far as the trade union 
officialdom and the expectations of ordinary working people were 
concerned. An essential part in understanding the significance of 
this climate is comprehending how it interlocked with the changed 
"nature" of the state. Whilst these relationships are on 1 y part 
of the myriad of connections implied in the notion of the modern 
state they are of central importance for this study of the 
division of labour. This condition and these expectations should 
be seen not only as a background within which to situate the 
(social) action, but are essentially present within the action 
surrounding the labour process appearing variously as both 
subjective reasons for certain lines of action and as objective 
limits to others. 
If expectations of labour were pessimistic as regards the 
future of the industry, those of management were hardly any more 
optimistic. The expectation of a return to the pre-war conditions 
of boom and slump coloured their outlook, and whilst attempting 
to "stabilise their labour force" in the immediate post-war 
period (106) they also warned of the problem of over-capacity 
which would follow from the expansion of capacity during the war, 
and they clearly expected the level of post-war demand to turn 
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down sharply after losses had been made good. 
The above argument about the persistence of pessimism should 
not be overstated, but should rather be perceived as an essential 
part of the consciousness of those people in the post-war ship-
building community, predicated upon past experience of the 
inevitability of boom and slump in terms of demand for their 
labour or product 007). Whilst a "boom" period was in progress 
the workers would make demands for higher wages using to the full 
extent the existence of a tight labour market to press home their 
claims. And as McGoldrick has argued (lOB), the employers would 
quite often grant substantial rises, confident that once the 
demand for ships turned down the workers would, without too much 
trouble, accept wage cuts. Such a period of a short boom had 
followed the First World War and expectations were that the same 
situation pertained in 1945. 
On the face of it, the position in which British ship-
building found itself at the end of WW2 was an enviable one. The 
defeat of Germany and Japan had effectively removed them from the 
stage of international competition. The level of demand for ships 
was extremely buoyant following the mass destruction of wartime 
(109), the above average age of world tonnage (llO) and the drop 
in carrying efficiency due mainly to longer turn around times in 
port (111). In this situation British shipbuilding was able to 
expand its share of the world market from the pre-war level in 
1930-39 of 35% to an average of 509,) for the period 1946-49 (llZ). 
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At the point of production however this period was anything 
but an easy one. The first problem to be faced was the 
changeover from wartime to peacetime production. This was a 
process which started before the end of the hostilities - ils 
effects on the workforce in North Eastern yards was noted by "The 
· Shipbuilder and Marine Engineer": 
"Declining overtime work and occasional, if temporary, 
unemployment have combined to make shipyard and engineering 
workers in the North East acutely aware of the uncertainties 
which peace time conditions may bring. They have not 
forgotten their experiences during the depression of ten 
years ago." (113) 
Such was the feeling of insecurity that the Tyne and Blyth 
confederation of the shipbuilding and engineering trade unions 
held a conference in Newcastle in April 1945 to discuss "post war 
employment and the provision of new work". It was agreed that 
maximum pressure should be brought to bear to ensure that any 
eventual decline in the shipbuilding industry would be offset by 
alternative opportunities for employment (114). The employers on 
the other hand were concerned that too much would be done to 
encourage new industry at the expense of shipbuilding. Thus, 
early in 1945 the Wear Shipbuilding Association made its feelings 
known to Sunderland corporation on the occasion of its 
development of post war plans for industrial development (115). 
The problems of reverting to peacetime production were 
further exacerbated by several other factors. Firstly, as Mark 
Hodgson 0 16) noted, the surrender of Japan in August 1945, far 
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sooner than anyone had imagined possible, meant that the 
admiralty cancelled several orders already placed with ship-
builders. Secondly, some shipowners were not coming forward with 
new orders. There were several reasons for this. Initially 
shipowners were anxious to know, before placing new orders, 
whether the American reserve fleet would be put up for sale upon 
the world market at "knock down prices". Another reason was 
suggested in the Shipbuilding and Marine Engineer: 
"Shipbuilders in the North East coast region have received a 
number of enquiries, but in a district where the majority of 
vessels operated are in the tramp class, owners for the most 
part are "marking time" until Government policy in regard to 
the replacement of tonnage lost during the war has been 
disclosed." (117) 
In the same journal other reasons for holding back on ordering 
are apparent - in a report by the North East Correspondent: 
"One Newcastle shipowner is not placing orders for new 
"tramps" due to hj gh cost and because be could not forget 
the events which followed the last war; and, whatever might 
be said to the effect that there must be no repetition of 
such conditions, the possibility of a similar occurrence 
could not, in his view, be entirely ignored by shipowners." 
(118) 
Memories of the past can be seen here to act as a real force upon 
the decisions of the present. The issue of price was perhaps 
predominant however, with the price of new tonnage in May 1945 
being double and, for more specialised tonnage, more than double 
what they were in May 1938 Cll9). Whilst there was hesitancy 
amongst some owners to place new orders, this tended to be in 
specialised lines such as tramp tonnage. In general the main 
problem was not one of lack of orders, as most yards in the North 
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East were by June 1945 considering their programme for 1947 or 
beyond; the real problem was increasingly that of labour. 
Apart from the general observations that the labour market 
was tight and therefore there were shortages in most industries, 
two main points should be made in relation to the shipbuilding 
industry. Firstly there was an acute shortage of labour in the 
outfitting trades, as by 1947 on the N.E. coast 1,500 men had 
been transferred or returned by the ministry of labour from 
shipbuilding to house building and repair. This situation was 
protested against by the Tyne Shipbuilders Association who, in a 
letter to the district Shipyard Controller in the Admiralty 
offices, Newcastle (6:2:1946) produced the following table 
showing the projected shortage in the "fitting out" trades: 
TRADE NO. AT PRESENT NO. DUE FOR NO. REQUIRED 
EMPLOYED RELEASE TO AS AT AUG. '46 
BUILDING IN ADDITION TO 
TRADE PRESENT NO. 
EMPLOYED 
Joiners 635 81 1400 
Plumbers 263 27 250 
Painters 229 67 180 
Electricians 496 89 190 
(120) 
The situation on the Wear was very similar as, for example, 
the Wear Shipbuilders Association protested in December 1945 that 
35% of joiners in Wear yards were "building workers"- in some 
yards the figure was substantially higher (121). The serious 
imbalance in the workforce that these shortages caused would 
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result in delays in delivery times, it was argued. Further to 
this, the priority given to the building industry meant that 
there was also a shortage in such things as sanitary fittings, 
baths, washbasins and taps, upholstery material and certain 
electrical fittings. 
The second point which should be made in relation to the 
labour force concerns the "metal trades". There was some 
unemployment with in certain groups, speci fi call y riveters, 
drillers and caulkers (l 22 ), whilst at the same time there was 
also a shortage of labour in other branches of the shipbuilding 
trades. This shortage is worth remarking upon as to a large 
extent throughout the period 1945-50 it can be accounted for by a 
reticence of boys to enter those trades whose only application 
was within the shipbuilding industry. The following figures from 
Boilermakers Annual Reports show the extent to which the decline 
of boys apprenticed to metal Lrades Louk pl~ce: 
YEAR 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
NO. OF APPRENTICES 
8643 
7537 
6928 
6004 
5917 
DECLINE FROM PREVIOUS YEAR 
- 903 
-1106 
- 609 
- 924 
87 
(123) 
The implications of these drops in membership were not lost on 
Sir Mark Hodgson, who suggested that: 
"Unless we direct our immediate attention to the task of 
organising the young folk at our trade our future stability 
will be affected." ( 124) 
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The problem of recruiting boys to the metal trades was also 
remarked upon by the employers. Here, however, the emphasis was 
not only upon the lack of numbers of boys entering the trades but 
also the relevance of the traditional apprenticeships to changing 
construction techniques. Thus at a meeting of the W.S.A. on 23rd 
March 1947 the issue of the recruitment of apprentices to the 
metal trades was raised by the delegate from the Bartrams yard. 
The situation was unclear, he suggested, due to the investigation 
of new training methods being undertaken by the S.E.F. 
nationally. This investigation, he adds, was being undertaken: 
" ... in view of the possibility in the near future of a 
complete reorganisation of the steel work by the 
introduction of semi-skilled labour on various machines and 
the rearrangement of plating work etc." (125) 
It is possible to argue that '~he complete reorganisation of the 
steel work" envisaged by the employers was not as "complete" as 
the above statement may suggest. For, at a meeting of the W.S.A. 
uiily fuur 111onths earlier, the issue of the future of sh1pbu1ld1ng 
at the corporation yard in Sunderland had been discussed. The 
issue had been raised initially after trade union pressure to 
keep the yard open. This yard had been opened during the war to 
help cope with demand; its specific importance lay however in its 
use of prefabricated parts for assembly. In addressing the 
future of the yard Mr. R.C. Thompson for the W.S.A. suggested 
that it was unrealistic to expect the yard to remain open, as: 
"(The) yard was from the first intended only as a wartime 
establishment for the assembling of pre-fabricated parts -
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which was in fact an expensive method of building ships." 
( 126) 
The view that the use of prefabrication in the construction of 
ships was an expensive method was largely drawn from studies of 
the American industry which had pioneered many of these 
techniques. This conclusion was drawn from the experience of 
particular market conditions, those of boom and slump, in which 
greater fixed capital overheads and relatively high labour costs 
militated against profitable production. However in a perceptive 
article the N.E. correspondent of the "Shipbuilder and Marine 
Engineer" suggested that the prefabricated construction of ships 
could be undertaken profitably in different circumstances: 
"One view is that should post war labour costs in the U.S.A. 
prove excessive in comparison with those elsewhere, American 
shipbuilding concerns might well feel disposed to establish 
new yards in the Far East when Japan has been defeated. 
Many of the prefabrication methods evolved or adopted during 
the war have come to stay. They are particularly well 
adapted lo the semi-skilled labour which it is anticipated 
will be both plentiful and comparatively cheap in the Far 
East after the war." (127) 
In Britain however the wholesale prefabricated construction 
of ships was generally considered to be an inefficient method in 
terms of cost, and in terms of the rearrangement of yards that 
such a development would call for. For, as R.B. Shepherd 
suggested in an article, "Developments in Brit ish Merchant Ship-
building": 
"The American constructional methods involving shipyards 
having ample area and crane capacity with a large available 
labour force, could not generally be applied to the U.K .. " 
(128) 
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The greatest change in constructional methods in the British 
industry undertaken during the war and immediately afterwards was 
the increased use of welding, which ultimately led to the demise 
of riveting 0 29). The perceived implications of the widespread 
use of welding varied. One suggested implication was expressed 
in an article in the "Shipbuilder and Marine Engineer" of July 
1947: 
"In the new era, the art of shipbuilding would tend more and 
more to organised accuracy and away from individual skill, 
and though individual skill and artistry would still be 
needed, it would be exercised at a higher level." (130) 
This statement encapsulates several of the features of the 
deskilling position advocated by Braverman, notably the move away 
from skill being held by the individual craftsman towards its 
exercise at higher levels. Was the greater use of welding at this 
time perceived by the unions and workers as the greatest threat 
to their "skilled" position? It is possible to argue that this 
was not in fact the case, the reasons for which we will now 
address. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, welding became established as a 
skilled trade, and more importantly integrated into existing 
constructional processes rather than being seen as a technique 
around which to restructure the whole division of labour. 
Welding as a technique was not feared in itself as the beginning 
of a vast deskilling programme. However what was new after the 
Second World War was its increased use on hull work and in an 
atmosphere in which prefabrication had been used successfully in 
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order to meet wartime demand. It was the prospect of 
prefabrication rather than the extended use of welding as such 
which was thought to present a threat to the skilled trades. 
This position was suggested in a letter sent by Dan McGarvey to 
the Boilermakers Monthly report supporting his nomination as 
Clyde (North Side) district delegate in which he notes: 
"I have watched very closely the modernisation of our 
shipyards etc. and also the upward trend of the welded ships 
and increasing prefabrication in particular, and I fully 
realise that the employer is at this very moment making an 
all out attack on our members rates and conditions. The 
position of our members in relation to prefabrication needs 
the constant attention of our society ..• 11 ( 131) 
Other members of the Boilermakers Society saw the main problem 
similarly, that is an attack upon rates and conditions of skilled 
men, ultimately an attack upon the notion of craftsmanship in 
general. However the facilitating factor in this attack was not 
always seen to lie in changes in technique. Thus a letter to the 
monthly report from Bro. Joseph Boyd, who was worried by the 
Government's decision to sell 140 liberty ships to private 
enterprise, suggested that this move: 
11 
... does not augur well for the shipbuilding industry in 
this country, and talk like a slump in two or three years is 
common." (132) 
This, it was seen, would lead to the emigration of skilled men 
and a further decline in the number of apprentices: 
" ... and will ultimately lead to the dream of the "boss": 
the break up of organised unions, shop stewards and the 
introduction of unskilled workers to our various crafts." 
(133) 
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How far was the "dream of the boss" a real threat? If the 
example of the introduction of welding in the interwar period is 
looked at this dream may be seen to be exaggerated, for as has 
been argued elsewhere the employers were at this time to a large 
extent working within an "ideology of craft" (134) 
However the issue of the legitimacy of the organisation of 
the division of labour along craft lines was raised in the 
after math of the war. The context was that in which pre-war 
practices had been restored, and the Labour government and trades 
union leaders were keen to demonstrate that they were "fit" to 
govern. Whilst the substance of the debate took place at a level 
above the shop floor, its importance lies in attempting to set 
the parameters of the debate within the industry insofar as these 
concerns were later to be accepted as part of the post war 
consensus <135 ). Most notable in these connections is the 
conscious defense and advocacy given to "the craftsman" by trades 
un.iurt leaciers. 
The "attack" upon the notion of craft came from several 
areas; however, perhaps a unifying thread in these attacks was 
the claim that the existent organisation of production was 
inefficient. Thus the "Shipbuilder and Marine Engineer" claimed 
that: 
"Today the demarcations of labour in shipyards and ship-
repairing establishments stands, in many respects, much as 
it has done for decades past, and, in relation to modern 
methods of production, it cannot but be regarded as 
restrictive in its effects on the efficiency of production. 
In the light of modern developments, many such customs and 
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practices are outmoded; and it could be readily proved that 
they have the effect of retarding and restricting efficiency 
in the construction and repairing of ships." (136) 
Such attacks on demarcation of labour are common throughout the 
shipbuilding press and usually are not paid much heed by lhe 
unions. However in the immediate post war period the relation-
ship between the unions and the state had changed with the 
election of a Labour government. Co-operation rather than 
conflict was stressed and there was a genuine commitment by the 
trade union leaders at least to get the country "back on its 
feet". In this task efficient production was conceived as the 
most important tool. Under these circumstances then, "efficient 
production" became, perhaps for the first time, a fundamental 
problem for the union leadership as well as management. As Mark 
Hodgson suggested in October 1945: 
"Intensified effort is essential, I admit, and I am 
satisfied that the workers of this country will gladly bear 
the brunt and further tighten their already narrowly 
stretched belts. The restoration of our homeland and our 
contribution to the turopean salvation are problems which 
call for immediate attention." (137) 
It was this concern with macro economics which made it impossible 
any longer for the unions to ignore the charges that it was the 
trade unions themselves which were responsible for restriction of 
output leading to inefficient utilisation of productive capacity. 
It became almost mandatory for trade unionists to reconcile their 
own demands for changes in working practices with the aim of 
increased output. Thus the agitation for a forty hour week took 
the form of claims that the reduction in hours would actually 
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increase producLive output due to the greater intensity of work 
of which more "refreshed" workers would be capable. This 
position was exemplified in Mark Hodgson's speech at the TUC 
conference in 1945, in which he extolled the virtues of a forty 
hour week: 
"If we as a nation are to undertake the task (of post war 
reconstruction) efficiently then the whole productive 
capacity of the people, tools and machinery of the nation 
must be intelligently applied ..• 
We maintain that with all the mechanical improvements 
introduced before and especially during the war, and with 
the intelligent use of all available labour and the 
scrapping of outworn ideas, greater efficiency and improved 
production can be obtained by the introduction of some 
degree of leisure calculated to fit the overstrained worker 
for a further substantial effort. 
Our claim is that given a five day working week, a 
refreshed worker will produce at least as much in a 40 hour 
week as a tired worker will in 47 or 48 hours. 
It is maximum output we want, and the fitter the 
worker, the better our chance of getting it." (138) 
Similarly, by the same writer in the Boilermaker's Annual Report 
of 1945: 
"The grsat nc:ed today is increased OUL!JUL u r all ilt:::Cessary 
useful and beautiful things for the use and happiness of all 
•.• Harder tasks and longer hours are not necessary but a 
more scienti fie application of machine power, giving the 
workers their rightful share of the advantages which science 
and machinery produce." (139) 
The above comments are clearly situated within a discourse rich 
in ideas of consensus, and displaying a zeal for increasing 
production which hitherto was more characteristic of the 
employers than the unions. Such a concern with increasing output 
is perhaps more easily reconciled with the interests of Boiler-
makers, who for the most part were paid by the piece, than 
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outfitting workers mostly paid plain time rates. Nevertheless 
lhe emphasis upon the "scrapping of outworn ideas" and the 
"scientific application of machine power" seem to suggest that 
the outlook of the leadership of this union was perhaps more 
"progressive" in terms of changes in working practice than in the 
past. Continued support in the post war period for the National 
Production Advisory Council set up during the war is perhaps 
further evidence of the progressive spirit. And, whilst there 
was some degree of hostility and suspicion directed towards the 
Council from the shop-floor, the trade union leaders involved in 
the council took a less critical view: 
"As a member of the National Production Advisory Council on 
Industry I can assure members that it is not the desire of 
this council to exhort workers to work harder, but instead 
to conserve energy by increased industrial efficiency. It 
has been proven in many industries that by bringing in 
consultants on motion study, production has increased and 
the energy of the operator has been conserved, thereby 
enabling him to earn higher wages without working any 
harder. There is scope for improvements in the industries 
we are connected with. Some shipyards and engineering shops 
have already been modernised, but there are many that have 
changed but very little over the past 50 years." (140) 
At first sight these statements seem to embody many of the 
features of scientific management and appear to give support to 
the position suggested by Henry Pelling earlier in this article 
that the trade union movement "became deeply committed to many of 
the processes of management" and that they were advocating "union 
cooperation in the introduction of scientific management". 
However appearances can often be misleading, and certainly it is 
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possible to argue that in relation to the shipbuilding industry 
the "scienti fie application of machine power" or the use of 
"motion study" should not be understood in terms generally 
accepted by scientific management theorists. Indeed this is 
spelt out clearly at the end of the article quoted above: 
"Let it be clearly understood that motion study mentioned 
herein has no relation to time study by stopwatch etc. as 
the Society would, at all times, resist any attempt tore-
introduce Bedeauxism." (141) 
As argued earlier the changes proposed have more to do with 
increasing piece work payments by raising output than with funda-
mental restructuring of the labour process. The use of the 
scientific application of machine power was conceived as a 
process to take place within the craft division of labour rather 
than as a basis for its extinction. Similarly the "motion" study 
was to be undertaken without an accompanying "time" study. In 
this way the knowledge produced by the consultants was seen to be 
a resource which could be used to maximise the piece earnings of 
the individual era ftsman rather than as a technique management 
could use to increase output disproportionately to the reward 
given to the individual worker as in Bedeauxism. 
That this view of the incorporation of science into the 
labour process was widely held by those concerned with the nature 
of craft in the shipbuilding industry can be further evidenced 
with reference to two general articles on the nature and future 
of craftsmanship. The first of these was a paper by J.W. 
Stephenson, Chairman of the Confederation of Shipbuilding and 
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Engineering Trades Shipbuilding Group Council, entitled "Science 
and Craftsmanship in the Engineering and Shipbuilding Industries" 
(142) In this paper an historical account of the nature of 
craftsmanship is given. It is asserted that in primitive society 
the roles of craftsman and scientist were united, "The crafts-man 
was in fact the original scientist." A separation of the two 
roles was seen to occur with the rise of urban civilisation. The 
craftsman who had been a "free agent in primitive society became 
a serf" with low social status which "confined him to his 
existing practices". On the other hand, "Scientific speculation 
was largely confined to the administrative sciences and was 
carried on by a limited class of people who had the leisure for 
it". The author goes on to suggest that the industrial revolution 
was the potential (as yet unrecognised) beginning of a return 
towards the increasing identity of these two roles, "The 
outstanding feature of the industrial revolution was the renewed 
application of experimental thought to the industrial crafts". 
And that, "although the social distinction between the scientist 
and the craftsman as professional worker and operative 
respectively has been inherited from the past, the technical 
distinction •.• is largely a matter of degree and there are 
elements of each speciality in both". 
However, Stephenson continues his analysis by asserting that 
hitherto the role of craftsmen in the shipbuilding industry has 
merely been to learn a large number of repetitive jobs, 
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''The historical development needs to set out because it is 
commonly considered that the mechanism and rationalisation 
which the application of science to industry entailed has 
led to the gradual elimination of the craftsman and to 
increasing monotony of work for those engaged in actual 
production. In fact the "mystery" of the old craftsmen 
largely consisted in the fact that he had to learn a large 
number of repetitive jobs by rote. Mechanisation has broken 
these crafts up into their separate units, each of which 
frequently requires only a very low degree of skill." (143) 
However, it is suggested that the other consequence of 
mechanisation has been the creation of a number of new skills: 
" ••. concerned with the control of processes the design and 
fabrication of prototypes, etc. which are required to master 
the production of a growing range of increasingly complex 
goods. The characteristic of the new craftsman is increas-
ingly that of versatility in the control of a scientific 
technique." (144) 
So then the new craftsman is more skilled than the old one in 
this view, because he must not only learn a number of repetitive 
jobs by "rote", but must also display a versatility in the 
control of scientific technique. Thus the new craftsman embodies 
the old but also regains part of his lost simultaneous role as 
scientist. Moreover it is suggested that there are two further 
factors which impel a closer degree of identity between the 
scientist and the craftsman. The first of these is the 
increasing speed of technical developments which demands a 
greater amount of "feedback" between the research worker and the 
worker who applies the technique. Secondly and more important 
for our purposes is: 
" the development of a new technique, "scienti fie 
management" so called, which in essence is concerned with 
the study of the act of work itself and the intent of which 
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is to make human labour more effective. This embraces a 
number of special techniques such as cost accounting and 
motion study which though they may be applied by specialists 
are not exclusive in character and can IN ESSENTIALS BE 
APPLIED BY THE WORKER HIMSELF." (145) 
The importance of stating that the worker should apply scientific 
management to himself must not be underestimated as it suggests a 
conception of scientific management and indeed of workers which 
would be foreign to the followers of Taylor or Bedeaux. One 
should note that this account also mentions motion study as an 
element of scientific management, but neglects to mention time 
study as another integral part. 
In his conclusion the author sees the relevance of the role 
of craftsmanship in these terms: 
"Therefore science and craftsmanship are complementary and 
they are foolish who think that because some new material is 
used, some new method is devised, or a machine replaces a 
hand process, the day of craftsmanship is over. Rather does 
progress demand a clearer appreciation of the essential part 
that craftsmanship plays in production, and an increased 
recognition that the scientist and the craftsman are co 
servants at humanity both essential for the development of 
social well-being and human good." (146) 
In a less sophisticated analysis Sir Mark Hodgson pursued a 
similar theme of the necessity of craftsmanship "for the develop-
ment of social well being and human good". Here he insisted that 
the only way that Britain could regain her leading position in 
terms of foreign trade was to produce goods of high quality, and 
these could only be produced by good craftsmen. The main emphasis 
of his paper was not orientated towards economic arguments 
however; rather he suggested that craftsmanship developed: 
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" ... the character of the people; and history, both ancient 
and modern, sets a considerable value on the quality of the 
citizens in any community." (147) 
Moreover he pointed to the importance of ensuring a greater 
supply of "good craftsmen for the future": 
In the industries which I am most closely connected with ... 
the war taught us a lesson. We had too few craftsmen and 
had to introduce dilutees - man and women with little or no 
experience, and since agreements provided that they should 
be paid craftsmen's rates, what this cost the nation cannot 
be easily estimated - but the cost was very great." (148) 
Thus a need for more craftsmen was justified in terms of their 
use in terms of national emergency. Also Hodgson saw the 
craftsman as a progressive rather than a reactionary force in 
relation to the introduction of new working practices: 
"Craftsmen who possess sound knowledge and skill are not 
easily daunted by new work and new problems, and men of this 
type will be a powerful influence in the expansion of 
British trade." (149) 
The importance of the above two articles is that they seek to 
express legitimate grounds for the continued relevance of 
craftsmen to the modern shipbuilding industry. They emphasise 
above all the flexibility of skilled labour to deal with changing 
circumstances and thereby seek to present craftsmen as a 
progressive force within the industry. Hodgson goes so far as to 
suggest that more skilled labour is needed to operate machinery 
designed for semi-skilled operators. He argues that if the 
operation of such machines was a "skilled" task then skilled men 
would only undertake these operations temporarily and therefore 
would not become the mere appendage of the machine. Both 
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articles stress the importance of the notion of craft in giving a 
certain character and quality to the labour force. 
The tension that existed between the advocacy of rigid craft 
boundaries and constantly extolling the virtues of expanded 
production was exploited by those seeking a more radical change 
in the production process and the organisation of labour. Whilst 
in general this ideological war was fought by the trade unions 
expressing their own commitment to improvements in output and 
stressing unity of purpose and consensus in this aim, there were 
statements which appear to adopt a different approach and seem to 
point to the conflict inherent in the capital labour 
relationship: 
"The members will have noticed the references to restrictive 
practices in debates in the house of commons, and the Tories 
when debating the matter invariably use the exception to 
vilify such restrictions. We may have to look at some of 
the practices referred to, especially where they concern 
trades union membership; on the other hand, there are many 
restrictive practices in the industries we are engaged in 
that must remain until we are working and livinq under a 
socialist system of society." (150) 
If the nature of craftsmanship was under question from within the 
industry and the press, the unions position was seen to be 
validated from other sources. Thus in the Boilermakers monthly 
report of May 1949 the words of the Superintendent of the City 
and Guilds of London Institute in relation to a newly proposed 
training scheme are quoted with approval: 
"In drawing up this scheme, the advisory committee has had 
in mind not only that sound craftsmanship is an essenti a 1 
basis of the constructional steelwork industries, but also 
that the traditional pre-eminence of the nation in this 
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sphere will only be enhanced, or even retained, if efforts 
are firmly directed towards the encouragement of 
craftsmanship of a superior type, in which the intelligence 
and skill in the industrial arts, so characteristic of our 
population, may be given full opportunity for development." 
(151) 
On the whole, the period between 1945 and 1950 did not see a 
victory for those people advocating the ending of "craft" 
production in shipbuilding. On the shopfloor changes in yard 
layout during this time owe more to attempts to improve 
facilities for transport and cranage, which hitherto were 
positively primitive, than any attempt radically to re-alter the 
division of labour. Whilst welding was expanded, it was done so 
as a distinctively skilled process rather than as a technique of 
fragmenting skilled jobs. Where new machinery, such as profile 
burners, were introduced they were, generally speaking, manned 
partially by skilled labour or in some instances "blacked" by a 
workforce, so much so that in some instances they had to be 
withdrawn. It would seem that during this time continuity of the 
organisation of production is more characteristic than sweeping 
change. This continuity, or inertia, as some would see it, was 
not simply a result of the strength of the unions and a corres-
ponding weakness of the employers, the situation was more 
complicated than that. Some employers genuinely believed that 
the highly labour intensive system of production based on a large 
number of craftsmen was more efficient than a highly capital 
intensive one. Some union leaders (and members) believed that 
the situation demanded greater production and more industrial 
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discipline, and made appeals in this respect: 
"It is well that we should understand that under Socialism 
or Communism we will have to work and work to regulated 
hours, and I see no reason why we should not start right now 
to put our house in order in this respect." ( 152) 
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Conclusion 
In many respects there is a great deal of continuity between 
the concerns underlying the division of labour in the inter-war 
period and that in the immediate post-war years. As we have seen 
the conditions existing during the period of hostilities were 
seen to be extraordinary in terms of a consistent demand for 
maximum output, a continuation was not expected or looked for 
after peace was concluded. Similarly the changes at the point of 
production were seen to be short term changes forced upon the 
industry, both capital and labour, by the requirements of war. 
However things were to change within the context of a sustained 
post-war boom. Although a realisation of the magnitude of these 
changes was to be only slowly realised, their scope was to 
encompass the whole world. These changes affected not only 
production techniques but were also the cumulative cause and 
outcome of other changes at the level of the occupational 
community. In relation to Wearside, as elsewhere, the period of 
the long term boom was to see changes in the social relations 
both within and between capital and labour. 
And yet the British Shipbuilding industry during the period 
1945-59 displayed many features characteristic of the industry at 
other times, its conservatism based on past practice affected 
unions and management alike. One dominating feature of the time 
was the belief in the inevitability of an imminent slump, pre-
dictions such as that of Mr. Marr of the W.S.A. made on 4 March 
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1949 were widespread: 
" •.• by 1952 Wear shipyards might only need 50% of present 
workforce, thus, some 5000 men will be unemployed." (153) 
Such predictions were wrong, however, for the situation that 
British shipbuilding found itself in was substantially different 
to that after the Fi~st World War. As several authors have 
argued, the sale of British investments overseas and debt 
incurred to the USA in the course of the war forced Britain to 
orientate itself towards an "outward looking economy" and export 
led growth as opposed to home led growth after the first War ld 
War (154). In this situation of a "seller's" market and with 
government encouragement the target for exports to reach a level 
of 175% of the prewar level was reached by 1950. However during 
this same period 1946-50 output in the industry rose by only 16~~ 
(l55), The failure to expand capacity substantially was a result 
of objective limitations such as the shortage of men, materials 
and power, the difficulty of financing large scale developments 
(15 6) and an estimation of the inevitability of the return of 
cyclical fluctuations in the demand for ships. Moreover the 
existence of a state commit ted to full employment strengthened 
the bargaining position of labour and the success encountered in 
sustaining full employment further reduced the relative 
flexibility of variable capital. In this sense the period between 
1945-50 was not a good time for the employers to attempt 
radically to restructure the division of labour and indeed 
evidence that they wished to do so is not conclusive. Capital 
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accumulation was not a problem for the employers during this 
period, with substantial profits being made despite substantially 
higher costs. 
The nature of the future of craft was explicitly raised 
during this time however. The context was that of the dispensing 
of Marshall aid and growth in influence of the "economic 
imperialism" of the USA. The potential threat to the "craft" 
division of labour in shipbuilding was diffused by pointing 
firstly at the historically cost ineffective nature of ship-
building in the USA and secondly by the apparent enthusiastic 
advocacy of several "management practices" by the trade union 
leaders. However as has been argued earlier the type of 
"scienti fie management" advocated by trade union leaders in the 
industry had the aim of increasing output and earnings 
proportionately within the established boundaries of craft rather 
than establishing a fundamentally different system of the 
organisation of labour. 
The nature of "skill" suggested by the example of the ship-
building industry during this period is not one predicated solely 
upon a notion of physical manipulation combined with a degree of 
mental dexterity but must also include the dimension of skill as 
a social status. For, as we have seen, the idea that semi-
skilled operations were being performed (captured) by skilled men 
was advocated by the former leader of the Boilermakers. The 
essence of skill and craftsmanship presented by such men is that 
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of flexibility, the potential to be able to respond to changed 
circumstance or practice. This would seem to point to the 
importance of the distinction made by Burawoy between deskilled 
work and a deskilled worker (157). For indeed any one task 
performed in a shipyard, or any other industry, is unlikely to 
demand all of the skills associated with any particular craft, 
and as specialisation by an individual worker within a craft is 
not unusual his claim to be a skilled worker is predicated upon 
the potential skill needed by the craft as a whole. Therefore 
the skilled status of individual workers is, within an 
organisation as large as a shipyard, often based on a cumulative 
skill content of the "collective craft worker". Thus within the 
yards the technical change which occurred during this period was 
largely absorbed within the framework of craft production. The 
effects of the deskilling of individual tasks were largely 
neutralised by their incorporation into the totality of craft 
tasks. For the individual worker then the social status of being 
a skilled worker may be as important as the actual tasks he 
performs. Of importance for the craft as a whole however will be 
the claim to legitimately encompass a wide enough range of tasks 
to justify the craft status. In this way whilst changes in 
technology during this period may have simplified certain jobs 
they did not seriously question the era ft status of "skilled" 
workers and there was no great move by management to restrict job 
autonomy or discretion in the carrying our of the tasks included 
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in particular crafts. 
In lhe next chapter an attempt will be made to outline some 
of the more important changes consequent upon the conditions of 
the long boom. Hopefully such an account will render a possible 
comparative dimension between the inter-war and wartime periods 
and those of the 1980s. 
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Table 
Percentage of workers, specified trades, in the major yards in 
the North Eastern Region: 1942. 
RIVER 
Yard! 
Holders 0111 
A B 
WEAR 
S. P. Austin 
Bartram 
J. Crown & Sons 
W. Doxford 
J. Laing 
W. Pickersgill 
Short Bros 
J.L. Thompson 
TYNE 
W.G. Armstrong 
Whitworth 
Hawthorne 
Leslie 
Palmers 
Readhead 
Swan Hunter 
(Wallsend) 
Swan Hunter 
(Neptune) 
Vickers 
Armstrong 
TEES 
6.45 
9.2 
5.1 
8.2 
10.1 
9.8 
12.0 
6.7 
6.2 
7.4 
1.9 
7.95 
1.6 
4.0 
2.2 
Furness 6.4 
Wm Gray & Co 7.6 
Stockton Con Co 4.9 
Teesside Bridge 
& Engineer Wks 11.1 
Key: 
3.5 
5.3 
3.6 
4.3 
5.9 
4.9 
6.7 
4.0 
3.0 
4.45 
1.0 
3.8 
1.0 
2.3 
1.5 
3.6 
3.9 
3.6 
5.7 
A = % of skilled workforce 
B = % of total workforce 
Riveters 
(hand) 
A B 
14.4 
18.6 
8.6 
1.1 
4.1 
12.6 
7.9 
4.4 
1.1 
5.6 
3.0 
3.7 
4.4 
0.7 
0.5 
9.7 
8.8 
4.1 
6.5 
7.8 
10.7 
6.1 
0.9 
2.4 
6.3 
4.4 
2.7 
0.5 
3.4 
1.6 
1.8 
2.9 
0.4 
0.4 
5.4 
4.4 
3.0 
3.3 
Riveters 
(pneumatic) 
A B 
0.5 
2.5 
0.8 
12.4 
5.7 
6.5 
6.8 
5.2 
11.0 
5.5 
0.9 
9.3 
9.7 
n/a 
3.2 
7.4 
n/a 
8.7 
0.3 
1.4 
0.6 
6.6 
3.3 
3.2 
3.8 
3.1 
5.3 
3.4 
0.5 
4.4 
5.5 
n/a 
.., n 
l..o/ 
1.8 
3.8 
n/a 
4.4 
Continued overleaf 
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Table 
Percentage of workers, specified 
the North Eastern Region: 1942. 
RIVER Platers 
Yard 
A B 
WEAR 
s.P. Austin 15.5 8.4 
Bartram 22.0 12.0 
J. Crown & Sons 11.3 8.1 
w. Doxford 20.7 11.0 
J. Laing 21.7 12.7 
w. Pickersgill 14.4 7.2 
Short Bros 17.8 9.9 
J.L. Thompson 18.7 11.2 
TYNE 
W.G. Armstrong 
Whitworth 16.7 8.0 
Hawthorne 
Leslie 13.95 8.4 
Palmers 6.0 3.3 
Readhead 17.9 8.5 
Swan Hunter 
(Wallsend) 11.4 7.5 
Swan Hunter 
(Neptune) 11.6 6.6 
\/ickers 
Armstrong 9.0 6.15 
TEES 
Furness 14.4 7.9 
Wm Gray & Co 15.5 7.9 
Stockton Con Co 12.2 8.9 
Teesside Bridge 
& Engineer Wks 10.7 5.4 
Key: 
A = % of skilled workforce 
B = % of total workforce 
(continued) 
trades, in the 
t:Jelders 
A B 
0.8 0.4 
2.1 1.2 
3.5 2.5 
4.2 2.2 
3.2 1.9 
1.9 0.9 
4.5 2.5 
5.4 3.2 
2.0 0.9 
4.1 2.5 
2.4 1.3 
5.1 2.4 
7.1 4.6 
8.5 4.6 
5.2 ).5 
4.2 2.3 
1.8 0.9 
9.3 6.8 
7.4 3.8 
major yards in 
CHAPTER f[])UR 
To~ards the Eighties 
Part I 
Approaching the Long Boom 
In the last chapter it was noted that for those connected 
with the shipbuilding industry the expectation was that after the 
war a slump in demand would follow a brief "boom" to make good 
wartime destruction, as was the case after World War I. This view 
was also shared by those taking a somewhat wider view of economic 
prospects. Thus the economist Samuelson predicted in 1943 the 
probability that for the U.S. economy, which was in a far 
stronger position than the UK, the post-war period would bring a 
" •.. nightmarish combination of the worst features of 
inflation and deflation ... there would be ushered in the 
greatest period of unemployment and industrial dislocation 
which any economy has ever faced." (1) 
A similar preoccupation with the developments that occurred after 
World War I led Joseph Schumpeter to suggest in 1945 that: 
"The all but general opinion seems to be that capitalist 
methods will be unequal to the task of reconstruction. (It 
is) not open to doubt that the decay of capitalist society 
is very far advanced." (2) 
However, with the benefit of hindsight it is easy to see 
that these views were mistaken, not because they were unrealistic 
at the time, but rather because longer term processes within the 
world system combined with specific forms of political action to 
ensure that history would not simply repeat itself. A key 
argument in an earlier chapter was that the ferocity of the 
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inter-war depressions was fuelled in part by the decline in 
British hegemony and the disinclination of the only other power 
who could have assumed that hegemony, the USA, to do so (3). In 
this situation there was almost a temporary retreat from the 
expansion of the modern World System as states "defended" them-
selves by measures of "economic nationalism" (4 ). In the 
aftermath of the Second World War the relative impoverishment of 
Europe and the indebtedness of Britain to the USA ensured that if 
the American economy was to avoid serious depression its only 
option was to become the "sponsor" of the growth of the world 
capitalist system. 
This was not, as we have seen, self-evident by the end of 
the war, when as Armstrong et al have argued there were two 
possible options facing the USA: 
"At one extreme was the option of exploiting to the hilt the 
position of economic dominance achieved by the United 
States_ Th:i_s L~ould be !'eflected j_n ins.istence on absolute 
freedom of penetration of U.S. goods, with no attempt to 
help the reconstruction of production inside these 
countries. At the other extreme the United States could 
concentrate on the fastest possible recovery in these 
economies on the grounds that this would be the best 
guarantee of an expanding market for U.S. trade and 
investment in the long term." (5) 
In the short term the former option was adopted with aid to 
Europe and Japan limited to emergency relief. The ending of the 
Lend-Lease scheme to Britain necessitated the negotiation of the 
"dollar loan" from the USA, and to a smaller extent Canada. But 
such was the relative strength of the USA both industrially and 
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fiscally that the loan was to little avail, disappearing as 
currency speculation rather than forming any basis for capital 
investment. Moreover the terms of the loan further exacerbated 
the problem of American (over)dominance: 
"The terms were onerous, one currency could only be 
exchanged for another under strict control. The loan 
required almost immediate convertability of sterling, into 
other currencies without government restrictions, as a 
condition for its acceptance. The loan arrived in 1946, at 
the same time as Germany and other European countries were 
presenting the United States and the United Kingdom 
governments enormous problems with financing their imports. 
Once the pound was declared convertible, the entire dollar 
loan disappeared in exchange speculations." (6) 
Britain could ill afford to "pay her way" in the 
reconstruction of Europe, having sold assets and incurred 
enormous debt during the war: 
"War damage at home and to shipping amounted to some £3 
billion. Overseas assets worth more than another £1 billion 
had been sold or lost and the income from foreign 
investments halved. The external debt had been increased by 
£3.3 billion. The export trade had been halved and exports 
were paying for less that a fifth of imports." (7) 
By 1947 it was becoming clear not only that Britain could do 
little to regenerate the European economy bul also that aid 
needed to be sought in order to reconstruct her own economy. 
Indeed the continuing problems of all European economies led to a 
realisation that: 
"rehabilitation of the economic structure of Europe quite 
evidently will require a much longer time and greater effort 
than has been foreseen ••• 
.. • The t ruth o f the m at t e r i s t hat E u r ope 's r e q u ire-
ments for the next three or four years of ••. essential 
products - principally from America - are so much greater 
than her present ability to pay that she must have 
substantial additional help." (B) 
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The launching of the Marshall plan indicated the official 
recognition by American statesmen of their "de facto" role as the 
hegemonic world power, and whilst much has been made of the 
Marshall plan as a "Truman Doctrine. in action" it was the 
economic self-interest of the USA rather than issues of 
ideological principle which forced the change of approach. 
However it should be noted that such economic self-interest was 
framed around and consciously addressed to a world within which a 
substantial non-capitalist bloc existed. As a senior US 
diplomatic officer stated al the time in commenting upon the 
prospects for Europe: 
"If these areas are allowed to spiral downwards into 
economic anarchy, than at best they will drop out of the 
United States' orbit and try an independent nationalistic 
policy; at worst they will swing into the Russian orbit. We 
will then face the world alone. What will be the cost in 
dollars and cents of our armaments and our economic 
isolation? I do not see how we could possibly avoid a 
depression far greater than that of 1929-32 and crushing 
ta;;es to pay for the direct L:UiiiiH.iliuenlti we should be forced 
to make around the world." (9) 
The USA had at long last begun to orientate itself towards the 
world not only as a state amongst others but as the global 
representative of capitalism. For as a contemporary US official 
put it, 
"If the American program for world trade were to fail, its 
failure would hasten the spread of nationalization among the 
other countries of the world ... We cannot insulate 
ourselves against the movements that sweep around the globe. 
If every other major nation were to go Socialist, it would 
be extremely difficult, if not impossible to preserve real 
private enterprise in the United States." ( 10) 
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The solution lo the problems of the US economy and Lhose of the 
other capitalist countries was seen to lie, unlike during the 
inter-war period, in the rapid growth of international production 
and trade. 
11 The general interest of US business and finance in the 
post-war period, perceived as such from 1947 onwards at 
least, was that the capitalist world should expand rapidly, 
with as open access as possible for US commodities and 
capital. 11 (11) 
The rise of the USA as the state exercising hegemony over the 
capitalist world should not just be seen in terms of a 
quantitative rise in its importance and a fall in the importance 
of Britain. Rather the form of the basis of that hegemony had 
changed from a state enmeshed in the responsibilities of 
colonial administration to one whose domination was built upon 
economic imperialism without the attendant complexities of direct 
colonial government. This meant a change in the basis of 
11control11 exercised through that hegemony; no longer was the 
detail inter- and intra-state cultural tinkering of the "divide 
and rule11 tactic necessary, rather the monoculture of capital and 
commodity control would suffice. 
The preconditions and implications of this state of affairs 
were profound. Not only could the 11economics of i mperialism 11 (l 2) 
be extended more easily than colonial occupation, but the rate of 
such expansion could become cumulative. In this way and 
effectively for the first lime the 11equality11 before the market 
of all people of the non-eastern bloc world was a real potential. 
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That these changes were reinforced by and articulated through 
technical change cannot be denied. Such changes affected not 
only aggregate figures of economic growth but were experienced as 
rapid changes in lifestyle of millions of people. So great have 
the changes in the post-war world been that Margaret Mead has 
spoken of the supersession of the concept of migration in space 
with that of "migration in time". In this context she suggests 
that a profound change in the relationship between the 
generations has occurred; the changes she outlines are worth 
noting. 
"Within two decades, 1940-60, eve.1ts occurred that have 
irrevocably altered human beings' relationships to other 
human beings and to the natural world. The invention of the 
computer, the successful application of atomic fission and 
fusion in both military and civil fields, the discovery of 
the biochemistry of the living cell, exploration of the 
planet's surface, the extreme acceleration of population 
growth ••• the breakdown in the organisation of cities, the 
beginning of man's destruction of his own natural 
environment, the linking up of all parts of the world by 
means of jet propelled flight and television, the building 
of the firsi: satellites and man 1s fiJ:st Vt:11l:.ures i11to space, 
the newly realised possibilities of unlimited atomic energy 
and synthetic raw materials, and, in the more advanced 
countries, the transformation of the age-old problems of 
production into problems of distribution and consumption -
all these have brought about a drastic, irreversible 
division between the generations." (13) 
We shall return to the issue of the relationship between the 
generations at a later point, but the important factor to note 
about the last quotation is the magnitude of the changes outlined 
and the extent of the geographical penetration of such changes. 
It is clear that the effects of these changes go beyond advanced 
capitalist countries. 
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"In the 1930s, when one arrived in a New Guinea village, the 
first requests were for medicine, as someone came forward 
with a festering wound or bad laceration, and for trade 
goods- razor blades, fishhooks, salt, adze blades, cloth. 
The European was expected to bring material objects from the 
outside world and, if he stayed, to make it easier for the 
village people lo obtain these goods. But in 1967 the first 
conversation went: 
"Have you a tape recorder?" 
"Yes, why?" 
"We have heard other people's singing on the radio and 
we want other people to hear ours." 
A major shift. Through the spread of a world culture of 
transistor radios and democratic theories about the value of 
each small culture, the people of Tambunam had heard New 
Guinea music, which it was now Australian-United Nations 
government policy to broadcast, and they had come to feel 
that they could participate, on an equal footing in this new 
world of broadcasting." (14) 
The world system in the post-war world was to become much 
more than a system of the exchange of goods. However, we are 
getting ahead of ourselves. In returning to a consideration of 
the circumstances at the beginning of the post-war period we must 
now look at another of the precc.ndi\;~e~ns of the long boom in the 
In the 
reconstruction of Europe, American control of the "purse strings" 
ensured that in most countries the autonomous part played by the 
organisations of labour would be small. 
"The Marshall Plan furnished the initial impetus for 
rebuilding the European economy, but it was only accepted at 
the cost of abstaining from socialist policies. 
Such was the background to the reconstruction and the 
policies of the trade union and political organisations of 
the working class in the European countries after the war. 
They had more or less to fit into it, being too weak to play 
a determining role." (15) 
The factors contributing to this weakness were various, and on 
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the whole ensured a degree of compliance with the policies of 
reconstruction which was largely absent in the wake of the First 
World War. 
"The existence of the large potential reserve army of labour 
in itself reduced the bargaining strength of the working 
class, but this was combined with a variety of political 
factors. Fascism in Germany and Italy, and occupation by 
the Nazis in other European countries, had weakened labour 
movements, as had the high unemployment of the inter-war 
years. The Cold War ideology, Stalinism, and the consequent 
split between the communists and other sections of the 
labour movement also weakened the working class ••. The 
terms on which the working class cooperated with capitalism 
varied from country to country ..• but the pattern of 
compliance and the dominance of social democratic strategies 
among the working class was general." (16) 
Where such compliance was not forthcoming coercion could be 
and was applied. Where industrial and/or political action was 
threatened by the working class, the economic climate was created 
in which capitalist control could be reasserted. In Germany 
strikes swept through the Ruhr in 1947; initially the issues 
concerned housing and food but over time the issue of 
nationalisation also came to the fore. At its height the strike 
wave involved 350,000 workers and as well as mass demonstrations 
Miners operated an effective "go-slow" when at work. During the 
strike wave the US Governor Newman said in a broadcast: 
"In the US Congress there is a distinct inclination to 
oppose further shipment of food to Germany. This can be 
traced back to rumours of strikes, threats of strikes and a 
certain resistance in behaviour to the authorities. Strikes 
which endanger the policies of the occupying powers, or 
interfere with their plans will not be tolerated •.. I have 
the power to cut the rations of anyone involved in work 
unrest •.. this would be drastic and extend for an 
indefinite period of time." (17) 
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In Italy a deflationary policy period from 1948 onwards 
effectively quelled industrial unrest. In France, the autumn of 
1947 saw a general strike to which the government responded by 
introducing legislation carrying penalties for "interfering with 
the right to work". They also called up 80,000 army reservists 
and Police broke up picket lines and occupied Paris' power 
stations. At its peak the strike involved three million people, 
but by December this had fallen by a third and on the 9th of that 
month the strike was called off. In Japan a nine point 
stabilisation programme was launched under the supervision of 
American banker Joseph Dodge. As a direct result of the 
retrenchment measures 700,000 workers were sacked. Dodge noted 
at the time that: 
" ..• the standard of living has probably been permitted to 
go too high ••• (higher unemployment) ..• will in turn lead 
to increased efficiency of labour and increased production." 
(18) 
In the USA itself there was a strike wave in early 1946 and wages 
rose by 15~~. However by May 1946 Truman initiated legislation 
which gave the government powers to induct strikers and union 
officials into the Army. This was supplemented in June 1947 by 
the much more comprehensive Taft-Hartley Act. In all these 
countries, then, there was clear evidence of an offensive against 
labour, in some cases by both government and employers. In those 
countries occupied by allied forces there was often direct 
evidence of Marshall aid being tied to concessions which were to 
be extracted from labour. The one country which appeared to 
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provide an exception to these developments was Britain. As 
Armstrong et al have argued, 
"Despite the anticommunist witch-hunt, and the control 
exerted by the right-wing leadership, employers in Britain 
never launched a frontal assault on the labour movement 
comparable to those in France, Italy, Japan or even the USA. 
This may actually have weakened the employers in the long 
run. Complacent, with their markets carved up at home and 
in the Empire, they failed to launch the kind of "rational-
ization" drive against the labour movement that was a 
precondition for the investment booms of the fifties in 
continental Europe and Japan." (19) 
The reasons why no such "assault" on labour was forthcoming 
are more complex than complacency alone. Firstly the labour 
surpluses evident in most countries which had experienced 
occupation of one sort or another were absent in Britain. As one 
historian has suggested, the slow rate of demobilisation had a 
double consequence: 
"While defense expenditure remained a substantial proportion 
of gross national product and of the government's budget, 
the economy was acutely short of labour." (20) 
A tight labour market is clearly not the best time for employers 
to initiate an attack on the conditions of labour. Added to this 
"objective" factor is also the psychological dimension of 
"victory" and the changed nature of the state. In continental 
Europe all of the belligerent powers had at some point been 
occupied by the enemy, a sense of defeat in both the capitalist 
and labouring classes made submission to the will of those 
promoting reconstruction under the Marshall plan more likely. Of 
more importance than this however was the changed nature of the 
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state. Nowhere was Marwick's third dimension of war, 
'~articipation in the national cause by hitherto underpriviledged 
groups who thereby make social gains" (21), truer than in 
relation to Britain. The condition of this participation were 
the incorporation of the representatives of labour and those 
sympathetic to the "cause" of labour into the state apparatus. 
Two of the most important features of this incorporation were the 
co-option of Labour politicians into the coalition government and 
secondly the increase in importance of those sympathetic to 
labour in the civil service. In the latter case within the 
treasury the rise from opposition to orthodoxy of the personage 
and ideas of J.M. Keynes readily springs to mind. But there were 
others of more "radical" temperaments who were also to be 
inducted into the civil service. G.D.H. Cole "found himself, 
somewhat to his surprise, a temporary civil servant in the 
Ministry of Labour" (22) organising the "Manpower Survey" of 
1940. 
It would be wrong to overstate the influence of such 
"participation" as purely a wartime contingency. However the 
election of a Labour government in 1945 ensured the continued 
relevance of a more radical outlook within the state than had 
been the case in the inter-war period. Certainly in the case of 
Keynes, his influence remained paramount for most of the period 
of the "long boom". Underlying his approach to practical 
economic issues was a philosophy which condemned the "love of 
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money" as the "moral problem of our age", and thus: 
"Keynes's efforts at making capitalism INork more effectively 
had as an ultimate aim, paradoxically, the supersession of 
capitalist values by higher and more satisfying ones. As he 
saw it, the real benefit of the almost inevitable advance of 
abundance was that it would dethrone wealth and material 
possession as dominating ends of life." (23) 
Given all these factors it was unlikely that a successful 
assault upon the labour movement and conditions and practices at 
work could have been put together; the "environment" created by 
the state and the problems of a tight labour market coupled with 
the dependence of many employers upon government contracts and 
the "cost plus" system militated against an employer's offensive. 
However it would be wrong to conclude in the absence of such an 
offensive that the unbridled aspirations of labour dominated the 
period of reconstruction. The particular nature of the State and 
balance of class forces created a self-imposed discipline in the 
sphere of consumption during the period of austerity. Economic 
"health" was restored to the nation by sacrifice in the realm of 
consumption, particularly imported goods, rather than 
"rationalisation" of production itself. A favourable export 
market existed enabling the government's inilial target of 175% 
of pre-war levels to be achieved by 1950 <24 ). There were 
however limits to the duration to which working people were 
prepared to give their voluntary consent to austerity, and 
pressures from this quarter, combined with those bemoaning lhe 
burden of taxes as a stifling of incentive to enterprise, reduced 
the Labour Party's majority at the general election of February 
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1950 and was a large element in its defeat in the election of 
1951. 
With the change of government was to come an eventual change 
of emphasis. The controls on individual consumption were to be 
lifted, the consumer boom based on, and giving form to, the long 
upswing of the post-war world economy was about to begin. In 
this movement Europe was to follow in the footsteps of America. 
"One of the most notable features of the present upswing in 
Western Europe is the great increase in purchases of 
consumer durable goods. The expansion of the West European 
motor car industry was largely destined for European 
markets, and concurrently there has been a growing sale of 
furnit4re, electrical appliances and other durable household 
goods which, when added to the increase in purchases of 
motor-cars constitutes a veritable wave of consumer buying." 
( 25) 
The long boom was to enable the continuation of consensus policy 
in both the political (26) and industrial relations (27) spheres. 
It would appear then that the "historical compromise" of the 
English class system had once again become the defining quality 
in this period of change (28). We shall return to the market 
conditions for shipbuilding during the period of the long boom in 
the next chapter. Now however we must address ourselves to the 
changing nature of the working class, specifically upon Wearside 
. 
but with inevitable reference to wider contexts. 
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One Side of the [mploymant Relationship 
There is a difficulty for anyone attempting to outline 
qualitative, as well as quantitative, changes in the lifestyle of 
the working class. It is an irony that this difficulty is often 
consciously acknowledged by writers as problematic and then, it 
would seem, almost ignored in their substantive material. 
Perhaps one of the best examples of this whole problem is 
available in the classic work of Richard Haggart, "The Uses of 
Literacy". The author states on the first page of the first 
chapter that: 
" ..• difficulties of definition are less troublesome than 
are those of avoiding the romanticisms which tempt anyone 
who discusses "the workers" or "the common people", and 
these romanticisms deserve to be mentioned first. For they 
increase the danger of over-stressing the admirable 
qualities of earlier working class culture and its debased 
condition today. The two over-emphases tend to reinforce 
each other, and so the contrast is often exaggerated." (29) 
Having noted this pitfall the author goes on to outline the "core 
of working-class attitudes": 
''The more we look at working class life, the more we try to 
reach the core of working-class attitudes, the more surely 
does it appear that the core is a sense of the personal, ~he 
concrete, the local: it is embodied in the idea of, first, 
the family and, second, the neighbourhood ... Where almost 
everything else is ruled from the outside, is chancy and 
likely to knock you down when you least expect it, the home 
is yours and real: the warmest welcome is still "Mek y'sel f 
at 'orne"." (30) 
These traditional virtues are at a later point contrasted to the 
processes that are increasingly '~nsuring that working-people are 
culturally robbed": 
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"Inhibited now from ensuring the "degradation" of the masses 
economically, the logical processes of competitive commerce, 
favoured from without by the whole climate of the time and 
from within assisted by the lack of direction, the doubts 
and uncertainty before their freedom of working-people them-
selves, are ensuring that working people are culturally 
robbed. Since these processes can never rest, the holding 
down, the constant pressure not to look outwards and 
upwards, becomes a positive thing, becomes a new and 
stronger form of subjection; this subjection promises to be 
stronger than the old because the chains of cultural 
subordination are both easier to wear and harder to strike 
away than those of economic subordination. "We are betrayed 
by what is false within", by our common weaknesses ... " (31) 
The theme of loss of something valuable in the face of 
increasing material prosperity is one that is repeated in many 
accounts of the working class in the post-war period. From 
sophisticated versions which viewed the working class from a 
distance to more "folksy" portrayals in the classic mould of 
Haggart there seemed to be emerging the potential for a consensus 
that the working class had become and was increasingly becoming 
not like it once was. The causes of these changes were not 
agreed upon. For Marcuse changes in technology and the labour 
process were the material basis upon which a change in 
consciousness was affected: 
" ... Changes in the character of work and the instruments 
of production change the attitude and the consciousness of 
the labourer, which become manifest in the widely discussed 
"social and cultural integration" of the labouring class 
with capitalist society. Is this a change in consciousness 
only? The affirmative answer frequently given by Marxists 
seems strangely inconsistent. Is such a fundamental change 
in consciousness understandable without assuming a 
corresponding change in the "societal existence"? Granted 
even a high degree of ideological independence, the links 
which tie this change to the transformation of the 
productive process militate against such an interpretation. 
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Assimilation in needs and aspirations, in the standard of 
living, in leisure activities, in politics derives from an 
integration in the plant itself, in the material process of 
production. It is certainly questionable whether one can 
speak of "voluntary integration" (Serge Mallet) in any other 
than an ironical sense." (32) 
Blackwell and Seabrook argue that the "damage" done to the 
working class cannot be seen to stem directly from the material 
gains made by the class in the post-war period. Rather, 
"The question is not whether certain life-enhancing or 
labour-saving objects and artefacts lighten people's lives 
(they most surely do) but what other function, other than 
their ostensible useful purpose, they serve? That is, what 
else is sold alongside, within and under these products? 
What concealed pains and forfeits are involved in their 
production right from the moment when the raw materials are 
extracted and processed until they appear in all their 
shining innocence in the world of goods." (33) 
The effects of such changes lead the authors to conclude that 
"what can be said with some certainty is that a moment which 
offered certain possibilities has definitively passed" 0 4). 
Whilst others have situated these changes differently, for 
exAmple MRrtjn sees changes in the post-~ar culture of the 
working class as representing the ritualised realisation of a 
move from "control" to "liminality" (35), the implicit question 
in all these analyses is "What Went Wrong?" (36). 
This question is central and forms the negative basis upon 
which many analyses of the post-war working class have been 
developed. It can be found not only within the sophisticated 
ruminations of sociologists and other social theorists but also 
within more localised studies. 
"The question was asked, "What went wrong?". If in 1939 and 
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earlier, before the break up in the pattern of working class 
life, the heroic women ruled the roost, how do you account 
for the transition to the notorious bingo women who neglect 
their children and who have allowed family life to go to pot 
on the large new housing estates in Sunderland and 
elsewhere?" (3 7) 
Is the question fair, given that its basis is a negative one? 
Are we as the apologists of Socialism or the gatekeeper of moral 
values adopting a role similar to that ascribed by Gouldner to 
Howard Becker as the "zoo-keeper of deviance", in which Becker's 
school of deviance 
" expresses the romanticism of the zoo curator who 
preeningly displays his rare specimens. And like the zoo-
keeper, he wishes to protect his collection; he does not 
want spectators to throw rocks at the animals behind the 
bars. But neither is he eager to tear down the bars and let 
the animals go. The attitude of these zoo-keepers of 
deviance is to create a comfortable and humane Indian 
Reservation, a protected social space, within which these 
colourful specimens may be exhibited, unmolested and 
unchanged. " ( 3 8) 
In the place of the deviant is the pre-war working class made 
exotic by its "migration in time". Nevertheless the zoo-keeper 
tag would seem relevant given the negative appraisal apparent in 
the terms of the question. The species appears to have escaped 
from (or is it entered?) its "iron cage" and, in pursuance of its 
libidinal urges, has lost its purity and produced mongrel 
offspring. Metaphor can be taken too far however! In order to 
appraise the changes that have come about in the post-war working 
class, and especially in so far as these changes relate to the 
division of labour, we must return to the particular situation of 
Wearside and chart those changes historically. 
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In Chapter 2 it was argued that the occupational community 
of shipbuilding workers in the inter-war period on Wearside was 
"reproduced" in relatively stable physical boundaries, which were 
structured hierarchically and through which networks existed 
which ensured local loyalties with respect to individual yards in 
times of loose labour markets. In its operation the physical 
density of the shipbuilding community served to ensure a 
particular "moral" density amongst the workforce and their 
families. It will be useful to retain these characteristics of 
the inter-war community in mind whilst we outline some of the 
changes in the post-war community. 
Physical Location and Housing 
Whilst the local authority had pioneered some attempt at 
slum clearance in the late 1930s, it was in the post-war period 
that a massive house building programme was initiated. In 1945 
the council made immediate plans to put up nearly 1,000 temporary 
homes and within two years to build some 3,000 permanent ones. 
By 1947 a vast programme was under way: 
"More than 20,000 houses in spreading estates were built in 
the twenty years after the War, acre upon acre of red brick 
stretching over the green fields and farms that had once 
surrounded the town. Sunderland almost doubled its built up 
area, and the change was recognized in the extension of the 
borough boundaries that took place in 1951 and again in 
1967." (39) 
Whilst initially many of these houses were to replace the 
12,800 (40) homes destroyed or damaged by German bombing, in 
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later years their availability meant a decrease in population 
density in central areas and areas adjoining the river: 
"In the 1951-61 period, therefore, even though the 
population of the whole town showed a small increase, eleven 
of the eighteen wards showed a decrease in population and 
all eleven were centrally located. By comparison the 
peripheral areas clearly show two rings of expansion: with 
greater rates further out and lesser rates closer to the 
centre." (41) 
These changes can be seen graphically in tables (i) and (ii). Of 
particular importance is the outflow of population from the wards 
bordering the river, Monkwearmouth, Deptford, Bishopwearmouth, 
Raker and Pallion in which were particular concentrations of 
shipyard workers. Added to this is the rise of structurally 
separate dwellings in all these areas. In other words there was 
an absolute out flow of population from these "shipbuilding" wards 
accompanied by a relative dilution in the physical concentration 
of the population remaining in these areas. 
The significance of these chanqes qoes far beyond a simple 
change in the location of dwellings. Rather, changes were 
wrought in the ecological structure of the community itself. One 
of the most important of these emerges from Brian Robson's study. 
He mentions in passing what for him is merely a methodological 
problem but which for our purposes indicates a development of far 
greater significance. This is the effect that counc.il housing 
has upon the relationship between social class (as measured by 
the Registrar General's categories) and rateable value. 
" ••• the inclusion of the council sector robs ... rating 
valuations of much of their diagnostic value." ( 42) 
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Robson goes on to show that the reason for this is the lack of 
correlation between social class and rateable value in the 
council house sector. He does this by dividing the census 
enumeration districts into three groups: those which include 90% 
or more of private houses (Private); those which include 90% or 
more council housing (Council) and those which include less than 
9m6 of either type (Mixed). A high correlation between rating 
values and social class can be observed in the Private sector but 
this breaks down in the Council sector: 
Correlation between rating values and Social Class 
a) Private sector r=0.870 
b) Mixed sector r=O. 767 d) Whole town r=0.606 
c) Council sector r=0.210 
As Robson suggests, 
"The coefficients for the private and mixed sectors are 
significant at the 1% confidence level whereas that for the 
council sector is not significant even at the 5% level. 
Thus, while social clgss me~' '.-'ary quj_te markedly from nne 
council estate to another, rating values show little if any 
change and what variation does occur is not necessarily 
associated with the social composition of the estate." (43) 
The author might have added that this decoupling of social class 
and rateable value occurred not only between estates but also 
within estates. In other words the skilled shipbuilding worker 
(Registrar General's category III) moving from privately rented 
accommodation in Pallion to a council house in Hylton Castle 
could find himself living next door to an unskilled worker 
(category V) with a larger family and therefore larger house 
(44) In such a situation then not only was the shipbuilding 
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worker confronted with a community in which there was a far 
smaller density of other shipbuilding workers but also the 
I 
geographical structuring of socio-economic groups was no longer 
directly established, via the market, in residential patterns. 
Both these locational and residential changes made the 
maintenance of occupational identity as the master status, and 
the speci fie moral density of the locale, problematic.· Given 
this development Hopkins is in one sense mistaken when he 
suggests that: 
"While provision of housing for those who needed it was an 
urgent priority, very little building was allowed for owner-
occupiers. This was understandable, but it had two results; 
the very large council estates were socially monochrome in 
colour; there was very little social mix and very little 
prov1s1on for the kind of houses that managerial types would 
want when new industries were attracted to the town." (45) 
The estates were composed primarily of manual workers, but in 
terms of the very important ~= divisions between such 
workers the social mix was perhaps greater, in residential 
patterns, than in the more hierarchical patterns of the older 
occupational community. It is exactly this social mix, indicating 
a potentially heterogeneous moral order, which people were 
concerned about in Dennis 1s study of opposition to slum clearance 
in 1965: 
"It all depends when we go an where they put waa. When they 
pull it down you got to go where they say. There is that 
many people mixed up! Half of them are making slums of them 
already. You can 1 t pick and choose. They dinnit seem to 
bother. They seem to mix the good 'uns with the bad 1uns." 
"We hope we 1 ll get amongst nice clean people- but we 
won 1t! We 1 ll be put among dirty people to give them an 
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example!" 
"We know the ne':J houses are nice, but its who you get 
beside." (46) 
The moral overtones of "clean" and "dirty" people, good 'uns and 
bad 'uns, of "many people all mixed up" are obvious and point to 
one of the features which is less popular amongst the champions 
of the pre-war working class, namely its basis in hierarchy. The 
hierarchy of occupation, of residential location and the moral 
division between "respectable" and "rough" were all symmetrically 
located in the occupational community which dissolved the 
boundaries of home and work. The dilution of the density of the 
shipbuilding occupations 1 culture, particularly amongst those 
moving out to the new estates, put a question mark against the 
occupational identity of a worker as the master status for 
himself and his family. The moral order of the community was no 
longer symmetrically located within the tight geographical limits 
or ti IE: physical ''occupational" commu:;ity. 
The pattern of residential location was further complicated 
as the "stability" of the long boom became evident to workers 
themselves, who in increasing numbers sought to buy their own 
homes. This development was noted by Hopkins in commenting upon 
the vast extension of public authority housing in the immediate 
post-war period: 
"Then, it was not expected that a time would come round 
about the early 'sixties when quite large numbers of newly 
married people who stemmed from well established Sunderland 
artisan families would no longer want council houses. In 
many cases it could almost be said that the bride-to-be 
could insist to the draughtsman, young technician or skilled 
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worker that they must go into an owner-occupied house 
immediately after the honeymoon. At this time there were 
very few houses available for buyers within the County 
Borough; houses between Durham and Sunderland could be had 
for nearly a whole thousand pounds less, and so it was that, 
in the sixties, a very large number of the most promising 
young men and their wives went to live at Shiney Row, 
Belmont, Carrville, Houghton-le-Spring and Penshaw. The 
men, and in most cases their wives too, continued to work in 
Sunderland, but of course, their rather well turned out 
children would be educated by the County, and Sunderland was 
left without any social mix on its housing estates." (47) 
The move out of the immediate locality of the workplace was 
also facilitated by the availability of transport. In the 
initial phases of council development the provision of adequate 
bus services became one important issue for those opposing the 
slum clearance programme. A survey by Sunderland Corporation 
Transport Department found that amongst families transferred from 
the Dock Street clearance area to Town End Farm estate total 
weekly journeys increased by 2319.1 (48). The later move towards 
private housing ownership was accompanied by a massive increase 
in car ownership. 
"The expansion in car ownership began in the fifties, but 
accelerated rapidly in the early sixties: 2,307,000 cars 
and vans in 1950; 3,609,000 in 1955; 5,650,000 in 1960; 
9,131,000 in 1965; 11,802,000 in 1970." (49) 
It is no coincidence that the period in which private car 
ownership "took off" was also that in which Hopkins noted the 
increasing tendency towards owner occupation of private housing. 
The continuation of the long boom had lasted through a period 
from which the initial financial benefits had gradually become 
associated with changes in attitudes; the rise of consumerism 
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took place in a context in which boom conditions began to be 
seen, especially by the post 1945 generations, as normal. 
However we are getting ahead of ourselves. The importance of 
changed attitudes will be dealt with later. The main point to 
stress is the fragmentation of residential locality as a central 
element in the occupational community. Furthermore in the case 
of Sunderland such geographical dispersion had two distinct 
moments (phases and aspects), the first being the expansion of 
council housing and slum clearance projects, the second being the 
increasing inclination towards home ownership amongst the skilled 
working class. If the allocation of council property in some 
senses jumbled up the social "structure" of location, the move 
towards private housing re-emphasised divisions between manual 
workers by putting far greater distance between skilled and 
unskilled than had hitherto been the case. Moreover private home 
ownership opened up divisions other than those based solely upon 
locality. 
"The increase in home ownership sets up new divisions within 
the wage-earning population: between those who thus acquire 
a small stake in the rising value of land and those who, as 
council or private tenants, are the victims of this 
inflation." (51) 
Neither of these two changes were conducive to the retention of 
work-based identity as a master status and therefore to the 
continuance of a specific occupational community. The shifts 
that occurred in residential location ensured that there was no 
longer any guarantee of the unproblematic integration of the work 
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and non-work spheres of life. Increasingly the dislance between 
the "small life worlds" of work and the ecological community 
presented the possibility of larger "gear shifts" within this 
multi-world existence (52). 
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Attitudes and Social Change 
There is a series of problems associated with talking about 
the attitudes or consciousness of the working class. Firstly,is 
a class a suitable "subject" or "object" in which to locate a 
specific consciousness? This problem is associated with a 
further conundrum - that in speaking about changes in the 
consciousness and attitudes of a given class, one might ask "what 
is the benchmark from which the "change'' has occurred?". Finally 
one should consider what might be construed as evidence of 
speci fie consciousness and attitudes. These questions are all 
pertinent given the continuing debate about the nature of the 
post-war working class, a debate fuelled by changing economic and 
political circumstances, the long boom and its collapse, 
consensus politics and the creation of Thatcherism. 
On consideration our first problem turns out to be a false 
one. For it is not a question of whether class is a suitable 
subject in which to locate a specific consciousness; class, as we 
saw in the critique of Braverman in Chapter One, is never just 
comprised of an objective moment. In reality class always 
implies a consciousness, as: 
" ... a historical phenomenon, unifying a number of 
disparate and seemingly unconnected events, both in the raw 
material of experience and in consciousness." (53) 
Again in reality the consciousness of the working (or any other) 
class will be far less unitary than any ideal typical formation 
of "true" class consciousness. The notion of false consciousness 
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is too often used as a bucket with which to bail out a "leaking 
theoretical vessel". The complexities of class and consciousness 
point to the fact that not all attitudes and action are dictated 
solely by class position (54). This implies that any attempt to 
portray a "generic" outline of working class consciousness will 
necessarily assume the status of an ideal type, a one-sided 
accentuation of '~he essential characteristics and tendencies of 
the phenomenon in question" <55 ). This is not to say that such 
views do not contain certain elements of reality, but rather that 
in the empirical situation the totality of individual and 
collective agencies involve elements which will often be self-
contradictory. 
The second problem of speaking of change in the working 
class is eased once we realise that any generic conceptions are 
likely to be ideal typical. Given this, our benchmark can be 
outlined with reference to evidence internal to our individual 
study, as in our consideration of the inter-war position and the 
importance of the "objective" position of the physical 
occupational community, and/or externally, with reference to the 
wider literature. However it is perhaps easier when, as in this 
case, the ideal type is referred to an empirical example. 
Focusing on shipbuilding workers on the Wear gives us the 
potential to use critically the wider accounts of the changes in 
the post-war working class. 
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This empirical reference point is particularly important in 
relation to our third problem, of what is to count as evidence 
for class attitudes and consciousness. The problem is often one 
of the meaning of social action. For example, is strike activity 
always an indicator of "true" working class consciousness? As 
will be argued below, the meaning of such social action can vary 
widely with context. Therefore any purely objective indices of 
class consciousness are likely to obscure as much as they reveal. 
In order to understand the meaning and significance of action as 
an indicator of consciousness, one must get closer to the subject 
and attempt to "re-cover" the inter-subjective significance of 
action and perception. Such a move, when compared with more 
general accounts of the consciousness of the working class, can 
provide a dialogue out of which hopefully something of 
significance can be constructed. In attempting this task I will 
actively use my own biographical experiences, in as much as these 
are suggestive of problematics and avenues of inquiry <56). 
Firstly, however, it is perhaps useful to look at some of 
the terms of the debate which have shaped the discussion as to 
the (changing) nature of the working class in the post-war 
world (57). Eldridge has suggested that the search for the '~ew 
working class": 
" ... is growing to be as long and tortuous as the quest for 
the Holy Grail." (58) 
That such a search has been a constant preoccupation of 
sociologists in the post-war period should not obscure the 
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changes in the terms of the debate from the "first wave" 
surrounding the embourgoisement thesis and the more recent 
formulations of Gorz and Seabrook (S 9). The background of rising 
affluence has given way to the collapse of the long boom, and to 
some extent the focus of the debate has changed from centering 
upon the working class at work to the working class in the 
political sphere and "what went wrong?" to the extent that 
Thatcherism has achieved three terms in office. 
Of course the view of the working class will differ if the 
focus is shifted from work to the non-work situation,and more 
importantly the actual changes in the priorities between these 
spheres within the class itself, will produce different outlooks. 
The importance of a growing dissonance between these two spheres, 
as far as the shipbuilding workers of Wearside are concerned, 
will be outlined below. However to return to the "first wave" of 
debate over the post-war working class it is perhaps useful to 
suggest that this debate was less conclusive than it might have 
been because of the time at which it developed. 
There are two elements to this view. Firstly the apparent 
stability of the post-war boom as viewed from the early 1960s led 
some theorists to link too closely and in a mechanistic way the 
notion of the qualitative change within the working class with 
the continuing rise of affluence, so that one of the key axes of 
the debate became the integration of the class on the basis of 
rising consumption. 
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••• the prospects of containment of change, offered by the 
politics of technological rationality, depend on the 
prospects of the Welfare State. Such a state seems capable 
of raising the standard of administered living, a capability 
inherent in all advanced industrial societies where the 
streamlined technical apparatus - set up as a separate power 
over and above the individuals - depends for its functioning 
on the intensified development and expansion of 
productivity. Under such conditions, decline of freedom and 
opposition is not a matter of moral or intellectual 
deterioration or corruption. It is rather an objective 
societal process insofar as the production of goods and 
services make compliance a rational technological 
attitude." (60) 
That such views failed to appreciate the historicity of 
their own epoch is now, with hindsight, obvious. A second 
element which served to complicate the "first wave" of the debate 
about the post-war working class is that quite often the focus 
on "the worker" disguised the fact that he or she was only post-
war in the sense of occupying the "present". Many workers in the 
1960s grew up through the experiences of the inter-war period and 
had presumably c::~rriArl m11rh nf thei.r 11 t'JOrld vie:.-J 11 (61) forward 
from that period. 
These considerations were particularly important in 
communities which traditionally had been dominated by a single 
industry such as shipbuilding. The necessity is pointed to of 
understanding that qualitative changes arose not only from 
individual consumerism, but also from the changed context of the 
community, and that the timescale of changes is longer and more 
uneven than in many accounts. In considering what changes have 
occurred one must beware of confusing the ideal typical 
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construction of the "traditional proletarian worker" for a 
description of an actually existing past reality. For if this 
confusion occurs almost any changes will appear as involving some 
degree of embourgoisement. As we have already established in 
Chapter Two, the working class shipbuilding workers on Wearside 
in the inter-war period were characterised by the politics of 
local loy a !ties as much as any wider proletarian consciousness. 
The complexity of this base line must be kept in mind whilst we 
attempt to outline some of the general developments in the post-
war period. 
Firstly, as we have already noted, the physical occupational 
community was to become increasingly dispersed, and such movement 
opened up the potential for an increasing "gap" between the war ld 
of work and the worlds of the community. Such developments did 
not however lead to the privatisation of the shipbuilding worker 
and his family, rather the basis for sociality became less work-
based, although the importance of locality remained. Thus for 
example those workers moving out to the council estates were more 
likely over time to give their allegiance to the local working 
men's club than to continue to travel to the area of the former 
physical occupational community. Similarly for the wives of such 
workers the locality became (or remained) the dominant feature in 
sociality; the importance of goad neighbours, the local shops as 
a meeting place, and increasingly the experience of work in their 
own right served further to exacerbate the distance between the 
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shipyard worker's family and the specifically occupational 
community. 
If privatisation was not characteristic of those undergoing 
relocation on Wearside in the post-war period, what about some of 
the other elements of the embourgoisement thesis, that both 
"political" and "industrial" integration would result from the 
harnessing of technological advances to mass consumer production. 
It is possible to argue that such a position is fundamentally 
mistaken and in order to do so we must look more closely at the 
political and industrial relations "consensus" as it appears in 
our empirical reference point. 
Firstly, it is indeed the case that many of the preoccupat-
ions of the inter-war period carried on into the post-war years. 
We have already noted the expectation that a slump would follow a 
brief replacement boom. This uncertainty combined with higher 
than average unemployment in some shipbuilding centres to ensure 
that defensive action to attempt to preserve jobs was more 
characteristic than action orientated towards purely economic 
aspirations. In this sense Wearside appears to represent an 
extreme example of these concerns. The immediate post-war years 
brought problems with supplies of materials leading to both lay-
offs and disputes. 
Thus in the winter of 1947 Mr. R. Cyril Thompson complained 
of the shortage of steel, and warned that: 
"The situation will inevitably lead to wholesale 
unemployment unless it is quickly remedied." (62) 
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The situation was not to improve quickly however, with the 
shortages being experienced throughou~ the 1950s. These 
shortages and the layoffs they caused were a constant source of 
friction, and served to remind the workforce of the precarious 
nature of employment in shipbuilding. Disputes arising out of a 
shortage of materials were relatively frequent. Thus on 19th 
August 1952 the/Ministry of Labour in the region recorded a 
/ 
strike at B~rtrams involving twenty riveters and seventeen 
holders up. The cause of the strike was recorded as: 
"Shortage of steel: some squads could not be absorbed." (63) 
However the report went on to comment: 
"Failure to absorb all squads occurring for some time: 
Strike coincided with visit of Mr. A.W. Digby, Civil Head of 
Admiralty on a fact finding tour of N.E. yards, Bartrams 
first item on itinerary. 
"It may be the walk out was merely a gesture of protest 
about the steel shortage." (64) 
This may have been the case, as the strikers returned the 
following day even though "some squads still remained 
unabsorbed"; however "discussions with management'' were taking 
place. It is unlikely that management could offer anything of 
substance to the riveters as the problem was clearly one of 
scarcity of supply which had been "occurring for some time". It 
was not only steel which was in short supply and causing 
problems. On 26th March 1947 fourteen rivet heaters went on 
strike causing 28 riveters to be laid off. The cause was 
reported: 
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"The coke being used by the Heaters was becoming exhausted 
and was, for the most part, small and dusty. The heaters 
complained of this and the firm promised to have this 
riddled (i.e. the dust shaken off) if they use it until 
sufficient supplies were received, delivery was expected 
during the next two days. The heaters complained that this 
was not satisfactory to them and decided to cease work ..• 
Mr. J.J. O'Donnell, Wearside Delegate of the Boilermakers 
Society, is aware of the dispute, and states that he is 
endeavouring to get a resumption as quickly as 
possible." (65) 
Again problems relating to coke supply were not solved quickly, 
so that by May 1952 there was an almost identical account of a 
strike, in which fifteen Rivet heaters ceased work, laying off a 
\ 
further fifteen riveters, fifteen holders up and four 
apprentices. 
"Poor quality coke - stock of coke nearly exhausted: heaters 
complained too much dust in it. Coke riddled and heaters 
came in 20th only to complain coke too large." (66) 
It is important to understand that the quality of coke was the 
decisive factor in being able to attain and keep the correct heat 
in the rivet fire. Failure to de this caused frustration end 
delay not only for the heater but also for the rest of the squad, 
and thereby led to a fall in piece earnings. Therefore the 
frustrations felt were real enough, and certainly in the above 
case could not be put down to over-zealous shop stewards, for as 
the strike report noted the heaters were "unorganised". 
"Only 2 heaters in N.U.G.M.W. - union official (as far as 
can be ascertained) is not doing much about it." (67) 
The continuance of "lay offs", whether induced through 
shortages or the traditional cyclical fluctuations in the demand 
for labour, emphasised that action to preserve employment was 
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still a relevant consideration, and was particularly so where 
local labour market conditions were loose. This is one factor 
outlined by G.C. Cameron to account for the fact that between 
1946 and 1961, whilst on the Tyne demarcation strikes accounted 
for only 3% of all strikes, a total of two disputes, on the Wear 
demarcation strikes accounted for some 43~6 of the total (68) 
Linking demarcation to labour market conditions seems a 
potentially useful strategy, although in relation to Wearside 
Cameron's suggestion that vertical demarcation occurs when ·~ocal 
unemployment is very low" and that horizontal demarcation occurs 
"when the level of local unemployment was high" (69 ) cannot be 
substantiated. This is so for two reasons. Firstly due to the 
uneven concentration of demarcation disputes between Wear yards, 
·~wo firms employing approximately 25% of the total area labour 
force accounted for 55~6 of all Wearside demarcation strikes"(70), 
therefore the conditions of the local labour market du nul 
operate as a force irrespective of the situations existing within 
individual yards. Secondly and more importantly however is the 
fact that the empirical data do not show a distinct pattern or 
phasing of the two types of demarcation dispute. Thus for 
example at Bartrams yards horizontal disputes occurred during 
1950, 1954, 1958 and vertical disputes at the same yard during 
1954 and 1956. At other yards on the Wear vertical disputes took 
place in 1953, '54 and '56, interspersed with horizontal disputes 
during 1954, '56 (3), '57 and '58 (2). 
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Indeed it is hard to sustain the view that vertical disputes 
were part of any managerial strategy aimed at dilution, or that 
they represented a response to intractible problems of labour 
supply. This is particularly so given that 75% of such disputes 
were settled in under four days and the remaining 25% within 
seven days (71). Moreover the context of such disputes was often 
that of meeting a short term contingency. Thus for example a 
dispute involving 55 welders occurred at Austin and Pickersgills, 
Southwick yard, on 7th March 1956, where the cause was recorded 
as: 
"Management•s refusal to employ a skilled welder on welding 
operations which were being performed by an apprentice who 
usually assisted a skilled worker who was absent owing to 
sickness. 11 ( 72) 
A full return to work was forthcoming the following day, 
whereupon: 
"Assistant District Delegate of the Boilermakers Society 
(achieved) amicable understanding with employers over 
dispute." (73) 
The context of the dispute was then one in which a skilled worker 
had "gone off 11 sick and the dispute was solved quickly. 
Similarly at Greenwells Dock twenty platers walked out without 
consulting Management or Delegate on 25th May 1954 following a 
revelation that during the previous weekend•s overtime a general 
labourer had removed some material from a ship. However as the 
report stated, 
11 A demarcation issue. It was ascertained by lhe platers 
that a labourer, during the weekend, had performed 
operations proper to their craft without consulting the 
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management or Trade Union Officials." (74) 
Again the idea of the vertical demarcation dispute as the 
response of management to labour shortage is not substantiated. 
However the point to grasp is, as Geoffrey Roberts has 
suggested, that rather than seeing demarcation as being directly 
linked to levels of unemployment it is rather employment 
insecurity, of which the unemployment level is only one factor, 
which is of more importance <75). Certainly this would seem to 
be so with respect to the general level of industrial disputes. 
Thus when a contraction of orders affected the smaller yards in 
the North East (i.e. those on the Wear) <76 ) during the late 
1950s the level of man-hours lost as a result of strikes and 
stoppages of work on the Wear rose dramatically above those in 
the Tyne district, so that during 1958 and 1959 the number of 
man-hours lost on the Wear was 91,000 and 24,000 respectively, 
whereas in the Tyne district the comparable figures were 43,000 
and 21,000 (77) 
The continuation of employment insecurity, unemployment and 
the preoccupation with occupational protection on behalf of the 
workforce ensured that in the shipbuilding industry generally, 
and perhaps on the Wear in particular, the objective conditions 
for worker affluence were by 1960 still largely absent. There-
fore any discussion of the effect of affluence on the attitudes 
of these workers would have to take account of the relatively 
late percolation of the objective conditions of affluence, with 
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as much emphasis to be put upon continuity of employment and 
therefore income, as upon a weekly wage. 
In pointing to the continuities with the inter-war period in 
terms of employment insecurity, one should be careful not to give 
the impression that nothing had changed at all. The fact was 
that such employment instability persisted in the face of, until 
the late 1950s, growing demand. Thus by the end of 1956, 
" ••• the Wear had 140 ships on order or under construction 
worth about £120 million and guaranteeing work for four to 
five years ahead. "It was a period of almost unexampled 
prosperity"." (78) 
Indeed the following year the high level of demand continued in 
spite of the fifteen day National strike in March, thus: 
"The Wear received the greatest number of orders in its 
history in a single week period with orders for 11 ships 
worth £12,000,000 ... "(79) 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the industry had this contra-
dietary character about it. Prophecies of impending doom inter-
spersed with buoyant optimism, the major "problem" facing the 
industry being seen variously as a declining order book or a 
shortage of labour with which to meet launch deadlines and there-
by cope with the timetabling of a full order book. Both of these 
views expressed partial truths. The pattern of demand for ships 
followed not only from the fluctuations of the replacement cycle, 
but from the less isolationist policies of the major powers and 
the opposition of the two power blocs of East and West. This 
coupled with the accelerating expansion of the capitalist world 
system ensured that rapid relative decline of the British 
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industry was not immediately translated into absolute decline. 
These meta-contexts had a direct effect at the point of 
production, ensuring that at several important junctures action 
at the level of nation states militated against any drastic 
downturn in demand for shipping. In this connection the 
importance of the Korean war beginning in 1949 can be seen in as 
far as it turned what was developing into a slump in demand into 
a boom. Another example of perhaps more importance was the Suez 
Crisis of 1956, which revived the freight markets in a dramatic 
way, a development which as we have seen was translated directly 
into orders for ships (80). 
The effect of such indirect "aid" to the industry, coupled 
with more direct measures such as the Government's £65 million 
credit aid scheme of 1964, ensured that the terrible slumps of 
the inter-war period did not re-occur. Moreover in the 1960s the 
wider economy was also enjoying boom conditions. The balance of 
power between capital and labour began to swing to the latter's 
advantage. However if moves towards employment stability and 
affluence for shipbuilding workers were more hesitant and uneven 
over time, this very fact seemed to speak of the meanness of the 
employers who constantly "cried wolf" of the imminent slump of 
orders, which because of other contingencies did not occur in a 
general way for another two decades. 
How then did these developments represent themselves at the 
point of production? The first point to stress again is the 
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uneven and at times contradictory nature of developments. 
Employment security did not emerge overnight, and the complexity 
of the moves towards this situation left their mark upon the 
workforce. However it is possible to indicate some of the changes 
which began to develop during the 1950s and continued into the 
next decade. 
Whilst the late 1950s saw the continuation of the demarc-
ation dispute as a form of "realistic conflict" (81), the period 
nevertheless saw the emergence of other types of action 
concerning some issues which would have been unthinkable in the 
inter-war period. The first of these indicates the changed 
position of the foreman and thereby suggests a different balance 
of forces at the point of production. Thus, for example, a 
dispute began at Bartram and Sons on 23rd March 1952 which 
directly involved 72 platers and laid idle another eighty 
helpers. The cause of the stoppage was recorded as "Attitude of 
Foreman" <82 ) It is perhaps worthwhile to quote in full the 
developments in this dispute until its resolution on 29th March: 
"Friday, 21/3/52 
Marshland (Wear Shipbuilders Association) unaware of dispute 
but since has been in contact with manager of the yard who 
was away yesterday. 
Cause of stoppage - - attitude of a foreman, but yard 
manager not notified of complaint. Platers attended yard 
lhis morning but after a meeting amongst themselves decided 
not to resume work, and the shop stewards were unable to 
influence them. 
Cook (District Union Official) in touch with management. 
Further meeting of men 4.30 today at which Cook will be 
present to try to effect a resumption. 
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24/3/52 
Complete resumption following meeting of men with Cook and 
shop stewards. 
Yard conference afternoon of 24/3/52, and indications that 
management will take disciplinary action against foreman. 
26/3/52 
Men give management ultimatum that unless foreman removed 
they would leave the Firm on Friday night. 
At a yard meeting, 24/3/52 (Cook, shop steward, management) 
management (Marshland) at first inclined to take 
disciplinary action against foreman but after full inquiry 
decided that this was not warranted and no solution was 
forthcoming. 
Shop stewards and men held meeting 25/3/52 afternoon and 
decided by 52 votes to 9 that unless foreman removed 
withdrawal of labour on Friday. 
Cook - men are ada~ant -but if men strike it will be 
unofficial. 
If during discussion Mr. Mellenby, Manager of Yard, had 
suggested some way out of the impasse such as removing the 
foreman to another department temporarily until the present 
discontent blew over, he (Cook) felt he would be able to 
avert a stoppage. No such suggestion was forthcoming, 
however, and he did not want it to come from him. I asked 
him whether a limit would be given to Mr. Marshland and he 
welcomed the suggestion: I therel:lpon informed Marshland of 
what Cook had said. 
Marshland hopeful of a meeting before Friday - Cook says he 
is availnblc. 
Other shop stewards in yard asked for a meeting with 
Mellenby tomorrow. 
Understood that other workers in yard "not entirely in 
sympathy with the boilermakers' action". 
29/3/52 
Cook - several meetings with Management, shop steward and 
Cook, as a result of which strike threat lifted. 
Management agreed to restrict authority of foreman and have 
warned him that any further complaints against him will be 
regarded seriously." (83) 
This dispute is interesting for it is one of the earliest 
examples of recorded action being taken over the "attitude" of a 
foreman. Also worth noting is the effort put in by the district 
official to avert a further stoppage even though he did not wish 
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it to be known to the men that the compromise solution was 
originally suggested by him. Finally the outcome of the dispute 
is worthy of note, for given the approach of other shop stewards 
in the yard suggesting they were not in sympathy with the boiler-
makers, this actually served to increase the pressure upon 
management to reach a prompt solution. Whereupon the management 
restricted the authority of the foreman and gave him a further 
warning in relation to his future conduct, despite their earlier 
position that disciplinary action against the foreman was 11not 
warranted 11 • 
Such action against the attitudes and actions of chargehands 
and foremen played an increasing part in the negotiation of order 
at the point of production. Sometimes the outcome of such 
disputes was less clear than in the above example. Thus when 67 
riveters and holders up went on strike, laying off a further 25 
rivet heaters and 19 rivet-catc.1ers, at Greenwells on 25th 
November 1957, the cause was recorded as 11objection to the 
attitude adopted by a charge-hand11 • The stoppage lasted only for 
one day, and again the district delegate of the boilermakers was 
instrumental in its solution, arguing that such a grievance did 
not warrant strike action. 
"Comments 
The return to work was reported as unconditional. No further 
trouble was anticipated. The District Delegate of the 
Boilermakers, Mr. Cook, advised them to return to work, told 
them that their complaint should be notified to the 
management and that it was not one which justified strike 
action. 11 (84) 
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However the willingness of the workforce actively to 
challenge the decisions and demeanour of immediate supervisors 
and foremen was a notable development of the post-war period. It 
speaks both of the growth of the objective resource of a tighter 
labour market and a change in the moral hierarchy existing both 
at work and in the wider community. Such action could be directed 
at individual decisions of foremen as well as at the wider focus 
of their attitudes and increasingly such action was successful 
from the workers' point of view. For example another dispute at 
Bartrams of 12 rivet heaters, laying off 22 riveters and holders 
up, on 18th September 1957, was solved in a day when management 
reinstated a rivet heater dismissed by a foreman (presumably for 
a disciplinary offence)(85), 
The incidence of such objections to foremen and charge hands 
is higher than strike reports alone might suggest. One Plumber 
recalled an occasion at Doxfords in 1960 when a disagreement 
arose between the Plumbers and a foreman over the calculation of 
bonus payments. 
"It was always the same, as you were working on a ship Harry 
Hunter had a graph of how the bonus was going. Early on it 
would be really high and towards the end he would play with 
the figures and the line would plummet. Anyway this one 
time we decided we'd had enough so we were walking out, up 
the bank. Halfway up we saw Benny Tewit the yard manager 
coming down - "Where you going, lads?" he said ... Well, we 
were all together, you know - brave like ••. so we said 
"we're going home." "What are you going home for?" he says. 
So one lad, I'll always remember, said "I don't know but 
we're not coming back till we get it!" Anyway we goes back 
into the shop and he got Harry Hunter. He could have took 
him into the offioe but instead he was ranting and raving at 
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him in front of us. He was saying "it•s 1900 and so and so 
not 1800 and so and so". He gave him a right talking to. 
It wasn•t right really, •cos Harry Hunter was canny really, 
even a bit soft. But aye, right in front of us. 11 (86) 
The tone of this account is interesting for there is no 
••celebration•• in the 11 Victory" over the foreman. In fact quite 
the opposite, the humiliation dealt out to the foreman was seen 
as a regrettable thing. An important point to be made about 
conflict at this level is that it necessarily involves a moral 
dimension and is inextricably bound up with individual identit-
ies. Conflict at work is rarely only experienced as a structural 
conflict between employer(s) and workers. Again these changes 
must be seen in relation to the decline of employment insecurity. 
Nevertheless such a change did not have an even effect upon the 
perceptions of all workers, as the account of another Plumber 
pointed out: 
11 
... in the post-war years of full employment, a change 
came over l.:.lie yards. Most of the olrlP.r foremen retired, and 
once some of the younger men felt secure and the 
uncertainties of unemployment were removed, they lost their 
fear of the foreman. The older men never did. They 
continued to live and work by the old standards.•• (87) 
An important feature of the loss of authority by foremen 
during this period is that there was little evidence of the 
emergence, on the management side, of any other features of micro 
control in the spheres both of the performance of work and 
discipline. It would seem then that on this issue the balance of 
forces at the point of production began to move in favour of the 
workers. 
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Similarly when one looks at the incidence of redundancy and 
unemployment during this period, the evidence suggests that the 
labour market was beginning lo tighten as redundancy itself 
became a harder issue for management to handle. As was argued in 
Chapter 2, in the inter-war period cyclical unemployment was 
accepted by the workers as a 11 fact of li fe 11 within the industry. 
In the post-~ar period this gradually began to change. Not only 
did disputes arise about the basis of decisions as to whom should 
be made redundant, especially when suspicion of the victimisation 
of shop stewards was involved, but also disputes began to occur 
over redundancy pure and simple. 
There are several examples of the first type of dispute 
occurring in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Some were of a 
relatively short duration such as the strike at Greenwells on 18 
June 1958 when 24 riveters and holders up came out after the 
laying· off of ten men inr lurli ng a shop steward. Work was resumed 
on the 23 June when the steward was re-engaged (88). Others were 
of longer duration: al Austin and Pickersgill action was readily 
taken over redundancy with alleged victimisation. On 19 March 
1958 thirty welders and six apprentices went on strike after 
eight welders including one steward were made redundant. There 
was a full resumption on 1 April with the district delegate Cook 
negotiating for the re-engagement of the shop steward (89), At 
the same firm on 15 January 1960 329 platers walked out over the 
laying off of five platers, one of whom was a steward. Although 
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they returned the following day there was a series of token one 
day stoppages over the following month, with eighty platers 
striking on 22 February (seventy workers laid idle), 81 platers 
on 29 Febr~ary (66 laid idle) and 150 platers and welders 
striking on 7 March (90). The outcome of these token strikes was 
reported by the Ministry of Labour as "no result known" (9l), 
with the workers ending the action on 14 March. 
One feature of these disputes worthy of note is the 
relatively long period for which they were sustained, and the 
relative frequency of disputes over dismissal and redundancy on 
the Wear (lmo of all disputes between 1946 and 1961) compared 
with that on the Tyne (4~o) and the Tees (2~0 for the same 
period (9 2). This again draws attention to the vulnerability of 
the labour market on Wearside and the uneven and problematic 
"drift" to1A1ards "full employment". But the message was beginning 
to become clearer to both management and workers that the vast. 
fluctuqtions in employment levels in the inter-war period should 
no longer be seen as inevitable. For the workers especially it 
became evident that action could be successful in preventing 
redundancy. Thus for example when thirteen boilermakers withdrew 
their labour at Greenwells on 8 May 1961 over the redundancy of 
eight men, the redundancy was cancelled by the following day, 
"Due to other work becoming available" (93). 
Redundancy was becoming much harder to handle. Thus even as 
Ken Douglas, the Managing Director of Austin and Pickersgill, was 
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quoted as saying of the Wear district, 
"There are no grounds for criticising our labour relations 
because we have the edge on many other districts. In 
Sunderland we have the ability to settle our problems and 
maintain a spirit of co-operation" (94), 
the maintenance fitters at J.L. Thompson's had begun what was to 
be the longest strike on the Wear for twenty years. The strike 
was to last for 118 days, and: 
"The cause of the dispute was the dismissal of the fitters' 
shop steward under a redundancy scheme. The men alleged 
that there had been unfair discrimjnation, a charge which 
was strongly denied by the management." (95) 
Gradually then, there began to develop a tendency towards 
the stabilisation of work forces, and despite Dougan's 
characterisation of the period between 1961 and 1965 as 
representing "The Struggle to Survive" (96), this continued 
throughout the period. In this connection it is perhaps useful 
to trace some of the comments about the industry on the Wear in 
order further to illustrate this process and the precarious basis 
upon which the greater "affluence" of the workforce was built. 
There are several aspects to these developments. Firstly, the 
vulnerability seen by some as underlying the full order books in 
the short term did not become apparent at the point of production 
during this period, and a feeling that employers were "crying 
wolr' was shared by workers and to some extent unions too. 
Secondly, such problems as did underlie the changing pattern of 
demand were seen to lie with unfair competition from abroad, 
subsidies and credit terms, and as far as the workforce were seen 
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to be a problem by management, wage demands and reduction in 
working time were initially seen to be perhaps more serious than 
inefficiencies in the labour process. Thirdly there was little 
evidence of forward planning by management as to how the demand 
for speci fie types of tonnage would develop. Most serious in 
this direction was a failure to appreciate how big tankers and 
some dry cargo ships would become. This fault necessi t.ated a 
continuous "ad hoc" form of modernisation of berths, and with 
continuous outlay of capital to achieve this the workforce could 
scarcely believe that the situation was as serious as some 
employers sometimes suggested. The irony that during the period 
of one of the fastest relative declines in the importance of a 
national industry the workers had "never had it so good" should 
not be lost on us. 
The annual outlook for Wear shipbuilding compiled by Colonel 
R.A. Bartram in January 1962 listed two main problems facing the 
industry: firstly the lack of long,term credit available and 
secondly "the continued rise in wages". Of the latter he went on 
to say: 
"Last January shipbuilding trades got 3.5~~ in wages. Trade 
Union leaders might point to orders booked since and say it 
made no difference. In fact it possibly was largely the 
cause of Britain's percentage of world orders dropping so 
severely during the past year.'1 (97) 
The drop in the percentage of orders was seen by some to imply an 
imminent decline in the fortunes of the industry. Thus in 
September of the same year Roland Vidal, Sunderland Corporation's 
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industrial development officer, was predicting that 1,000 ship-
yard and marine engineering workers could be out of jobs over the 
next year ( 98 ). This mood of pessimism was carried into 1963 
when Sunder land Junior Chamber of Commerce stated in a report 
published in November that the Wear workforce could be expected 
to drop from 12,000 to 8,000 over the following ten years (99). 
However only one month later a "Brighter outlook for the Wear" 
was pronounced as it was revealed that the river had booked more 
than 40% of the £7~ million worth of orders placed wilh British 
shipyards under the Government's credit aid scheme (lOO). Also it 
was noted that whilst completions were low, nevertheless for the 
third successive year. 
"The Wear is second to the Clyde in production among British 
shipbuilding centres." (101) 
Furthermore Mr. Cyril Thompson announced his intention to have a 
bigger berth built: 
"We have the space to build another large berth tl.fld Lhe 
space for new pre-fabricating shops to double our output and 
the number of employees." (102) 
These indicators and the fact that most yards on the river had 
orders to last until the end of 1965 indicated that immediate 
pessimism was misplaced. However some have argued that the 
"signs of decline" were apparent on the river at this time. Thus 
John Spence has suggested that: 
"In January 1964 Shorts total workforce of 300 went on the 
dole when the yard ran out of orders. 11 ( 103) 
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We must be careful not to confuse the demise of an individual 
firm with the fortunes of a wider section of the industry. The 
failure of Shorts did not necessarily indicate an absolute lack 
of orders but also reflected on the management of the yard over a 
number of years. For as Hopkins noted, 
"The yard had not been modernised during the war. This had 
to be undertaken in the late fifties and early sixties and 
financed out of current profits~ eventually it seemed that a 
family firm could no longer survive under modern conditions 
without large capital resources." (104) 
Indeed Mr. John Short, Managing Director of the company, in an 
article entitled "Why Shorts Yard is Closing", acknowledged the 
limitations of his individual yard in which the biggest berth 
could only cope with vessels of up to 22,000 d.w. tons. 
"We simply have to face the fact that our berths are just 
not big enough to accommodate the bigger class of general 
cargo vessel now in demand." (105) 
Again this technical limit was felt despite modernisation "in 
recent years" which: 
" ..• involved the construction of a new fitting out quay, 
the extension of one of the berths and the provision of new 
shops well equipped to undertake prefabrication and pre-
assembly. These schemes, it is estimated, cost about 
£750,000. II (106) 
Moreover another important feature of the closure of Shorts 
was that the 30D workers went to other yards on the river rather 
than "on the dole". As the Shipbuilding and Shipping Record 
commented in January 1964, 
"Six months ago, when it became evident that a rundown of 
labour was inevitable, arrangements were made for other 
shipyards to absorb redundant craftsmen. This arrangement 
has worked smoothly." (107) 
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whilst one observer noted that during the last two months of the 
yard, 
"John Short spent endless hours on the telephone getting 
jobs for the men he knew so well. 11 (108) 
It would nevertheless seem that the absorption of workers did go 
smoothly, for by February it was being stated that: 
"The closure ... will not lead to more unemployment on the 
river, for other yards are absorbing the 300 manual workers 
and technical and administrative staff." (109) 
Even after the absorption of the workers from Shorts the demand 
for labour was maintained, with Laings attempting to increase its 
workforce to 500 in April 1964 to cope with the influx of work 
gained with the assistance of the Government's credit scheme. It 
was further planned to increase the workforce to 900 within '~he 
next few months" (110). 
However a note of caution was struck later in the year by 
A.J. Marr, Managing Director of Laings and President of the 
Shipbuilding Conference. He drew attention to the increasing 
threat of Japanese competition in export markets. 
"The threat in this connection is, of course, the continuing 
expansion of the Japanese shipbuilding industry, whose share 
of world orders is now approaching the sm~ level. Their 
price advantage is such that no amount of modernisation or 
further increases in shipyard efficiency can close the gap. 
This is a problem shared by shipbuilders throughout the 
western European countries." ( 111) 
Marr saw this problem as stemming from the credit terms and 
interest rates available in Japan and not from inefficiencies in 
the division of labour. Anyway how could warnings of decline be 
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treated seriously by the workforce when in the following month 
Laings began another extension programme, this time to their 
number 3 berth to en a b 1 e the m to build ships up to 50, 0 0 0 d. 111. 
tons (ll 2). 
As the prophecies of impending doom continued the terms of 
the problem were seen to change and throughout 1965 it was labour 
shortage which was mentioned as the most pressing problem. Thus 
in January, Clem Stephenson, chairman of the Wear Shipbuilders 
Association, warned of the possible return of recession and 
perils of wage rises and reduced hours, and then went on: 
" .•. the gradual rundown by the shipbuilding industry had 
resulted in the departure of traditional shipyard craftsmen 
to other industries and even if maximum shipbuilding orders 
were forthcoming there were not enough skilled shipyard 
workers to meet this demand." (ll3) 
This view would seem to have some substance for in July Mr. Cyril 
Thompson, Chairman of J.L. Thompson and Son, explained the three 
month delay in the launch of the 34,500 d.w. ton tanker 
"Kirriemoor" in terms of labour shortage. He suggested that: 
" ... urgent attention must be given to the labour shortage 
if the future of Sunderland as a shipbuilding centre was not 
to be seriously and perhaps permanently jeopardised." (114) 
Furthermore the berth on which this ship was built, "a modern 
berth completed only a few years ago", would no longer be used 
for shipbuilding. In future he said that only their new big 
berth would be used. However, 
"Even on this basis we are short of every class of skilled, 
semi-skilled and unskilled labour." (ll5) 
So the tendency towards the stabilisation of workforces was 
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completed under the pressure of labour shortage. A shortage 
exaggerated not only by the boilermakers' ban on apprentices, but 
also due to the increasing labour market opportunities elsewhere, 
for example the structural steel and pipe work involved in the 
expansion of the chemical industry on Teesside was mentioned by 
several workers in this respect. Also the expansion of 
contracting firms such as Steels and William Riddie's was seen to 
exacerbate labour shortage and to put upward pressure on ship-
yard wages (ll 6), 
For workers at this time the maintenance of steady employ-
ment and the amount of building going on seemed to indicate that 
all was well in the industry. 
"Things ran very smoothly, at Doxfords they used to have up 
to 3 ships moored side by side in the river and I would do 
the tank testing, bump, bump, bump from one to the other. 
Things were very predictable, you knew what you would be 
doing not weeks ahead but years ahead, it almost used to get 
boring sometimes." (117) 
However work in hand did not always indicate the financial health 
of an individual yard. 
"Wages were rising and managements, in some cases, took on 
work at a loss rather than have empty berths with heavy 
overheads to maintain. In these days, a yard without work 
at credit would close for ever. In the slump between the 
wars a yard would close, employ a watchman and a skeleton 
staff, and then open up again when an order came 
along." (118) 
Problems of profitability and the declining share of world 
tonnage built in British yards led not only to the Shipbuilding 
Inquiry Committee, chaired by Geddes, but also, in its aftermath, 
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to a concern by both Employers and Unions to improve the 
situation. Indeed less than three months after the publication 
of the Geddes report in February 1966 Dan McGarvy, President of 
the Boilermakers Society, was quoted as saying: 
"We have given a firm declaration today that there will be 
no more stoppages of work over the demarcation 
disputes." (119) 
This declaration is not as startling as it may seem, for 
demarcation disputes had already dwindled to a low level given 
the arrival of "full employment" and the amalgamations of the 
Blacksmiths and the Shipwrights with the Boilermakers in the 
early sixties. Although the removal of employment insecurity must 
be seen as the major factor here, for as McGoldrick has pointed 
out, at earlier points disputes between different sections of the 
Boilermakers were relatively common (120). McGarvey's statement 
was made at a meeting of employers and Unions at York in the 
context of the "new realism" in the industry in the aftermath of 
Geddes and the Labour Government's increasing involvement with 
the industry; as such it was an attempt at reassurance on a 
public plat form that the unions were "reasonable people". 
Of more importance however were the subsequent moves towards 
the relaxation of working practices. In understanding the 
limitations involved in these developments it is necessary to re-
emphasise the context in which they took place. The disap-
pearance of immediate employment insecurity and a tight labour 
market ensured that in spite of the Government's advocacy of 
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changes similar to those involved in the Fairfield experiment, 
the prime concern of the employers, on the Wear at least, was not 
with these changes as an element in reorganising the division of 
labour as such, but rather insofar as they would help overcome 
immediate labour shortages. This was the intention of the 
individual agreements arranged very quickly after Geddes in the 
yards at Bartram's, Laing's and Thompson's, where it was reported 
that: 
"Platers, Welders and Shipwrights are to relax demarcation. 
The platers will allow shipwrights to work in their 
department provided they are under the direction of a 
foreman plater, and welders will permit the upgrading of a 
number of tack welders. Also Laing and Bartram platers and 
shipwrights will be able to do some of the Platers' work in 
the fitting of brackets, for example." (121) 
The same factors were important in determining the attitudes 
of the trades unions towards these "changes" in working 
practices. Thus a speech on 16 February 1967 by Dun McGarvey was 
rArorted in the Shipbuildinq and Shipping Record where the issue 
of labour shortage was linked to the possibility of changes in 
working practices (122), Furthermore at a conference in Newcastle 
in June, McGarvey suggested that restrictive practices were to be 
seen as equivalent to "property rights" to be sold by workers and 
bought by employers. Moreover, 
"Mr. McGarvey stressed that appropriate compensation must be 
given to workers when they surrendered practices based on 
long training and experience and designed to safeguard their 
security against economic hazards." (123) 
In the face of greater employment stability the unions then 
agreed to bargain over working practices. However in some senses 
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this does not demonstrate the imparlance of issues springing from 
the division of labour but rather the opposite. In the context 
of the tight labour market the unions' decision to let lhe 
employers "buy the book" (124) had the beneficial effect of 
showing them as "responsible people" and yet also allowing them 
to pursue what was becoming the almost exclusive bargaining 
issue, higher wages. In the event, in the short and medium 
terms, such agreements did not radically alter working practices. 
For as McGoldrick has suggested, 
" .•• agreement on paper did not necessarily mean agreement 
in practice. The Boilermakers, for their part, exacted a 
high price for this lease on their birthright, and this in 
turn proved costly in terms of the outrage to other groups 
of workers who saw the Boilermakers' R.O.W.P. as the 
extension of existing differentials. But more importantly 
the agreement was a poor one, in which the prescription of 
specific items of flexible working meant that more general 
flexibility was lost. The disputed interpretation of the key 
phrase "progressing own work" meant that "more flexibility 
was paid for than was achieved in practice." (125) 
The prominence of the short term concerns variously felt by 
employers and unions as labour shortage and the search for higher 
wages served to obscure the longer term aim, as promoted by the 
Labour Government. And yet this position of change in theory but 
not in practice meant that when the Commission on Industrial 
Relations reported on the shipbuilding and shiprepairing industry 
in 1971 a sense of "deja vu" was forthcoming. The power of the 
workgroup and the extent of craft sectionalisation was contrasted 
with the small impact of the changes forthcoming as a result of 
the R.O.W.P. negotiations. 
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'tThe extent of independent control probably appears less 
from inside the industry than from without. Management 
would assert that it is managing the work of the yard and 
the workforce in it. Yet ... many decisions about 
recruitment, demarcation, manning, the hours actually 
worked, overtime and so on are actually made independently 
by the union or the work groups. Management has not agreed, 
in any formal sense, that this should be so, but it allows 
it to happen; it preserves a pretence about the real 
situation." (126) 
However the agreement of the Unions to endorse, on paper, 
elements of flexible working and the small returns that such 
agreements gave to the employers ensured that: 
" ... the question of job control, which had been at the 
centre of industrial relations since the mid nineteenth 
century, became secondary to a formalised system of 
collective bargaining." (127) 
This was true at the level of formalised bargaining, where 
wage issues increasingly played a very large role. The promotion 
of the importance of the wages issue would seem to accord with 
Taylor's account of the potential that full employment afforded: 
"Fu 11 employment ~"-' 8.8 Fl ner.essary prerequisite for the 
maximisation of labour power and in the post-war period we 
can see a loosening of former rigidities and austerities. 
Workers began to think and act like capitalists and the 
values of acquisitiveness became almost universal." (128) 
We must beware of overstating the case however, and whilst 
workers may indeed have shown great enthusiasm with regard to 
wage rises this does not necessarily indicate a change in 
priorities from issues of job control to those of wages as 
McGoldrick implies. For as we have seen in relation to the Wear 
in the inter-war and wartime periods, the evidence for workers 
"resisting at the point of production" expropriation of control 
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over the labour process is not too convincing. Indeed the 
evidence of any serious attempt to expropriate such control was 
not forthcoming. The preference of employers for flexibility in 
the face of fluctuating demand was of course a vital element in 
their acceptance and in some cases advocacy of the existent 
division of labour. However in the post-war period these 
fluctuations were not forthcoming as demand was maintained, and, 
as we have seen, the consequences of this and the wider boom in 
the economy led to the solidification of variable capital and the 
disappearance of the option of closing yards as a method of not 
incurring heavy overheads. The objective value of a labour 
inte~sive division of labour and the craft organisation of 
production would seem to have passed, and yet the employers 
achieved little practically in terms of changes in working 
practices. This is even more surprising apparently, given the 
ideAl rrerequisites of the pre-fabricated assembly of ships. 
"The rise of large-scale and capital intensive shipbuilding 
diminished the importance of flexible access to a highly 
skilled, mobile workforce. The larger volume of production 
of individual yards and the greater standardisation of 
output provided a firmer basis for continuously employing 
workers with specialised skills, while greater mechanisation 
increased the amount of semi-skilled machine-tending work. 
The shift to prefabrication led to a division of labour more 
industrial in character, based on location in the flow of 
production as opposed to type of activity or craft, which 
increased the possibilities of imparting skills through 
simple systems of on-the-job training associated with 
upgrading or internal promotion." (129) 
Even if some of the more objective rationalisations of the 
craft division of labour had disappeared by the mid 1960s the 
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"skilled" definition of the work lived on together with the craft 
administration of the production process (130). 
These features of the labour process were no longer located 
symmetrically across a moral order which, while complex in the 
details of its hierarchy, spanned both the contexts of work and 
non-work. Rather the changes in the locations and structuring of 
the manual working class had served initially to confuse a moral 
order based upon the ~ymmetry of hierarchy in work and non-work 
spheres focused upon occupational identity as a master status. 
Subsequently the non-work patterning of residential locations was 
re-established via the growing market of private housing, 
creating in a more stark form a kind of residential apartheid. 
Both these developments served to deepen certain divisions within 
the working class and were to spell the end of the occupational 
community both in its physical form and as a morally cohesive (or 
viewed differently, coercive) force. The basis of craft control 
at work was increasingly less supported unproblematically within 
the non-work sphere. Yet in spite of these far-reaching changes 
in the community, technical changes in the industry and formal 
agreements over changes in working practices, there appeared to 
be some dimensions of control over the work process which seemed 
invulnerable to change. The next chapter will outline some of 
the dimensions of this entrenched control and seek to explain 
why, two decades later, that control apparently evaporated with 
minimal resistance from the workforce. An understanding of this 
Chapter 4 - 333 -
problematic will illuminate not only the nature of shipbuilding 
and the employment relationship, but will also allow us to 
address the question of the changed nature of the working class 
in an empirical context. 
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Table i 
Population Change: Sunderland CB Wards 1951-61 (1961 Boundaries) 
Population Change Percentage 
Ward 1951 1951-61 Change 
Central 13,133 -7,086 -54 
Bridge 10,247 -3,874 -38 
Hendon 10,808 
-2' 920 -27 
Monkwearmouth 15,501 -3,996 -26 
Deptford ll,779 -2,900 -25 
Bishopwearmouth 9, 429 -1,529 -16 
Park 12,610 -1,697 -13 
Raker 9,952 -1,226 -12 
Colliery ll, 038 -1,249 -11 
Pal lion 11 '579 -1,055 -9 
Humbledon 11,113 -732 -7 
Thornhill 8,682 -59 -1 
Fulwe11 8,495 1,339 16 
Southwick 7,545 1 '727 23 
St. Michael 8,972 2,112 24 
Pennywell 12,828 3,802 30 
Thorney Close 7,807 12,892 165 
Hylton Castle 47 14,616 31,097 
Source: Census 1961: Reprinted in Dennis, w. Peo~le And Planning, 
London, F abtn: & r aber, 1970, pl70. 
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Table ii 
Structurally Separate Dwellings Occupied: Sunderland CB Wards 
1951-61 (1961 Boundaries) 
Dwellings Change Percentage 
Ward 1951 1951-61 Change 
Central 2,449 -744 -30 
Bridge 2,650 -482 -18 
Hendon 2,908 -342 -12 
Southwick 2,651 19 1 
Raker 2,819 138 5 
Pall ion 2,979 204 7 
Colliery 2,741 290 ll 
Thornhill 2,592 408 16 
Humbledon 2,612 465 18 
Park 2,275 460 20 
Fulwell 2,700 684 25 
Bishopwearmouth 1,815 583 32 
St. Michael 2,415 1,074 44 
Pennywell 2,539 1,193 47 
Monkwearmouth 1,553 1,821 ll7 
Deptford 
Thorney Close 1, 775 3,552 200 
Hylton Castle n/a 3,826 
Source: Census 1961: Reprlnled in Dennis, W. People And Planning, 
London, Faber & Faber, 1970, pl71. 
CHAPTER fiVE 
Craft Workers 2 Crisis 8nd the Collapse of Control; 
or a demoralised! lament? - "We knet:1 it coll.Bldn't last 11 o 
Part I 
In the last Chapter it was suggested that in spite of the 
technical changes implied in the move towards pre-fabrication and 
the formal agreements over the relaxation of working practices, 
there was again little movement towards any radical restructuring 
of the division of labour which would herald the forthcoming 
demise of the craft apprenticed "skilled" worker. As others have 
noted some employers were still supportive of the craft system of 
production, even if the meaning of craftsmanship was seen to have 
changed: 
" from implying a mastery of technical mysteries to 
being a promise of competence in a variety of exacting 
conditions and circumstances." (l) 
The importance of such an analysis, which stresses a multi-
faceted view of skill, must be understood if we are to avoid the 
pitfalls of suggesting that skill is totally socially created. 
Thus for example in an otherwise useful treatment of the concept 
of skill Charles More singles out the shipbuilding industry as an 
example of where apprenticeship was used to delimit skill in an 
"artificial way" (2). Whilst we may accept that the whole period 
of a five year apprenticeship may not be taken up with the 
imparting of the mastery of technical processes, and a similar 
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point could be made for most courses of "professional" training, 
the period was seen as one in which the "rules of conduct" of the 
yard could be learnt together with the more informal "tricks of 
the trade" (3), Further to this the employer's "support" of the 
craft division of labour lay in exactly those features of 
apprenticeship identified by More himself: 
"It seems reasonable to suggest that apprenticeship has 
retained an economic rationale as a period during which 
adolescents can spend time not on productive work but on the 
training necessary to make them productive in the future, 
"paying" for this training by foregoing the higher earnings 
they might obtain elsewhere." (4) 
Perhaps of greater importance however than More's estimation 
of riveters as being "not in reality highly skilled" is the 
realisation that hierarchy of and fluctuations in the skill level 
of individual trades are, in the context of shipbuilding, a 
natural aspect of a complex and changing division of labour and 
do not by themselves indicate lhe purely social creation~ or 
maintenance, of the craft division of labour. Thus the important 
point is that even into the 1970s authors could claim that: 
"Despite very considerable changes which have taken place 
over the years a shipyard can still fairly be described as 
having a craft technology." (5) 
The craft technology and the associated craft administration had 
rendered any abrupt reorganisation of the labour process 
unlikely. This is not to say that some of the managers within 
the industry were not considering the possibility of radical 
change. As one Wearside Manager wrote in 1969: 
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" ..• the inevitable course of industrial advance common to 
all industries should also be adopted in the shipbuilding 
industry. One has seen that advancement of modern industry 
is based not only on technical development but also on a 
more intelligent division of labour. 11 (6) 
And again at a later point: 
11 the author feels that from this study one conclusion 
stands out above all other findings, viz. that shipbuilding 
is not as unsuitable as generally accepted when it comes to 
the possibility of introducing scientific management, the 
reasons why it has not been applied to a larger extent being 
put down to measures of conservatism and traditions." (7) 
The unsatisfactory nature of concluding that what exists in "the 
present situation" can be put down to "conservatism" and 
"traditions" should, by now, be obvious. Moreover the author's 
emphasis that scienti fie management is "generally accepted" to be 
"unsuitable" in the context of shipbuilding indicates that his is 
a voice crying in the wilderness. It would seem then that even 
into the 1970s, and notwithstanding changes in technology and 
attempts to change working practices, the legitimacy of the craft 
division of labour was accepted either pragmatically or in 
principal by a majority in the industry. 
Given the lack of any general attempts radically to 
restructure the craft division of labour it followed that 
attempts to raise labour productivity would necessarily have to 
take account of the realities of craft technology and 
administration as well as the context of international 
competition in which, as we saw in the last Chapter, there was a 
belief that no amount of modernisation or further increases in 
shipyard efficiency could close the price gap with the Japanese. 
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In this sense changes in working practices were to be seen as 
only one element, and not necessarily the most important one, in 
an attempt to close the gap. In such a context the potential 
divergence between the outcome of the two levels of the 
negotiation of control outlined by Brown (B) is great. 
In this account the two levels are seen thus: 
11 In the first place negotiation can obviously be observed to 
take place through 11official11 channels, between employers or 
their representatives and tho Trade Unions, and through 
slightly less 11official 11 channels between managers and 
workers, or their representatives, the shop stewards •.. 
Secondly, however, there is negotiation in the sense implied 
by Strauss and his colleagues when they describe an 
organisation as a "negotiated order". This refers to the 
ways in which the behaviour expected of the employer and his 
representatives in the authority structure of the firm and 
of the worker is 11negotiated 11 in the daily interaction 
between manager and worker, worker and worker, and manager 
and manager. My contention is that there is no clear break 
between this sort of negotiation and bargaining about 
industrial relations as commonly understood. 11 (9) 
It must be understood that divergence of aim and outcome at these 
11 b•J0 11 Jevels does not imply o brc:CJk between the twu su1.·Ls uf 
negotiation, but in fact confirms the opposite. It is important 
then not to separate these two levels, as McGoldrick does, into 
the duality of theory and practice (10) or any other distinct 
localities such as micro and macro. The locality of the two 
types of negotiation can vary with the level of analysis. Thus 
in the empirical context the outcome of the official negotiation 
over Relaxation of Working Practices was the agreement outlined 
in the last Chapter. That this agreement achieved less in prac-
tice than on paper owed much to negotiation through the "slightly 
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less official" channel of managers, shop stewards and workers as 
well as through the daily negotiated order of the workplace. 
The overlapping nature of these "two" types of negotiation 
are illustrated well in Tony Elger's study, part of which looked 
at the Marine Engineering section of Doxford and Sunderland 
Ltd. (ll). The empirical study in this research was carried out 
between 1968 and 1970 and attempts to give an account of the 
rationalisation scheme launched in the engine works, which was 
addressed in part towards helping to solve the crisis of 
profitability and in part as an attempt to secure government 
funds under the auspices of Wilsonian modernisation. The 
account is sophisticated and brings out well the complexities of 
the craft ethos and individual differences between the skills and 
social positions of the workers. Within the context of rational-
isation Elger points to the fact that 
" ... Doxfords management patrolled the bounc.Ja:des ol cr&lt 
organisation and the division of labour without any 
concerted attempt Lo atlack those boundaries ..• "(12) 
Thus the centrepiece of the rationalisation became the pay 
structure. The replacement of payment by piece to one based on 
merit was an attempt to return some power to the foremen. The 
payment system amounted to measured day work with several bands 
of achievement in three areas, those of Efficiency, Industry and 
Accuracy. 
"The implications of the scheme as a whole, however, 
continued to depend crucially on just how the assessment 
process was worked. That process placed considerable 
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potential power in the hands of the foreman since, though he 
was just one member of a management "Assessments Committee" 
of five, he would clearly be the source of the 
"recommendations" and judgements underlying their 
decisions." (13) 
It would seem that the potential power of the foreman was 
not, or could not be, realised in practice for Elger noted that 
assessments produced only a narrow range of scores clustered 
towards the top end of the range, and a noticeable drift into the 
top merit level over ti~e. 
"These results appeared to be a consequence of both a 
reluctance on the part of foremen to award scores below 8 or 
9 for Efficiency and Industry (with 10 as the norm for 
Accuracy), and the willingness of management to revise 
scores upwards on appeal ••• shop-floor organisation had 
sustained some degree of mutuality and wage push in lhe new 
conditions, thus exemplifying the point that changes in 
payment systems may modify the expression of conflict on the 
shop floor but cannot simply suppress or transcend the bases 
of that conflict." (14) 
The willingness of workers and shop stewards to go through 
the ''slightly less official" channel and challenge management 
score::; combined •·•ith the elaments of "~tt;yutl.CiL.iun': implied in Lhe 
foreman's unwillingness to award low scores served to frustrate 
the realisation of the aim involved in the rationalisation of 
wage scales. This is a useful account then as it covers the two 
types of negotiation outlined by Brown. However it leaves 
largely unanalysed the intensity of the moral dimensions of the 
employment relationship, the extent to which the enduring forms 
of worker control are partially located in an essential identity 
of the skilled worker, the dimensions of which owe as much to 
practical as discursive consciousness. The importance of under-
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standing this level of reality 9 not in isolation but in as far as 
it relates to, supports and is supported by other levels, is 
crucial. 
It is within this multiplexity of levels that the tenacity 
of the day to day craft "control" of the division of labour in 
the shipbuilding industry lay. A setting relatively more complex 
than that confronting the single occupational group of "turners" 
in Elger's study. Within a shipyard the wide variety of distinct 
occupational identities has been seen to interact with the 
physical (and therefore locational) complexity of the workplace 
and historically different payment systems to encourage the 
development of a workforce whose attitudes and "images of 
society" have been characterised more by "paradox ... than 
pattern" (l 5) 
The heterogeneity characteristic of the orientations and 
images of the snipbu1lding workforce outlined by Cousins and 
Brown are seen to be influenced most importantly by the immediate 
social context, particularly the objective market and work 
situations, and are therefore historically contingent. From their 
vantage point of the early 1970s they suggested that changes in 
the industry (16) would increasingly lead to a realisation of a 
"latent proletar ianisation" and therefore a relative rise in the 
importance of collective as against sectional action, thus 
implying a relative shift towards more "official" forms of 
negotiation. Their argument is worth quoting at length. 
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"These changes (see note 16) have meant that increasingly 
shipbuilding workers on Tyneside - and elsewhere - have come 
both to share common market and work situations, and to be 
aware that they did so. Particularism in relations between 
management and men is increasingly giving way to universa-
lism - in larger and necessarily more bureaucratic organis-
ations. Because of the need, in management's view, to 
secure mobility of labour between jobs and yards a 
deliberate attempt has been made to break down demarcation 
lines and to secure greater all-round flexibility in the use 
of labour. But this can only be achieved at the cost of 
creating a much more homogeneous and potentially unified 
workforce. Shipbuilding workers now more nearly share the 
same market situation and have fewer chances to pursue 
particular individual strategies in their pursuit of pay and 
security; collective action against a common employer is the 
most obvious possibilty for them. They are now more likely 
to experience the same range of work situations - and to 
have fewer, if any, chances of escaping from deprivations 
and grievances in one yard under one employer by going to 
another employer; collective action is again the most 
obvious strategy. If men's social consciousness is 
influenced by their immediate social context, and if we are 
right in stressing the importance of the market and work 
situations as influencing consciousness, then, one must 
expect "proletarian" social perspectives to increase in 
importance." (17) 
It will be argued as one of the themes of this Chapter that 
the ::::bovc view, •·;hilst a reasonable projection when ul"ly.imilly 
formulated, is in fact deficient in a number of respects. 
Firstly it underestimated the tenacity of the "non-formal" 
negotiation of order and thereby treated the implementation of 
formal agreements and the translation of change at the corporate 
level onto the shop floor as relatively unproblematic. Secondly 
it offers a vision of the change between sectional and collective 
action as primarily a question of the qualitative expression of 
the contradictions inherent in the employment relationship. In 
both of these respects the analysis fails to take adequate 
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account of the wider fortunes of the industry insofar as this 
implies a changing balance of power between capital and labour. 
Thirdly, and in some ways most seriously, the analysis of images 
of society of shipbuilding workers largely on the basis of 
questionnaire data treats as unproblematic the relevance of 
replies about the numbers of "classes" in society as this relates 
to potential action at the point of production. The dangers of 
mistaking action primarily motivated by a temporary "instrumental 
collectivism" for more solidaristic and class wide action must be 
guarded against. 
In the next section an attempt to rectify some of these 
shortcomings will be made by outlining some of the diverse forms 
through which the day to day negotiation of order was 
accomplished in the yards in the period prior to 1979. Such a 
"static" account of some of the processes of control and identity 
will be st..:pplemented at a late.c i-JU..i.nL wltll reftHence to Lhe 
historical development of the industry in general but with 
specific reference to the Wear. 
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Part II 
The Conte~t 7 Control and Co-operation 
a) Physical Location and Control 
One of the hardest features of the shipbuilding industry to 
convey to people who have never seen a shipyard is the sheer 
complexity and size of the physical workplace. Even in 
relatively small yards such as those on the Wear the absence of a 
single workspace is compounded by a multiplicity of activities 
occurring in differing vertical as well as horizontal planes. 
The dizzying effect of this complexity and size I remember well 
from the Monday morning early in September 1975 when I began work 
as an apprentice plumber at the Deptford Yard of Sunderland Ship-
builders (formerly Laings). It is perhaps useful to outline some 
of the observations I can recall from that first day of 
participant observation, of the most direct kind, in order to 
attempt to convey some of the complexity of the physical layout 
of the yard. 
A friend and I walked the three miles or so from Hylton 
Castle Estate to the yard that first morning. On crossing Queen 
Alexandra Bridge we turned left down the bank towards the yard. 
The first large building encountered was the joiners shop 
actually outside the yard gates. The double doors were flung 
open and the sight and sound of circular saws in action dominated 
the immediate interior of the shop. Down at the gates 
themselves, opposite the Sa ltgrass pub, other new apprentices 
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were gathered. We joined them and sat on the path waiting for 
the training officer to take us into the yard (l8). While sitting 
there on the ground I remember looking up at one of the two 
massive pre-fabricating sheds. Its proximity and size dominated 
the view and reminded me of a secular version of Durham Cathedral 
without the ornamentation. 
The training officer arrived and we began the walk through 
the yard towards the canteen. Groups of blokes were walking 
about or standing talking, some gave "wolf whistles" and shouted 
various comments about apprentices. We walked past the offices 
round to the left, past the second pre-fabricating shed and more 
men, some of whom appeared to know me. 
"There's another bloody Roberts"; "Hey, I know your father 
and he's fucking crackers". ( 19) 
After a "pep talk" from the training officer which largely 
consisted of telling us how lucky we were to have got an 
apprentic:eshitJ a11U how if i::.here was any nonsense we would be out 
because for every one of us in here there were fifty lads outside 
the gate who would gladly take our place, we went on a tour of 
the yard. This started in front of the offices where the general 
layout of the yard was explained. From there we zigzagged 
through a maze of cabins down to the berth and from there into 
one of the pre-fabricating sheds. The noise was deafening and 
the air was thick with fumes. It wasn't the wide open space 
inside the shed that I had expected. Instead there were cabins 
two storeys high and several partitions which restricted a wide 
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view. This was compounded by the sections being fabricated, 
again their size and angular construction blocking an overall 
appreciation of the "space" in the shed. We wandered across the 
shed dodging in and out of the vertical girders and round several 
partitions and emerged out of a door on the far side. Outside 
there were a number of buildings, stores and "shops" including 
the plumbers shop. We were split up and sent off in separate 
directions according to our designated trades. I and three other 
lads went to the plumbers shop. It was very warm inside what was 
a rather ramshackle building, with ancient-looking machinery and 
tools lying about everywhere. Our journey to get here had taken 
several hours with what seemed like miles walked, up and down 
steps through a myriad of little connecting doors and passages or 
walkways, turning through 360° so often that any sense of 
direction evaporated. For that first week, before we were sent 
lo Wearside College, the contusion was such that plenty of time 
had to be allowed for toilet trips to ensure finding the correct 
location before desperation set in! All this in what was a 
relatively small yard. Moreover as new apprentices we were not 
allowed on the ship, where we were assured things could be even 
more complicated. An abiding impression left by these 
experiences was not only the conception of spatial complexity but 
also of physical movement, men walking everywhere, individually 
or in small groups, or standing talking or was it waiting 
purposefully for something? As a new recruit this wasn't clear 
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to me and furthermore by the reaction of the training officer or 
some of the other managers it was not clear to them either! 
Within such a complex physical setting the managerial 
problem of the physical control of labour is immense. There are 
several dimensions to this problem. Firstly workers can use the 
size of the yard or a ship simply to hide. As Brown et al found 
in their study of shipbuilding on the Tyne when talking to a 
manager, 
(Prompt) "I've noticed on the ferries little stickers on the 
cabins. I gathered this is a new scheme which has been 
introduced?" 
"This was done for a specific reason on the ferry because 
as you will appreciate there are a lot of cabins on there -
there are about 320 cabins. On a normal ship there are 
about 50 cabins ... In the past the ships have been such a 
hell of a mess through lack of information, lack of 
drawings. lack of equipment that all the cabins are wide 
open till the very last day. Every single cabin on the ship 
there is somebody working in. You will appreciate that with 
320 cabins you can't afford to do this. So what I did was 
sectionalised the ship in such a way we closed up about 20 
cab i n s a w e e k , s t d i. L l1 i y i::l l a c e r t a in t i rn e. T h is w as .i de a 1 
that we should have every thing into that cabin, complete, 
washed out, painted, locked up on a certain day. 
I did a preliminary inspection to make sure that all 
the work was finished behind the ceilings to get the ceiling 
up and then a fortnight afterwards to gel the cabin locked. 
I do an inspection on a Friday of these two sections, one of 
the ceiling work and one of the cabin work. But as I said 
before some days we would be very short of plumbers on this 
ship, I found on inspection of the ceiling that the plumbers 
just hadn't finished behind the ceilings. And it is 
possible they're a week late and consequently the cabin was 
out a week or a fortnight. Perhaps it wasn't exactly 
finished in a week, but I don't object to this provided that 
I can see the ship being closed up regularly as it did 
happen. You can't be so very rigid in shipbuilding and the 
scheme has worked. And by doing this method we've closed up 
the sections, got people out of the cabins where they tend 
to hide and into passageways where you can keep them moving 
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and the ship is being closed up." 
(Prompt) "Into the cabins where they can hide?" 
"Well if you get a man into a cabin he can shut the door 
behind him and he can make the work last if he wants to, but 
if you get a man out of the cabin he's got nowhere else to 
go so he's got to get on with his work in the passage-
ways." (21) 
In the absence of cabins other parts of the ship can be used 
not just as a place to "take a breather", but also for a multi-
tude of other activities, of a greater or lesser degree of 
illegitimacy, which comprise elements of "leisure in work" (22 ). 
Thus one worker recalled how when he and the "mate" he was 
working with started to "feel the cold" on a refrigeration ship 
on which they were working, 
" we used to knock off and go into one of the 
refrigeration units ... it was like a big room all covered 
in cork tiling - very warm. And we would start - you know, 
first of all just throwing light punches, but then we would 
get carried a way and really start lacing into each other. 
In the end Ronnie always used to get the better of me - he'd 
end up with my left arm caught under his and he's give me 
rights to the sidt: ur ,ny heau. I'd shoul ':righL, we're warm 
enough now, we'd better get back to work"." (23) 
Being the tradesman had the advantage of being able to determine 
when work should interrupt the boxing! 
Another more extreme example of using the "company's time" 
creatively was given by a plumber working at Greenwells who 
remembered one labourer who would go missing to melt down and 
steal the lead insulation from electric cables (24). 
The ability to cease work when •desired was not only the 
prerogative of those who would go and hide, for the complexity of 
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the production process offered plenty of opportunity to come off 
the job for "legitimate" reasons. One of the most common of 
these is to go in pursuit of either tools or equipmenl. Once 
away from the area of "direct supervision" of an individual 
foreman, a worker could if desired "go walk about". The length 
of such excursions was limited only by the plausibility of the 
story the worker could think of to tell the original foreman. 
Such plausible stories were not hard to come by, for often delays 
could have basis in fact. Thus in some cases the hunt for 
equipment could take several days, and in one case a worker 
recounted an experience at Shorts yard in the early 1960s where 
after waiting a fortnight for a foreman to supply a welding set 
he became so bored that he left and went to another yard. The 
search for tools and equipment does not exhaust the battery of 
semi-legitimate reasons for leaving one's work; visits to the 
ambulance room for everything from indigestion tablets to 
sticking plaster to keep spectacles on are combined with trips 
to perform one's natural functions. Indeed the culture of the 
toilet usually features very large in most accounts of working in 
the shipbuilding industry. Furthermore absenting oneself from 
the job is only one strategy - others can include delaying 
tactics in starting in the first place (about which more will be 
said later) and even under certain circumstances going home after 
clocking in. This latter attempt at "working a flanker" could be 
tried when contractors were working in a yard. If they were 
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working overtime it was sometimes possible for a night shift 
worker to leave when they did having made the requisite arrange-
ments for "clocking out" (25). 
b) Of foremen and Workers: The Interpenetration of Personal and 
Industrial Relations 
In the situation where yards had amalgamated and the 
simplistic management structure of the family firm was replaced 
by the more bureaucratic structure of professional management, 
and with less reliance on piecework, the importance of the fore-
men to ensure that work was being done grew. For as personnel 
were transferred between yards and the rate of turnover of 
managerial staff increased (26), together with the use of 
contract labour, this ensured that the days when the owner or 
senior management knew the trade of all the men in the yard had 
gone for ever. Increasingly it was only individual foremen in 
direct t:cont.roP of groups ot workers who had any idea of who 
should be doing what. Ironically however it was also during the 
period of the long boom, as we saw in the last Chapter, that the 
coercive force of the foreman declined. 
If ensuring that workers were in the right place at the 
right time was a problematic feature of the foreman's 
responsibility, then even more so was their responsibility for 
the effort expended by the workforce. For as Brown et al argued, 
"So far as control of workers is concerned, this tends to be 
the responsibility of the foremen. Control of effort and 
pace of work largely depends on direct supervision." ( 27) 
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However these same authors quote to good effect three managers 
whose views of how foremen achieve "control" differ. 
" .•• the management and foremen do control this (the race 
of work) whether by getting men to do more work or putting 
more men on the job- they control pace." 
" craftsmen do set the pace of work: you need to have 
one supervisor per man to do otherwise. You feel like that 
sometimes. 11 
" ... the foreman doesn't have to stand over them. He may 
have the matter of ten men working for him. He'll detail 
each of them off to a job and he'll follow that job. He'll 
go round and lets the men see he knows he's on the job and 
watching the job and this acts as an incentive for them to 
work. He doesn't interfere with them in any way, just asks 
them how the job is going; if he's stopped, can he help him 
in any way; and so on." (28) 
Another paper based on this same research suggests that the last 
quotation may be a realistic portrayal, as 72% of workers 
questioned said they never experienced time checks with the 
figure being as high as 90% of platers and 88% of plumbers (29). 
In this sense the above authors are correct to stress the 
importance of the internalisation of standards of work of the 
craftsmen themselves. 
There are several important features which stem from this 
realisation. Firstly, due to the decline in the coercive power 
of the foremen, itself based upon the wider changes in the 
economy and the labour market, the importance of those 
internalised standards as an element in the effort bargain grew 
in the period of the long boom. Secondly, following from this 
shift away from the "objective" determinacy of the wider labour 
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markets towards the "intersubjective'' regulation of the standards 
of "a fair day's work for a fair day's pay", the effort bargain 
was potentially more volatile as a direct creation or negotiation 
of intersubjective agency. Thirdly this implies a growing 
importance of the non-coercive aspects of the relationship 
between foreman and workers and to this extent the 
particularistic form of that relationship is to be understood in 
both its moral and economistic contexts. It is to this issue 
that we will now turn our attention. 
In attempting to confront these issues we are faced with the 
problem that there does not seem to be any well-developed frame-
work for their analysis. Where efforts have been made to 
recognise the validity of these issues, they often end up merely 
by restating the problem or stopping short of a move which they 
see (wrongly) as propelling them towards elements of individual 
psychology. Thus for example two authors were not prepared to go 
any further than noting: 
"Many of the responses to the workplace are individualistic 
and escapist." (30) 
This is not to deny, however, that some useful attempts have been 
made to capture the complexities of the negotiated order at the 
point of production. The work of Burawoy and, preceding him, 
Donald Roy, did tackle some of these questions in the context of 
a machine shop. In describing the control of the labour process 
the importance of the notion of "making out" is seen to lie in 
the fact that such a system: 
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" ... inserts the worker into the labour process as an 
individual rather than as a member of a class distinguished 
by a particular relationship to the means of production. 
Workers control their own machines instead of being 
controlled by them, and this enhances their autonomy . 
•.. The system of reward is based on individual rather than 
collective effort. Second, the combination of autonomy with 
respect to machines and dependence with respect to auxiliary 
personnel has the consequence of redistributing conflict 
from a hierarchical direction into a lateral direction, in 
which individual labourers face one another in conflict or 
competition. The constitution of the worker as one among 
many competing and conflicting others masks their common 
membership in a class of agents of production who sell their 
labour power for a wage, as distinct from another class of 
agents who appropriate their unpaid labour." (31) 
Here then the objective character of the labour process is 
used to explain the fragmentation of the workers at the point of 
production. However such fragmentation as an element of 
organisational integration has been noted in industries with 
labour processes far different to those of the machine shop, 
indeed as we have seen in the work of Brown et al division 
amongst the workforce in shipbuilding is possibly more character-
istic than wide solidaristic stances. Clearly there is a need to 
situate these problems in a more general context than that of an 
individual labour process which cannot accommodate all the 
aspects of the negotiation of order in the workplace. 
This realisation was implicit in the work of Donald Roy, who 
concluded of his own research that: 
" attention has not been drawn to intragroup role and 
personality variations in intergroup relations. Such 
additional discriminations and the questions that they might 
raise in regard to the study of institutional dynamics must 
be left for future discussion." ( 32) 
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Similarly Burawoy himself bemoans the lack of a Marxist 
psychology which can extend the understanding of the production 
of consent. Thompson acknowledges this problem, suggesting that: 
"An analysis of the existential aspects of the production 
and reproduction of identity must therefore be situated in 
the "theoretical black hole" between capitalist/patriarchal 
structures and individual action. This is indeed necessary, 
but indicates why a Marxist psychology will not be the 
vehicle. Such concerns with individual identity do not 
enter the Marxist analysis of capitalism. Therefore the 
conceptual tools cannot be generated from within 
Marxism." (33) 
In attempting to contribute towards a theory of the "missing 
subject" we must beware of restating the vexed dualism of 
individual and society. What is missing is not a psychology, 
Marxist or otherwise, but rather an understanding of the inter-
penetration of structure and agency such as that sought by Philip 
Abrams outlined in Chapter One. 
" ... the process of identity formation and the process of 
social reproduction are one and the same. Insofar as we·can 
understand personal identity and social structure not as 
distinct st~tes of being but ns clsmcnts ~f a single process 
of becoming; historical sociology is freed from the spurious 
dualism which puts knowledge of the individual beyond the 
reach of social science. But the bases for such an under-
standing are to be found not in general assertions of its 
desirability but in the empirical study of the "becoming" of 
identities and societies." (34) 
The question cannot then be reduced to one of "individual 
psychology", and yet "individualistic" responses are often a 
crucial element in what is more than merely a fragmented labour 
force. The tendency to polarise collective (class) stances to 
individualistic (psychological) response is fundamentally 
inadequate. In most situations the employment relationship and 
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the contradictions inherent in it are produced and enacted by 
people who bring far more with them to work than purely a class 
position. The terrain on which the contradictions are lived out 
is often moulded as much by moral concerns as any more purely 
structural locations. In pther words we have to give attention 
not only to the importance of individuals as constitutive of 
collectivities (and vice versa) but also to the importance of 
technical and affective rationality insofar as this leads to the 
interpenetration of private and public statuses, of personal and 
industrial relations. 
As far as the relationship between foremen and workers in 
the yards is concerned, I wish to stress two aspects of the 
mutual relationship, those of strategies and sociability. Agein 
these two aspects are not often distinct in the empirical 
situation; their division is more a discursive device than 
raprcsenting any more fulludn~tmLi::il u.ivil:>.iuns. Strategies then are 
pursued by both foremen and workers 0 5). Typically the 
objectives of such strategies are manifold and over lapping. For 
the foreman elements involved may include getting enough work 
done so as not to incur the wrath of his own superiors, whilst 
also not being seen to be too "bossy" by the workers who could 
also make his life awkward. Such a balance also includes 
dimensions of the production and reproduction of identity, to 
both his "superiors" and "subordinates" he must not be seen as 
too "soft" but particularly to the latter group he must attempt 
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to encourage the belief that he is "fair" 0 6). Individual 
workers must also avoid being seen as soft or as too much of a 
"willing horse", but also as craftsmen it is often important. for 
it to be known that one can perform most of the tasks of one's 
trade if one feels like it. The importance of these individual 
elements of identity differs between individuals and it is upon 
these differences that the strategies adopted often depend. 
Again it must be stated that such differences cannot be reduced 
to individual psychology, as identities are created and recreated 
socially, and often historical contingencies can play a major 
role. 
For example, it was noted in the last Chapter that some 
older workers retained their fear of foremen based on their 
experiences of the inter-war period. However this only 
represents a small potential group which foremen can "encourage" 
to •~orh: in a direct way. Fu1· ulhers different strategies will be 
used. Identification of "willing horses" can be an element which 
foremen can use to good effect. There are those in the yards who 
in spite of everything do not internalise group norms over pace 
of work (37) The appeal to the "willing horse" can take 
different forms. Thus one plumber recalled how a foreman used to 
encourage one worker in the group shop to undertake jobs no-one 
else wanted. 
"He would come out onto the shop floor with a sketch and 
would announce that he had an impossible job, maybe a big 
eight inch diameter pipe with loads of offsets and bends. 
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As soon as Morris would hear this he would grab it and put 
it with his other jobs. We would all laugh and Vincent 
would return to his office smiling. This happened all the 
time." (38) 
In this case then the foreman 1 and almost everyone else, knew 
that this individual worker liked to rise to a challenge 1 as long 
as the job was 11 almost impossible" this worker would grab it. 
The importance to this worker of being seen as the most highly 
skilled worker in the shop was used well by the foreman. In 
other cases foremen would use reason, cajole, scorn or threaten 
workers with transfer of location or shift in order to ensure at 
least a minimum performance of the group as a whole, with the 
willing horses taking most of the flogging. However given the 
possibility of thwarting any direct pressure by disappearing or 
"botching up" jobs, many foremen rely on the internalised 
standards of the craft workers themselves. In this respect much 
effort is expended on retaining convivial relations with 
indiv..i.Jual wurke.t·s, Clitd in some cases attempting to elicit 
feelings of sympathy for a difficult position. 
"Sometimes he would come over like a big daft labrador - he 
would say "Jim, we 1ve still got these jobs to finish, and 
l 1 ve been getting a lot of flack from Charlie (the head 
foreman) 1cause we 1re not getting through them quick enough. 
Do you, do you think you could manage another one?" And l 1d 
say, "oh all right then", and he would walk away saying 
"thanks Jim"." ( 39) 
Some workers were even beyond this sort of appeal. On several 
separate occasions the account of the plumber who did the tank 
tests at Thompson 1 s was mentioned. This was a man that all the 
foremen were frightened of. 
Chapter 5 - 371 -
"He had his own shed and one of them (a foreman) would poke 
their head round the door and say "will it be alright for 
you to do this?" and just leave the paper and get away 
quick." (40) 
Apparently the individual concerned had been in a Japanese 
prisoner of war camp with the head foreman and it was believed 
that "he had something on him", either that he had taken beatings 
on behalf of the foreman or "knew something dodgy about him". 
Anyway what ever the reason this worker was treated very warily 
by all the foremen. 
This is perhaps an extreme case, however in other accounts 
there were references to the existence of a high degree of 
"negotiation" between foremen and individual workers with 
reference to the allocation of particular jobs. It is important 
to note not only that the worker evaluates the job but also the 
identity of the foreman and the way the foreman asks the worker 
to do the job. The issue was rarely one of worker refusing to do 
the job, (although some individuals could get away with this), 
that kind of direct opposition would provoke a crisis whereby the 
foreman could operationalise the formal inequalities of power in 
the employment relationship and refer the matter to a manager. 
Rather the opposition to a job would take the form of ·~ocking it 
up" or not performing to the best of one's ability. Thus one 
worker, in assessing his own ability at his job, went on to 
conclude: 
"I was fairly capable of doing what I was asked to do. 
Probably wouldn't always do it to the best of my ability, 
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depending on which way I was asked to do it.'' 
(Prompt) "So from that point of view would personalities 
come into it?" 
"Oh certainly yes, if you were approached the right way you 
would probably do a job and make a good job of it. Whereas 
if somebody spoke to you as if they were talking to a dog -
if you like, you could gamble there would be something wrong 
with the job like." ( 41) 
Such a response would seem to lie somewhere between Dubois' 
categories of "instrumental sabotage" (with limited objectives) 
and "demonstrative sabotage". It has an instrumental (defensive) 
element in that it aims to change the behaviour of someone in 
authority and yet its focus is the demeanour of an individual not 
a collective stance of management. Thus it is not demanding a 
change in "working conditions" that could be legislated by 
management (42). Whilst it shares this feature with "demonstrat-
ive sabotage" it diverges from other features that type of 
sabotage. 
noemonstrative saboLage is not demanding any improvement in 
working conditions - but this does not mean that it is 
simply gratuitous. It is expressing a real discord, a class 
enmity. It may be sheer vengeance, the only thing left to 
do when all else has failed, a cry of despair, a last gasp: 
"The boss has attacked us, and we are having revenge on his 
goods". It can also be a way of indicating that the 
interests of owners and workers are at variance: "Why 
produce good quality, work enthusiastically, economise on 
materials, do all that is laid upon us, why bother, in 
short, for a boss who is simply exploiting us?" (43) 
In our case the response is not expressing "a class enmity" 
in any direct sense. Surely the hierarchical ordering of the 
division of labour is a central aspect of the structural ordering 
of statuses of domination and subordination, but this is not felt 
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by the worker to be the central problem. Being treated like "a 
dog" is the problem, one which depends largely on how one is 
approached. In the context of the complexities of the labour 
process in shipbuilding then with the potential porosity of the 
working day (44) characteristic of non-machine paced work, one of 
the main centres of negotiation of the effort bargain becomes the 
moral ground of individual sociability. Dyadic interaction which 
is nonetheless structured by formal inequalities deriving from 
the employment relationship become the centres of negotiation. 
The elements of such relationships go further than any facile 
notion of the "human relations" approach, at one level they are 
"structured" by the inequalities of the employment relationship 
with its formal statuses of domination and subordination, whilst 
at another level they include evaluations of individual identity 
which introduce an asymmetry in what individual foremen can '~et 
away with". 
On the latter point the assessment of identity of individual 
foremen by workers includes both occupationally relevant and 
non-relevant features. A foreman is evaluated both in terms of 
his past and present mastery of his craft. Sometimes there is a 
feeling that a foreman has really been "demoted upwards" - in 
other words was a lousy craftsman on the tools. Others are held 
to be competent craftsmen whose knowledge can be trusted when 
help is needed. Indeed in particular situations foremen can gain 
much in the eyes of workers by demonstrating high levels of 
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expertise. In this sense one worker gave an account of an 
accident on a ship at Doxfords when a fire in the shaft tunnel 
killed several men: 
"The firemen arrived and were just standing, they didn't 
know how to get in, if there was a short cut or anything. 
But then Charlie Kirkham worked out if they cut into the 
tail end of the after end tank they could get into the 
tunnel. It was just that knowledge that nobody else seemed 
to have - he chalked on the sections .•. everybody else was 
just standing .•. I didn't like the fella mind, he was like 
a bull in a china shop, but sometimes you need that to get 
things done." (45) 
Other elements in the identity of foremen which do not 
relate directly to work based issues can play a part in how much 
an individual worker will put up with from a foreman. Thus one 
worker explained how during a prolonged period of his daughter's 
illness and subsequent death one foreman who "was a right swine" 
had "gone easy on him" and thus demonstrated that he was "really 
a gentleman". Whilst such demonstrations of "humanity" would 
occur in most work placc:J, the point is that given the lack or 
machine pacing, technical control, payment by results and the 
potential to subvert directives, such positive evaluations assume 
a direct importance in the creation of consent. 
All of this becomes of prime importance when it is realised 
that some jobs within a craft are considered to be worse than 
others, and also that specialisation within a trade tends to 
occur as a "natural" process of negotiation. It is when a bad 
job needs to be done that a foreman has, as one option, to rely 
on his authority as seen by individual workers. 
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"You found over a period of time blokes would tend to get 
the same job on the following ship; if they made a 
reasonable job on one particular ship they would probably 
get the same job to do on the next one. Therefore you would 
get blokes that was always used to fitting air pipes because 
they did them on the last boat. ... It was good in some 
respects and bad in others, depending on what particular job 
it was. If it was a job where you were working in confined 
spaces - in the double bottoms and what not, which there 
wasn't very many people keen on doing, you wouldn't be very 
happy to do it every ship. So it was a case of if you made 
too good a job of it you were going to get it on the next 
boat, so if there was a few leaks introduced in the pipes 
th~ chances are you probably wouldn't get the job on the 
next boat." (46) 
In relation to such bad jobs and cases where "botched jobs" 
had to be put right, or jobs required the application of surplus 
skill, foremen often relied upon more than their own authority. 
The principal element in such situations was the negotiation of 
"perks". The approach of the foreman on such occasions were 
characteristic of someone "asking a favour": 
"The foreman would approach you and ask you, "hey, will you 
do that job for us?" and you could gamble that if a foreman 
approached you with a "will you do us a favour" attitude 
that it ~cs a bit of a horrible job. ~o you would bdY 
"What's in it for me like? Like if I do it as fast as you 
want it doing what am I likely to get out of it?" you know 
... be it a half shift booked in for you or whatever, or a 
job and finish which as soon as you'd finished the job you 
could get away home or whatever." (4 7) 
The importance of the use of devices such as these is that 
the negotiation of the effort bargain extends beyond the scope of 
the employment contract and involves the illegitimate use of 
overtime payments or time off. It should be emphasised that many 
such jobs occur on each ship and are therefore, to some extent, 
routine occurrences which nevertheless are seen to require the 
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use of "perks 11 • f"'loreover there was a clear belief amongst workers 
that higher management colluded in these negotiations, between 
foremen and workers, by their "knowledge" of these processes. 
(Prompt) "Did the upper management know that this went on?" 
"Well I think they did but .•• I think it was for "kidem 
stakes" - they used to make it try and look as if it was 
just between the foreman and the man on the shop floor - so 
you didn't bring management into it. Yes they probably knew 
about it, it was a case of "oh· give the lads whatever you 
need to, for to get lhe job done", aye." (48) 
The idea that higher management colluded in these practices 
is underlined by the fact that once control of yard exits was 
tightened up, foremen were still willing to issue written pass 
outs for workers with whom they had agreed a "job and knock" (job 
and finish). 
(Prompt) "If you were given a job and knock how would you 
get out of the gate?" 
"At one time earlier on you could just walk out. Later on 
you would get a pass out, the foreman would present you with 
a pass out." (49) 
Again this points to the lack of any controls over the workers in 
terms of the negotiation of the effort bargain or their physical 
presence, other than those stemming from the foreman and 
importantly the internalised standards of performance, both 
quantity and quality, of the workers themselves. This element of 
self control is of particular importance, for as we have already 
seen, attempts at direct control by foremen can be subverted by 
"botching up" or going missing. Both of these tactics carry some 
risks to the worker however. If attempted too often or in too 
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overt a manner, their oppositional intent becomes manifest (50). 
This can result in either formal disciplinary procedures being 
invoked, or more usually the individual is branded a trouble 
maker or a ''barrack room lawyer 11 and transferred between sections 
and workgroups. The stability of status of trouble maker then 
lends to become solidified in a process not unlike that of the 
11looping effect'' described by Goffman, where the expectations of 
those in authority of 11 further deviance 11 are matched by the 
assumption of an immediate defensive stance on behalf of the 
individual. This wariness is then interpreted by those in 
authority as evidence of the correctness of their original expec-
tations, and so on (51). The initial expectations of the foremen 
are usually formed through information passed within their own 
ranks. Thus during a period of several days spent with the 
training officer at Doxfords (Pallion Yard) in 1981 I was witness 
to a discussion between a foreman plater and my 11host11 (52). 
We entered a shed on the floor of the covered-in yard, 
whereupon the foreman ordered about three other people out, 
closed the door and began a diatribe against an individual who 
had just been transferred to his squad. Amidst the cursing and 
references to 11 barrack room lawyers" were appeals for the 
training officer to ask other foremen about the man. 11 They know 
what he is like". Halfway through this diatribe the foreman 
noticed my presence and broke off mid-sentence. Stabbing a 
finger in my direction he demanded, 
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"Who the bloody hell's he?" 
The training officer replied, "It's alright, he's from Durham 
University". Whereupon the foreman continued to fume. The 
ferocity of his outburst was remarkable. However the training 
officer reassured him that: 
"You know you won't be stuck with him for long." 
That such individuals are kept on the move is well recognised by 
the workers themselves. As one shipwright put it, 
"I'm sick of it. I get shunted about all over, I've been to 
Thompsons (North Sands) and Laings (Deptford) - they even 
sent me to Smiths Dock on Teesside. When I came here 
(Doxfords, Pallion) the foreman just walked up to me and 
said "I know about you"." (53) 
Given the pitfalls of being seen as a trouble maker, the 
realisation of how far you can go in opposition to particular 
foremen becomes part of a stock of knowledge on the shop floor. 
So me strategies used do not carry as great a risk of being seen 
as oppositional (both to authority and the individual) as others. 
One such approach seeks to prompt the foreman, or further 
encourage him into excursions of self indulgency. Here the 
knowledge of the interests and temperaments of individual foremen 
is crucial. Thus in one case, 
"All you had to do was go in and start talking about 
(tropical) fish. You would say, you know: "Jacky, I was in 
Armstrong's Aquatics with the bairns on Saturday and we saw 
this fish, it was sort of black and swam funny - you know, 
like this - do you know what it was?" If it worked he'd 
start asking if it had fins here or did it swim on the 
bottom or top or whatever. Once he started you could be 
there for hours, talking about how they breed and what ill-
nesses they get - it was all interesting, mind." (54) 
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In other cases a more collective at tempt to encourage the 
self indulgency of a foreman would work, and examples of these 
occasions are fondly remembered and retold to others involved, 
particularly where a certain arrogance can be detected in the 
foreman, such as pretentions at being a great orator: 
"Harry Hunter, he used to have this bench outside his office 
in the Plumbers shop. Every now and again he would come out 
when everybody had just got in and he would stand on the 
bench with his hands on his lapels. "Now then, men" he 
would say, and we'd all start to gather round, "Now then, 
I'm sorry to have to announce the death of brother so and so 
at the age of 80 odd who worked in this yard 40 odd years 
man and boy." Then he would go on about what jobs this man 
had worked on and what ships he'd been on. By this time 
we'd crowd round tighter and especially if it was raining or 
we didn't want to go out we used to offer up useful 
comments, "Wasn't he the bloke that used to grow leeks?" or 
something like that, and he'd go off on another tangent. 
All the time we'd be whispering to each other out of the 
corner of our mouths "go on Harry, go on Harry" - by this 
time half the morning shift could have gone by." (55) 
Many of the tactics of indulgence and avoidance incorporate 
elements of behaviour which have direct parallels in the school 
sil.ui:::iLiun. IL l::; Lftet·e\ure perhaps not merely a coincidence lhat 
Corrigan's perceptive study of working class boys' experience of 
school was, given the findings, based in Sunderland. Here the 
author suggests that the "major single point" to be learnt from 
the research is: 
" ••• that it is impossible to extricate the behaviour of 
the individual from the power situation. "Carrying on" 
represents at one and the same time taking no notice of the 
teacher, being aware of the teacher's power, and doing what 
the teacher doesn't want you to do. The only link between 
these three is that the boy is asserting his right, in the 
given power situation of the classroom, to take part in 
whatever action he feels like. That action is not dominated 
by values of a pro- or anti-school nature; instead it is 
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about the power situation perceived and experienced in that 
school. Given that for the boys the teachers are "big-
heads", and they try to rule you, the boys are presented 
with a problem of initiating their own action. To start 
using the analogy of a guerilla struggle, "carrying on in 
class'' represents the ability of the boys to continue their 
normal way of life despite the occupying army of the 
teachers and the power of the sch ·ol, as well as their 
ability to attack the teachers on the boys' own terms." (56) 
The analogy with the school situation is an imperfect one, 
for the role of the foreman involves important contradictions, 
which will be developed later, and cannot be seen as 
approximating to that of the school teacher. However where 
managerial action was forthcoming, to increase or rather enforce 
direct control, resistance which is sometimes recounted as almost 
"prankish" could be forthcoming. Thus one worker told of how 
periodically a particular manager would attempt to prevent 
workers leaving the ship 15 minutes before "knocking off" time: 
"He would arrive at the end of the gang plank about twenty 
minutes before the buzzer. When we got mind of what he was 
doing we started to come off half an hour before finish, and 
:JO on. On a fevJ occasions he wuulJ f:>ee someone he thought 
should be somewhere else and chase them. I remember one time 
when he was chasing all of us round and round the sheds." 
(57) 
It ought to be pointed out that those involved in such chases 
were not just the "young and daft" element in the yard, but 
included men right up to retiring age, some, as in the case of 
this individual, mature men with teenage or adult offspring much 
taken to talking of "common sense" and "respect". Clearly for 
the craftsmen the imposition of direct control of this kind was 
taken as an attempt to treat them in a "childish" manner. If the 
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response could be seen as in some respects adequate to this 
challenge then the explanation lies in the context rather than 
purely in the psychological characteristics of the individuals 
concerned. 
Again the point should be made that such frustrations of 
managerial objectives stops short of overt refusal to perform, 
hence the "prankish" nature of some of the avoidance strategies. 
Where non-performance cannot be hidden, attempts to neutralise 
potential sanctions of foremen are made. Such attempts often 
call for the use of skillful "patter" in order to introduce 
humour into the situation. Thus an example was given of where a 
degree of "mucking about" had resulted in a pipe going over the 
side of a ship. The dialogue between the "chief patter merchant" 
and the foreman then went as follows: 
"Why isn't that pipe in yet?" 
"Oh Gordon can I ask you a question ••. If you know where 
;:;omcthing is have you lu~l l L ?'! 
"What are you on about?" 
"Just that ..• If you know where something is, have you lost 
it?" 
"Of course it isn't bloody well lost if you know where it 
is." 
"Oh I'm glad about that, because I know where the pipe is, 
it's down there- (pointing over the side of the ship)." 
"Yer daft bugger, go and get another one." (58) 
In this case the potential row between the foreman and the 
plumber has been deflected by the skillful use of discourse. The 
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use of humour as a defensive strategy amongst the British Working 
Class has been pointed to by Michael Mann, who suggests that it 
re-emphasises "a strong cultural sense of group identity" whilst 
also providing: 
" a way of apparently overcoming, but in reality 
accommodating to, the threat and the vulnerability." (59) 
In the yards the ability to incorporate the foreman into the 
"cultural sense of group identity" stems from his contradictory 
position of being on the one hand an agent of management and yet 
on the other a craftsman whose authority is based, in part, on 
being "one of the lads". 
The importance of establishing authority as one of the lads 
rather than a more raw exercise of power is of course 
historically contingent. The emphasis upon the importance of 
sociability as an element in the negotiation of the effort 
bargain became of increasing importance in the post-war period, 
and fron1 a managerial point of view such negot1at1on was seen as 
problematic. As Hopkins noted in 1971, 
"It is well known that industrial relations are not as good 
as they used to be; on the other hand, people assert that in 
former times, the situation was firmly held by the fear of 
want of a drastic sort." (60) 
This realisation is important, for the existence of the 
objective constraints of the "fear of want" outlined in earlier 
chapters served to confuse issues of authority and power. Thus 
Hopkins' assertion that the "worsening" industrial relations in 
Wearside shipbuilding can be seen as a breakdown in a previous 
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moral code, a loss of pride in craft and the bureaucratisation of 
the work situation does not compare like with like. Given the 
degree of constraints and power inequalities in the employment 
relationship in the pre-(second)war period one must be careful 
not to confuse issues of consent and acquiescence at the point of 
production. For as Weber noted, 
"Obedience will be taken to mean that the action of the 
person obeying follows in essentials such a course that the 
content of the command may be taken to have become the basis 
of action for its own sake .•• Subjectively, the causal 
sequence may vary, especially as between "submission" and 
"sympathetic agreement". (61) 
Given this, the intriguing question is not the moral decline of 
the working class but rather, given the tactics available to the 
worker of "going missing", "botching up", "indulging the 
foremen", "negotiating perks" and "the humour of patter", why aily 
ships got built at all? Despite the tactics available to workers 
foremen do still make a difference and importantly individual 
craft vvorkers tt.emselvet; ohuw internalised standards with respect 
to both quantity and quality of work. As Brown et al concluded 
in their study of shipbuilding, 
" •.• control over effort does appear to depend very much on 
the foreman and on the internalised standards of the worker 
himself, especially in the many situations on the berth or 
ship where a worker inevitably spends long periods of time 
out of sight of any foreman or manager." ( 62) 
Moreover, 
" the control of quality of work during production rests 
very much with foremen and managers, and again with the 
workers himself, insofar as he has internalised certain 
standards of craftsmanship." (63) 
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Given the decline of the objective content of coercion (i.e. 
loose labour markets) it would seem that in the period of the 
post-war long boom the importance of "responsible autonomy" as a 
feature of the mobilisation of labour grew. However we should 
beware of committing an inversion of the failings of Hopkins. 
The growth of the importance of responsible autonomy was relative 
and not absolute. This feature of the regulation of the effort 
bargain in shipbuilding is indicated in both the craft process of 
production and the craft administration of labour. Its existence 
cannot be reduced purely to a "strategy'' of management. The 
tenacity of responsible autonomy as a feature of the labour 
process in shipbuilding leads one to doubt that its existence is 
as contingent upon labour market forces as, for example, Friedman 
suggests: 
"The Responsible Autonomy strategy requires secure 
employment. It may be possible to persuade workers to 
behave responsibly while employed, but it is difficult to 
get thuse workers to behave "responsibly 11 in accepting lay-
offs without a struggle." ( 64) 
The evidence from the shipbuilding industry in the inter-war 
period, when lay-offs were accepted as part of the '~atural order 
of things", suggests that this view is mistaken. Moreover it red-
uces behaviour to strategies, in this case managerial strategies, 
and to an extent underestimates the degree to which both 
management and workers were acting "in good faith". There is an 
important sense in which a degree of responsible autonomy has 
historically been given or allowed, and taken or accepted by 
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craftsmen in the British shipbuilding industry as part of an 
existential identity. This feature should not be underestimated 
in as far as il has contributed to the tenacity of the craft 
division of labour. Again, elements of organisational and moral 
categories become interwoven to the extent that their analytical 
separation inevitably produces distortion. 
In this way the craftsmen become responsible not only for 
the operation of their own autonomy, but also for the work rate 
of the ancillary workers, "their mates". In this respect skilled 
workers more easily identify with foremen or "white collar" 
engineers than unskilled workers. Thus Braun and Fuhrmann quoted 
a time served craftsman and engineer: 
"Blue collar workers have to do a bit more manual labour, 
but I don't think there is any difference in the economic 
situation. And that's as it should be. And I can't think 
of any differences (in the styles of life). For that 
matter, there are no differences in the way they think. At 
least not in respect to craftsmen. But a simple labourer, 
he hasn't developed himself intellectually, so naturally he 
think::: di ffcrently. He can't :::ce how things arc connected, 
and if someone tells him something, he parrots it. But an 
intellectually alive person thinks his own thoughts, 
independently of whether he is a blue or white collar 
worker." (65) 
Similarly perceived differences in the technical, intellectual 
and moral capacities of craftsmen and unskilled labourers in the 
Wear shipbuilding industry survived into the 1980s <66 ). One 
incident in the Dept ford yard in 1979 serves to illustrate the 
symbolic importance of the hierarchy between skilled and non-
skilled workers. In this case a squad of plumbers were working 
overtime to complete fitting out for sea trials. The foreman 
Chapter 5 - 386 -
sent out for suppers, as was the norm when excessively late 
working occurred, ordering the "errand boys" to get: 
"Fish lots for the craftsmen, Pattie lots for the 
labourers." (67) 
This caught the imagination of the rest of the workers in the 
yard, the tale has passed into "legend" and to this day labourers 
are sometimes referred to as "Pattie lots". The point is that 
the inferior status of labourers serves to bolster the identity 
of the craftsmen as a responsible worker. Historically the 
notion of the labour aristocrat implied both autonomy and 
"responsibility". 
One should not however overstress the importance of 
"responsibility" as an aspect of ensuring that a certain amount 
of work gets done. Other more mundane factors also play a part. 
Firstly the coercive effects of boredom are often overlooked as a 
spur to do some work, thus the frustrations felt by workers 
waiting for tools or space is often real enough. Secondly the 
organic nature of the production process ensures to some extent 
that, unless in dispute, sectional groupings of workers are 
anxious to complete their work, and be seen to do so, as it fits 
into the wider production process. This form of self-discipline 
is indeed an essential part of the craft division of labour, and 
in this sense the upper level of output is set by social rather 
than technical limits. Indeed in the changed circumstances of 
the U.C.S. work-in: 
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" .•• so great was the enthusiasm that a major problem 
became the restraint of production to pre-occupation 
levels." ( 68) 
In the more "normal" circumstances of a shipyard, however, 
where "fatalism" (69 ) towards the social organisation of industry 
is perhaps more characteristic than attempts at radical change 
the craftsman, as Sabel argued, sees technical mastery as an 
important element in individual identity. Thus, 
"What counts for him ••• is technical prowess, not place in 
an officially defined hierarchy of jobs: Titles are not 
important, savoir faire is." (70) 
Clearly such prowess can only be demonstrated by doing work. 
Moreover as we have already seen, such good work pays dividends 
in being able to negotiate further autonomy in terms of perks 
etc. Thus it is important to realise that for workers in ship-
yards control can be manifested as much by performing work as 
avoiding it, this again emphasises the craft nature of the prod-
uction process. Finally, without wishing to labour the point, 
work, including the physical activity of labour, is a source of 
satisfactions as well as deprivations. As Studs Terkel noted 
work is not only about the scars, "psychic as well as physical": 
"It is about a search too, for daily meaning as well as 
daily bread, for recognition as well as cash, for astonish-
ment rather than torpor; in short for a sort of life rather 
than a Monday through Friday sort of dying." (71) 
Whatever the exact combination of these factors in 
individual cases, the point remains that whilst demand for ships 
has existed the workforce in the yards has been prepared to work. 
Some harder and technically better than others, and, as a whole, 
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rarely as hard as management would wish them to. Nevertheless the 
craft division of labour in shipbuilding has proved to be 
tenacious enough to last into the second half of t.he twentieth 
century, often enough with the "support" of the employers as well 
as the Unions. 
In the next section I will attempt to outline the context in 
which those "controls" dealt with earlier in this chapter became 
seen to be problematic by management, not just in an ideological 
sense, but as a practical problem to be effectively dealt with at 
the point of production. 
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Part III 
When the Courtship was Over: Court Line to Nationalisation 
So far in this Chapter I have been concerned to explicate 
some of the features of the production and reproduction of 
control at the point of production in the post-war period. I 
have avoided looking at the issue in terms of specifically trades 
union development not because this is unimportant but rather 
because the issues have been well dealt with elsewhere (72 ). In 
general terms the shipbuilding industry displayed a pattern 
similar to most other large industries in the post-war period. 
On the basis of the long boom, the inter-war period pattern of 
relatively strong localised union representation remained, 
although supplemented (and sometimes contradicted) by strong 
(both financially and increasingly as a negotiating centre) 
central organisations. At the point of production the importance 
of the shop steward was acknowledged by most workers. Some 
pointed to the growth of health and safety functions as well as 
wide ranging bonus negotiations as evidence of greater union 
activity in the post-war period. In another case a worker 
joining the Deptford yard from the building trade in 1972 spoke 
of his amazement at the level of union organisation and the 
authority of the shop stewards. 
However another constant theme, in the non-activist workers' 
view of the trade unions within the yards, was the increasing 
sense in which the union was seen as an external body. There 
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were several levels to such views. Firstly the division between 
the official union structure and the less official post of shop 
steward was emphasised particularly as this represented itself in 
relation to unofficial action. Thus there was almost universal 
condemnation of examples where union officials had ordered men to 
resume work after their action was deemed unofficial <73 ). At 
another level some workers displayed resentment over the practice 
of periodically having to show their union cards in order to 
prove that they were fu 11 y paid up members. Such showing of 
cards amounted to almost a ritualistic display and for some 
emphasised an individual subordination in the face of the union's 
external authority. At another level workers were suspicious of 
the motives of individuals who sought the role of shop steward. 
The position could be "used" by the ambitious as a springboard 
into management. This was particularly so in the post-war period 
wit~ the growLll u r proft::ssional ifil:ii ii:Hjement functions, as Hopkins 
noted of the Wear: 
"The experience gained by a really able shop steward 
resulted in quite a number of them going into personnel 
work." (74) 
And even earlier, 
"During the war I remember Jack Gibson, in Doxfords, being 
made "Labour manager" when he ceased to be Chairman of the 
Shop Stewards." (75) 
As the labour market tightened during the long boom and stewards 
were afforded more facilities, the position was seen to offer the 
potential for the realisation of "ambition" of a different kind. 
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"Some worked it as a cushy number, they could openly walk 
around all day talking to their mates, if anyone said any-
thing they were on Union Business." (76) 
The recognition made by, amongst others, the Donovan Com-
mission (77) that a distinction between the union and workgroup 
should be made needs then to be supplemented by an understanding 
that the workgroup cannot be reduced to their "unofficial" union 
representative, the shop steward. The individual worker himself 
could be out of sympathy with both the official union and the 
workplace representative, and on a day to day basis find himself 
occupying a stance of "desubordination" with respect to both 
Management and Unions (78) It should be emphasised that this 
does not mean that workers in the yards were or are opposed to 
trades unionism in general, for, as will be demonstrated later, 
workers saw unions as necessary and, in relation to management, 
the unions are evaluated in positive terms. But such general 
C:JI.ii.LceclaliuiJ h; noL always transformed into an uncritical 
endorsement of day to day practice in the yards themselves. 
As illustrated in relation to the "career" potential of the 
shop steward's role, such issues are situated historically. 
Similarly the increasing division between the national union and 
local representatives and the drift towards national bargaining 
has been well captured by McGoldrick (7 9). The other side of this 
coin however has been the changing nature of the corporate form 
in the post-war period. On the Wear the post-war period has seen 
the demise of the family owned firm and the rise and fall of the 
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conglomerate ending in the Nationalisation of most yards on the 
river in 1974 with final nationalisation of Austin and 
Pickersgill in 1977. 
The Changing Corporate Form 
Such changes are important for several reasons. Firstly the 
tendency towards the agglomeration of individual capitals has 
been seen by Marx as an inherent structural imperative within 
capitalism itself (80). Thus, as Aaronovitch has argued, 
"There is no more familiar story than the evolution of the 
firm: from the entrepreneur who owned and directly 
controlled the enterprise, through various forms of 
partnership and associations, to the full development of the 
modern joint stock company, which has become the dominant 
form of the organisation of capital in all advanced 
capitalist economies." (81) 
Secondly, and of more importance for our purposes than the 
empirical expression of a general structural tendency, is the 
fact that changes in the corporate form can imply shifts in the 
qualitative aspects of capital as well as the purely quantitative 
agglomeration. These changes are of particular significance 
insofar as they affect lhe capital-labour relationship. Again 
there can be both quantitative and qualitative aspects to these 
changes. Thus the agglomeration of individual capitals can imply 
a fundamental change in the relative resources of capital and 
labour. The workforce located at an individual organisational 
level has now to contend with multidivisional capital. This 
presents the workforce with the problem of the growth of the 
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strategic resources of capital as well as a growth in their 
absolute power (resources) ( 82 ). Further more changes in the 
corporate form may provide not only the objective resources with 
which to carry through a change in management strategy towards 
labour but under certain circumstances may also provide a crucial 
change in the willingness of agents of management to carry 
through such changes. In other words such changes underpin the 
extent to which the specific form of managerial control 
strategy in a particular situation is the outcome of both the 
objective resource endowment of capital (and labour) and the 
agency of management (and workforce). 
In order to illustrate the relevance of these considerations 
we must return to the empirical level and follow the changes in 
the corporate form and managerial strategies as they occurred on 
the Wear. Whilst the demise of the shipbuilding company as a 
wholly privately owned (stock) firm belonged in general to an 
earlier era, the retention of family control of the voting stock 
and thereby actual control of the organisations survived in some 
yards on the Wear into the post-war period. However "family" 
yards came under increasing pressure and with the closure of the 
two smallest remaining yards, Crown and Shorts, the attractions 
of amalgamations were heightened. Whilst there had been a long 
history of informal co-operation between individual yards and 
more formal connections in terms of overlapping directorships, 
the pressures now indicated a need for formal corporate 
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amalgamations. In the two decades after the war there were 
several moves in this direction. Austin and Pickersgill merged 
in 1954 and the Sunderland Shipbuilding Dry Docks & Engineering 
Co. Ltd. was formed with the amalgamation of Sir James Laing & 
Sons, T.W. Greenwell & Co., the Sunderland Forge & Engineering 
Co., John Lyon & Co. and the Wolsingham Steel Company. 
Eventually two groups emerged on the Wear, the Doxford & 
Sunderland group, formed in 1961, and with the post Geddes 
incorporation of Bartrams, the Austin & Pickersgill group. In 
the case of the former grouping, individual yards had largely 
kept their own identities and existing management teams. The 
amalgamations in this group had, on the whole, been associated 
more with developing a more secure (i.e. larger) financial base 
than with any widespread or radical changes in product range or 
organisation of production. As far as the control of labour was 
concerned at Dox ford and Sunder land, continuity was more 
characteristic than change, the craft administration of labour 
was not challenged and control of work was largely a feature of 
the self regulation of the craftsmen on the one hand, and the 
influence of labour market conditions, insofar as this shaped the 
context of the relationship between the foremen and the 
workforce, on the other. 
In the case of the Wear, then, the agglomeration of capital 
can be seen as a necessary but not sufficient factor in 
determining managerial and organisational change. The 
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"character" as well as the size of capital unit needs to be taken 
into consideration. In the other Wear grouping, Austin and 
Pickersgill, the acquisition of a majority share in the company 
by London Overseas Freighters in 1957 (and a share buy-out in 
1970) resulted in changes on the board and a shake up of top 
management. Perhaps as a development of this the company became 
more innovative in product design and more aggressive in 
marketing, as evidenced in their eventual success of their 
replacement "liberty ship" the SD14, first launched at Bartrams 
yard in 1968. A change in managerial strategy towards labour was 
forthcoming in the Doxford & Sunderland group, following its 
takeover by the Court Line group. Importantly such a change 
occurred as part of a wider strategy of change both in terms of 
market orientation and production techniques. It is these changes 
upon which we will now concentrate. 
On Monday 8 May 1972 the Sunderland Echo reported that there 
was speculation in "the city" that Court Line would soon make a 
bid for the Doxford and Sunderland group. The evidence for such 
speculation was given as Court Line's review of the Wearside firm 
and the fact that already the firm's shares were rising in the 
stock market, indicating the presence of an interested 
party (83). On 17 May a £10 million bid for the company was 
announced by Court Line. Despite losses made by Doxford and 
Sunderland of £1,249,000 in the 1971-72 financial year the 
Managing Director of Court Line was optimistic that the firm 
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could be rnade profitable. The context for such an attempt was 
seen to be one of change. Change in market strategy, in 
production techniques, in relations with the workforce and 
importantly in the full integration of existing and proposed 
production sites. As Court Line's Managing Director put it: 
"We are convinced that with the backing provided by the 
Government's regional development plan and the co-operation 
of the trade unions we could make Doxford and Sunderland Ltd 
a very profitable business ... 
... We are confident we could help increase productivity in 
the existing yards to the benefit of all concerned. It 
would also be our intention to construct a new covered 
shipyard to provide at least 1,000 additional jobs in 
Sunder land as soon as possible." (84) 
The improvement in co-operation between management and workforce 
was seen to be a cornerstone of Court Line's project on the Wear. 
Indeed Jim Venus, the man Court Line were to put in charge of the 
Wearside development, had already achieved success in the 
development of the covered yard at Appledore in Devon. In 
relation to that success he laid great emphasis u~on: 
" ... the co-operation between management, employees and 
trade unions that has made this development (Appledore) 
possible." (85) 
After an initial hesitation on behalf of the unions, and worries 
that the Court Line bid would lead directly to a single group on 
the Wear (86), they eventually were persuaded that the take-over 
would be beneficial to their members. Thus on the day that the 
Doxford and Sunderland Directors advised acceptance of a slightly 
improved Court Line offer the "Echo" lead with an article 
entitled "Court Line Backs Wear Against the World" in which: 
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"Mr. Henry Wilkinson, district secretary of the Amalgamated 
Union of Engineering Workers, welcomed the news today. He 
said Court Line would inject much-needed capital investment 
into the area. 
The company was progressive in its outlook and made a point 
of involving its workers in all aspects of development. He 
regarded the situation as lhe beginning of a new era for 
shipbuilding in Sunderland." (87) 
The initial outline plan of Court Line involved considerable 
changes in the function of all the yards in the group to create 
an integrated product line. The most radical change was to be 
the construction of a covered in yard. The Managing Director of 
Court Line, Mr. Young, said that Greenwells would be the site of 
the new covered in yard which was to have an area of 250,000 
square feet and be capable of building vessels of up to 30,000 
tons. Moreover, 
"He envisages the yard concentrating on smaller highly 
specialised ships of around 4,000 and 5,000 tons built two 
at a time, slightly larger than those built at the Appledore 
covered in yard." (88) 
Each of the other yordo woo to concentrate on a particular 
specialised type of tonnage. At North Sands (Thompsons) with its 
single large berth giant natural gas carriers of up lo 150,000 
tons were to be built, with its former forte of bulk carriers 
being "left to foreign competition". The Deptford yard (Laings) 
was to build ships of up to 70,000 tons, particularly specialised 
tonnage for the transport of chemicals and refined oils. Finally 
the Pallion yard (Doxfords), which was in the process of being 
run down, was to be used for "ba:uges, rig platforms and other 
complex and unorthodox structures for drilling rigs." (88) 
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Following a feasibility study it was decided that the 
covered in yard should not be built on the site of Greenwells 
dock, but rather that the Pallion yard should be the site of the 
new development. To this end a loan was secured, the first to a 
major shipbuilding company, under the selective assistance 
provision of the 1972 Industry Act. The loan of £9 million 
depended upon Court Line itself supplying a further £3 million. 
Work began on the construction of the covered in yard at Pallion 
in October 1973, and was eventually finished in December 1976. 
The investment in the covered in yard was not the only capital 
expenditure that the firm committed itself to, so much so that by 
the time of the demise of Court Line in June 1974 a £22 million 
investment programme was under way. 
The Court Line takeover of Doxford and Sunderland was done 
in an atmosphere of confidence. People were encouraged to draw 
dir6ct parallels betlrJeen the success of the Appledore yard ar.d 
the plans that the company had for the yards on the Wear. The 
welcome given to the takeover by the Unions was shared by the 
workforce. The programme of capital expenditure was seen as firm 
evidence of the long term commitment of the company towards the 
yards. Other features of Court Line were seen as beneficial too. 
Ironically, as it was to prove, the size of the firm was seen to 
indicate that a greater degree of security existed lhan in the 
days of "local" owners. There was even a rumour which developed 
at the lime that the firm would provide, through its other 
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interests, free holidays for the workers. The mood of optimism 
for the future had rarely been as evident. 
This buoyant mood was further encouraged by changes 
occurring within the yards. The provision of amenity blocks and 
cabins close to the berths were appreciated by the workers. 
"We got toilets with wash hand basins, soap and towels, and 
hot water! It had never been heard of before." (89) 
"It was at t.his time that safety gear was introduced, ear 
defenders, hard hats and what-have-you. Overalls, we were 
given overalls for the first time, before that we had to 
come in our own work clothes - just, you know, your old 
clothes ... " (90) 
In looking back at the Court Line period there is almost 
universal agreement amongst workers that a kind of "golden age" 
appeared to have dawned. Importantly, it was not just the 
physical environment that was seen to have improved. 
"When Court Line came into being there was an easing off 
period inasmuch as there was nobody leaning on you as much 
as there had been previously. When Court Line appeared you 
started getting different amenities - cabins and such like, 
places where you could sit down and eat a meal rather than 
sort of sit on a block or crouch down somewhere to eat your 
meals •.• When Court Line came along, from the bloke on the 
shop floor's point of view everything seemed to pick up, 
everything seemed that much better .. Control eased up but I 
wouldn't say output eased up, I would say there was probably 
as much work done from a work point of view because people 
were happier, there was nobody actually leaning on you then. 
There didn't seem as though there was the pressure upon 
people (that there was) prior to Court Line coming in ... 
there was a more relaxed atmosphere." (91) 
For the first time it seemed that a strategy of '~esponsible 
autonomy" was being pursued enthusiastically by management rather 
than being granted grudgingly as the inevitable outcome of a 
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craft technology. The change was noticeable not only at the non-
activist level but life also became easier for shop stewards. 
One ex-steward spoke of the difficulty of restraining a "grin 
breaking all over your face" when one went in to ask management 
for something, confident in the knowledge that they would usually 
deliver. 
"Once we even got the steward to raise the issue of the 
water being too hot in the wash block, it was dangerous -
you could scald your hands they regulated the 
temperature, no problem." (92) 
Not everything was applauded, however; the increase in 
managerial personnel was, at this point, greeted with a degree of 
bemusement. 
"That was when all the different coloured hats started to 
appear. There was green ones, red ones, white ones, that 
was when the place started to look like a bloody billiard 
table." (93) 
Moreover when the benign policies had a control implication these 
were quickly spotted and dealt with. Thus for example whilst the 
company's policy on issuing boilersuits was, in general, well 
received the fact that different trades were issued with 
different coloured boiler suits was seen as a "dodgy move". 
Rather than promoting a pride in one's craft it resulted in men 
from different trades swapping garments and thus neutralising any 
potential that colour coding had for control over the physical 
movement of labour within the yards. 
When the plunge in Court Line's share prices was reported in 
the Sunderland Echo on 20 June 1974 it took Wearside by surprise 
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despite lhe facl Lhat Court Line's di fficullies had been teporled 
to the Secretary of State for Industry as early as Februa:ry of 
that year (94 ). Following the suspension of dealing in Court 
Line's shares on 21 June the Labour M.P. for Sunderland North, 
Fred Willey, gave guarantees over the future of the yards after 
talking to Industry Minister Tony Benn (9 5). By 27 June the 
future of Court Line's shipbuilding interests were sealed, they 
were to be wholly Nationalised. The impact of the Court Line 
crash on Wearside was considerable, and even now workers are at 
pains to point out that it was the holiday side of the company 
which brought about its demise, not the shipbuilding 
section <96 ) 
Nationalisation on the ~ear 
The context of the nationalisation of Court Line's interests 
on the Wear was not as straightforward as the speed of its 
c~ccution might 3uggc3t. Whil3t tha Labour Party wore returned 
to office in February 1974 with a policy of nationalising the 
industry, support for this move locally was less solid. As the 
Sunderland Echo was at pains to point out, 
"Last November when shop stewards and union officials met 
the then Minister for Trade and Industry (Mr. Christopher 
Chataway) to discuss the final development plans for 
Sunder land Shipbuilders Ltd., the unions gave Government a 
"hands off" warning on behalf of all the shipbuilding 
workers on the Wear. 
Men in the Austin and Pickersgill Group also passed on the 
the Government their opposition to Nationalisation." (97) 
In the same article, two days before Tony Benn announced the 
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nationalisation of the group, the district secretary of the 
A.U.E.W., Mr. Henry Wilkinson, suggested that whilst there would 
be government intervention he expected it to be "in the form of 
partnership (rather) than direct state control." After the 
Nationalisation plans were announced some local politicians 
displayed great enthusiasm for the move. Thus in a Council 
meeting on 27 June Councillor Robert Kirby noted that: 
"I cannot put into words the despondency that was going 
around the yards. But when they heard the news you would 
have thought they had won the football pools." (98) 
However Fred Willey displayed a more defensive attitude 
towards the move, emphasising the pragmatic issues and distancing 
it from any wider ideological standpoint. 
"The fact is that Sunderland Shipbuilders is going into 
public ownership because there is no other bidder .•• Lack 
of interest in Sunderland Shipbuilders had nothing to do 
with any Government nationalisation plans .•• it was because 
the company was committed to a £22,000,000 investment 
programme. 
No-one but the Government was prepared to make any kind of 
offer to Court Line, said Mr. Willey." (99) 
Another issue in the muted response of the workers and the 
unions to the nationalisation package was their enthusiasm for 
the Court Line management teams in the yards. This concern was 
again voiced by the district secretary of the A.U.E.W.: 
"Of the future of Sunder land Shipbuilders Mr. Wilkinson said 
he was sure the vast majority of workers would wish the 
present senior executives to remain in control. "I know 
they would get the full support of the workers because they 
have a good working relationship with the employees and the 
unions", he said." (100) 
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However the local M.P. pointed out subsequently that there could 
be no guarantees on this issue. 
"Mr. Willey also warned that State ownership of Court Lines 
interests on the Wear did not carry any guarantee that there 
would not be changes in management. Court Line had not 
hesitated to change the management structure when it arrived 
on the Wear." (101) 
Despite reservations Henry Wilkinson of the A.U.E.W. endorsed the 
idea of the nationalisation of the yards, saying that 
"Now we have gilt edged security with the finance to carry 
out all that is necessary ••• I think it will be of supreme 
importance to this town." (102) 
Workers' responses were mainly characterised by relief that 
the yards would not close. With hindsight some of them have 
developed a more critical view of the "rescue" package, comparing 
favourably the situation under private enterprise and describing 
Court Line's collapse as "the worst possible thing that could 
happen". 
The Court Line period is for the most part remembered 
positive 1 y by the workforce. The spirit of co-operation 
displayed by the management amounted to the adoption of 
"responsible autonomy" as a management strategy rather than a 
technological implication of the division of labour. However it 
would have been interesting if the company had survived to see if 
this spirit could have been maintained in the face of changes in 
working practices to bring them into line with the modernisation 
of plant that they initiated. As it happens the demise of Court 
Line occurred at the very point when demand for tonnage slumped 
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dramatically. On a world scale the tonnage of ships on order 
fell from 120.7 million g.r.t. in 1974 (128.9 million g.r.t. in 
1973) to 82.3 million g.r.t. in 1975. In Britain new orders fell 
dramatically from a high point of 4.4 million g.r.t. to 0.9 
million g.r.l. in 1974 and only 67,000 g.r.t. in 1975. This then 
was the context in which the newly nationalised yards on the Wear 
faced the world in the Autumn of 1974. 
Before going on to look in more detail at the continuities 
and changes on Wearside after nationalisation, it is perhaps 
useful to take a wider look at the world market in the demand and 
supply for ships. No attempt will be made here to address the 
notion of the "crisis" in shipbuilding, rather general historical 
patterns will be referred to insofar as these are relevant to the 
pressures that were to be exerted upon the division of labour and 
working practices in the yards. 
Chapter 5 - 405 -
Part I\! 
The Shifting Contours of World Shipping 
Speaking of the British Economy between 1870 and 1914 Peter 
Mathias has noted that: 
"Shipbuilding has been mentioned as one area where British 
world hegemony and technological leadership remained 
unchallenged." (103) 
Similarly J.R. Parkinson has written that: 
"In the second half of the nineteenth century the British 
Shipbuilding industry eclipsed all others in its rate of 
growth and, in the fullness of its competitive power, 
overwhelmed all markets until it produced for a time over 
sm~ of the world's ships." (104) 
The conditions of this dominance have been well researched by 
others (105). However attention should be drawn to the fact that 
the industry in Britain benefited by the headstart given to "The 
First Industrial Nation". This was so not in terms of a direct 
headstart for the metal shipbuilding industry but rather stemmed 
from the historical consequences of that "hondstort" in other 
areas. A first consequence of this was the favoured access to a 
largely protected market built upon colonial expansion. Secondly 
the emergent technologies in earlier "engineering" industries 
ensured ~ supply of relatively skilled labour for the industry as 
it emerged. Given this element in its success some relative 
decline in the standing of the industry was inevitable as other 
nations developed their industrial strength. And indeed this 
proved to be the case from the beginning of the twentieth century 
until the Second World War. The development of German, U.S., 
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French, Dutch and in the latter part of the period Japanese ship-
building industries reduced the British share of world output to 
a figure consistently below 50%. 
Those who point to the fact that the British share of the 
world market has consistently declined (with temporary resurgence 
at some points) since the 1890s fail to appreciate that the 
external conditions of the wider world system have changed 
dramatically over the period. This fact makes the search for a 
single pathogenic factor in the decline of the British industry 
overly simplistic. Moreover the changing international location 
of the industry involves implications for competitive 
productivity which, even in the absence of the complicating 
factor of subsidies, go beyond the immediate labou~ process. 
As noted above the relative decline of the British industry 
up until the Second World War could be seen in some ways as a 
"natural" process of dt;;Lhruniny the monopoly position of lhe 
first industrial nation. The decline was relative to other first 
world nations. In the post-war period Britain's relative position 
declined at an increasingly faster rate, even in conditions of a 
massive absolute increase in world tonnage up until 1973. 
The features of this accelerated decline are complex, for as 
was argued earlier the construction nature of the industry and 
the fact that the majority of the cost of a ship is bought-in 
means that it was unlikely that any improvement of efficiency 
within the yards could overcome the inefficiencies occurring in 
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supply industries. In this sense the fortunes of the industry 
were inextricably tied to the wider fortunes of the British 
manufacturing industry and performance of the economy as a whole. 
On these wider issues it has been convincingly argued by John 
Eatwell that in the post-war period Britain became firmly 
entrenched within a vicious cycle of cumulative causation. It is 
through the process of these effects, rather than any static 
comparisons, that the competitive potential of states is to be 
appreciated. Thus, 
"It is the dynamics of the principle of cumulative 
causation, rather than in the static idea of comparative 
advantage, that an explanation of the structure and develop-
ment of trade between the manufacturing countries is to be 
found. The self-reinforcing dynamic of industrial expansion 
will ensure that competitive strength is maintained and 
enhanced. In the longer ru.1, the location of competitive 
strength may be altered by new institutional arrangements, 
or by an inability to adapt to the changing market 
conditions inherent in major inventions, or by the rise of 
competing nations. But fundamentally the free market works 
to strengthen the competitive advantage of successful 
economies and weaken Lhe positi011 uf Lhe U11successful. The 
successful will tend increasingly to dominate trade, while 
the unsuccessful decline." (106) 
At the level of the national economy then, the decline of 
Britain as a manufacturing centre provided one context in which 
the shipbuilding industry has to be located. Accounts focusing 
upon the industry itself have detailed the way in which the 
speci fie division of labour which was the source of the 
industry's strength in the nineteenth and early twentieth century 
became increasingly inappropriate in the post-war period. As 
Lorenz and Wilkinson have noted, 
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"We have argued that the failure of the British response in 
shipbuilding can be understood only by considering the 
particular technical and market conditions in which firms 
operated, and the ways these conditions interacted with the 
system of industrial relations. The fragmentation of output 
in small-scale yards and the system of craft specialisation 
it spawned, hallmarks of nineteenth century success, led to 
competitive failure in the twentieth century." (107) 
Several authors have stressed the primary part played by workers 
in "resisting at the point of production" the potential for 
change in the division of labour (lOB). This study has demon-
strated that on the Wear it was the reticence of employers rather 
than the actual reticence of the workers which acted as a brake 
on the transformation of the division of labour. Such resistance 
was of course based on far more complex and substantial issues 
than a certain "conservatism" amongst employers. This view 
avoids the pitfalls of a "labour-led theory": 
11 
... that is, the sort of theory in which labour is not 
only seen to be able to affect productivity outcomes, 
through the strength of its organisations, but is assumed to 
be actually in control, anJ dule i:.o deter1nir1t: Lhe overall 
pattern of capital accumulation and investment as 
well." (109) 
Ironically it could be argued that one of the factors 
involved in the employers' reticence to invest in a "modern 11 
division of labour in the immediate post-war period was not 
primarily the strength of labour at the point of production, but 
its institutionalised weakness in the wages sphere contributing 
to a low-wage economy. As R.B. Shepheard argued in his review of 
the prospects for welding and mass production techniques in ship-
building in 1946, 
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"The reason for the relative backwardness of some sections 
of industry in this country and for the reluctance to 
convert monotonous processes into fully mechanised jobs is 
that human labour is still relatively cheap." (110) 
This directs attention to the strategy of management and 
employers: 
" unless perhaps, through some alienated logic, U.K. 
workers are to carry the can because, by virtue of putting 
up with low wages, they have failed to make their managers 
invest more." ( 111) 
If the division of labour in British shipbuilding became 
increasingly inappropriate to meet its competition in the post-
war period, the evidence from Wearside is that the primary 
responsibility for this lies with the owners and managers of the 
yards. If the policies of the employers and managers handicapped 
the industry relative to their European competitors, more 
structural and locational change was to decrease further the 
decisiveness of the effort bargain at work as the final arbiter 
The processes involved here have been well described by 
Charles Sabel in his book Work and Politics. Of interest for our 
purposes is the point that the relatively consistent and large 
growth in demand during the post-war long boom fostered the 
development of capital intensive divisions of labour using mass 
production techniques. However given the associated growth and 
penetration of the capitalist world system outlined earlier, the 
stability of the mass market and the advantages of mass 
production techniques meant that manufacturing industries could 
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become internationally foot-loose. 
"Consider the way mass-production industry in the core 
industrial countries is being crowded out of markets by 
pressure from formerly or currently low-wage competitors on 
the periphery, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Mexico, 
and Eastern Europe. The industrialisation of these 
countries is doubly linked to the triumph of Fordism in the 
United States and elsewhere. For breakthroughs in mass 
production techniques in some countries not only make 
industrialisation an urgent matter for the others, but 
provoke successful competition with the leaders as 
well." (ll2) 
If Britain was being increasingly left behind in the ship-
building industry by the more capital intensive industries in 
continental Europe and Japan then the entrance of the newly 
developing countries into the industry added a new twist to the 
story. The disadvantage of Britain's low-wage, low capital and 
therefore low productivity industry relative to the high-wage, 
high capital and there high productivity industry of continental 
Europe (and to some extent Japan) became compounded with the 
2rrival of the low ''Jagc, high capital anu Utt:nefore h.iyh 
productivity and low cost industry of the newly developing 
countries. It should be noted that the aggregate effect of 
individual industries with such a profile in newly developing 
countries is that low wages between individual warkforces and 
employers are associated with a very low social wage. In other 
words the cost advantage of these countries lies both at the 
level of the firm and at the more macro level of the reproduction 
of the labour force. The implications of this for Britain and 
other first world nations is either that they have to make up the 
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cost difference, not only at the level of the firm but also at 
the level of the social reproduction of the labour force, by 
superior productivity or they have to avoid direct competition 
with such countries. 
This development in the second half of the twentieth century 
found even countries that had modernised their division of labour 
at a disadvantage compared to the newly developing countries and 
in relation to the (now) enduring market leader, Japan. Further-
more with the collapse of world demand in the early 1970s and 
then again in the late 1970s and early 1980s even some of the 
most technically advanced shipbuilding nations found the pressure 
of cost competition unbearable. 
"Sweden's retreat from shipbuilding illustrates the danger 
to the core countries. In order to minimise the 
disadvantage of high labor costs, the Swedes concentrated on 
the construction of relatively unsophisticated large ships 
in series by automated methods. In the early 1970s Sweden 
was the second largest shipbuilder in the world. But ship-
y a r d s ~ n 8 r 2 z i 1 ; K orca and S p o in G cor. adopt c d the n e I:J 
techniques, and paid their workers at rates a quarter or 
less of what Sweden's were earning. When the world market 
for merchant ships began to collapse (launchings dropped 
from 35.9 million gross tons in 1975 to 15.4 million in 
1978), Sweden was unable to hold its share of the declining 
orders for standard ships. Beginning in 1977, one major 
yard after another was taken over by government. By 1980 
there remained only two private shipbuilders, and Sweden 
ranked eighth in the world league tables of 
launchings." ( 113) 
Increasingly, as we have seen in the case of Court Line, 
Britain adopted a market strategy of attempting to avoid direct 
competition with countries producing unsophisticated large ships 
to concentrate on less standardised higher value tonnage (ll4) 
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The net effect of this strategy of attempting to establish a 
market niche was to accept the position as a marginal producer. 
The problem with this is that marginal producers become 
particularly vulnerable to overall fluctuations in demand. As 
their "product line" is small, large rises in overall demand tend 
to produce proportionally smaller rises in "specialised tonnage". 
Moreover the acceptance of the role of marginal producer ensures 
that there can be little movement towards capturing part of the 
more mass market in times of boom. However in times of slump 
marginal producers come under pressure from market leaders who 
can attempt to retain an optimum use of their plant by 
diversifying into more specialised areas. With the collapse of 
world demand in the second half of the 1970s it was this latter 
scenario which increasingly materialised. Thus for example the 
growth of the South Korean industry between 1975 and 1982 was 
matched by a diversification into ever more complex tonnage so 
that they "moved into" the market in which Britain was competing. 
Symptomatic of this position was the placing of an order, in 
1982, on behalf of the Central Electricity Generating Board. This 
was for a cable laying ship with a Korean yard. The question was 
one not only of the efficiency of production within the yards. 
Material and wage costs were lower in Korea, and the presence of 
state subsidy and below cost tendering were seen as issues. 
"There has been a rapid growth in the Korean yards in recent 
years from a negligible base in 1975, to second only to 
Japan in merchant ship building. In 1982, South Korean yards 
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produced 1.6 million g.r.t. of shipping. The yards of Daewoo 
and Hyundai have been undercutting European prices by as 
much as 35%- as can be seen from the C.E.G.B. order. Korean 
wages are much lower than those prevailing in European and 
Japanese yards and Korean steel is also significantly 
cheaper. However western shipbuilders feel that these 
factors do not account for the price differences, and claim 
that the Koreans are quoting prices below cost to secure the 
. orders needed to fill their vast new shipbuilding capacity." 
(115) 
This then was the developing context in which the yards of 
Sunderland Shipbuilders were nationalised in 1974. Over the 
coming years the issue of Government attitude towards the 
industry was to prove crucial. For it seemed unlikely that the 
solutions to the "crisis" facing the British shipbuilding 
industry could be found at yard level alone. Ominously for those 
working in the yards, if Government should prove unsympathetic 
the chances that what had been lost in other spheres could be 
recaptured with change in the division of labour seemed unlikely. 
However in the immediate aftermath, very little changed 
within the yards. 
"It happened that fast, it changed overnight and it was all 
just the same people after the event. There was no line 
drawn and said "this is before and this is after" you know. 
Everything continued on the same. The same workforce and 
the same management. 11 (116) 
What had been affected however was the optimism which was 
evident under Court Line. Whilst some drew solace ftom the fact 
that it was not the shipbuilding side of the corporation which 
had caused the collapse, others were more cautious. However, even 
in the face of collapsing world demand, there existed an under-
lying scepticism as to whether things were as bad as some said. 
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Moreover a belief did exist to some extent that public ownership 
would ensure that jobs could be preserved. Thus in my own case on 
coming up to leaving school in 1975 with little idea of what I 
wanted to do, my father advised me that getting a trade in the 
yards was about the best that could be hoped for. He explained 
that the outlook for the yards was probably no worse than it had 
been at other times, and it was better to be working outside than 
to be shut in an office all day. The careers officer visiting the 
school enthusiastically endorsed my decision to apply to the 
yards, and on finding that my father and brother worked there 
eagerly crossed my name off the list and refused my request for 
information on a career with the Forestry Commission. That 
skilled work in the yards amounted to "a good job" was emphasised 
by the jealous references of some of my contemporaries to the 
fact that I had relatives to "speak for me" (ll7). In 1975 there 
Wl:IB Lhen no shorlage of applicants to work at Sunderland 
Shipbuilders, a point reinforced by the training officer's 
disclosure that for every one of us successful candidates there 
were another eighty unsuccessful ones. 
If there was little change in management personnel during 
this period, there was nevertheless a feeling, in retrospect, 
that during this period the momentum established under Court Line 
had been lost. A long term strategy appeared not to exist (llB). 
This situation was to change with the Nationalisation of the 
whole of the shipbuilding industry in 1977. 
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Part V 
The Industry Nationalised 
By the time the Labour Government's nationalisation plans 
for the industry, developed during the period 1970 to 1974, came 
to fruition on vesting day, July 1st 1977, the market demand for 
ships had declined dramatically. More generally the objective 
conditions underlying the "long boom" had changed. Economic 
problems began to emerge as an immediate and overt challenge to 
the post-war industrial and political consensus. These changes 
were to set the context for the shipbuilding industry in the 
coming years. As Hagwood has noted, 
"This change in demand altered the prospects of the U.K. 
industry from those expected when the Labour opposition drew 
up its nationalisation proposals in conjunction with the 
unions, and it seemed inevitable that the proposed 
nationalised body would have to preside over the contraction 
of British Shipbuilding." (119) 
At once these wider contexts placed a question mark over 
another of the main aims of the nationalisation: the promotion of 
industrial democracy. This aim amounted to an attempt to promote 
and develop a consensual approach to industrial relations issues. 
As the British Shipbuilders corporate plan of 1978 pointed out, 
"The Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act placed upon 
the Corporation the obligation to promote industrial 
democracy in its undertakings and the undertakings of its 
wholly-owned subsidiaries. British Shipbuilders believes 
that the main objective of industrial democracy is to create 
a climate which will enable the performance of the industry 
to be raised." (120) 
------------ --- ---
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The prospects for such a consensus approach to industrial 
relations were unlikely to succeed in the face of mass redun-
dancies which would result from the adoption of any three of the 
four options facing the industry outlined in the corporate plan. 
These options were presented as follows: 
Option 1 - Maintenance of Capacity and Employment 
Under present marketing circumstances, the most optimistic 
strategy which could be considered is to maintain the 
current capacity level of 630,000 c.g.r.t. and employment of 
33,300 in merchant building. 
The total subsidy requirement to support 630,000 c.g.r.t. 
depends on the assumptions made on price levels, but it is 
reasonable to assume that in a deteriorating market, the 
subsidiary would be very high if all capacity were to be 
filled by "buying in" work. 
Option 2 - Maintenance of Market Share 
This option assumes that capacity would be reduced in line 
with anticipated world demand, with a traditional aggregate 
market share being maintained. It must be further assumed 
that yard closures, but not major profit centre closures, 
w o u 1 d b e i 11 e v i t a b 1 e l o q u a l.i f y f u 1' ( E • E • C • ) I 11 L t:: 1 v e n t i o n 
Fund and to provide a sound base for future improvements. 
Option 3 - Naval Support plus Competitive Yards 
Option 3 considers a reduction in capacity to a level of 
330,000 c.g.r.t. at the anticipated trough in demand in 
1980/81. This figure is commensurate with maintaining a 
small number of internationally competitive merchant 
building yards, along with the "mixed" yards whose continued 
involvement in merchant and naval work is regarded as 
strategically necessary. 
Option 4 - Naval Support 
Option 4 sets out to meet the national strategic objective 
identified earlier - namely, to have sufficient yards within 
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the "mixed" groups involved in merchant shipbuilding such 
that capacity exists to protect national interests in times 
of crisis. This option represents the situation wherein 
250,000 c.g.r.t. of capacity would be retained, but it 
assumes that many of the merchant yards would not survive a 
continued depression in ship-building demand (121). 
After considering the consequences of all four strategies 
the report made the following recommendation: 
The Proposed Strategy 
From the preceding discussion it can be seen that Option 2 
goes significantly further than Options 1, 3 and 4 towards 
adequately meeting the objectives set for the merchant 
shipbuilding sector. 
The cut-back in capacity required for Option 2 would itself 
improve the efficiency of the Sector if the closure of some 
yards with an historically poor productivity record were 
effected; but a strategic aim of British Shipbuilders must 
be to improve productivity to a level comparative with 
European competition. For this reason, the Proposed Strategy 
will be to reduce capacity to the 430,000 c.g.r.t. level by 
1980/81, as in Option 2; but thereafter a 25~~ improvement in 
product-ivity will be sought over the last two years of the 
plan whilst holding manpower levels constant. This will 
result in higher levels of output than shown in Option 2 and 
a larger market share than historically obtained. The 
Proposed StraLegy will thus be to achieve the following 
capacity and employment levels; and to incur the following 
support costs: 
78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 
Capacity 632 530 430 475 530 
Employment 33,300 27,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 
Intervention Fund £m 85 110 110 85 50 
(at 430 cgrt level) 
British Shipbuilders proportion of world output will rise 
from 3.19~ in 1980/81 to 3.3% in 1982/83. (122) 
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The possibility of pursuing this option was compromised by 
the fact that the analysis of market trends was hopelessly optim-
istic. Instead of British shipbuilders increasing their market 
share of Merchant tonnage to 3.3% of world output by 1982/83 with 
a workforce of 21,000, it declined to 1.3%·and the workforce was 
cut to 14,505 (123). In subsequent years the decline continued so 
that by April 1988 the total workforce of British Shipbuilders 
amounted to some 6,000 employees 0 24 ) compared to a total for 
the merchant sector of 41,659 immediately after nationalisation 
in July 1977 (87,309 for British Shipbuilders as a whole) (l2 5). 
This massive decline in employment within the nationalised 
industry obviously had an effect upon workers' perceptions of the 
worth of nationalisation. On the Wear where, as we have noted, 
enthusiasm for nationalisation even as early as 1974, and in lhe 
context of a "bail-out", was muted, the lesson that nationalisat-
ion was no friend of the working man was hammered home. As one 
worker wrote in 1982, 
"Nationalisation, once hailed as the only means of getting 
better working conditions in the old days, has become 
reality. The civil servants got to work with their pruning 
knives - railways and collieries first, pit closures, talk 
of uneconomic mines then the closure of railway lines. Coal 
routes which had all led from local collieries to the 
Lambton and South Dock staithes were closed- teamers and 
trimmers made redundant, a reduction in collier fleets; no 
new tonnage ordered and the small yards which catered for 
coal owners went to the wall. A river with a capacity to 
build dozens of ships a year, with enough personnel to man 
the yards now found that not enough work was coming in from 
other sources. Now we have a nationalised shipbuilding 
industry and it is happening again. The civil servants want 
a further reduction in manpower, early redundancy for older 
men and no replacements ... 
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... Our yards were always able to compete favourably with 
their rivals and I am certain that if many of our local 
yards were not nationalised many of our local men would be 
employed. I may be wrong, and I have no doubt that the 
shipbuilding emperors who dictate policy to the industry 
will deny it, but politics come into it. Our destiny is 
decided and policies formulated away from Wearside. Many 
Wearsiders believe that if a yard, for instance in Scotland, 
was uneconomic and had no orders and if the political 
climate was uncertain with closures and pressure from the 
Scottish Nationalists on the cards, an order won by a Wear 
yard would be diverted to Scotland. Certainly I believe 
that the Tyne has some considerable political pull." (126) 
It would be wrong to conclude from such statements that 
workers on Wearside saw private enterprise or the old owners in a 
very positive light; rather the choice is seen to be one amongst 
lesser evils. As another worker put it, 
"In the past it was really bloody bad. I mean I hate them, 
I hate them families, I hate the Thompsons and the Marrs on 
this river. I think there's a hell of a lot of hatred for 
them. Yet I hate even more the breed which came up after it 
was nationalised - and from that time the decline went (on) 
- you could see it going. First of all you got more 
managers, every manager wanted someone underneath him, the 
fellow underneath him wanted somebody to help him out. 
Before you knew where you are you had a personnel officer 
with about fifteen assistants!" (127) 
The terms in which these workers condemn the nationalisation 
are qualitative as well as quantitative. Their reservations are 
based upon very personal experience, not only of the redundancies 
but also of the changes in working practices which have been 
forced through in the face of union impotence and even their 
acquiescence. Changes objected to both in their content and form, 
the former in as much as they imply a deskilling of the craft 
worker and the latter in the way that the management of these 
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changes have been seen as an assault upon the dignity of the 
worker as a human being. Moreover in the eyes of the workers 
these assaults are seen to be directly connected with the 
managerial problem of producing enough "voluntary" redundancies 
given the position adopted by the unions that there should be no 
compulsory redundancies (128). The following sections attempt to 
give an account of these changes as they unfolded on Wearside. 
The context of the crisis in British shipbuilding is inescapable, 
but my focus is more specific; it attempts to understand the 
behaviour of the workers at the point of production in their own 
terms, and render intelligible the apparent lack of collective 
resistance by the workforce. In doing so it inevitably has to 
resume the analysis of wider issues such as the changing nature 
of the relationship between work and the community, relations 
between generations and indeed the whole area of the nature of 
the working class. 
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Part VI 
8orking for British Shipbuilders 
The importance of paying proper attention to industrial and 
human relations in any plan for a viable shipbuilding 
industry cannot be overstated, as success depends upon the 
commitment of all parts of the workforce from senior 
management to tradesmen. From the outset British 
Shipbuilders has worked for improvement in these areas, and 
the process is ongoing." (129) 
The period of uncertainty which had been the hallmark of the 
position of Sunderland Shipbuilders from the collapse of Court 
Line in 1974 was ended with the nationalisation of the whole 
industry in 1977. The development of the corporate plan made one 
thing certain in the future: there would be redundancies. The 
certainty was hardly easier to bear than the uncertainty. A 
feeling of despondency was widespread in the Wear yards, amongst 
managers and workers alike. In this atmosphere of doom, 
managerial control of the work process slackened its already 
loose grip. l'ioreover the respons1be autonomy of the workers 
became less and less "responsible" as morale worsened. 
Aspects of sociability at work flourished during this 
period, the usual pastimes such as card schools became only one 
strand in an increasing array of leisure pursuits including 
everything from fishing to film shows. At the Deptford yard for 
example the "porno king" brought in cine films and with the 
incorporation of foreman the cabin was open for business most 
afternoons 0 30 ). It was on night shift however, where 
managerial control was traditionally at its least, where the 
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collapse of the moral self regulation of the craftsmen was most 
evident. 
The syslem of work allocation involved a number of jobs 
detailed on dockets being left for distribution by the foremen. 
At the end of the shift uncompleted jobs were replaced in wallets 
to be returned to the dayshift. There seemed to be little in the 
way of a control system over the amount of work expected or done. 
Indeed, the only pressure being mentioned by workers was that 
exerted in the form of animosity from workers on day shift at the 
"lazy sods" on nights. In this situation, then, 
"The foreman was over the tip if you did anything. He would 
be happy if you fit just one pipe, anything. •• ( 131) 
Again pressure to end "leisure pursuits" was more forth-
coming from external agencies than from management. This was the 
case at the Deptford yard in relation to salmon poaching. It is 
interesting that even in relation to this example there is a high 
degree of sectionalism evident. Thus it is unclear who started 
the poaching, the plumbers claiming they did, the joiners 
claiming they did and both of these groups claiming that the 
boilermakers didn't. Salmon were poached in nets and then 
disposed of to a local pub. All went well, according to one 
plumber, until the "loud mouthed" boilermakers joined in. They 
were intent on netting the full width of the river and to this 
end used a rubber dinghy to get the net across to the far side, 
with half a dozen men holding a rope tied to the dinghy in case 
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of trouble. The competing groups of "fishermen" must have drawn 
attention to themselves for one night the police launch 
approached at speed with spotlights glaring. The boilermakers 
put their retrieval plan into operation. The dinghy skipped back 
across the river. In the darkness one of the "ropemen" fell into 
a hole and broke his leg. All the men escaped but the nets were 
captured. The police complained to management the following day 
and dire warnings were issued, the men having already decided to 
cease activity for a while. 
Perhaps the commonest non-work activity on night shift at 
this time was sleeping. Indeed my own father regularly went to 
work with sleeping bag and alarm clock. It was usual to "show 
willing" by working for three or four hours of the shift 
beginning at nine o'clock and then at around midnight to "get 
your head down" until six or half past the following morning. 
Finding a good place to sleep could be a problem. However the 
"irrational" fears of some workers could be used to good effect 
by others. Thus at Deptford several huts gained a reputation for 
being haunted. This enabled a select band of men not frightened 
of ghosts to "get their full stretch" in sparsely populated 
cabins whilst others attempted to snooze in crowded cabins amid 
the noise emanating from card schools. 
At North Sands (J.L. Thompsons) there again grew up rumours 
of hauntings, although these were strangely given greater 
authority than the "hauntings" at Deptford even by those not 
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fearing "the ghost" at the latter yard. At North Sands a 
practice grew up among night shift workers going to the medical 
room for very large doses of "Benylin" to help them sleep. Even 
on dayshi ft where control could be tighter there grew up "games" 
amongst workers to see how long one could go without actually 
doing any work. In the context of decline where every new order 
was qualified by the thought that it could be the last, workers 
were acutely aware that they could be working themselves out of a 
job. 
This is not to say that workers were happy that they could 
take their regulation over the pace of work to an extreme extent. 
Many did work rather than face boredom after the initial amuse-
ment that they could "get away with murder". For a minority the 
situation could be used to express a "capitalist ethic", the idea 
of the gi;'eatest return for the smallest input. However a more 
general conclusion upon this period is that of unease. The 
traditions of self regulation did not easily die even in this 
context of decline. The unease could be clearly detected in 
accounts given by workers. After detailing the latest leisure 
pursuits or how little work they had been doing, there were 
increasingly comments that the situation was getting out of hand. 
" ... No seriously, it's getting too bad down there now ... 
Somebody's still building the ships but it's hard to see who 
it is." (132) 
"It's serious, you almost get embarrassed, how little work's 
getting done." (13 3) 
These feelings coupled with the expectation that it could not 
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last suggest that Hughes' objection to the use of the term 
"restriction of production" may be ill founded. He suggested 
that: 
"This term contains a value assumption .•. namely, that 
there is someone who knows and has a right to determine the 
right amount of work for other people to do. If one does 
less, he is restricting output." (134) 
In this case the "right amount of work" was seen to be, in part, 
a function of the stocks of knowledge of the workforce themselves 
who increasingly were beginning to feel guilty at the extent to 
which they were restricting output. The expectation that things 
could not go on as they were goes some way towards explaining an 
initial hesitancy to reply to what was to become a managerial 
attack on working practices. To some extent, in its initial 
phases, the assertion of control by management was seen as 
legitimate in view of how much had been "got away with" during 
this period. 
The option advocated by British Shipbuilders placed prime 
importance upon reducing capacity and employment during the years 
between 1978 and 1982. Thereafter the plan envisaged increasing 
productivity whilst holding manpower levels constant. This did 
not happen, the reduction of capacity and employment continued 
and it was in this context that moves towards increasing labour 
productivity occurred. Moreover the election of the Thatcher 
Government in 1979 held direct implications for the shipbuilding 
industry, both in terms of the absolute level at which the 
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industry would be maintained, and the concept of an integrated 
naval and merchant state sector. In a wider sense, however, the 
policies of the Conservative Government were to have a direct 
effect upon the balance of forces between capital and labour. 
The collapse of the long boom growing apace throughout the 
1970s signalled the end not only of the industrial relations 
consensus, but as the election result of 1979 indicated, the 
political consensus which had dominated British politics since 
the war. It must be noted that this change was not only one of 
emphasis. As Roger Simon suggests, 
" by the end of the 19 7Os British capitalism entered a 
period, not only of economic crisis, but also of organic 
crisis in Gramsci's sense of the term. The system of 
political representation, which had served to ensure the 
hegemony of the capitalist class for the previous fifty 
years, began to disintegrate, and an intensive search for a 
new system, a new alignment of political and social forces, 
was pursued." (135) 
The triumph of Thatcherism then not only presented problems 
for an increasingly polarised Labour party lead1ng to the 
emergence of the S.D.P., but its policies had very direct 
implications for industry. For two of the main strands of 
Thatcherism involved: 
"First, it rejected the Keynesian methods of running the 
economy with the aim of securing full employment that were 
followed by Labour and Conservative governments alike during 
the long post-war boom. Instead, it adopted an extreme form 
of monetarist doctrine: the government was not responsible 
for what happened to the economy but only for maintaining 
sound money, free competition and the security of property 
and contract; the source of economic prosperity was 
individual enterprise, and government activities should be 
reduced to a minimum. Second, since trade unions obstructed 
the free working of market forces, their legal tights had to 
Chapter 5 - 427 -
be severely curtailed in order to shift the balance of 
bargaining power in favour of the employers; the system of 
corporatism was to be ended." (136) 
Not only were the legal rights of unions curtailed as an 
element of shifting the balance of bargaining power, but perhaps 
more importantly rising unemployment contributed to what some saw 
as a "new realism" on the shop floor. As Nichols points out, 
soaring unemployment in 1980 was associated with a fall in 
industrial disputes to a post war low, and a decrease in male 
absenteeism on the grounds of ill health, and that: 
" ••. whether. consideration is given to the fall in trade 
union membership or to the very marked decline in the extent 
to which official trade unionism had the ear of the govern-
ment, it is not difficult to argue that at the outset of the 
1980s the trade unions had been weakened." (137) 
The effect upon workers was suggested by Ron Todd in 1981: 
" ••• we've got three million on the dole, and another 23 
million scared to death." (138) 
The apparent inability of the Labour movement to respond 
effectively to the new situation exposed the "Myths of Trade 
Union Power" (139), and led a former head of the Treasury to 
suggest that: 
"What has emerged in shop-floor behaviour through fear and 
anxiety is much greater than I think could be secured by 
more co-operative methods." (140) 
Whilst this general scenario was characteristic of the early 
years of the 1980s, a note of caution should be introduced, the 
mediation of this general context in relation to shop floor 
behaviour is complex and as Nichols suggests we must be aware of 
the ideological terrain on which we are moving: 
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" . . . such is the potency o f the ''new rea 1 is m" as an 
ideological force that it always threatens to lure us into 
accepting simplistic assumptions. Prominent among these is 
the idea that there was one shop-floor world before Thatcher 
and that this was subject to a radical transformation after 
- the change being such that, according to Thatcher herself, 
and Howe, even by the years 2T and 3T the changed work 
practices and effort levels on Britain's shop-floors had 
already translated into dramatic improvements in labour 
productivity." (141) 
With this point in mind we must return to a consideration of 
the issue of control at the point of production and see how the 
increasing managerial offensive attempted to break new ground by 
challenging the traditional status of the craftsman as a 
representative of a particular trade. This offensive also 
attacked, largely for the first time, the craft administration of 
labour itself. 
In these developments the positions adopted by the unions 
are important and have been well analysed by McGoldrick 0 42 ). 
He points to the desire of the unions to move from sectionalism 
towards collectivism in terms of a common wage rate for workers 
in the industry. This desire was fuelled by the "responsible" 
position adopted towards the industry in the light of National-
isation, but also drew on the practical lessons learnt during the 
Upper Clyde Shipbuilders work-in and the debacle over the Polish 
order. 
The eventual agreement between the C.S.E.U. and British 
Shipbuilders, "Wages and Salaries Restructuring, Harmonisation 
and Productivity" (W&SRHP) was completed in the light of the 
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manpower plan agreed in August 1979 in which the Government: 
" ..• more or less extended existing policy and finance for 
another two years, within which time they expected to see a 
turnaround in the industry's losses and a "rapid attainment 
of high levels of efficiency and productivity"." (143) 
The W&SRHP agreement envisaged a national uniform wage scale, but 
the retention of local agreements over working practices, 
although these were increasingly guided by national definitions. 
The situation seemed in some respects to resemble an inversion of 
the position in the inter-war period where, over the introduction 
of welding, the national structure of the Unions had been able to 
capitalise on the local divisions amongst the employers. The 
monolithic structure of British shipbuilders now confronted 
unions divided between shipbuilding centres and individual yards. 
On the Wear especially Austin and Pickersgill's yard had been run 
as a separate entity from Sunderland Shipbuilders - wages at 
Austin and Pickersgill were higher but working practices had been 
sold to achieve this. The tension implied in this situation was 
brought out at the delegate conference convened to formulate 
attitudes to what was to become the W&SRHP agreement. Thus a 
delegate from Austin and Pickersgill said that they had already 
achieved "full interchangeability": 
"We have consolidated allowances, we have got nothing left 
to sell, we have sold the lot for £103.00 ... " (144) 
The question then was could the employers use the leverage 
that such disparities in working practices between yards implied 
in the same way that the unions had exploited those differences 
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to force the employers' hand in the inter-war period? More 
generally the question remained, as ever, could agreements on 
changing working practices achieved on paper be translated into 
actual changes on the shop floor? 
In the yards that comprised Sunderland Shipbuilders in the 
period up until phase four of the W&SRHP agreement, it started 
slowly. A change of attitude began to manifest itself in the 
form of a tightening of control over work allocation and time. 
Gradually the job content in the "job and knock" negotiations 
assumed a larger proportion. These processes occurred unevenly 
between locations and shifts. The traditionally looser form of 
direct control on night shift remained, but even here men 
complained of not being able to "get their head down" as much as 
they used to. Similarly, control in "shops" tightened up more 
appreciably than on the ship. This meant that simultaneously 
there existed different forms of the effort bargain at different 
locations within the same yard. Thus on a night shift in the 
Deptford yard in 1982 whilst one group of plumbers on the ship 
were still negotiating "job and knock" another section of 
plumbers in the "group shop" were working for almost the full ten 
hours. The w ark pace differed accordingly in the two locations. 
On the ship a hectic pace was the norm in order to finish as soon 
as possible, whereas in the "shop" the pace was more sedate: 
"I don't hurry at all, I just plod because you know when one 
job is finished there's always another one." (145) 
Similarly the covered yard at Pallion was looked on as worse than 
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Deptford and North Sands from the point of view of the degree of 
control exercised by foremen and managers (146), 
An interesting feature of this period was the lack of 
resistance offered by the workforce to this increase in 
managerial control The attitude was that there was an 
inevitability about this tightening up. Whilst these moves were 
not particularly welcomed, they were seen to some extent as 
legitimate, given that by their own standards things had 
previously begun to get "too bad". However as time passed the 
managerial offensive continued until it started to encroach on 
areas clearly deemed illegitimate by the workforce. Thus even on 
night shift the foreman announced that men would not be allowed 
out (of the plumbers shop) twenty minutes before knocking off 
time to turn their cars around "for a quick getaway", as had 
traditionally been the practice. This was seen as going "a bit 
far" by the men. During this period discussions of the changes 
usually included comments upon the extent to which foremen 
appeared to be "living in fear", and much sympathy was evident 
for their predicament. 
However as the tightening up continued, that sympathy began 
to wane, as frustrations built up. The position in which some 
men could get away with more than others continued however, and 
could be a source of light relief at times. One incident 
recalled fondly at Deptfords involved a foreman trying to prevent 
workers leaving a ship some twenty minutes before "knocking off" 
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time. One man, a plumber called Gordon, came down the plank 
first. The foreman said: 
"I'm sorry Gordon, but if you leave the boat I'll have to 
put your name in the book" (for a wr i lten warning), 
The reply was to the point: 
"You put my name in that book and I'll rip your fucking 
spine out," (14 7) 
He then pushed past the foreman who tried to retrieve the 
situation by shouting that the worker was desperate to go to the 
toilet and, amid the roaring laughter of the other workers, that 
no-one else could leave the boat. 
The feeling among the workers was now that the management 
were trying to go too far, a feeling apparently confirmed by the 
video that the management commissioned and then showed to the 
workforce. The substance of the video was the amount of working 
time lost by late starting and early finishing. The film began 
by noting the different levels of productivity between British 
and Japanese shipbuilding workers (148), It continued by showing 
scenes of the Wear yards with men standing talking or drinking 
coffee, repeatedly returning to a shot of a clock with a voice 
asking, "Why are these men still here? Work should have begun 
twenty minutes ago", etc. 
The response of the workers was one of outrage. If the film 
was intended to increase their commitment to work it could not 
have had a more opposite effect. Questions were asked as to what 
management spent their time doing? And why they started at nine 
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o'clock when everyone else started at 07.30? A feeling was 
rising that management had decided to act daft and the only 
response that individual workers could initiate was to act twice 
as daft. The position of the shop stewards became impossible, 
with workers raising more and more grievances and management 
becoming less and less responsive. Many stewards gave up their 
posts or volunteered for redundancy, the work having become '~ust 
too much hassle" 0 49 ). This exacerbated the problem, for 
replacement stewards, when they could be found, were 
inexperienced in a situation which demanded the maximum of 
negotiating skills. Research on Tyneside showed that in one ship-
building group the constituency size of shop stewards grew from a 
ratio of 1:40 in the 1970s to 1:65 in 1984 (lSO), indicating a 
decline in the level of shop floor organisation in the yards. It 
is likely that a similar decline took place on Wearside. 
It is hard to exaggerate the levels to wh1ch feelings rose 
in the yards of Wearside during the first half of the 1980s. 
Union response was almost totally disabled by the deteriorating 
employment prospects within the industry. Thus by the beginning 
of 1983, 26,000 jobs had been lost within the industry since 
nationalisation in 1977. A further 3,000 redundancies were 
announced in the first month of 1983, followed in quick 
succession by 9,000 more in April of that year. 
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!Part VIJI 
IRedundlancy 
The first. mention of 9,000 redundancies was made in "The 
Times" industrial notebook on 20 April 1983. The figures 
announced by the outgoing chairman of British Shipbuilding, Sir 
Robert Atkinson, were seen to imply the "devastation" of ship-
building communities, and the paper questioned whether the 
Government could allow this to happen? 
"In an election year, can Mr. Jenkins really afford to see 
more communities, admittedly not in Tory strongholds, 
devastated and the country subjected to another bout of 
depressing news of big industrial closures? For that, in 
essence, is Sir Robert's message." (151) 
It seemed that such pragmatic political considerations were 
likely to be the only retarding force in the path of the proposed 
redundancies. For as the article continued, 
"At the Govan yard on the Clyde, where there are new orders, 
the mood of shipbuilding workers throughout the country was 
summed up by a shop steward who dismissed as futile any move 
to begin a strike against further cuts. The battle, he 
warned, was against the Government." ( 152) 
By 3 May 1983 it was clear that British Shipbuilders were intent 
on pressing ahead with the redundancies and that still more were 
to come. As the Guardian reported, 
"Delegates representing 64,000 shipyard workers will decide 
tomorrow how to fight at least 9,000 redundancies, in the 
knowledge that British Shipbuilders has already drawn up 
contingency plans for a more drastic rundown of the ailing 
industry •.• 
.•• "Job losses could be significantly greater than the 
9,000" Sir Robert Atkinson, the departing B.S. Chairman, 
told startled managers in a report less than a month ago. 
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His industrial relations director, Mr. Maurice Phelps, 
added: "Unfortunately, large-scale redundancies cannot now 
be avoided". (153) 
There were signs emerging that the Unions had had enough and 
that some kind of industrial action would be forthcoming. More-
over, local managers appeared to be growing increasingly critical 
of the "heavy handed" tactics of the B.S. central administration. 
"Union officials appear convinced that Sir Robert is 
determined to press ahead with the 9,000 redundancies - and 
if -he does, that could provoke a militant response. For 
over the past few years most of the redundancies have come 
from "volunteers". It is questionable whether another 
rundown could be achieved without compulsion. On this 
occasion the shipyard workers can count on the support of 
1,500 managers who have simply had enough." (154) 
The conference backed a call for industrial action to stop 
the redundancies and to pressurise the Government into providing 
an emergency package to save the merchant industry. The tactic 
of yard occupations and sit-ins was the one favoured by the 
unions. The proposal was condemned by British Shipbuilders and 
the majorii.y of the press. However even the media were not 
altogether without sympathy for the unions' case. 
"Last week's response by the Unions was a predictable back-
lash by an increasingly angry labour force to the threat of 
yet more cuts and the rapid fall of shipyard workers down 
the pay league in recent years ••. But to make good the 
threat and turn the sit-ins into a reality would be an act 
of desperation." (155) 
In the face of the sit-in threat, British Shipbuilders 
responded to the pragmatic political pressures upon the 
Government in the run-up to the general election. A point 
recognised by the Guardian: 
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" ••• the State company - which will soon press the new 
Industry Secretary Mr. Cecil Parkinson, for emergency aid to 
prevent a collapse of the merchant building sector - post-
poned the redundancy programme until after the election • 
... Under the original plan B.S. had hoped that its 
subsidiary yards would have begun declaring redundancies by 
now." (156) 
The delay in carrying through the redundancy plan and the re-
election of the Tory Government had served to weaken the 
unanimity of the unions' opposition, as the Guardian continued: 
" in spite of union resistance to compulsory 
redundancies, there are indications at several yards -
particularly on Wearside - that the required number of job 
losses can be achieved by voluntary severance." (157) 
Of the 9,000 redundancies 1,150 were to be from the Wear yards. 
The move towards "voluntary" acceptance of this number of 
redundancies sank any prospect of a unified struggle against job 
losses. British Shipbuilders were to achieve this target and 
more in the future in an apparently unproblematic fashion. 
Furthermore the willingness of individual workers to accept 
voluntary redunu<:IIIL!Y WHo oeen to damage the prospects for the 
"Save Our Shipyards" campaign being run by Tyne and Wear 
Metropolitan Council and made a nonsense of their claim that: 
"United We Stand. 
The avalanche of support for the "S.O.S." campaign has 
surpassed all expectations." (158) 
It seemed that the "avalanche of support" was forthcoming from 
everyone apart from the workforce in the industry. Moreover this 
was not the first time that the local organisers of a campaign to 
resist redundancies had been in effect undermined by the work-
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force. On 5 February 1981 at the beginning of the job losses the 
Secretary of the Wear C.S.E.U., Henry Wilkinson, boldly announced 
that: 
"There should be no doubt in anybody's mind that the River 
Wear as well as the rest of the country will combat any 
enforced redundancies." (159) 
The question of enforced redundancies never arose, for as 
the Sunderland Echo of 28 February pointed out: 
"More than 700 men have indicated a readiness to accept 
redundancy even in an area of 17~6 unemployment." (160) 
The Regional Organiser of the General and Municipal Workers' 
Union resigned in disgust, saying: 
"They are betraying their forefathers, throwing away - for 
short-sighted and selfish reasons- job opportunities for 
the young and putting shackles on their trade union 
negotiators ... I say the shipyard workers on the Tyne and 
Wear need a bit of fight in their bellies 1 ike the miners. 
Do they not realise we are a maritime nation and as such 
shipbuilding in this country could never be finished." (161) 
Was this a fair comment? Were the motives for taking 
voluntary redundancy simply reducible to "Short-sighted and 
selfish reasons"? At a deeper level did the willingness to "sell 
ones' job" indicate a change in the quintessential nature of the 
traditional working class? There were those who thought so: 
"It has always been the Left's critique of capitalism that 
it must hide its true purposes from the people who, if they 
recognised its true nature, would rise up against it. It 
was Mrs. Thatcher's priviledge to shout its true nature from 
the housetops to the plaudits of the people who, far from 
rising up, inclined themselves to its will. As industry 
after industry shrank in the early 1980s - steel, 
shipbuilding, engineering, cars, chemicals, construction -
the workers accepted the common sense of c\apitalism, took 
their redundancy payments and were glad." (182) 
)· 
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The reality of the redundancy issue on the Wear is perhaps more 
complicated than either a lack of moral fibre of a "lack of fight 
in their bellies" of the workforce. The redundancy issue has to 
be seen directly in the context of the changing nature of working 
practices and the wider political environment. If such an 
analysis is forthcoming it is at least as easy to argue the case 
that the "ease" with which the "voluntary" redundancies were 
achieved on the Wear was in part due to the high level of the 
struggle within the yards rather than the opposite. 
A point forthcoming from Wear workers when discussing the 
redundancy situation on the Wear in the first half of the 1980s 
was that: 
"The old time stewards were the first, they got out 'cause 
they knew what we were in for." (163) 
Some of what they were "in for" has already been outlined. The 
managerial offensive began by tightening up on the movement of 
labour and the "productive input" of the working day. The 
aforementioned "durable aspects" of worker control began to break 
down under extreme pressure from above. The foremen and middle 
management were exposed to extraordinary pressure from senior 
management. In the minds of the workers the person ultimately 
responsible was Eric Welsh, the Managing Director of the 
Sunderland yards. One worker from Pallion summed up these 
feelings in a reply to a questionnaire issued by the company. 
"Mr Welsh would have done well in S.S •• " (164) 
This did not mean Sunderland Shipbuilders! The intense pressure 
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exerted by the senior management and the fear that this generated 
in the lower supervisory grades in the face of the possibility of 
forced redundancy or even the closure of all the yards on the 
river ensured that for the first time managerial control initiat-
ives were not diluted in their transference to the shop floor. 
Importantly these control initiatives were increasingly being 
linked to changes in working practices being fostered under the 
auspices of the phases of the W&SRHP plan already agreed by the 
unions. 
The union agreement to the general idea of such changes in 
working practices coupled with the "enthusiasm" with which they 
were pursued by higher management in their creation of an 
atmosphere of fear precluded any collective response. However 
individual responses were forthcoming. More active expressions 
of "botching up" began to emerge, which bordered on sabotage. As 
one universally acknowledged "responsible worker" explained, 
"They get you that way, as sick as a parrot. There's 
sabotage now, I've started rubbing the chalk marks off pipes 
in the pallet that are ready to go out." (165) 
The pipes pre-fabricated in the group shop are numbered with yard 
and detail position location numbers - to obliterate these would 
involve a considerable delay in their delivery to the right 
place. But this was mild by comparison to some of the acts going 
on. The removal of pieces of machinery, the deliberate fusing of 
lighting systems in inaccessible places, electric welding 
machines left arcing to earth until they burned out were just 
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some of the ways that frustrations were vented. There was little 
comfort in such acts however, as managerial offensive continued. 
Foremen were obliged to keep written records of the progress of 
jobs to be submitted weekly, under relentless pressure. Some-
times they booked jobs in that were not completed and they 
appealed to or cajoled men to finish quickly. The "catch phrase" 
of one foreman at Deptford, when making such appeals, caught on 
and men greeted each other with A.L.'s words, 
"You've got to do it Bob, they'll chew my balls off if you 
don't." (166) 
The workers knew that the pressure was coming from senior 
management and more specifically its personification in the form 
of Eric Welsh, but the effects were felt on the shop floor in the 
deteriorating quality of relationships between workers and their 
immediate supervisors. Access to higher management was 
restricted and even the personnel department appeared to be 
remaining aloof. As a worker from the Pallion yard asked, 
"Why does it take three weeks to see personnel?" (167) 
When senior management were spotted in the yards their 
reception was hostile. Thus one worker recalled, the reaction of 
his friend at seeing a group of managers: 
"We were working up on one of the masts when he spotted 
them. He was hanging on with one hand shouting "Bastards, 
bastards". They took no notice!" (168) 
The "big brother" approach was seen as particularly sinister by 
some. 
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"They've got videos down there, they can sit in an office 
and see who isn't where they should be. Their computer 
monitors the use of power, if there's a shortfall in any 
area of the yard they want to know why." (169) 
Amid all of this, intense individual struggles went on in 
circumstances where the union was seen as impotent. 
"Health and Safety, all the time I stopped them with that. 
On one occasion I was working in the double bottoms when a 
plate slid over the tank top and dropped down a manhole. 
"I'm not working here", I said to the head foreman, so he 
got a manager. He asked what could be done to help, could I 
suggest anything? I told them a lip should be erected 
around the manholes to stop things sliding down. On another 
occasion they were lining sections up using lasers. Now I 
noticed when they first started using lasers they used to 
rope areas off and put up signs - "Danger Lasers", all that 
had gone. So I got onto them about it, work stopped while 
they roped off the main area and put signs up. I don't know 
what it was we had to beware of, but I got the signs back. 
The problem was it didn't hit the management, it only annoy-
ed the blokes working on the job - they now had to rope off 
areas and put up signs as well as their other work." (170) 
Again, the problem was how to hit back at management rather 
than to increase the general level of "hassle" on the shop floor. 
It seemed an intractable problem which added to the frustrations 
all the more. Where direct attacks could be made upon management 
they were eagerly grasped. One such event gained great notor-
iety. It occurred on the night shift at Deptford, but by the end 
of the following day shift was being celebrated in the rest of 
the yards .on the river. The Deptford night shift had been "get-
ting out of hand" for some time. On one particular ship no matter 
how hard the supervisors and management tried the men kept 
managing to paint "S.S. Rubber Duck" on the hull in large 
letters. More management were drafted onto the night shift. One 
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night the lads spotted Eric Welsh on the quayside. The spot-
lights were turned on him and an assortment of bolts, flanges and 
other objects were thrown at him. He got away but not before a 
few direct hits were registered. In calmer moments some of the 
perpetrators confessed that it was a stupid and dangerous thing 
to do, but that they could not help themselves. 
The problem of such individual resistance is, as we have 
seen, that its target cannot always be hit and thus in some 
circumstances only serves to make an intolerable situation worse. 
Moreover with the tightening of control and increasing issue of 
written warnings individuals were risking "the sack". For many 
of those most active in resisting, this likelihood persuaded them 
that taking redundancy would pre-empt their increasingly inevit-
able dismissal and loss of entitlement to any redundancy payment. 
The importance of redundancy entitlement built up over a 
number of years in the absence of occupational pensions etc. is 
often underestimated. As Elger found at Doxfords Engine Works in 
the late 1960s, the redundancy entitlement was for some workers a 
major reason why they didn't look for work in more attractive or 
higher paid jobs. 
"If I leave now I'd lose £400 redundancy so it would take a 
lot to shift us." (171) 
Ironically it was the threat of losing redundancy entitle-
ment which inclined many of the workers at the yards in the 1980s 
to leave. Not only was it a way of escaping the "torture" that 
the work situation had become, 
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"Every Monday morning you go in you might as well bend over 
-you're waiting to be buggered!" (172) 
but also it forestalled the loss of entitlement by dismissal. 
Moreover the plans of the Tory Government to privatise the 
Warship yards were well advanced by this time. The fear was that 
if a buyer could also be found for individual merchant yards 
these would be sold with no guarantee that long standing 
redundancy entitlement would be honoured. Again it was the 
threat of its potential loss which encouraged some workers to 
take the payment and leave. 
Such decisions were not taken easily. For weeks and 
sometimes months workers and their families agonised over making 
the right decision. And all the time the pressure at work 
increased until some could take it no more. 
"It's become a matter of dignity - I got to get out." (173) 
Individual decisions were taken in the light of financial 
circumstances at home. This inevitably meant that the workforce 
were divided by their individual home circumstances and many of 
those who did not leave wished that they could have done. How-
eve r such w a s the press u r e that so m e "had" t o 1 eave even i n the 
face of unfavourable circumstances at home. Despite the claims 
of Maurice Phelps, British Shipbuilders' Industrial Director, 
that: 
"nobody wants to force people out of the industry" (174) 
the net effect of the managerial offensive on the river was to do 
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just that. As a twenty seven year old shipwright, married for 
two years with a new mortgage and a pregnant wife, who had just 
applied to "take his lot", put it: 
"I don't care what anyone says, there has not been one 
voluntary redundancy on this river. Blokes have been 
hounded, abused and pushed into it." (175) 
Another responded to the accusation that he was selling his son's 
future job. 
"I wouldn't wish that set-up on my worst enemy let alone my 
son. He's better off without it. I've got my dignity and 
my redundancy." (176) 
The redundancy issue on the Wear was clearly tied to changes 
in working practices. 
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IPart VIII 
The End of Craft Control? 
Initially felt as a tightening of managerial control, the 
offensive developed into formal changes "disguised" as wage and 
productivity agreements under the auspices of W&ARHP and with 
union agreement. Phase 4 of the W&SRHP scheme was outlined to 
the Shipbuilding Negotiating Committee on 12 October 1983, and 
the local details of the productivity deal and changes in working 
practices and technology were formulated over the winter months. 
There was by this time a feeling that resistance should be 
offered to any management proposals. But the prospects for a 
collective stand were not good. Any industrial action was seen by 
the unions and shop stewards as equivalent to walking out of the 
yards never to return. As well as the shorter term work based 
tactical considerations, more long term processes had weakened 
tile potent1al resources upon which workers could call to fight 
against changes in the labour process. Several of these issues 
are apparent under the general tendency towards the growing gulf 
between the work and non-work community situation of Wearside 
shipbuilding workers. 
Despite claims in the Save Our Shipyards campaign or of 
banner headlines in the Sunderland Echo of the town rallying to 
save jobs, division was more characteristic than solidarity. The 
differences in the home circumstances and financial commitments 
of individual workers could, as we have seen, exert a determining 
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effect upon their willingness to take their redundancy, and the 
same was true of attitudes towards industrial action. More 
generally the increasingly heterogeneous non-work environment of 
workers had over the years begun to destroy what little 
"patterning of paradox" had existed in the past. That this was 
to some extent a legitimate development was tacitly acknowledged 
in the "community". An illustration of one strand of this 
process was forthcoming in a discussion between three shipyard 
workers, about another worker, in a Sunderland pub. 
(a) What I can't understand is P ... - which way does 
he kick? 
(b) He's a Tory. 
(c) Bastard. 
(b) He had an inheritance. His Dad had money. 
(c) 
(a) 
(b + c) 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Bastard. 
He's a canny lad though. 
Oh aye he's canny. 
You've got to keep an eye on him though. 
Oh aye, you've got to watch him. 
Bastard. 
What was odd about this conversation was that the Tory 
sympathies of the worker under discussion were seen to stem 
naturally from his being left money (enough to buy a large 
terraced house in an upmarket part of Fulwell). In other words 
that his political affiliation was determined solely by his non-
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work situation and that he was nevertheless a "canny lad" (177). 
Another feature of the divorce between the work and 
community situation was used by the management to put pressure 
upon workers to accept the "productivity" offer. The 
consequences of mailing the details direct to each individual 
home were outlined by one worker. 
"When my wife opens the letter and sees the figures that's 
all she thinks about. She sees it in terms of how much more 
that amount will buy in the shops. She doesn't see what I 
would have to do to get it. 11 (178) 
Finally in a more general sense the division between work 
and community and changing patterns of family life have isolated 
generations from each other. The generation of shipyard workers 
beginning their working life in the inter-war period have now 
retired. The relative decline in the industry over which they 
presided was masked by the absolute growth in the post-war 
period. For them the crisis of British Shipbuilding is in no way 
tied to them. Ironically the unchallenged degree of authority 
that they experienced over the production process is projected 
onto their sons and grandsons, and it is here that the 
responsibility is seen to lie: 
11 
... as time went on you got people who weren't interested 
and nowadays - there's no buzzer blows in the shipyards, 
them days eight o'clock in the morning the buzzer blew ... I 
was walking home one day (I'd been on night shift) and I met 
a lot of big lads coming along and I said "when the buzzer 
blows you're supposed to be starting work not getting out of 
bed", and that is it at the present day- this morning the 
shipyards - none of them will be started before nine o'clock 
because they'll be discussing the Manchester United Cup 
Final from last night - because they're not on piece, 
they're on bonus because the whole system has gone rotten 
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... I could do better than some of the 18 year olds now and 
I'm 72 years old ... I'm talking about work, not putting 
hours in and that's the trouble with them at the present day 
•.• nowadays they couldn't care less - couldn't care less 
about it." (179) 
The heterogeneity emerging from the breakdown of the 
occupational community, outlined in earlier chapters, serves to 
shatter the potential for solidaristic support. In such an 
atmosphere and with the shop stewards advocating acceptance the 
phase 4 deal was voted for by a majority of the workforce. 
Although as to how many had given their "informed consent" there 
was dispute. 
"Nobody knew what the hell they were voting for. The motion 
proposed by the stewards had about four amendments which had 
to be voted on first. Blokes were asking me, "What are we 
voting for now?" (180) 
What they were endorsing is attached in Appendix (3) The 
main points in the national agreement included the following 
sections: 
;; Interchangeab11ity/F lexibilit y 
The nature of the work in the industry is such that it is 
essential for employees at all levels to work effectively, 
and to recognise that change will be a normal part of the 
working life. Therefore, all employees must be prepared to 
acquire new skills, and to remove customary practices where 
they are no longer appropriate. To meet the demands of 
competition it is accepted that new working practices will 
be adopted which match those of our international 
competitors and enable companies to respond to changing work 
priorities, product and workload fluctuations. The key 
elements of these new practices which need to implemented 
urgently and to the fullest effect are: 
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Interchangeability 
1. All levels of staff will be interchangeable as required 
according to their individual skills and experience. 
2. Hourly paid employees will be interchangeable within 
their main group, i.e. within steelworking, outfitting 
and ancillary groups. 
3. Skilled employees will also be required to be inter-
changeable across groups and trades, providing they are 
capable of undertaking the work required, and will also 
undertake ancillary work as appropriate. 
4. Ancillary employees will also be required to undertake 
tasks within their ability, including work which 
skilled employees have in some cases traditionally 
retained, but which can be completely undertaken by 
other employees after retraining. 
5. All employees will be fully mobile within their company 
and between areas and departments including maintenance 
and production. 
Flexibility 
6. Skilled employees, in order to progress the completion 
of their own work will undertake their own servicing. 
7. As part of the above arrangements, it is agreed that in 
order that employees will use the full range of their 
skills and abilities to maximum advantage, companies 
will have the option of establishing area supervision 
and integrated groups of workers as required." (181) 
The local agreement restated in a bolder fashion the points 
in the national agreement. Thus area supervision and integrated 
work groups were labelled "Composite Groups" - they were used to 
signify the end of the single trade work group (182), thereby 
rendering demarcation concerns which arose, in particular between 
plumbers and fitters at the North Sands yard, an issue which 
could be handled by an "independent" foreman. Demarcation 
increasingly became a matter of individual group dynamics rather 
than an issue uniting a whole trade. The principle of craft 
exclusiveness had been surrendered, although the consciousness of 
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individual workers as belonging to a particular trade remained. 
This again increased the frustrations on the shop floor, and some 
workers talked of a "sell out" by their representatives. 
The local agreement also went further on the introduction of 
new techniques, and the point of introduction, before discussion 
was conceded. 
"We should try new techniques first and get them working 
while talks are going on about these other matters (Trade 
Unions, pay, demarcation). That means no delay in using the 
techniques that have helped foreign shipbuilders grab a 
bigger share of our markets." (183) 
The agreement at a national level headed off a threatened 
national strike. The new Chairman of British Shipbuilders was 
well satisfied: 
"After 13 hours of talks a national shipyard strike -
accompanied by yard occupations - had been averted. "A hell 
of a good day's work", said a smiling Mr. Graham Day (Salary 
£80,000 plus performance bonus) ••• 
••• The unions had been pressing for an increase on basic 
rates as a precondition of further productivity talks. Mr. 
Day has persuaded Mr. Murray, and 29 shipyard delegates who 
endorsed the outline deal, to accept a productivity 
agreement as a precondition for getting more money." (184) 
Once again the tying of wages to working conditions had 
helped British Shipbuilders to further the aim defined by Graham 
Day in the Financial Times: 
" ... the craft basis on which B.S. has operated - rigid 
demarcation lines, fierce protection of skills and the like 
- has to be altered. We've got to get from a craft to a 
system basis." (185) 
The workers received £7 a week for accepting the deal, on 
union advice. The changes were felt very quickly on the Wear, as 
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a painter explained in February 1984: 
"lt 1 s ridiculous. I 1 ve been working in the joiners shop 
today, sweeping up - me, a skilled painter!" (186) 
As for the composite work groups it lfJas explained in the local 
agreement that training would be given, 
"The groups will be responsible for unit or area completion, 
usually with one Supervisor, and the people in it will have 
the skills required. Each person will be expected to carry 
out whatever work is necessary to complete the job, 
including work that has been thought of as "belonging" to 
only one group. Retraining will be organised ••• 11 (187) 
According to Mr. R.D. Clark, the personnel director on the 
Wear, such training amounted to "multi-skilling", and the manage-
ment welcomed the rising skill level in shipbuilding 0 88). He 
went on to say that whilst the changes in working practices had 
been "driven through in the face of an adverse economic climate", 
workers were now happier and more involved in their work because 
they could follow through the processes on the yard floor (189). 
The reality on the shop floor was rather different. The 
retraining was seen as a mockery, but workers took the £75 given 
to those who volunteered. As a shipwright explained: 
"I served a five year apprenticeship to become a shipwright 
but now after three days hanging about with the welders I 1m 
a welder, three days I 1m a rigger, two days I 1m a burner and 
two days and I 1 m a plater! 11 (190) 
Mr. Clark made the claim that the workforce were happy with 
the changes occurring only one month after Sunderland 
Shipbuilders had commissioned a piece of survey research looking 
at worker attitudes in the firm. In the light of the results of 
that research (which he had at the time of the interview) his 
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analysis seems odd to say the least. Dissatisfaction with the 
situation in the yards clearly ran through most of the replies to 
a large majority of individual questions (see Appendix 4). Thus, 
for example: 
As 
"Question 5 
"Sunder land Shipbuilders is a pretty good place to work - I 
would recommend a friend or member of my family to work 
here." 
0' Agree 0' Disagree 10 tO 
1 and 2 3 4 and 5 
Pall ion 16 9 74 
Deptford 17 11 71 
N. Sands 11 7 81 
Main Office 36 20 44 
Aggregate 18 10 70 
the survey research firm commented, 
"C 1 ear indication that the consider ab 1 e majority of 
employees feel that this is not a good place to work. In 
other questionnaires we have carried out, it is possible to 
observe that whilst there are many complaints and grumbles 
about one's workplace it is still possible to feel that 
overall it is a fairly good place to work, and consequently 
that one would recommend it to family and friends. It is in 
answer to this question that we see that the concerns that 
the workforce have go particularly deep." (191) 
In answer to the statement that 
"Senior management can be trusted to make sensible decisions 
for the Company's future", 
79~~ of Dept ford's manual workers disagreed, and the figures for 
Pallion and North Sands yards were higher still at 80% and 81% 
respectively. As far as industrial relations were concerned, the 
results were even more clear cut. Thus: 
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Question 12 
How would you describe relations between management and 
trade unions at Sunderland Shipbuilders at present? 
0' Excellent 0' Poor 
'" 
,o 
1 and 2 3 4 and 5 
Pall ion 1 3 95 
Deptford 3 5 89 
N. Sands 2 3 89 
Main Office 9 10 82 
Aggregate 2.5 4 90 
(192) 
The results are clear cut and suggest that the workforce 
were far from happy with changes in the yards. Moreover given 
the context of the survey, coming as it did in 1986 after several 
rounds of large scale redundancies when some of the more critical 
workers had already left in desperation, and, with shop stewards 
advocating that men should not co-operate with the survey, it is 
likely that some of the more critical workers left in the yards 
did not complete the questionnaire. 
The depth to which the morale of the workforce had been 
driven is even more apparent in the replies and comments to the 
"free answers" and "open questions" sections of the survey. In 
all three yards the largest single response to the question of 
what was liked about working for Sunderland Shipbuilders was 
"Nothing". This was written by 66 men from Deptford, 60 from 
North Sands and 209 from Pallion. The next most popular "like" 
in all yards was that "It is a job/better than dole". 
The individual quotations again make the situation crystal 
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clear. Some of these expressed a deep sense of injury to the 
self: 
''!J.Jhat do I have to do to get management to realise I am a 
human being, not a mindless unfeeling robot! HELP!" 
"Attitude of management to workforce is one of hatred and 
hysterics." 
"Being treated unfairly (you've got to work here to 
understand that)." 
"Men - totally demoralised - need to be encouraged and 
nurtured- sick of being stamped into the ground." 
"This is the worst job I've had in 45 years in 
shipbuilding." (193) 
Other comments were more concise: 
"Management stinks - are corrupt." 
"Management back-stabbing." (194) 
Management behaviour towards the workforce was seen variously as 
ignorant and flippant, high-handed, dogmatic, bullying, arrogant, 
petty, persecuting. Even attempts at beinq witty carried the 
same message: 
"Treated like idiots, led by idiots, paid like idiots." 
"Thank Mr. Welsh for his effort on our behalf." (195) 
Specific issues featured in replies too, the ending of 
canteen facilities producing hot meals for manual workers yet 
their continuance free to staff members was a large concern. 
Similarly the non-payment of a £500 bonus which had been 
"promised" by Eric Welsh was mentioned several times with 
comments such as 
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"Where's our £500 - thieves." 
A whole section of replies referred to the work itself, where 
comments included: 
"Not being able to develop new skills." 
"Quality control system not working." 
"Seeming lack of standards in inspections which causes lack 
of confidence when working with owners reps and having to 
reply "I don't know" to 9ma of any questions relating to 
specific standards of tolerance." 
"Misuse of skills." 
"Lack of training." 
"Responsibility of job taken away from tradesman." 
"Taken away job satisfaction." 
"No faith in new workpacks." 
"Too much new work." 
"Departments working against each other." 
"Rundown of craft trades." 
"foo many supervisors know nothing of the particular trade 
they're responsible for." 
The list goes on, throwing serious doubt on the claim that 
the workforce was "happier" with the new working practices which 
seemed indeed to have been "driven through". The management had 
by 1986 been able to "drive through" almost every change that 
they had desired. Composite group working had become the norm 
and a computerised stock control system "Artemis" had been 
installed. Movement was being made towards a continental split 
shift system worked on a four set, three shift basis. 
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Throughout the whole period of these changes the 
redundancies had continued. One man leaving British Shipbuilders 
in 1986 was Graham Day. After spending less time as Chairman of 
B.S. than manual workers spend as apprentices Day, who complained 
"I am earning here well below my capacity in Canada", was off to 
British Ley land. In an article entitled "Buoyant amid the Wrecks" 
the Guardian noted that: 
"One man's timbers remain unshivered by the gurgling noises 
emanating from North-eastern shipyards •.. Day's achieve-
ments at B.S. are said to have so impressed Mrs. Thatcher 
that he was being considered as Big Mac's (Ian McGregor) 
successor. Particularly endearing to the boss was his no-
nonsense approach. He was reported to have said of a shop 
steward: "I would love to get him behind the shed and take 
my jacket off to him". 
Instead, he stripped down the workforce to 9,000 - a tenth 
of the numbers at nationalisation in 1977 - thus surmounting 
widespread opposition to his productivity proposals. He also 
engineered the sale of profitable warship yards. He admitted 
that the plan was uncommercial, and astonished M.P.s by dis-
closing that he had only been informed of the Government's 
decision hours before it was announced in the Commons." 
(197) 
Leaving Wearside in 1986 was Eric Welsh, who, after organ-
ising the details of the shutdown of Smiths Dock on Teesside as 
the head of North East Shipbuilders Limited, reopened part of the 
works as a private ship repair company. He also had "achieved 
much", on the shop floor the core workforce had been whittled 
down to approximately 2,000 workers plus an increasing proportion 
of subcontract workers. 
The craft administration had apparently given way to the 
constant flow principle based on the composite work group and 
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CAD/CAM systems dominated the stages of both pre-outfitting and 
the more established prefabrication of structural steel units. 
As an article written by a manager of N.E.S.L. in the Durham 
University Industrial Society Magazine put it, 
"At Pallion, as in all British shipbuilders yards, the 
building process is on the workstation principle. That is 
to say that the whole ship structure is broken down in 
design terms, into a great number of sub-assemblies. 
There are workstations throughout the yard, each specialis-
ing in the production of one kind of sub-assembly. Starting 
with the smallest, each sub-assembly moves on to the 
following stage where it is further enlarged, until a main 
unit is created. That is then taken to the building berth. 
This whole operation is an exercise in precision. Each unit, 
built to drawings produced by computer, must fit snugly and 
exactly with the others at the point of assembly in the 
berth. When it is considered that units may weigh a hundred 
tons or more and stand as high as a church, the task is 
obviously an exacting one." (198) 
"An exercise in precision" - is this how it actually worked 
at the point of production? As has been outlined the changes were 
"driven through" with little regard for the views of the work-
force, and the new system of working was imposed without detailed 
consultation. The result was a hybrid of the new system of organ-
isation of work and some of the older detail working practices, 
executed in an atmosphere in which no one wanted to be identified 
with mistakes, the consequences of which, if they occurred in the 
early phases of the transformation of plans into reality, could 
be far more wide ranging than in the earlier systems. The 
consequences of this in relation to the requisite degree of 
precision were profound. A plumber explained how the new system 
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worked in practice: 
"1. The plans arrive and are to be converted into detail 
sketches. The sketchers draw the individual pipes to 
be fabricated. But as they would be no good if they 
end up too small, they add lOOmm extra. 
2. The sketch is numbered and entered on the computer and 
the sketch goes to the group shop for "fabbing". 
3. When the pipe is fabbed it is then fitted with a tag 
detailing its location and palatised among many more. 
4. The palate is delivered to its location which is not 
necessarily the right one or even the right yard. 
5. When the palate is delivered the paper tags are often 
torn or get soggy in the rain or just fall off. So a 
labourer has to rummage through the palate for the 
right pipe. 
6. When the pipe is found it's too long (remember the 
sketcher left lOOmm extra). Therefore if another one 
looks a better fit you take that. Or you get a hacksaw 
and cut it or take it back to the shop to be cut. As 
you would have done in the old days." (199) 
In this example then, the supposed divorce between 
conception and execution and the fragmentation of work locations 
and tasks is frustrated by the decisions of the sketchers and the 
consequent decision of the craftsman to use the pipe that "looks 
the better fit". The formal system is not translated unproblem-
atically into "systemised response" at the point of production; 
the discretion of the individual worker is to some extent left 
intact. A point borne out in the company's survey where 78% of 
the workers at Pallion and 77% and 72% at Deptford and North 
Sands respectively replied that they always felt personally 
responsible for the job they did (200). 
The persistence of the era ft ethos among the manual 
workforce and their immediate superiors represented itself in an 
even more dramatic way at times. Thus when under pressure from 
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superiors to speed up the work in order to finish a ship nearing 
the end of its completion time there was a tendency for the new 
system to break down and the old patterns of working to re-
emerge. In such a situation foremen order workers to bypass the 
computerised stock control and allocation system and physically 
go and obtain their materials and tools, on their authority, as 
they would have done under the old system. 
Moreover the specific craft identities deemed irrelevant to 
the composite work groups also reassert themselves as the basis 
of the physical procurement of tools and materials. Thus for 
example plumbers complained that stock-keepers in the stores 
belonging to the A.E.U. would not hand over materials to them, 
but if a "friendly" fitter could be found they just walked in the 
back of the store as was the practice in the past. A similar 
tendency has been noted in a study of the Aerospace Industry 
where the physical movement of plans and desiqns re-emerges and 
dominates the new CAD/CAM system when deadlines are tight: 
" examples were cited where reverting to manual methods 
has to happen in order to get the work out on time ... 
..• I was directly involved in getting the last project off 
CAD/CAM, to meet the deadline • 
••• such situations tend to strengthen the resolve of those 
who prefer the old ways and make it easier for them to 
abandon the struggle to adapt." (201) 
The point to be made about both these examples of the re-
emergence of older working patterns is not that the workers are 
fighting at the point of production to retain their "archaic" 
craft specific skills, but rather, they are fighting to get the 
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job out in time. In the yards it is not the intensity of the 
conflict between capital and labour that leads workers to revert 
to more traditional working patterns. Rather it is the case that 
in spite of everything else that management has done, the workers 
still see themselves as having a responsibility towards their 
work and "getting the job done". This comes across in the 
Sunderland Shipbuilders survey: 
As 
"Question 26 
"I feel personally responsible for the job I do." 
Always Never 
1 and 2 3 4 and 5 
Pall ion 78 8 14 
Deptford 77 9 13 
N. Sands 72 11 14 
Main Office 92 4 4 
Aggregate 77 8 12 
the summary put it, 
"Overall, something slightly more than three-quarters of the 
population feel personally responsible for the job that they 
do. The majority moves up to 92~~ in the main offices. As 
with one or two earlier questions, this hints at a basic 
feeling of pride in one's work which should be a source of 
strength for the organisation. However if this feeling does 
not have an outlet, if people feel that their work is not 
worthwhile ..• then it can be a source of some frustration." 
( 202) 
The feeling of personal responsibility for one's work, a 
hallmark of the craft worker, was not easily extinguished, even 
in the face of technical changes in the labour process. This is 
the key to understanding the high levels of both conflict and co-
operation which were, during this period, displayed by the same 
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individuals. The co-operation sprang from a personal 
responsibility to see the job through. The conflict arose not 
primarily because of objective technical changes, but rather due 
to the management offensive in relation to its direct control 
strategy and more generally in relation to its whole human 
relations approach. This "offensive" represented the empirical 
manifestation of the external pressures working upon the 
industry. Those of the modernisation of capital and working 
practices as an element in achieving large growths in productiv-
ity in the context of overall reduction of capacity and cost. 
A belated appreciation of the realities of the managerial 
offensive was given in the House of Commons in July 1987 by the 
town's two Labour M.P.s. Chris Mullin, for Sunderland South, 
described the management as "bone headed" and went on to say: 
"In Sunderland the yards had a management that is more 
interested in pursuing the class war than in shipbuilding. 
They have exploited the crisis in shipbuilding to inflict 
further humiliation on a workforce that has already made 
great sacrifices." (203) 
Bob Clay, for Sunderland North, spoke of the management's 
" arrogance, secrecy and hostility to the workforce 
The number of managers that have been turned over in 
Sunderland in British Shipbuilders even exceeds the number 
of Government Ministers we have had dealing with these 
debates, or the number of chairmen of British Shipbuilders 
we have had at a national level. 
How can you expect workers in a shipyard to feel any 
confidence in the future when they see managers come and go 
in sometimes extremely mysterious circumstances. There 
needs to be a whole inquiry even now into the way British 
Shipbuilders has been managed." (204) 
There was no inquiry however, and the M.P.s were berated in 
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the media for damaging the image of Sunderland Shipbuilders. The 
response from the new managing director of Sunderland Ship-
builders sought to exploit the "irresponsibility" of the M.P.s. 
He said: 
"I am not prepared ••• to conduct any part of the company's 
business through public debate either in the media or 
elsewhere." (205) 
The "hidden abode" of the workplace was to remain obscured from 
public view then, on the pretext that to discuss such issues 
would damage the company's image. 
By this time however the ferociousness of the managerial 
offensive had abated somewhat. The desired agreements over 
working practices had been achieved and the requisite number of 
"voluntary" redundancies had been forthcoming. Union resistance 
to managerial initiatives had been weak and short lived. However 
the workers still found themselves in a state of desubordin-
ation, the changes in the labour process had not totally des-
troyed either the craft ethos or a willingness to exercise non-
formal controls over the mobility of labour. One such example 
where the management did not appear to realise that control needs 
to be created and recreated and is rarely finally won was in 
relation to the four set, three shift basis of working. 
The system was introduced without union agreement and on a 
"purely voluntary" basis late in 1986. Most workers were opposed 
to its introduction, however as the direct controls over physical 
attendance were relaxed they found that the system could be used. 
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Because if the four set pattern within an individual shift there 
was nearly always one section of the workforce who had a 
legitimate right to be in the amenity block or moving to or front 
it. Thus the overlapping nature of coffee and dinner breaks was 
used to good effect by workers who could escape a "booking" by 
choosing, in explanation, the "right set" to belong to. So well 
was this tactic used by the workforce that the pattern of shift 
working was withdrawn by the management early in 1988 as 
"unworkable". The nature of the respite from constant managerial 
pressure was well understood by workers: 
"Aye, they're leaving us alone at the moment, they've got 
what they want .•• it'll start again soon though, there's 
talk of more redundancies again." (206) 
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Conclusion 
The changes in the organisation and control of the division 
of labour in the Wearside shipbuilding industry which took place 
between the time of publication of the first British Shipbuilders 
Corporate Plan in 1978 and 1988 were massive. Formal agreements 
between management and unions, which in the past had only been 
partially realised at the point of production, were implemented 
in full. Within the ten year period however there was not a 
uniform offensive waged on behalf of the management. Rather the 
key period in which the changes were "driven through" at the 
point of production began in 1983 and continued until 1987. This 
period began at the same time as the appointment of Graham Day as 
the Chairman of British Shipbuilders, and coincided with the 
"rule" of Eric Welsh as the Managing Director of Sunderland 
Shipbuilders. This is not to suggest that these men alone caused 
the rundown of the industry and the offensive for the sake of it. 
Rather they were willing to attempt to drive through changes 
in the organisation and control of labour which aimed to increase 
productivity in the context of a projected decline in state 
support. In this respect the enthusiasm with which they pursued 
their work was directly translated into a level of ferocity on 
the shop floor. A move which was seen by Robert Atkinson as 
largely pointless and one that he was unwilling to undertake. As 
he put it on the "World in Action" programme in June 1984: 
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" ••• In early April 1983 I made it clear that the problem 
was the world recession and the absurd dumping of ships by 
Korea and Japan, and the solution lay totally outside of the 
control of British Shipbuilding. It was Government, it was 
EEC and it was O.E.C.D •• " 
(Commentary) The Department (of Industry) took a different 
view and looked around for a chairman who would share that 
view. They came up with Canadian lawyer Graham Day ••. 
During the two months that they spent at British 
Shipbuilders before Sir Robert left the two men rarely spoke 
to each other. 
"I wouldn't be a party to decimating that great British 
Industry. I really believe that certain Ministers would 
like to see it run down and have nothing to do with 
Government." (207) 
This view was to prove correct. Day presided over the priv-
atisation of the warship yards, a move he himself acknowledged as 
being against the overall interests of the corporation. The 
"asset stripping" went on with the piecemeal closure or privatis-
ation of yards throughout the country. By March 1988 the Guardian 
reported that the Trade and Industry Secretary, Lord Young, was 
" ... considering removinq the safetv net of subsidies for. 
British Shipbuilders by setting a deadline for ending state 
support in a radical review of options for privati-
sation." ( 208) 
On Wearside the Sunderland Echo pronounced that the closure 
of all the yards of N.E.S.L which would surely follow the ending 
of subsidies would "rip the heart out of the town". It went on, 
"The time to organise another co-ordinated, all out campaign 
has come. We cannot afford the luxury of awaiting Govern-
ment announcements - by then it will be too late. 
Meanwhile Wearside shipyard men and 
undergoing agonies about their future. 
reached boiling point and British 
corporation could disintegrate." (209) 
their families are 
The rumours have 
Shipbuilders as a 
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Such disintegration was indeed a reality, as the Guardian noted: 
"The Government yesterday signalled the break-up of the 
state owned British Shipbuilders group, with news of 
possible buyers for the Govan yard on Clydeside, which 
employs 1,750 people and Appledore, in Devon which employs 
1, 500. 
The announcement places a question mark over the future of 
the N.E.S.L. yards at Sunderland, employing 2,500 people, 
which has run into contractual problems with its £100 
million contract to build 24 ferries for a Danish 
financier." (210) 
The breakup of what was left of British Shipbuilders will in 
all probability lead to the end of shipbuilding on the Wear. The 
selling off of the Govan yard means that there is no longer any 
pretence of the corporation being able to offer an integrated 
product range. The Wear yards are left with the capacity to 
build highly specialised tonnage; a market which whilst providing 
insulation from the fiercest of far Eastern competition is never-
theless a niche in the high risk end of a high risk industry. 
This point is underlined by the collapse of the firm which had 
ordered an oil-rig support vessel in 1987; the ship was 
eventually sold at a price well below its cost. The latest blow 
to the industry on the river was the cancellation of five of the 
24 ferries ordered by a Danish consortium. For the workers in 
the yards the anguish over these cancellations was mj xed with 
anger over the explicit reason given by the firm for the 
cancellation: the poor quality of work, with the chairman of the 
V.R. shipping company saying of the two ferries already delivered 
" ... they were so bad they had become "laughing stocks" in 
Denmark." (211) 
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It is at present doubtful whether the yards on the Wear can 
recover from this series of blows. 
This then has been the context under which the changes in 
working practices have been achieved. Organised resistance has 
been largely absent for several reasons. Firstly the nature of 
the crisis in shipbuilding led the unions to accept the changes 
largely on pragmatic grounds. Secondly the ideology of co-
operation established within the nationalised industry under the 
Labour Government could not easily be reversed, given the 
context, under the Conservative Government. Thirdly the de facto 
acceptance by the unions of voluntary redundancy ensured that the 
potential workforce solidarity would be uneven and the point at 
which to make a stand would be unclear. 
Thus it would seem to be this generation of workers in the 
yards who will bear the final conclusion of the decline of the 
British Industry which began at the turn of the nineteenth 
century. In this context the apparent acquiescence displayed by 
these workers is to be seen as "submission agreement" rather than 
"sympathetic agreement". Individually their resistance to the 
changes has been both non conflictual by intent in terms of their 
continuing tendency to assume responsibility for their work. But 
also the more overt challenges of management have been 
tenaciously resisted as an exercise in the dialectic of control 
and de-subordination. If the work has become deskilled the 
workers have not, and this survival of the craft ethos constantly 
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threatens managerial control. 
Ideologically the workers have apparently nowhere to go. 
Nationalisation has been in their experience the vehicle of their 
oppression. A feeling that you cannot fight the state, borne out 
by the result of the miners strike, again diffused the 
possibility of collective action. Yet the attacks by the 
representatives of labour on those selling their "birthright" by 
taking their redundancy is misplaced. It has been the failure of 
the labour and trades union movement to take initiatives on 
behalf of the workforce during the years of strength which has 
resulted in such an apparently easy victory for those currently 
running down the industry. Given this run-down the changes in 
the organisation of the division of labour confronted workers 
merely as an attempt at a humiliation of the "captives" before 
their final "execution". On the evidence available this seems in 
sorue respects not to be too far from the truth. In a situation 
where any resistance to the "will" of management was deemed 
illogical or deviant the aspirations of the workers were, in 
contrast, modest. As Derek Duffy of the Deptford yard put it: 
"We are not political men. All we want is the right to work 
••• All I want is to come to work, build ships, and take a 
pay packet home on a Friday night." (212) 
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both front and rear doors. Soon he was stuffing the cable 
into the hatch. As it dropped onto the coals the rubber 
ignited and the lead melted. The molten lead ran down 
finding its way through the fire bars and pattering down in 
a red molten stream into the ashcan. 
Dan gleefully pushed more and more cable in and soon 
the stove was glowing and the sweat was running down his 
face. The molten lead was by now half filling the ashcan 
and he was well on the way to having a great big ingot. The 
cabin got hotter and Dan stripped off his coat then his 
overalls. It was a bitterly cold night outside but the 
cabin was roasting. Dan was by now so engrossed as he 
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odd form of combustion the stove pipe had begun to draw 
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phone call, the fire brigade was on its way. We could hear 
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more shipyard men who had turned out to watch the 
excitement. We were just in time to see a figure hurtle out 
of the rear door. It was a cold night .•• but Dan was 
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while cursing the loss of his loot before his natural good 
nature took over. Luckily our chargeman was a man with a 
sense of humour. He knew what Dan had been up to and 
although he could not approve he warned him to watch his 
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Conclusion 
"Cartesianism has such a grip on philosophical thinking that 
opponents appear either extravagant or mad." 
The theoretical aim to which this project was addressed as 
outlined in Chapter 1 has indeed proved to be almost impossible 
to achieve in practice. Unthinking the dualism of structure and 
agency necessitates the mediation between all levels of social 
life from the individual utterance to the world system. Moreover 
to be undertaken successfully such a project needs to incorporate 
the uneven nature of temporal flow, from individual life times to 
the rise and fall of world hegemonic powers. In as far as this 
thesis has actually grappled with these issues it has merely hin-
ted at possible directions and typologies for further analysis. 
In this sense, for me personally, it will serve as a pilot study. 
It has re-emphasised how much I still need to learn and the 
responsibility that one, as a sociologist, owes to the subjects 
of study. If I have achieved nothing else in this thesis I hope I 
have provided a "sympathetic" but "realistic" account of the non-
activist worker in the Wear shipbuilding industry. Workers who 
have at times been berated both by capital, for being 
unreasonable, and by trades union officers, for not having enough 
"fight in their bellies". I hope I have sliown that both these 
views are mistaken. 
In another, more personal, sense this study has successfully 
overcome one dualism. At one point during the research I used to 
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describe this work as one of exorcism, of externalising my own 
past in order to get on with the future. Having completed this 
(stage of the) project I now evaluate far more positively the 
''role strain" I have at times experienced whilst undertaking this 
study. 
For this research was formulated out of the confrontation of 
two sources of experience. On the one hand my experience of 
higher education and academic sociology led me towards a 
literature concerning the working class and industrial organisat-
ions. On the other hand my continued location in a working class 
community, as far as my home and family life were concerned, gave 
a critical impetus to my academic studies. The objects of both 
these centres of experience were the same, namely the working 
class and the world of work. However a crucial difference lay in 
the "distance" from which these "objects" were viewed. 
The distance and detachment of much academic sociological 
study of "the class" contrasted with my participation in the 
lives of those referred to in such studies. Importantly my 
participation in the culture of my own community was not as an 
organic intellectual in the Gramscian sense. Rather than being 
concerned primarily with issues of political and industrial 
activism this environment was my home, the shipyard workers were 
my father, my brother, old school friends, mates with whom to 
relax and have a few (too many) drinks. Such relationships 
ensured that any attempts to make generic statements about '~he 
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worker~' had to be framed carefully if the authenticity of their 
lives was to be respected. 
It was this concern that led me to appraise critically the 
existing sociological work upon the shipbuilding industry. This 
criticism deepened during the pe~iod of the research itself and 
the original problematic as to why, if the workers could retain 
control over the labour process in the inter-war period, they had 
apparently totally relinquished that control with little 
resistance in the 1980s, was overly simplistic. In developing my 
analysis of shipbuilding on the Wear in the inter-war period it 
became obvious that the secondary literature was flawed in 
several respects. 
The accounts of McGoldrick and Lorenz based their analysis 
primarily on the Clyde, with some mention of the Tyne, and 
focused especially upon the introduction of the S.E.F. welding 
plan. Such analyses cannot give a basis for generalisation about 
the nature of British Shipbuilding. Their accounts of the 
conflicts surrounding the introduction of the S.E.F. welding plan 
are not convincing in relation to the industry on the river Wear. 
There are several reasons for lhis. Firstly due to differences 
in product type the timing at which the issue of welding would 
become a practical issue differed, indicating a need to under-
stand the uneven development of the industry at a national level. 
Combined with the latter point was that fact that structural 
welding was far from a universally accepted technique even 
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amongst owners themselves. Thus these two issues ensured that on 
the Wear at least the employers' offensive was largely in theory 
and not in practice. Indeed on the Wear, not only was riveting 
seen to be a far superior process, and would remain so even into 
the post-war period, but the employers remained enthusiastic 
advocates of the craft division of labour. Not only was the 
welding issue of marginal importance on the Wear, but the. 
evidence for workers resisting expropriation of control at the 
point of production is not forthcoming. On this river such 
employer attempts to expropriate control at the point of 
production are not generally in evidence. 
This raises important analytical issues for the study of the 
division of labour. Namely, that one cannot deduce the strength 
of capital or labour solely from the objective contours of the 
labour process. Such contours need to be related to the product 
market and, importantly, to the situated social action of capital 
and labour which cannot be deduced simply from their supposed 
roles implied in the personification of structural categories 
(i.e. capital and labour). This further indicates the need to 
relate the control issue within the workplace to the wider 
community and the control potential of what Alan Warde has called 
"local political hegemony" (2). 
In the context of Wear shipbuilding in the inter-war period 
such an analysis developed in Chapter 2 demonstrates the need to 
understand the moral dimension of the division of labour existent 
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within the objective and experiential unity of the work and non-
work community. In this way workers on the Wear in the inter-war 
period inhabited a single "small world" rather than a series of 
"small life-worlds" in the phenomenological sense. Thus Chapter 
2 suggests that in the inter-war period there was little evidence 
of an employer offensive aimed at attacking the craft control of 
the division of labour on the river Wear. Given the fact that 
conditions for successful capital accumulation were as bad, if 
not worse, on the Wear than elsewhere, this again suggests that 
we must be careful in linking employer offensives at the level of 
the labour process directly and immediately to conditions of 
capital accumulation. Indeed during this period and more 
especially during the Second World War it was workers on the 
river who berated employers for their conservatism in relation to 
changes in the division of labour. 
This pattern continued into the post-war period. HowP.vRr 1 
on a general level, the position of Britain as a "victorious" 
power, and the political colour of the government which initiated 
the building of the post-war consensus, ensured that Brjtish 
industry did not restructure its industrial division of labour 
(especially labour practices) to the extent of other countries. 
Moreover the event of the "long boom" produced a relatively 
stable, and growing, market demand. Conditions in which Fordist 
and constant flow techniques of production could be used to 
maximum advantage. Whilst initially the British shipbuilding 
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industry held on to an absolute level of output its relative 
decline accelerated. Furthermore the massive increase in the 
penetration of the capitalist world system brought out the 
potential for "footloose industry" and the phenomenon of rapid 
technology transfer indentified by Sabel. This implied that on a 
global scale the "efficiency" of the division of labour in 
production was of decreasing importance as the arbiter of costs 
and market success. Increasingly as the developing countries 
entered the market the costs to capital in terms of the 
reproduction of national society as a whole (including the social 
wage) became important. 
These developments held the implication of crisis for the 
British shipbuilding industry, with its "traditional" division of 
labour. However we should avoid the temptation to see the 
detailed working of these processes as the manifestation of some 
inevitable historical law. Such a view would merely replicate the 
tendency to portray the epoch of stable demand built upon the 
post-war long boom as the normal operating conditions of 
Capitalism. However with the benefit of the hindsight of the 
1970s and 1980s it becomes apparent that the period of the long 
boom may have been an exceptional period in the development of 
the capitalist world system. In this sense the triumph of 
quantity production techniques of shipbuilding in the post-war 
period and the rapid decline of the British industry may have 
rested upon exceptional conditions. Indeed, as Lorenz and 
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Wilkinson have argued, 
"European firms are now showing a distinct preference for 
less capital-intensive and more flexible methods than those 
characteristic of the 1960s, and under these conditions it 
is unclear whether large-scale specialised facilities will 
prove an advantage or a handicap." (3) 
The period of the "long boom" brought not only buoyant 
product markets but also helped to sustain relatively tight 
labour markets, particularly for skilled labour. The net effect 
of this development for the shipbuilding workers on the Wear, as 
for workers elsewhere, was a rise in prosperity. The 
consequences of this process need to be clearly stated. The 
account provided in this research suggests that a "drift" began 
to occur between the spheres of work and non-work. Most 
importantly this represented itself in a breakdown of the 
physical and geographical boundaries of shipbuilding community. 
The upshot of this was that the moral (or immoral) order of local 
political hegemony built upon the unitary experience of the work 
and non-work spheres lessened. 
In the context of greater affluence the non-work world 
became an arena in which, over time, individual life styles 
served to introduce a degree of heterogeneity into a community 
previously re-produced within the constraints of closely defined 
physical and social limits. The most manifest expression of this 
fragmentation was the increase, especially amongst skilled 
workers, of private home ownership. 
Such a process, once started, became cumulative over time 
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and when associated with other characteristics of the 
"respectable" working class, such as a tendency towards smaller 
families, the degree of fragmentation grew with each generation. 
It must be understood however that such fragmentation does not 
amount to a transformation of the non-pecuniary elements of 
class, even though the changes transformed individual life 
styles. In relation to education and other aspects of culture 
the skilled workers' reference groups remained working class (4). 
Whilst this remained so, the magnitude of the changes within the 
working class were seen in an exaggerated form from the "inside". 
What all this meant was that whilst changes were underway 
which in theory would reduce sectionalisation at work and make 
manifest a "latent proletarianisation", in the non-work situation 
pressures were operating in an opposite direction. Not only did 
advocates of the latent proletarianisation thesis (5) over-
estimate the degree to which changes at work would reduce 
sectionalism, but they also failed to grasp the increasing degree 
of fragmentation in the non-work sphere, based not only on the 
withering of the physical occupational community, but also on the 
uneven incorporation of individuals into the cash nexus. The 
implication of these processes in the work situation was an 
acceptance of a weakened determination to defend craft statuses 
as the "master status", the institutional recognition of this 
development on behalf of the trades unions was expressed in an 
increasing willingness to "sell the book" and agree to changes in 
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working practices. 
The willingness to enter into such agreements also included 
ideological changes amounting to the "new realism" of 
responsibility in the post-Geddes era and a situation in which on 
the whole more flexibility was paid for than was forthcoming at 
the point of production. Again the reason for this cannot solely 
be accounted for in terms of worker resistance or the strength of 
labour relative to capital. Rather employers did not make 
concerted attempts to introduce effective control systems which 
could overcome the more enduring forms of organisation and 
practice on the shop floor ranging from the special privileges 
accorded to particular individuals to the craft administration of 
labour as a dominant form of organisational structure. 
All this was to change however with the deepening crisis and 
the nationalisation of the whole of the British industry. The 
survival package as laid out in the first British Shipbuilders 
corporate plan of 1978 was tough enough. Redundancies and 
changes in working practices were accepted by the unions and in 
return they were reassured by the commitment to industrial democ-
racy which was stated as a primary duty of the corporation: 
" to promote industrial democracy in a strong and 
organic form in ils (the corporation's) undertakings." (6) 
This attempt to continue and develop the industrial relations 
consensus which had been the hallmark of post-war years of the 
long boom was to falter due to the severity of the slump in 
demand which now faced the shipbuilding industry, and more 
Conclusion - 497 -
graphically the election of the Conservative government in 1979 
ensured that consensus policies with regard to industry were 
largely a thing of the past. 
The break with the past consensus by the Tory government 
embraced both political and industrial elements. The form of 
nationalised organisation, the public corporation had been 
devised by the Labour party in the 1930s, its "independence" with 
board members being chosen on "grounds of ability" was meant to 
preclude its use for the pursuit of sectional interests. Such an 
objective could only work within a wider framework of political 
and industrial consensus. For as Tomlinson argued, 
" .•• the public corporations form was constructed so as to 
work for the general public interest ••• as against 
sectional interests. The weakness of this kind of justifi-
cation for non-representation of particular interests is 
that it assumes that the fact of "non-representation" will 
itself guarantee pursuit of the (unproblematic) general 
interest." (7) 
NuL unly did the Conservative governments from 1979 onwards 
re-define the general interest as involving a move away from the 
mixed economy towards private enterprise, but also within this 
overarching ideology they applied the criteria of "success'' of 
nationalised industries as involving the production of profit, 
whilst at the same time obliging them to sell off assets which 
were attractive to private enterprise. Clearly these two aims 
could not be met, privatisation of assets yet the production of 
profit in remaining centres involved a paradox which was to 
exacerbate problems of redundancies and exert greater pressure at 
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the point of production to recover in productive "efficiency" 
what had been lost in the fragmentation of overall financial 
viability. This was the context in which the managerial assault 
upon working practices took place in the 1980s. The public 
ownership of the industry initially loosened management from 
immediate market constraints whilst continuing to expose workers 
to them to an increasing extent (8). 
Objectively the potential for collective resistance to the 
assault upon working practices was low given not only the 
introduction of sophisticated control systems but also the 
massive reductions in the numbers of the workforce. The severity 
of the changes on the Wear however can only be grasped when it is 
understood that it was not only the case that reductions in the 
workforce were used as a lever to changes in working practices, 
but also that changes in working practices were used as a lever 
to ensure that ::;ulr.icient "voluntary11 redundancies were forth-
coming. In such a context the "power" of the trades unions 
appeared to have evaporated. The stewards that remained no 
longer went to the foreman's office with a smile on their faces 
eagerly anticipating another victory. More often they were to 
reply to a worker's grievance "there's nothing I can do about 
it!". Workers' commitment towards trades unionism on the shop 
floor was continually kept in check by the inability of the 
stewards to get results. A fundamental aspect of the cumulative 
power of the trades unions had been thrown into reverse. 
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"For the nature of power is ... like to fame, increasing as 
it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the 
further they go, make sti 11 the more haste." ( 9) 
Not only was the objective basis n f trades union "power" dealt a 
severe blow in the 1980s, with loose labour markets and mass 
unemployment, but also their inability successfully to articulate 
the concerns of their members at work reduced their appeal, for: 
"Reputation of power,. is Power; because it draweth with it 
the adherence of those that need protection." (10) 
The irony of the situation should not be lost upon us. The 
effective power of capital to pursue changes in the labour 
process was all the more enhanced by the fact that it was state 
capital in its nationalised form which "drove through" the 
changes. Moreover the unions in the yards who, in some cases, 
such as the boilermakers, had advocated nationalisation of the 
industry consistently in the post-war period, were now 
apparently helpless to resist a vicious onslaught at the point of 
production. 
It would be wrong however to finish this account implying 
that there had been a total collapse of control on behalf of the 
shipbuilding workers on the Wear. The feeling of despondency 
amongst the remaining workforce is hard to overstate. 
Ideologically they have nowhere to go. The unions are seen as 
ineffective, and nationalisation (seen by many as equivalent to 
socialism) does not work to their interests as perceived from 
"the present". Nevertheless quiescence should not be mistaken for 
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total submission. Resistanc& to the impoGJit!on of mBn~ag®riml 
power continues, its form is that of de-subordination, its 
application is "subversjve" with respect to managerial objectives 
even when it emerges as a concern to get the job done. At such 
times the importance of craft sectionalisation re-emerges even 
though the changes in production technique identified by R.K. 
Brown et al are well established. This again points to the fact 
that the intersubjective disposition of the workforce cannot be 
deduced from the overt contours of the physical division of 
labour. 
The second half of our initial problematic is clearly in 
need of restating then. The collapse of craft control in the 
1980s is not total, its submersion is one of degree and is 
temporally contingent. Control needs to be asserted and re-
asserted over time, the first wave of the managerial offensive in 
the yards on the Wear which took place between 1982 and 1986 
appeared to carry all before it, however as the failure of the 
four set, three shift working pattern demonstrated, resistance 
had not disappeared. Similarly the breakdown of the new system 
when under pressure illustrates that managerial control is not 
omnipotent. Whilst it could be objected that the re-emergence of 
older patterns of working is a temporary feature of a 
transitional period, it seems likely that such re-assertion of 
older working practices will survive as long as the industry 
itself does on the Wear. The important point to be noled then is 
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not necessarily the collapse of craft control in the Wear yards 
in the 1980s, but rather, given the ferocity of the managerial 
onslaught and paucity of the objective resources for resistance, 
the notable feature is that resistance continues. A resistance 
that owes as much to a workforce desire to get the job done as it 
does to more directly oppositional forms of protest such as the 
wit.hdrawal of labour. 
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The Nature of the Wearside Bor~ing Class~ 
To~ards a More Comple~ Problematic 
One of the central themes running through the whole of this 
project has been an attempt to understand the nature of the 
workers in Wearside shipyards. This concern framed the initial 
problematic in relation to the secondary literature on the inter-
war period and re-emerges several times in attempting to 
explicate the changes occurring between then and now. The 
complexities of the issues involved cannot be neatly summarised 
in a conclusion, but hopefully do emerge from a full reading of 
my account. Rather than attempting a summary I will conclude by 
I 
addressing some of the views of the working class presented 
implicitly or explicitly by others, in the light of my study of 
Wearside. Again, my aim is not to prove other accounts wrong, but 
rather to raise issues which demand an understanding in order to 
appreciate the full comrtexitics of class. 
The work of Lorenz and McGoldrick on Clydeside shipbuilding 
has already been dealt with to some extent. T.heir inversion of 
Braverman's passive view of labour on the basis of the objective 
contours of the labour process must be qualified by two factors. 
Firstly the locality of their study must be taken into account. 
Clydeside, and to a lesser extent Tyneside, have particular 
political cultures which in the inter-war period could not be 
assumed as characteristic of Wearside. The heterogeneity of local 
political hegemony must be addressed if the inter-subjective as 
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well as the more objective issues of class are to be dealt with. 
An issue of greater criticism with respect to their work is 
the sources through which their accounts are established. A 
reliance upon Employers and Union minutes and events around which 
industrial action occurred screen out the more routine processes 
of the reality of class at work, and the complexities of the 
inter-subjective views of the non-activist worker are given no 
voice. This approach ignores any reference to moral frameworks 
of meaning through which elements of hierarchy may be accepted 
upon pragmatic grounds, or even deemed legitimate to some extent. 
Moreover in neglecting the non-work context, these studies 
neglect the extent to which class was reproduced in a unitary 
fashion across the work-non-work divide. The resources for 
possible struggle at work were reproduced in what was, on Wear-
side at least, a strictly ordered society. The "small world" of 
the occupational community may have upheld the dignity of the 
"working man", but as the women who experienced work in the yards 
in wartime testified, for them such work was seen as a form of 
liberty relative to the more restrictive routine of the non-work 
community. The radical potential and traditions of the inter-war 
working class should be seen in its context relative to the 
rigidities, produced from both within and outside, of the 
community. Whilst it is perhaps true that the "class" had a 
greater sense of identity during this period than subsequently, 
it should not be thought that this identity was, in total, 
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autonomously created. In some ways the coherence of the identity 
was a product of the rigidities surrounding the community. Such 
an identity could, given other factors, facilitate a radical 
response, but equally such an identity could merely indicate the 
rigidly structured subaltern position of the class. We must not 
then mistake coherence and identity for radical self assertion, 
·and sensitivity to life styles and language (ll) must also guide 
our appreciation of the inter-war working class. Such an 
approach, linked to one that does not assume that the inter-
subjective disposition of even a section (i.e. male workers) of 
the class can be deduced from the existent contours of the labour 
process must be adopted if we are to avoid producing an unreal 
"benchmark" against which to assess the working class in the 
post-war period. 
Indeed it is this change from the working class of the 
inter-war period inhabiting the "small world" of the occupational 
community to the post-war working class inhabiting the "small 
life worlds" of "modern society" that has led some theorists to 
talk of the integration of the working class or even of its 
disappearance altogether. Early versions of the integration 
hypothesis, such as that of Marcuse in "One Dimensional Man" 
emphasised how the working class, particularly in the USA, had 
been "bought off" by "successful" capitalism. Such accounts 
emphasised the ability of capitalism to overcome limitations of 
the market by creating the warfare/we! fare state. Underpinning 
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these accounts was the view that the economic conditions of the 
long boom were now the norm. 
However with the collapse of the long boom, and the re-
emergence of the cyclical tendency of boom and slump, it seemed 
that the institutionalisation of the working class was no longer 
conditional upon the material success of capitalism. Gorz, for 
one, bid a non too fond "Farewell to the Working Class". Others, 
such as Seabrook and Blackwell, continued the earlier themes of 
the incorporation. Thus in their account of "The Working Class 
in the 1980s" they suggest that: 
" M a r gar e t Thatch e r sensed the "s e a change" that was 
occurring at the heart of the working class, and she 
believed that it was sufficiently advanced for her to be 
abJe to detach large sections of the working class from an 
allegiance, which had become enfeebled, to organised labour 
and its movement. She could accomplish this the more 
convincingly because capitalism itself had been transformed 
from satanic mill to shopping mall, from an irrational and 
inhuman system which inflicted suffering and deprivation 
into a sagacious and beneficent means of distribl!ting the 
good things of life." (12) 
Their account seems plausible because it resonates to some 
of the populist portrayals of the "feeling" of the class 
available in any letters page of local newspapers or snatches of 
conversations overheard on bus journeys, and indeed these form 
some of the sources used by Seabrook. Yet such a view, 
characterised by its clarity and coherence, remains a view from 
outside of the class. In some senses it merely inverts the 
failings of Lorenz and McGoldrick. Where they concentrated on 
the work situation to the neglect of the non-work situation, 
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Seabrook does the opposite. Where they focus upon the activis1: 
worker and situations where capital and labour "confront" each 
other, Seabrook does the opposite. There are similarities as well 
however, - both approaches appear to deduce, in a rather simple 
fashion, the inter-subjective disposition of the class from the 
objective contours of aggregate formations. ~or Lorenz and 
McGoldrick the existent form of the labour process implies a 
strong labour force actively struggling to retain control. For 
Seabrook the success of Thatcherism at the ballot box is 
indicative of change occurring at the "heart of the wo.rking 
class". Ironically Seabrook's account would harmonise well with 
those of Lorenz and McGoldrick, each the p.olar opposite of the 
other. The active working class of the inter-war period becomes 
transformed into the fragmented, pacified class of the 1980s. 
Both views hold some truth, but neither can be seen as a 
definitive account, they are partial accounts masquerading as a 
general truth. On this point the work of Seabrook is more at 
fault than that of the other two authors. His inversion of their 
tendency to portray workers as being engaged in active struggle 
is pursued with dedication. As Bey~on has noted, his skills as a 
writer are used to overcome his partial presentation. Those 
skills are indeed great, as his account of Sunderland 
demonstrates: 
"Sunderland. The river opens the town, a deep wound in its 
granite base, and the cliffs glitter like silver beneath the 
grass that partly covers them." (13) 
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An evocative portrayal? and yet one which immediately puts 
someone from Sunderland on their guard as to the thoroughness of 
the research. Sunder land has a 1 i mestone base, not granite! A 
small point? maybe, but as his account of the town and the people 
in it unfolds the accuracy of his geological description can be 
seen as similar to his social description. The unemployed in the 
town are seen as turning to crime, or sexual fantasy, their every 
day life being one of degradation. The concluding paragraph is 
given over to the words of Dave? 
"I'm very right-wing. There's too man)l people in the nick 
who ought to be at the end of a rope. You go and do a bank, 
spill blood like it was milk, only eight or ten years. It's 
ridiculous. I've got no time for worrying about mankind, 
I'm too busy worrying about myself. I think everybody is 
selfish, everybody is out for himself. All our brothers! 
What brothers? I don't believe it. What happens in Asia, 
Africa, that's their fucking bad luck. And when they come 
here, give them hand-outs, offer them houses. It's asking 
for trouble if you can't house your own people. I don't 
believe in unions - the only union I believe in is a guy and 
a chick coming together for a good fuck; I don't worry about 
the bumb either; the only big bang I'm concerned about is 
the one I might get tonight." (14) 
The selectivity of Seabrook's account is again an inversion 
of those radical academics who wish to portray the working class 
as inherently revolutionary but always subject to betrayal by 
their leaders. Because he has consigned the "older" traditions 
of working class self-support to the dustbin of history he does 
not look for any signs of its continued existence. He polarises 
the class into those who have work and are "doing alright thank 
you very much", and those who are deemed to have fallen into a 
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state of absolute degradation, both groups paying a one dimen-
sional homage to the cult of commercial culture. He is happy with 
programmatic statements from individuals, such as the one quoted, 
and having confirmed his "theory" he leaves to re-confirm it 
somewhere else. He does not ask the question as to whether the 
totalising statements produced in an interview situation with a 
stranger actually relate to the processual life style of these 
individuals. Neither does he see the other working class people 
in the town: fathers who still take their sons fishing; women on 
the estates who club together to get trips to the beach organised 
during summer holidays; teenagers amassing skill and knowledge in 
dismantling (and re-assembling) motor bikes; reciprocal 
arrangements for child care between families; the coming together 
of communities in the face of some tragedy. In short his account 
is too simple, it catches only one, undeniable, element in 
contemporary working class life but it does not hear the "douhlP. 
tongued signs" that are still there for those that will listen. 
Seabrook claims to portray the reality of working class life 
in the post war period and to listen to the voices that Labour 
politicians have been deaf to. Yet his portrayal of the '~ammon 
man" (and, to a lesser extent, woman) ends up as condescension. 
"We are left with a view of the working class which gives no 
place to popular culture as an imminent, dynamic form and 
this elitist adjudication of cultural practice weighs 
heavily upon the account." (15) 
The view of the shipyard workers on Wearside produced in 
this study is not to be seen as a general definition of the 
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working class. However any such definitive statements about the 
class must take into account such particular portrayals. The aim 
then is the promotion of an adequate understanding of lhe 
complexities involved in such attempts at general accounts rather 
than the provision of such an account here. Nevertheless it is 
possible to make some comments which engage with more general 
debates even on the basis of such a particular study. 
Firstly, whatever the material gains that have been made by 
workers on Wearside in the post-war period it would seem that 
those gains are very vulnerable. Such vulnerability is still a 
feature of working class life, in the absence of occupational 
pensions and the vicissitudes of manual work, to an extent not 
experienced by those in more middle class occupations. Perhaps 
more importantly however is the continuance of cultural 
inequality. The reproduction of inequality through generations, 
via the mechanisms of the education system and the attitudes 
enshrined therein, ensure that cultural capital remains unequally 
distributed. In this environment we have not, despite some 
individual indicators, said "Farewell to the Working Class". 
Present quiescence should not be mistaken for integration or 
harmony. Pragmatic conditions indicate against active outbursts, 
but, if a widespread boom was to occur, as some suggest, in the 
1990s (16) horizons would again rise and the reference group may 
become "those above" rather than "those below". 
The basis of such potential activism stems not from any 
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direct symbiosis between the working class and the labour 
movement. Indeed its form may not be associated with the 
official labour movement. But one thing this study of the ship-
yards on the Wear has brought home to me is that the position of 
these workers under capitalism remains one of "de-subordination". 
Surely, the pattern is complicated by the asymmetry which has 
developed between the work and non-work spheres, yet whilst most 
workers on the Wear do not, and cannot afford to, dwell on the 
issue they know that somewhere along the line they are getting 
"ripped off". When this realisation cannot be ignored and even 
"fantasy equality" 0 7) cannot be sustained some leave the yards, 
others, under the force of the cash nexus or the work ethic, 
remain. One thing is certain however, and that is that whatever 
happens to the shipyards on the Wear the present generation of 
t•JOrker:::: L'~i ll not forget how management kicked them when they were 
down; as to how they respond to that experience in the future, 
that is less clear. 
"For these workers experience the class struggle every day 
of their lives. If, in the way they cope with it, they 
produce a politically confused situation that's just too 
bad. Radical intellectuals may put their hands to their 
heads in despair but that doesn't help either." (18) 
Ideally this conclusion should finish here. However by way 
of a post script I should perhaps return to the issue of the 
relationship of the ''theory" outlined in Chapter 1 to the rest of 
this study. If, on reading the first chapter, one expected that 
it would provide a strict theoretical framework into which the 
Conclusion - 511 -
more empirical data could be slotted, disappointment with the 
work as a whole will most likely have followed. In my own 
defence I wish to re-emphasi se that it was never my desire to 
construct an all-embracing formal theoretical structure. 
Rather, the aim of the first chapter was to engage with 
existing the?retical approaches in a positive (opportunistic?) 
way to develop their strengths in as far as they could handle the 
interpenetration of structure and agency, and yet to purge them 
of any tendency towards a positivistic theoretical imperialism. 
What I saw this as providing was a perspective rather than a 
logical, but static, framework. I hope I have written this study 
in a way which admits a reflexive interaction between theory and 
empirical data. I have tried to respect the meanings implied by 
the actors and yet to contextualise the action within the 
contexts of multifarious flows of temporality, location and 
culture. Contexts enabling as well as constraining, produced and 
experienced. 
Finally I hope the "perspective" has allowed for the intro-
duction of some of the aspects of social reality often neglected 
by sociologists - those of feelings. The actors are human, not 
just "cultural dopes", or even aggressive economic "men", 
although at times they may approximate these caricatures, they 
have feelings, hopes, fears, desires and "standards". They can 
be seen at times as their own worst enemies, or at others as 
their own severest critics. As an individual I have learned a 
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lot from "analysing the behCJviour of my subjects". Not only 
about their social relations and situations, but at a more 
personal level about the dangers of gauging human behaviour 
against an inflexible rule of coherence or "rationality". In 
short I have learned a lot about dignity, a phenomenon which 
cannot always be dismissed with reference to false consciousness. 
These lessons, which have been of profound importance to me both 
as a person and social scientist, have, I believe, been learnt 
all the more easily because of the relatively loose perspective 
which I developed and modified over the course of this project. 
When I see a welder striking up an arc on the Wear I see a 
person who may be working due to direct control or because of an 
internalised "responsible autonomy". I see a era ftsman, hierarch-
ically removed from labourers and demarked from other trades, 
although he may share leisure pursuits with men from either 
group. I see iLis use of a technology adopted relatively late on 
the river. I see a man worried about the future, and I see the 
massive shifts in the geographical location of industry on a 
global scale. I see his home region in relation to the rest of 
the country and ultimately the cleavage between the advanced 
world and developing nations. I see a man who had, as a child, a 
particular experience of the education system and parental advice 
about the world that played a part in his "choice" of career. I 
see then an individual, but through his life I see a society, 
human society. Its totality is there in a series of presences 
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and absences of the present and the past, of human being and 
striving of the absolute and the relative. This is what the 
perspective I developed in Chapter 1 tries to do, it attempts to 
"ground" the sociological imagination for the purposes of this 
study. This was the aim; as to whether I have succeeded in this 
to any degree is not for me to say. 
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the "Agency" of the Thatcher Government. 
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looking at the inter-war period is just how much the 
"official" language of newspapers has changed. The use of 
class labels (i.e. lower class, working class etc.) appeared 
frequently in reports in the Sunderland Echoes of the inter-
war years. The disappearance of such labels in the post-war 
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the more "objective" indicators of class, but does hold 
important i mpl icat ions for the external production of the 
rigidities of class identity. 
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with a small boat was required to ship "goods'' down the 
river rather than walking out of the gate with them. On 
fantasy equality, see: 
Ditton, J. and Brown, R. "Why don't they revolt? 
"Invisible Income" as a neglected dimension of Runciman's 
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AIPPENDIX 1 
Table I Leading building ports in 1790-l and 1804-5 and 18145 
1790-1 1804-5 1814 
peace years war years 
tonna~e tonna~e tonna!!!je 
London 16,372 12,680 
Newcastle* 12,444 15,054 (1st) 8,481 
Whitby 11,753 9,950 3,813 
Hull 8,193 10,839 7,926 
Liverpool 6,710 4,154 3,896 
SUNDERLAND 3,951 14,198 (2nd) 14,330 (1st) 
Whitehaven 3,630 6,750 4,711 
Bri::;tol 3~071 1~h::>3 
Total: English ports 104,010 127,901 
Scotland 18,817 23,306 
G. Britain 82,855 
* these figures are for the Tyne and at least half of this output 
would have been in the County of Durham. 
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TABLE XXXI 
Tonnage commenced, launched, and under construction at 
the end of each quarter, 1920-39 ('000 gross tons) 
Under I Under 
Date Commenced Launched construction Date Commenced lAunched construction 
---
1920 I 708 454 3,394 1930 I 427 345 1,615 
II 589 523 3,570 II 230 468 1,392 
III 594 483 3,731 Jli 161 379 1,117 
IV 506 . 580 3,709 IV 132 297 909 
1921 I 393 433 3,799 1931 I 33 146 694 
II 69 322 3,530 II 23 170 556 
Ill 51 308 3,283 III 39 80 417 
IV 55 467 2,640 IV 105 71 401 
1922 I 51 334 2,236 1932 I 26 35 373 
II 39 149 1,920 II 28 69 281 
Ill 82 307 1,617 III II 48 238 
IV 231 261 1,469 IV 7 39 225 
1923 I 335 228 1,492 1933 I 77 13 252 
II 241 239 1,338 II 50 II 288 
Ill 112 66 1,271 III 40 42 304 
IV 245 115 1,395 IV 75 65 332 
1924 I 228 362 1,474 1934 I 203 35 481 
II 375 365 1,517 II 147 36 587 
Ill 253 360 1,468 III 77 183 604 
IV 195 353 1,297 IV 93 207 597 
1925 I 202 339 1.165 1935 I 144 106 556 
II 190 298 1,094 II 108 116 560 
III 261 225 1,009 Ill 119 113 531 
IV 161 216 885 IV 311 132 743 
1926 I 193 191 843 1936 I 233 194 842 
II 168 172 841. II 282 168 849 
1ll 68 208 775 Ill 293 212 929 
IV 152 68 760 IV 273 280 964 
1927 I 580 128 1,217 1937 I 253 176 1,014 
II 437 269 1,390 II 368 253 1,200 
Ill 370 356 1,536 III 219 266 1,185 
IV 377 499 1,580 IV 217 223 1,125 
1928 I 342 407 1,441 1938 I 173 179 1,089 
II 279 403 1,203 II 157 286 1,037 
Ill 245 388 1,090 Ill 87 309 885 
IV 432 246 1,243 IV 88 241 780 
1929 I 362 270 1,357 1939 I 71 158 591 
!I 428 393 1,454 II 402 138 791 
Ill 360 369 1,448 
IV 499 473 1,560 
\' 
~ 
,I 
.. _ J., 
I-. 
TABLE I 
LAUNQ-IINGS OF SHIPS OVER 100 g.r.t. EJCO.UDING WARSHIPS 
Source: Lloyd's Register of Shipping 
UK 
% 
UK Export NORTH EASr 
UK WORLD %of Launch- %of 
YEAR Nos. Tons Nos. Tons World ings Nos. Tons World 
1892 681 1,109,950 1051 1,358,o4s 8q 251 570,296 41·9 
1893 536 836,383 846 1,026,741 81·4 192 431,405 41·9 
1894 614 1,o46,5o8 932 1,323,538 79·0 252 544.768 41·1 
1895 579 950,967 88o 1,218,160 78·0 222 497.564 40·8 
r896 696 I,I59,751 III3 r,s67,882 74•0 280 611,727 39·0 
r897 591 952,486 990 1,331,924 71·4 236 498.594 37'4 
1898 761 1,367.570 1290 1,893.343 72·3 299 763,825 40•0 
1899 726 1,4I6,791 1269 2,121,738 66·7 276 766,282 36·0 
1900 692 1,442,471 1364 2,304,163 62·5 23·0 264 794.300 34•4 
1901 639 1,524,739 1538 2,617,539 58·2 23·0 279 872,723 33'4 
1902 694 1,427,558 1650 2,502,755 57·0 19·0 258 701,005 28·0 
1903 697 1,190,618 1650 2,145,631 55·5 20•0 252 581,343 27·0 
1904 712 1,205,162 1643 1,987.935 62·0 19•0 257 671,580 33·7 
1905 795 1,623,168 1576 2,514,922 64·5 21·5 276 872,314 34·6 
1906 886 1,828,343 1836 2,919,763 62·6 20·3 334 1,005,148 37'4 
1907 841 1,6o7,89o 1788 :z,778,o88 s8·o 34•1 297 817,510 29•4 
1908 523 929,669 1405 1,833,286 50•7 40•3 154 355,859 19•3 
1909 526 991,o66 1063 1,6o2,057 62·0 24•4 197 434,810 27·1 
1910 sao 1,143,169 1277 1,957.853 58·4 19•5 196 578,315 29·5 
1911 772 1,803,844 1599 2,65o,r4o 68-o 22·4 331 977,278 36·8 
1912 712 1,738,514 1719 2,901,769 6o-o 23·9 267 888,683 30·6 
1913 688 1,932,153 1750 3.332,882 s8·o 21•7 267 974,109 29·2 
1914 656 1,683,553 1319 2,852,753 59•0 24•4 262 8s4.6g7 30•0 
1915 327 650,919 743 1,201,638 54·2 14·75 IIO 352,825 29•2 
1916 306 6o8,235 964 1,688,o8o 36·0 108 353.445 20•9 
1917 286 1,162,896 1112 2,937.786 39·6 !.36 6I !/~JJ 20·8 
1918 301 r,348,rao 1866 5.447.444 24•7 162 736,858 13·5 
1919 612 r,62o,w 2483 7,144,549 22·6 6·0 184 716,295 10·0 
1920 6r8 2,055,624 1759 5,861,666 35·0 41•0 210 948.902 16·s 
1921 426 1,538,052 1379 4.356,843 35•3 38·5 137 662,753 15·2 
1922 235 1,031,081 852 2,467,084 41·8 26·0 90 432,137 17·4 
1923 222 645,651 701 1,643,181 39·2 2•9 89 255.542 15•5 
1924 494 1,439,885 924 2,247.751 64·1 15·3 202 631,258 28·0 
1925 342 1,084,633 855 2,193.404 49•5 16·4 roB 382,8ss 17·4 
221 
UK l MERCHANT Sl-IJPPJNG LAUNOU:S IN THE NORTH EAST 
% Source: Lloyd's Register 
UK Export NORTH EASf 
UK WORLD % of Launch- % uf 
YEAR Nos. Tons Nos. Tom World mgs Nos. Tons World I flartlepool Middiesbrough 
tmd Whitby and Stockton Newcastle Sunderland TOTALS 
1926 197 639,568 6oo 1,674,977 38-2 14-0 57 198,979 1 1·8 No. g.r.t. No. g.r.t. No. g.r.t. No. g.r.t. No. g.r.t. 
1927 371 1,225,873 802 2,285,679 53·6 21·8 129 567,197 24·8 ~ ----~ 
1928 420 1,445.920 869 2,699,239 53·6 20·2 163 641,120 23·9 
1929 489 1,522,623 1012 2,793,210 54·5 17-1 199 679,321 24-8 1892 36 98,623 46 103,725 94 181,508 75 186,44o 251 57o,:zy6 
1930 481 1,478,563 1084 2,889,472 51-2 44-o 141l 6o8,476 21-o 1893 28 79,120 46 89,707 70 144,261 48 I18,317 192 431,4o5 
1931 148 502,487 596 1,617,II5 31-1 40·7 35 168,796 10·4 1894 3° 81,839 45 104,071 106 11)0,601 71 168,257 252 544,768 
1932 100 187,794 307 726,591 25·8 31•2 30 72,252 9·9 !895 37 95,8l9 47 115,003 86 161,476 52 125,266 222 497,564 
1933 108 133,115 330 489,016 27-2 9-1 2] 37,419 7.5 !896 29 82,093 63 I12,932 103 200,746 85 215,956 280 6ll,727 
1934 173 459,877 536 96?.419 47·5 10·2 40 66,717 6-8 x897 25 6s,686 38 88,827 113 169,58s 6o 174,496 236 498,594 
1935 185 499,0II 649 1,302,080 38-3 12·8 4J 134,929 IO·J 1898 44 125,791 51 14°,729 120 238,551 84 258,754 299 763,825 
1936 328 856,257 999 2,117,924 40·4 10-9 9G 340,922 16-1 1899 41 128,o34 51 146,599 112 249,038 72 242,611 276 766,282 
1937 309 920,822 1101 2,690,580 34·2 13·5 96 341,199 12·6 19°0 4° qo,623 44 144,164 110 265,142 70 244,371 264 794,300 
1938 2(ry 1,030,375 IH9 3,033,593 34·0 19-8 87 398,100 13·1 I90I 41 I50,607 46 161,058 II6 292,989 76 268,069 279 872,723 
1939 201 629,705 941 2,539,424 24·8 19°2 21 8l,824 40 108,230 130 280,860 67 230,091 258 ?OI,oo5 
1940 229 842,910 495 1,754,198 48·1 I903 2 8 8o,8o8 39 91,675 125 219,360 60 181),500 252 581,343 
1941 245 1,185,894 510 2,491,173 47-6 19°4 31 96,154 38 110,236 116 236,055 72 229,135 257 671,58o 
1942 273 1,270,714 1300 7,815,369 16·4 19°5 36 124,006 40 132,748 126 310,391 94 305,169 276 872,314 
1943 243 1,136,8o4 2078 13,884,776 8-o I906 44 144,603 44 147,857 149 385,987 97 326,701 334 1005,148 
1944 279 919,357 1738 11,169,503 8·1 19°7 28 94,469 48 138,621 131 292,814 90 291,606 297 817,510 
1945 307 893,515 1326 7,192,679 12·7 2·03 u: 433,758 6-1 1908 13 37,843 18 57,210 83 174,259 40 86,547 154 355,859 
1946 314 111201526 6go 2,114,702 53·3 10·2 IO'J 509,995 23·9 19°9 l8 57,712 27 62,492 95 182,235 57 132,371 197 434,810 
1947 343 1,192,759 787 2,102,621 56·9 31·6 IOJ 474.842 22·6 I9IO 23 86,295 44 I08,754 69 203,831 6o 179.435 196 578,315 
1948 342 1,176,346 872 2,309,743 50·9 34·9 IOj 500,681 21·6 l91l 34 135.557 95 141,934 117 412,959 85 286,828 331 977,278 
1949 320 1,26],467 926 3,131,805 40·5 41-2 96 531,121 16-7 j 1912 3° 121 ·725 71 143,570 86 317,6H So 305,734 267 888,681 
1950 275 1,324,570 1013 3,492,876 38-o 33·3 82 538,956 15-4 1913 33 153,071 62 154,743 94 366,331 78 299,964 267 974,1o9 
1951 261 •• 341,o24 1022 3,642,564 36-8 44.9 77 616,894 16-9 I 1914 29 124.419 70 137,165 91 315,585 72 277,528 262 854,6<n 
1952 254 1,302,548 1074 4,395,578 29·6 31·8 72 540,333 12·5 !9!5 I3 59,3o8 3° 58,574 36 124,001 31 IIo,94:z IIO 352,82S 
1953 220 1,317,463 1143 5,096,050 25·9 27·7 7] 612,110 12·0 , I9I 6 II 54,295 27 31,342 35 133,336 35 134,472 108 353,445 
1954 253 1,408,874 1233 5,252,631 26-8 34·2 72 576,111 10·9 1917
1 
l3 65,622 2J 109,306 52 231,907 48 204,398 IJ6 6n,233 
1955 276 1,473,937 1437 5,314,850 27·7 36·6 75 623,970 I I-7 l9IS 25 I00,4I3 24 I09,298 55 266,594 58 260,553 162 736,858 
1956 275 1,383,387 IBIS 6,670,218 20•7 31·4 7~ 639.304 9·5 1919 20 82,233 36 119.943 64 239,836 64 274,283 184 716,295 
1957 26o 1,413,701 1950 8,501,404 16-6 xB·s 72 6z4,x87 7·3 '920 16 73•221 44 195.452 83 365,775 67 314,454 210 948,9o2 
1958 282 1,401,980 1936 9,269,983 15·1 24·1 7a 688,626 7·4 1921 6 34,IOI 28 129,559 73 354,813 30 144,280 137 662,753 
1959 274 1,372,595 18o8 8,745,704 15-7 8-4 70 6n8,581 7·1 1922 4 18,822 17 45,814 42 240,788 27 126,713 90 432,1 37 
x96o 253 1,331,491 2020 8,356,444 15-9 n-o 66 61 4,98o 1·2 1923 s 23,864 23 42!709 44 137,408 17 51,561 89 z55 ,542 
1961 247 1,191,758 1990 7,94o,oo5 IS·OI 23-6 6r 568,442 7-1 '924 14 55,8o4 s6 105,707 76 275,672 56 194,075 202 631,258 
1962 187 1,072,513 1901 s,374,754 12-8 15.4 41) 461,42o 5.5 1925 9 37,874 2 5 s8,786 5' 194,614 23 91,581 108 3s2,s55 
1963 16o 927,649 2001 s,53s,513 1o-9 3o-6 3,1 44o, 171 5·1 1926 3 14,8 14 2' 22,361) 25 126,6o9 s 35,187 57 1911,979 
1964 179 1,042,576 21 47 w,z63,8o3 10-1 , 4.3 4.; 53o,xo8 5.• 1927 13 6s,s88 18 64,783 61 274,056 37 162,77o 129 567,1 97 
1965 158 I,o7J,074 228o 12,215,817 8-8 12·7 3) 455,120 3·7 1928 9 39,743 33 93,223 70 3oo,5o8 so 207,646 162 641,120 
222 223 
Table Il-continued TABLE IH 
MERCANTILE WORK IN HAND IN GROSS TONS 
Hartlepoo/ Middlesbrough Source: Lloyd's Register of Shippi11g and Whitby and Stockton Newcastle Sunderland TOTALS 
No. g.r.t. No. g.r.t. No. g.r.J. No. g.:·.J. No. g.r.l. 
llart/epool Middlesbrough 
1929 IS 7o,385 61 91,824 6s 271,6o1 s8 245.511 199 679,321 and Whitby and Stockto1l Newcasr/e Su11der/and 
1930 14 39.481 40 71,935 54 323,750 40 173,306 148 6o8,476 
1931 - - 9 38,990 19 120,992 7 8,814 35 t68,796 
1932 7 31,9ll 14 13,487 7 24,,226 2 2,628 30 72,252 1910 
1933 - - 14 14,685 4 11,033 5 H,701 23 37,419 June JOth 65,28J 70,967 19·h5J7 108,5oo 1934 2 1,100 21 16,2j8 9 30,169 8 19,210 40 66,717 September Joth 54,048 65,648 204,016 I09,27J 1935 2 10,228 14 12,582 19 80,736 8 31,382 43 134.928 December JISt 42,IJ5 74.587 206,692 126,897 1936 9 41,015 40 51,667 21 109,441 36 138,799 96 340,922 19ll 
1937 IO 43,6I5 30 39.740 18 102,121 38 155.723 96 341,199 i March JISt 69,4JO 76,408 241,159 I56,80J 1938 II 47,633 16 39.569 25 141,897 35 169,oo1 87 398,100 June JOith 69,506 86,649 246,504 September JOth 51,686 8H,908 I95,104 255.247 I85,8o8 WAR YEARS December JISt 64,J5J 68,J57 240,913 I94,648 1912 
1945 10 45,270 15 50,342 37 122,635 49 2IS-5II Ill 433.758 March JISt 78,2JO 84,077 261,471 201,050 1946 13 46,653 14 87,279 35 184,052 45 192,0ll 107 509.995 June JOth 101,582 1947 II 43.309 16 56,o72 35 185,914 41 189:547 103 474,842 September JOth 
88,842 JI0,529 214,062 
1948 12 40,443 25 75.348 30 206,845 38 178,045 105 soo,681 December Jist 
97.725 91,196 J20,843 2ll0,105 
1949 7 27,96? 22 104,075 30 217,971 37 18L 108 96 531,121 98,844 108,40J J 12,763 2J2,I8o 
1950 7 35.693 19 105,344 22 2o6,5o1 34 191:418 82 538,956 1913 
1951 9 50,5o6 16 125,556 24 243,499 28 197,333 77 616,894 March JISt 106,8o5 108,210 JJ5,J 10 245,674 1952 8 45.347 13 122,756 25 201,338 26 170,892 72 540,333 June JOtiiJ. 88,518 106,980 JI2,62o 2J8,o8o 
1953 6 29,18o IJ 153,544 27 234,714 27 194:6?2 73 612,ll0 September JOth 81,502 100,973 297,250 2]6,450 1954 7 45.891 II 125,076 28 214,967 26 H)O,I77 72 576,u1 December J 1st 8o,63o 91.404 J02,J75 2]1,220 1955 6 32,665 10 130,776 30 238,146 29 222,383 75 623,970 1914 
1956 6 39.916 10 129,120 27 259,391 29 210,877 72 639.304 March JISt 8J,750 8J,JI5 JI9,227 204,066 1957 5 38,238 10 111,877 29 263,274 28 210,798 72 624,187 June JOth 85,4o6 82,504 285,157 1958 5 39,143 II 131,303 32 249,837 30 268,343 78 688,626 September JOth 79,88o 69,258 
172,10J 
1959 3 20,305 7 92,875 32 257,874 28 247:527 70 618,581 J02,8JI 191,064 
1900 2 23,503 7 120,959 34 262,085 23 208,433 66 614,980 December JISt 71,6!0 72,035 267,226 187,051 
1961 2 19,559 5 95,628 27 193.942 27 259.313 61 568,442 1915 
1962 - - 3 50,275 22 196,790 21 214,355 46 461,420 March JISt 61,830 86,915 J00,997 161,342 1963 - - 5 81,830 IS 154,355 16 203-986 36 440,171 June Joth 71,J50 8],165 270,854 162,8J6 1964 - - 7 72,047 20 226,533 18 231,528 45 530,108 September Joth 73.530 85,855 26J,59I 176,685 1965 - - 2 43.513 18 158,930 16 252,677 36 455,120 December JISt 6o,64o 60,475 260,546 16],639 1916 
March JISt 72,800 4J.405 294,H6 169,I29 Notes: June JOth 69,625 5I,670 310,577 197,J59 1 In 1918 Whitby figures were included with those of .M.iddlet.brough ami Stockton September 30th 72 ,275 76,480 401,926 220,004 
rather than with Hartlepool 19IJ 
• Some small sailing vessels built by Nonh East in this period, :Jut negligible 
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Midd/esbrough 
Hartle pool Stockton Middlesbrough 
only and Whitby Newcastle Sunderland 
I 
I Stockton I 
1918 I Hart/epoo/ a,zd Whitby Newcastle Sunderland 
June JOth 9J,450 1J7,J70 33J,275 242,050 
September JOth 82,000 130,IOO 3J0,755 2I8,245 
I 
1926 December JISt 77,200 146,820 378,oi5 24I,I75 
March JISt 29,760 22,617 I60,237 53.478 1919 
March JISt 75,6oo I48,420 4J3.922 259.467 June Joth 29,320 42,58o 155,685 61m8 
June Joth 76,450 I6J,28o 498,2~14 269,018 September JOth I9,62o 4J,810 I27,J44 46,425 
September JOth 77,J20 227,565 5J6,9{)o 286,J9o Decem her J 1st 29,J20 J9,810 160,977 J7.767 
December JISt 90,IOO 225,920 59J,lt9 299.465 1927 
1920 March JISt 45.730 94.961 251,842 I '4,488 
March JISt 89,I40 217,790 629,408 J46,2I5 June JOth J0,670 78,721 264.578 IJ2,950 
June Joth I September 30th 45,100 77,2J2 254,871 166,I97 September JOth I07,640 256,50J 660,726 J22,098 December JISt J8,414 97.902 272,IJ6 I94,678 
December JISt 97.960 28I,OJI 658,112 J27,I20 I 1928 1921 March Jist 4I,I08 8j,020 246,004 162,346 
March JISt I06,JOO 2JI,18I 710,752 JJ9,J75 June 3oth 2I,8J2 73.999 2I0,753 li I,86J 
June JOth 89,965 2IJ,258 680,J34 J28,488 September Joth 16,990 45>364 I60,J66 65,[46 
September JOth 89,88o 190,018 6oJ,HJ4 29I,276 December JISt Jo,825 48,047 154.912 102,091 
December JIst 67.405 IJ4,075 5I6,n6 2oJ,654 1929 
1922 March Jist J9,058 78,!)0J q8,990 I57,60I 
March JISt 56,68o 99.987 4J8,IS4 I8I,457 June JOth J6,5IJ 77,687 225,101 161,181 
June JOth 46,5J0 75,124 384,304 I44,JOI September JOth 34.930 57.977 224,446 I]5,864 
September 30th 52,68o 57.49J J5J,76I u6,676 December JISt 28,760 79,204 263,628 I92,028 
December JISt 32,J40 83,J95 265,097 I02,58J 1930 
1923 March JISt J8,440 70,944 J24,42J I49,236 
·-March JISt 4I,J67 95,247 276,78I I I9,75J June 30th 22,000 44·74I JJI,067 I09,255 
June JOth 3I,127 72,5IJ 222,652 127,495 September Joth 6,200 59.$00 25I,926 63,097 
September JOth 22,677 49,878 2J0,257 I I7,777 December JISt - 43>930 193,J84 J I,5 r8 
December JISt 41,597 52,615 247,85:> 139,o64 19Jl 
1924 March JISt 39.720 l41,J I7 2I,260 
March JISt 45·467 52,6I5 247,85:> IJ9,064 June Joth Js,68o 113,073 I6,I76 
June 30th 45,090 70,508 2S8,56B I3S,6J8 September 30th 5,400 9,055 8o,JI8 10,920 
September 30th 34.4IO 7I,740 249,s8z I32,604 December JISt 26,350 10,986 44.J04 7,020 December 3I st 4o,68o 54>735 224,0q IOJ,7J4 1932 
1925 March JISt 26,J50 12,917 J5.760 7,020 March JISt JI,430 41,255 198,18) 8o,no 
I 
June JOth 25,600 2,205 I6,6oo 9,66o June Joth 28,745 J9,649 222,22I 7I,262 September Joth 10,400 - [I, 140 9,648 September JOth I8,245 Jo,68o 207,84;1 57.840 December JISt 10,400 - 2,950 7,020 December JISt IS, us JI,670 I65,s8·5 46,9IO 
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Middlesbrough Middlesbrough 
Stockton Stockton 
Hartlepool and Whitby Newcastle Sutzder/and Hartlepool and Whitby Newcastle Su11derland 
i 1946 1933 
I0,730 8,540 March JISt 4,8oo 10,000 March JISt J9,06o 9J,J52 JI4,968 197,J10 June JOth 4,8oo I6,4JO 14,705 16,040 June JOth 44.410 75,2J6 J46,o98 192,615 September JOth 4,8oo 16,040 20,505 11,000 September JOth 49.310 105,876 358,522 203,170 December JISt 4,8oo 10,750 15,J40 12,180 December JISt 58,s8o 109,730 3~h,w5 193.700 1934 
28,8oo 1947 March JISt 4,8oo 5,027 11,200 March JISt 5J,IOO I02,8J8 410,485 206,803 June JOth 5,88o I0,6IJ 5•,6so IJ,200 June Joth 52,J60 92,679 4o8,o85 226,440 September JOth 5,88o 10,7I I 61,4]0 18,260 September JOth 5J,OIO 9J.751 412,235 228,186 December JISt 4,8oo 11,188 59,9I5 14,88o December JISt 54,220 116,296 4J2,115 239.950 I93S 
52,960 14,862 
1948 March JISt 10,140 7,6oo March JISt 54.37° 120,921 408,025 225,920 June JOth 10,140 6,460 5J,575 20,518 June 30th 57,58o u8,079 417,305 2J2,450 September JOth 10,140 J5,720 44,8:5 J0,480 September 30th 55,272 120,J14 425,260 231,975 December JISt 2J,84o J7,084 65,2n5 55,7o6 December JISt 57.474 12J,899 435,66o 224,775 1936 
88,170 1949 March JISt 26,295 J9.925 9J.230 March .Jist 49.739 12J,700 J92,9JO 215,765 June JOth JO,I50 23,927 108,6~3 IQ9,450 June JOth 62,742 I57.7I8 J92,JOO 2I0,5JO September JOth J0,26o II,94J II I,Ifi'O 90,6JO September JOth 48,072 17J,5JO 40J,770 207,I94 December JIst J5,07° I6,IJO I I9,4(:J IJo,6o5 December JISt 41,780 I71,6JJ J88,967 206,625 1937 
126,6go IIJ,8JO 
1950 March JISt 4J,58o 29,JJO March JISt 49,080 IJ5.55J J99,25J 200,626 June JOth 46,890 J9,405 IJ8,9I9 I40,960 June 30th 52,48J I27,477 J7J,040 207,862 September JOth 49,6JO 48,I96 14I,2.p 160,126 September JOth 5J,840 IJ2,209 J79,29J 24I,82I December JISt 46,985 J9,846 I29,6II 169,697 December JISt 55,104 150,267 400,208 219,4J7 1938 
March JISt J5,5JO J4,995 I46,85z 155.542 
June JOth JO,J70 J5,760 I58,6og I25,7J7 
September JOth 27,JIO 26,8oo IJO,OOI 95.461 
December JISt IJ,?OO 29,012 129,385 61,601 
1939 
March JISt IJ,450 5,610 8o,I8o 44,879 
June JOth 26,922 25,630 9I,OJ6 I 18,955 
I94S 
September 30th 40,250 I47.902 244,177 245,270 
December JISt 40,970 II2,JJ6 292,089 22J,I98 
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APPIENDIX 3 
, ' 1 i' 
P.O. Box 1 
Pall ion, Sunderland SR4 6TX 
Telephone Sunderland (0783) 670143 & 75473 
Telegrams Doxford Sunderland 
Tele)( 53165 · 
TO EMPLOYEES OF SUNDERLAND SHIPBUILDERS 
'he papers sent with this letter are those given to the Shipbuilding 
egotiating Committee (S.N.C.) by British S~ipbuilders at the 
eeting on Wednesday, 12th October, 1983. 
t Sunderland Shipbuilders the figures show a surplus of 89 employees: 
hese could be selected from over 100 volunteers but we would need 
o agree on more interchangeability to match people who want 
edundancy with jobs actually surplus. With agreement, we could 
eal with this without compulsory redundancy. 
ince the loss of the Falklands barges, lay-offs cannot however be 
uled out in the short term. 
ooking at productivity, you have a copy of the National Survival 
lan and linked with acceptance of this is an offer of £3.50 per week 
or 26 weeks. In our Company we have a new Bonus Scheme ready for 
cceptance with £121 already earned. The £3.50 could be paid in 
ddition to this providing the Survival Plan is also agreed. 
e need agreement on the Surviva1 Pl~n for our mm fut..ur~::; many of 
he proposals contained in it are well known to Managers and Stewards 
fter many hours of meetings on these subjects. 
f everyone had been at work we should have given time to discuss 
ith you the points in these papers; as it is, I hope you will see 
hat contained in them is ultimately a message of hope for Sunderland 
hipbuilders providing we are prepared to change. 
istered Office: 
nton House, _ 
6 Sandyford RoseL 
'castle upon Tvna NE2 10E 
g•stared No. 531279 
R.D. CLARK 
PERSONNEL MANAGER 
AMEM~OF 
!SmTISH SMIPI!IUILDERS 
MARKET FORECAST 
WORLD 
WORLD SHIPBUILDING OVERCAPACITY IS CURRENTLY APPROXo 40 PERCENT 
DEMAND FOR NEW SHIPS WILL FALL DNTTI THE MrDDLE OF 1984 TO A LOW OF 
APPROXo 13M GRT 
FROM MID 1984 DEMAND IS EXPECTED TO RISE TO .APPROXo 25M GRT by 1990 
1983-=84 
1984-=85 
1985=86 
1986=87 
I"IAREET FORECAST 
BRITISH SHIPBUILDERS 
ACTUAL TO DATE PLUS EXPECTED 
FORECAST 
FORECAST 
FORECAST 
B.S. COMPETITIVENESS 
90?000 CGRT 
180?000 CGRT 
200 9 000 CGRT 
TO COMPETE WITH EUROPEAN SHIPYARDS ON A COSTS BASIS BRITISH SBIPBUILDERS 
MERCHANT SUBSITII.ARIES MITST: 
REDUCE MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS COSTS 
= ·REDUCE OVERHEADS AT SUBSITIIARIES AND AT TEE CENTRE 
REDUCE PRODUCTION MANHOURS 
= MANAGEMENT AND STAFF MITST PLAN AND ORGANISE BETTER 
~ WORKFORCE MITST APPLY COMPETITIVE WORKING PRACTICES 
P AN.AMAX BULK CARRIER 
1980 
1983 
23 PERCENT REDUCTION 
EUROPEAN COMPETITION 
EXAMPLE 
650,000 MANHOURS 
4009000 MANHOURS 
BRITISH SHIP:BUILDERS REQUIRES MORE THAN 650,000 MANHOURS FOR SIMILAR SHIP 
0 
B o So ORDERS POTENTIAL 
NOT MORE TRAN SIX POSSIBLE ORDERS .ARE FORESEEN FOR MERCHANT VESSELS 
IN TEE NEXT FEW MONTHS o 
mNISTRY OF DEFENCE ORDERS FOR 2 X TYPE 22 FRIGATES AND ONE SUB!'fl...AIU:NE 
ARE ElCPECTED o 
A SMALL NUMBER OF MOD (N) SUPPORT CRAFT ORDERS ARE POSSIBLEo 
A LDn'l'ED AMOUNT OF MISCELLANEOUS WOBK IS EXPECTED o 
ANTICIPATED BUSINESS WILL BE DlADEQU.P.'!E TO SUSTAIN ALL FACILITIESo 
BRITISH SEIPBUILDERS LOSSES 
BaSo LOSSES FOR 198}=84 MAY APPROXIMATE £100M 
TO REDUCE LOSSES BoSo MUST: 
IMPROVE COMPETITIVENESS 
DISPOSE OF SlJRPLUS ASSETS 
CONCENTRATE ON MAINSTREAM ACTIVITIES 
. 
GOVERNMENT LOSS FUNDING MAKES UNLIKELY EEC APPROVAL OF ANY mPROVED 
DIRECT PRICE SUPPORT 
m 
FOR 198 3=84 BRITISH SHIPBUILDERS CANNOT AGREE TO ANY GENERAL WAGE 
INCBEASE 
BRITISH SHIPBUILDERS HOPES TO NEGOTIATE QUICKLY A SELFQ··FIN.ANCING 
PRODUCTIVITY PAYMENT SCB.EME 
B o So MAINSTREAM ACTIVITIES 
BS WILL CONCENTRATE ON MERCHANT SEIPBUILDING 
BS WILL COin·INUE IN OFFSHORE Su:BJE01' TO COi,IMERCIAL LEVEL OF' OBDERS AND 
PEEtFORMANCE 
BS WILL DISPOSE OF SURPLUS ASSETS TO REDUCE COSTS AND REALISE CAPITAL 
BS WILL REVIEW ALL NON MAINSTREAM ACTIVITIES .AND WILL DISPOSE OF NON 
PROFITABLE PARTS 
:SS "WILL ACT UPON ANY W.ARSEIPBUILDING DISPOSAL DECISIONS BY GOVERNMENT 
0 
SRITISH SHIPBUILDERS 
Nl-.TIONAL FF-~"'"lEWORK AGREEMENT FOR SURVIVAL 
PREAMBLE 
At the present time, B.S. is facing a major workload crisis and to 
secure further work must. achieve major reductions in the cost-price 
gap. The industry must ohtain substantial improvements in productivity 
and unit costs to improve its competitive position and long term · 
su=vival. To achieve this, B.S. is seeking a radical reappraisal of 
its operations and particularly;-
(i) Design, planning, scheduling and production engineering, 
production methods, quality control and computer applications. 
(ii) Improved supervision, work organisation, flexibility, 
interchangeability and communications. 
Much of this work will resuire the introduction of advanced 
manufacturing techniques and computer systems. To succeed, will 
require a fundamental change in the basic approach to our business and 
the active support, acceptance and co-operation of all employees is 
crucial. 
It is mutually agreed therefore that this section provides the basis 
for subsidiary companies to jointly review their operations and to 
conclude local agreements which supper~ ~is National framework:-
1 o ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNIQUES AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS 
1.1. It is recognised that to improve performance and 
• productivity, companies need a radical reappraisal of their 
existing opPrr~ 't .5.ons. 1~::; part of 'i..his, both parties agree to 
the introduction of advanced manufacturing techniques and 
computer systems involving better and earlier planning and 
production engineering, scheduling and material control~ 
improved work organisation and production methods. 
It is agreed that these new techniques, equipment and systems 
will be introduced and will be used on an ongoing and 
continuous basis, and will involve:-
( i) Communication a~d training programmes aimed at 
familiarising employees with these new techniques 
and providing the necessary skills. 
( ii)· 
(iii) 
( .i.v) 
1. 2. 
1.3 
2 
N<>•A· r:-~ethods of working, new systems beth manual and 
cc::-.;-"'ut.er for scheduling and monitoring the progress of 
worY., for time charging and for cost control. 
R~defined duties to operate these advanced techniques. 
Use of control techniques (e.g. quality and accuracy 
control) including self certification. 
Bo~r1 parties agree to the following approach for both 
advar.ced manufacturing techniques and computer systems. 
Consultation on all applications during which, 
disc~ssions will take place on the following:~ 
( i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
The scope of application involving the type, 
location, and areas of work affected. 
The timing of introduction including any trial 
periods. 
Health and Safety aspects. 
Training. 
1.4. An introductory period of 12 months during which a full 
evaluation of the effects of the application can be 
car=ied out. To assist with the evaluation, companies 
can introduce techniques such as activity sampling, job 
analysis, systems charting and the like. Any disputes 
will be resolved using the National Procedure Agreement. 
0 
3 
Note: The 12 month perioc.wi11 commence when the 
plant/equipment/process is available and operational. 
1.5. Where applications in the form of new techniques or 
computer systems are introduced, then it is accepted that 
they ~ill continue to be used or operated throughout any 
introeuctory period referred to in 1.4. above, even 
though the procedure agreement may be exhausted. 
1.6. It is jointly agreed that benefits to employees 
resulting from the operation of new techniques/computer 
systerrs shall accrue throush the operation of approved 
productivity bonus schemes. No payment other than 
through the operation of approved productivity bonus 
schemes shall be made to employees, other than where the 
evaluation referred to in 1.4. above has identified a 
significant change in individual skills and 
respor.sibility. In such a case, the individual employee 
will be re~graded using existing domestic wage and salary 
structures. 
1.7. In the case of major capital expenditure full agreement 
will l:e required on all aspects of use and operation, : 
incluCing manning and employee provisions, prior to the 
Corporation approving the investment of its limited 
resources. 
,.---· 3. INTERCHANGEABILITY/FLEXIBILITY 
The nature of work in the industry is such that it is essential 
for employees at all levels to work effectively, and to recognise 
til"'i" r.~ ~11'J~ w5.11 he ~ ncrm~l pilrt of tl • .:;i..&· wu.ckiug liie. 
Therefore, all employees must be prepared to acquire new &kills, 
and to remove customary practices where they are no longer 
appropriate. 
To meet the demands of competition it is accepted that new working 
practices will be adopted which match those of our international 
competitors and enable companies to respond to changing work 
priorities, proeuct and workload fluctuations. The key elements of 
these new practices which need to be implemented urgently and to 
the fullest effect are:= 
INTERCHANGEABILITY 
3.1. All levels of staff will be interchangeable as required 
according to their individual skills and experience. 
3. 2. Bou.rly paid employees will be interchangeable within t~'leir 
main group, providing they are capable of undertaking the work 
required, i.e. within steelworking, outfit.ting and ancillary 
groupso-
3. 3. Skilled ~mployees will also be required to be inter-chC:~ng~;,~,le 
across s~cups and trades, p~oviding they are capable of 
undertaking the work required, and will also undertake 
ancillary work as appropriate. 
3.4. Ancillary employees will also be required to cndert~ke ta~KS 
within their ability, including work which skilled ernploye~s 
have in some cases traditio~ally retained, but which can ce 
competent:!.y undertaken by ather e:-;-:ployees after ret.rc.ininc;. 
3.5. All employees will be fully mobile within their com~any ar.d 
between areas and departments, including ~aintenance and 
production. 
FLEXIBILITY 
3.6. Skilled employees, in order to progress the completion of 
their own work will undertake their own servicing and 
particularly:~ 
( i) 
(ii.) 
{iii) 
Outfit trades will undertake servicing 
activities of drilling, tack stud and other non 
structural welding, hi-cycle grinding, 
slinging, good housekeeping and simple 
maintenance and similar activities; 
Steelwo:ri..inc; t.xades tv undertake servicing 
activities of caulking, burning, drilling, tack 
and other non structural welding, slinging, 
good housekeeping and simple maintenance and 
similar activities. 
M~chine c_?c:;:a t.o~.s -:...w U})t:l:a lt::, clean, remove 
finished parts and remove swarf etc. 
3.7. As part of the above arrangements, it is agreed that in order 
that employees will use the full range of their skills and 
abilities to max~um advantage, companies will have the option 
of establishing area supervision and integrated groups of 
workers as required . 
. ../ For Example 
(i) Area supervision with full acceptance by both staff 
and hourly paid. 
. ( ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
s· 
Multi-trade manning of workstations, with f~ll 
flexibility/interchangeability to progress work and 
reduce waiting time within the group. 
Pipe~orker squads including plumbers, coppersmiths 
and fittersu so that all pipework can be 
manufactured and installed by one pipeworking group. 
Ancillary worker groups. 
Redleaders and painters to form joint painting 
squads. 
3.8. It is stressed that the above provisions will be used against 
the basic belief that employees work best in their own 
skills,and therefore it is in the interest of the industry to 
use its employees on work which fully utilises their skills 
and experience. 
NOTES: 
(i) Any detailed Agreement reached under the above 
paragraphs must take full account of any retraining which 
may be necessary; the individual competence of the 
employee(s) involved and all aspects of safe working 
practices ~.d heal~~ p=oteetion. 
(ii) The terms and conditions of existing working practice 
agreements in companies shall be superseded by any 
arrangement concluded within the terms of this framework 
agreement. 
4. MANPOWER RESOURCES 
In order to reduce the cost-price gap and improve performance, it 
is recognised that a full reappraisal of any traditional manpower 
scales or ratios will be required. Both parties agree that:-
4.1. Management is responsible for establishing effective 
organisation structures together with a balanced work 
force and for determining manpower scales or ratios, on 
the basis of pr~uctive methods of operation and 
workloado 
4.2. Management is responsible for determining the manning 
requirements for operating equipment, processes, and 
u~her Production functions as well as plant and 
m~chinery, on the basis of the most productive methods of 
~0rking, the competence of employees and all aspects of 
~afety and health protection. 
4.3. It is management's responsibility to balance manning 
with workload and to determine priority actions. In 
doing so, it is recognised that a range of measures will 
r:e:e:d to be employed, ;.1hich ..,,ill include the following:-
(i) Temporary transfers to and from other B.S. 
subsidiaries. 
(ii) Recruitment, including the use of short 
term/fixed term contracts. 
0 
(iii) Sub contracting, in respect o£ materials, work 
and special skills, both within and outside the 
Corporation. 
(iv) Overtime working. 
(v) Shift working, including where necessary, 
nightshift, double dayshift, 1inkshift and 
continuous manning. 
(vi) Lay off and short time workingo 
4.4. It is agreed that all the above measures will be used, but 
where separate national understandings exist or are agreed 
nationally on any single measure, then the terms of the 
J"';:;t j nn.,;~1 i=!.!Jreem~nt will be o•.rerridi.."'l.g. 
4.5. It is further agreed that consultation wil~ be essential to 
the effective operation of all of the above measures, but 
recognising the critical nature of the need to maintain or 
recover the programme, it is agreed that local consultation 
will be completed and the measures implemented if necessary, 
within 5 working days from the commencement o£ joint 
discussions. 
5. PRODUCTIVE USE OF THE WORKING DAY 
5.1. Currently within the industry, a large proportion of the 
working day is lost through poor planning, scheduling, lack of 
materials, tools and equipment and by lost time associated 
with tea breaks, and starting and finishing practices. 
\ 
lt is recognisec that it is ~anagement's responsibility ~ 
organise and cor.trol the me<~.sures ·by which pxoductive biC!:P::.:-.; 
can be significar.tly improv~d, and the areas which will 
require urgent attention at local level include:~ 
( i) Planning and sc~eduling arrangements~ 
(ii) The availability of materials, tools, equipme=~ ~~­
technical inforrna~ion. 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
(vii) 
Shift arrangements and particularly periods o~ 
overlap. 
Management anc supervisory involvement at 
workstat:ions. 
Timekeeping and absenteeism control at all leve~s. 
Controlled star~ing and stopping times. 
Phasing of tea and meal breaks at times to meet 
eoployee and procuction needs. 
6. MOST E.TI'EC'I'IVE USE OF R'E:SOtJRC~S 
The ~ost effective use of resources detailed in Phases 1-4 a=e 
re-affirmed except where ammen~ec or superseded by this do~.e~~-
i . . CONCLUSION 
It is agreed that the above measures ~e essential for the 
=~~·iv~l c: ~~c indu~~i- It i~ jointly accepted that it is 
critical for each cocpany and each ~orkplace to produce agr~~~s 
based on this framework, related to their own particular ne~cE. 
For such actions to work the commitment at all levels will =~ 
essential, and although the document stresses the manageria: ~:~, 
it is a core ingredient that the trade unions, their 
representatives and employees are fully involved. Su_-vival ~~: ~ 
a joi.I:'t effort. 
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SUNDERLAND SHIPBUILDERS LIMITED 
PRODUCT~V~TV 
AGREEMENT 
~984 
1. li'ihl© ~~liil {l@fl illli!G ~~li'GGJU!OOililli is to help win 
back wor!< that has been going to the more 
competitive European and Far Eastern Shipyards. 
For e){ample, these yards ;ue quoting 450,000 
hours for a similar class ship to 865 ship, the 
Hupeh, compared to 825,000 hours which we 
took and which for us was a good improvement. 
The Agreement is just part of what we are 
doing-but a very important part-to increase 
each person's contribution and to help keep down 
costs. 
We also hope that the Agreement will give 
everyone a real opportunity to improve earnings 
through our bonus incentive scheme. 
people who between them have the skills to carry 
out and finish the job. That way there wilt be less 
wasted time, a better job and more job 
satisfaction. 
The term in the Agreement for this is 'Composite 
Groups'. The groups will be responsible for unit or 
area completion, usually with one Supervisor, and 
the people in it will have the skills required. Each 
person will be expected to carry out whatever 
work is necessary to complete the job, including 
work that has been thought of as 'belonging' to 
only one group. Re-training will be organised and 
jobs on which Composite Groups will work have 
been identified. 
The same idea is applied to staff such as technical, 
commercial and production staff working in teams 
qtn>®CJJI'lllil<IDI7 and sharing information and pro~lem 
solving to produce a better result more qu1ckly 
and with less misunderstanding. 
DITilllG17«:1lilmiTil\ID®tiDIID60fiqv IB11Til<dlli'i7~m<dloo @17\t»I!J.JI)lliD 
Our Steelworkers have already shown what is 
possible with interchangeability; the Outfit Trades 
still have some training to be completed and 
Ancillaries are 100% interchangeable. The 
Agreement gives full interchangeability within 
each main trade group. 
Sharing the available work helps to keep everyone 
2 
4. 
in Sunderland Shipbuilders Limited employed. 
When there is a shortage of work, what is 
available will be shared between trades and trade 
groups, after re-training. The Agreement gives 
complete interchangeability across trade groups 
during periods of shortages or surpluses of 
manpower. 
Ancillary employees could help with parts of a job 
that do not need a skilled man's experience 
leaving skilled employees with more time for their 
trade skills. The Agreement means that Ancillaries 
will undertake some work where there is no 
definable skill content. 
DITilllvc<dlllll«:ll6oiTil oQ IK!I®w li'®«:lliliTilo~llli®Q 
Many of us recognise the need to update 
equipment (e.g. computers) and techniques but 
find problems in that this conflicts with our other 
interests such as Trade Unions, pay, demarcation. 
We should try new techniques first and get them 
working wlllfill® \looO~a !IIi'® W\t»DITil~ OITil about these 
other matters. That means no delay in using the 
techniques that have helped foreign shipbuilders 
grab a bigger share of our markets. 
5. ILoaH !Rl®UD®W c{l 00SJII'1lB'ilin~ ILeYeQg 
No one likes to think his job is over-manned; but 
probably everyone will agree that all long 
3 
established practices need review occasionally. 
This review will be carried out using proper 
methods. If there is no agreement then the 
Procedure for the Avoidance of Disputes can be 
used but the changes can take place for a three 
month trial period while we talk the matter 
through. 
3. ~<OJOMii'ilQclllli"!.f "irw«ll-~ihlofkt WOJr?~Dii'ilW 
In just some areas, two-shift working can be 
useful, e.g. preparation, painting, berth erection. 
It can help to avoid bottlenecks which hold up 
other people. It is worth on average £20.00 per 
week (for a Tradesman) and in addition full 
consideration will be given to overtime 
opportunity. 
It will be worked Oli'il ail 'lfOJDMililQ~Ii'\f ib>GJQDO cli'ilDV so if 
a shiftworker's circumstances change and shifts 
do not suit him, then he can go back to daywork. 
CGililmllilWO tl!hl<ZJ ~OJWG® ~li'Gl&l~ 
Taking a break to have a hot drink during a work 
period is quite a boost especially on a winter's day 
if you have been working in the open air. The 
problem is that it knocks a hole in the morning's 
work-jobs stop, paint sets, everyone moves 
around on and off ships-and we reckon it costs 
about half an hour on average per person over and 
above the actual break time. 
4 
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8. 
We want to move the break to 7.30 a.m.- 7.50 
a.m. so that people can have a hot drink, etc., 
between arriving at work and starting work. This 
would give four hours before the next break and if 
this seems a long time to some, then take a snack 
or hot drink onto your job and have it there. We 
will not object providing everyone is sensible 
about it. 
An hour's dinner break can seem a long time and 
compared to half an hour's break it is also extra 
time to heat and light the Yards. So there is a 
double bonus-there is an energy saving and you 
can get home half an hour earlier instead of sitting 
in the amenity waiting for the buzzer. 
9. ThG ILI!ll<!:IEJO ~li'Clll~M<etlo~fitlV fo:l.~li'®®m®tntl 1~ 
This booklet is a guide only and full details are 
available from Personnel Officers or members of 
Management. The guide does cover the main 
points-nothing has been deliberately left out and 
the wording has been kept simple avoiding the 
legal type jargon in which Agreements tend to be 
written. 
Providing we can reach agreement by 1Oth 
February, 1984, then a payment of £7.00 per 
5 
l 
normal week will be added to earnings ~~[Q) 
backdated to 1st November, 1983. On 10th 
February that will be worth more than £100 back 
pay (for full attendance). 
If we do not reach agreement by 1Oth February, 
then the back pay is lost for good. 
We will be meeting representatives throughout 
and \'@Mii' views are vital. ~~~~ '1i'!Xl~ I?~CGV§. Think 
of our future, then decide. 
6 
APPIENDIX 4 
NORTH SANDS = COMMENTS FROM ~FREE ANSWERS~ 
NORTH SANDS D~ES 
Do ~o~ like ooanagemen~ 
Bad Managemen~ 
Bad o~ganisation 
No planning 
Atten~ion of Management to uo~kfo~ce 
( igno~rui~ Md flippant v hi@l 
~d~d 0 do~tic 9 bullyifig 9 
a~~ogant~petty 9 pe~secuting) 
1! 
1 
6 
1 
3 
67 
Treated lik® children 9 di~~ 9 se~fs 9 8 
slaves 0 aniu!als 
Too oouch hassle/ha~assment 9 racist 3 
dictato~shi~ · 
Too many th~eats 9 bookings 2 
Mo~® in~e~®r®s~®d in tiMes than gettin~ 4 
jobs don® 
~ ~esp~c~ fro~ ~gament 2 
No ~rust fi'o~ management 1 
Poo~ ~o~kfo~cG ~~ment ~®l&~icm£1 0 8 
No trustp no discussio~ 1 
Work 
= 
1&\ck of job s®cm>ity 
No te~ ~o~k 
14 day ~O~king C~US® 
"W'o~king p~ctic@s do not s~®~ to bG ~o~kin~ 
To~ ~r oo~t~oto~~ do ~oe lik~ usin~ 
stud gw1 
Bad inte~~epa~tment communications 
No t~&inifi~ to Bllo~ movement to oth®r 
dep~&-t~ent£1 
Do not lik~ ~o~king in both 
•p 
~ 
. 
.... 
\ 
No~hin~ 
It is ~ job I b®tte~ than dol~ 
F~i~nd5hi~ of ~o~kfo~c~ 
St®ady job 
~~oxim!ty to ho~ 
!nte~estin~ ~nd ~lid ~o~k 
Edueation~l poliei~s 
Smt15faetion of job completion 
'ao~kin~ outsid~ 
~Y day 
Holidays 
Night5hift 
CNelfti.m:a 
60 
46 
9 
2 
13 
8 " 
1 
2 
2 
6 
2 
1 
1 
snip buildin~ has been MY life fo~ 29 y®&X"So X lik® 
th® plac~o 
Life long assoeiationo 
It ~as bette~ 30 y®&lf'S agoo 
Chall®nga of ove~comin~ adve~sityo 
• 'j 
p 
. 
..... 
Ai~ of ~looffi ~ncl cl®sponcleney hangs ovG~ y~~cl 
CoiDp~ny fro~ ~~o bo~to~ h&s no ~ish ~o fo~t®~ & ta~m 
a pix-H. 
Manageweft~ b~ek~s~~bbin~ 
Tot~l disenehantoo®nt of woikforc~ ~i~b co~p~ny 
confronh~icm~l IDt~itucl® const<mtly ~dof)t®cl by roan~geooen~ 
Y was proud to ~ork for So~oBo ye~~s ~o but not now 
Cooopany h&s introcluc~cl J~panesQ p~aetic~s. but not~for 
theooselves = still h~v® free ooe~ls ®teo 
1 director said 9 ~®t this r~bble ·fioooGQ ~~aning ~ork®rs ~ho 
had just got back trom shiptri~ls ~t sa~ 
!his is the ~orst job I 0ve had in 45 y~~rs in shipbuilding 
Disciplin~ry rules misconstrued and ~bus®d by ID&nagement 
ArQ ooanagement pr®pared to ~ive up p®rks to pres®rv® future 
ot company ~s oo®n have hsd to do 9 by ~iving up cant0en 
facilities 
ao~ can ooan~gament take man out of yard ~ith shipyard 
property to his ho~® to do work in company hours 
Uorkforce havG some excell~nt ideas on improving company 
pertormanc® but most ~re frustrat®d by ~agement 0 
supervisors not eomooitt~d or don°t car@ 
PAY 
Poor 212 
A ~ P comp&i"'isoi'l 11 
No bonus Oi"' ine®n~iVG 52 
Bonus pro~sGd ~nd not p~id ~~ 
'tfil®E'® is OUX" ~500 5 
Cpnt~eto&-s ~3 
Li~tlG job 3GCUi"'i~y 3~ 
~&' OV®&>~iiil® i"'~~Q£1 2 
Ov®rtiooG ~o@ lo~ o~ ~ shifts 
· 'i'h~t X ~ cm11 ~®mpo&-ai"f "" 
Poor &-~dtmdMCf . ~1 
·.. No onra mderstMds oomas systG~S . 
lDG~li~y b®~W®Q~ S~ff &nd ~Oi"'kfo~C@ 
GSp®Ci~lly rG £lick ~&J 
Pe&-so~l i"'G~rds no~ ~dGquatra fo&- ®xp®e~®d 
contribta~ioEA 
~ges l~G&> ~~ o~hG&- ~rd3 bu~ ~® ~V@ MOi"'G 
t&-a.ifi~ ~d in~Grcban~bility 
Uhy do con~~etoi"'s ~~t ~O&>® for samG ~o~k 
tfuy ~ft®&- &J.ll @Ut'M.ck£J ~® u~ still tJorst paid y~d 
0 
t 
\ 
. j 
....... 
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PALLION = COMMENTS FROM wFREE ANSWERS~ 
-:-· l.. - ...... (J 
.. ~ 
DISLIKES 
Everything 
Manageooent · _ ·. -
Bad Management 6~ 
Bad attitud® of manager~ and supervisors 25~ 
Treated like children 35 
treated like an aniwal 1 
treated like :3lav~~ · __ . __ . 2 
treated like machine~ 1 
treated like a number · 5 
Management by'vict~sation and threat$ 10 
Management by fe~ ~ 
Too much barrassment . 19 
Too much booking and na~takifir;; 52 
Managewent too concerned ~th petty thing~ ~ r I 
Bad atlilOSph®&"Q ·:·:·. -: , -· - 1 
. -.-~ _cUctatorhl ~tiitud®·-.. -~; __ :,. · -; .. "': - :-.- JS .. :· ..• 
I 
ManA~f:lilent h~v® no resp®ct for ~orld'o!r'c® 2@ _ 
'to!orkforoo .. doilt trust_ ~~®ment .. • 115 . "'. . 
. l;l'orkforce have no conf'id®nc® in 'ID&la.gement . 6. -
9us rmd theiii 0 attitudca __ @? ~agewent ... ; · -·-
dcgmat.ic -attitud~ of »Wla~estent _ .. .- :-·_:.. __ ~--~- .: --3 · :: ·· ·· ~: ··· · _ .. · .. v~ctoricw·-~ttitudca of'·~~gewemt· ·.:.. : __ · _.:. ~ 3~~-::.:.·_:-_~::. · __ :_ 
~...:l!'!'Cl>!!ili!U1®d at ti tud® ©? IDCmageiDent -- :: : -: 'il ~..: ~,: · ~ . · • ·., · · · 
no co~p-ra~tio'&i bet~ca®n- ~agei!lent ;m~·~-'::--_· ~;::-~-:· :_;_.;_-,>- ~-- ;...:-:··; :_·::.":-.. · .·- · 
: -· n~0;:~~~~:i~~~~~~~i~ii~~·-c,/ ~~~~~~~cG ·._·'. ~~-~-~i-~~:--~-~~·>-~:<:.; ;: .. ~- ~:~:~::~-~- ,. --~ -~-~--
._ ........... ~ .. -. • - ..... .....:~.A.-. • 
no COiil!lltmi~tioiil bG!ltt-J®®&a umna~ewent a\nd _ .. . . . __ .. 
~orkfoi'OO~.t.- --:·. -~;:,.-7---'· .. :~ 20-.- ·-· -··---- .. ·-·-----
poor-. ~li~~n~/t-!or-ltX'cJrc® 1relation~ · ·· · 13--: ·~ · · ,-_: · · - · ·· 
umnagel!lent «Jo:a u t list®:a -- · · : · 5 .. -;_ <:: _.: 
too many ~~<air~ an<X sl!pervisors 21 .. 
SU)))®r'Vi50lf~ il@ ~~inifi~ iJ1! cran t·hay 
arG · su~JM'isiiill8 · - · .... 
· Mana~emen~ don v ~ '!mot:J ~~ they ar~ doing 
Management should ~dopt ~o1rca honest approach 
~orkforoo oversu~rvised .. 
lack oX' l~dsrshiE>·:··. ·~- ·. · 
~ . . • 
5 .. 
3 . 
lack of oi"~an_il!il~tio&i\~ ··.:--~- .::. ·· . ·.- ~ -.--=··-~ 14) -
No or- bad plmm~ _ _.::,. ~::.: =-- ~ · . @ :· .. 
Lot-! IDOMllQ of t:JoJrkforcG · .. · · -_. . · _- · · .. :-:--· ·- · ~- · .-· :: ·-
Broken proirls®s from D!aM.~ement. - ·· -·.- ·· . ·3 
. ~nagement ~t ti Y;ud® . o? _v joi>5 for the :boys ll .. - . · ·· · .. · _ : _.,.; · . . _ . _ 
'X'oo ii!!WY ~gel!lent pos~ · • - .:_.-_ . · - ,,_ · ·· ·. · .. · 5 . .:· .. · ·· · .. .-. ··-:- · · ~ -~ · .· - · (? ·-
-·-· ... 
·disrega~"d shotm -~c; ufiioog·~::·.··~- -~- :~ -:· _·-:·7-· -~ : .. ·· 4) ~:-;·~.:::~::·-~ : ~ ~-.:_:_:~---: _,_. ·_ · :.··. -~-
Ce1rt&in ~94ars ~looys \X};)s®ttil?lg uolr'kforcG :_ ·:- .. ;:~--:_. ~ -·~~~ :~ ::: ~-·_; ... -.~: '·. ..-
M&na~emen~ Qblackliiail<ar0 ~ : ·_·_ ~ :_. .. ·_ ···-··. · ·- ·· r • :~.--~-~.:,·-· •• ·"""-~- -"·· :·· 
~bully 'boy tactics ~gf' ~agel!lent 0 . ~.- • .·- ... . . . . :: . . ·• ~ ____ .. ~ 
l'lobe:v ~gars 01r Gls®0 _ ·:.: _ . .. . . ~ - __ .. .. • . 
. •· 
:- .. -~ ..... -· ...._ 
•. 
·- .. ·.# 
... . . .. 
. -~ ,; :-~ .. ·_:_~- --·~.-:..: ~ . . --~--: .... -., . . ... ·. 
.. ·- .... . --- .... .·. •··. --:.· -..:... ~-:: · .. -
•· 
... -- .. 
~ . -
·-
-· . -
fl~a~iiDent®cl 1&t4J;J,.,A.fl of mi:magew~mt 
Junio~ eup®~viso~s ~nd m~nagement seem incompetent ~ 
liaisons.~itfi ~o~kfo~ce =see things only thei~ Bay 
Manag®went unable to get good l:!orking ~Glationship 
There is fGeling of mutu~l contewpt bet~een ooana~ewent ancl 
shopfloo~ 
B®ing tre~t®cl unfai~ly (you 9V® ~ot to ~ork h®r>@ to~ 
tmclerstand th~t) 
Being told B® v!"® alone but Bill v!"® 'g®tting . .-iess oooney ~nd 
poorer Borking conditions 
Class distinction = io®~ directors calling workfare@ 
0rabbl® 9. 
Treated lik® idiots~ led by idiotsp paid like idiots 
x:'etty manageoo®i'lt 
Managewei'lt stipks 9 are co~rupt · ~ageooent ~® conce~ned with·time ~stl!!d and petty things 
~ather thari time ~asted ~aiting foX" ~te!"ials which coulcl 
h~ve been bought locally 
Manageme~~ upstarts in wrong job 
Poor feedbacks ~d misleading information from manag~went 
To~l lack of ooeaningful discussion br&tween ooanage~t and 
Ul®Xl 
M®n= tot~lly d®ooo~alised = need to b® encourag~d ~nd 
nurtured = sick of being stamped into ground 
Manage~e~~ Ulore concern®d ~i~h policin~ ~®thods i~stG~d of 
encour~in~ IDQ ~o ~~~ ou~ ~ go~ job 
~eiDen~ ~ck of concern ~bo~~ indi~id~l 
~ein~ soc~l ou~c~s~ ~d ~l~ys ~Gifi~ dGpressed 
A~tititudG o? ~ag@mGn~ ~o uorkforeG is ofiG of ~t~ &nd 
Klyst@ries 
Jobs ?or ~h® boys 
Manag~~e~t don°~ kno~ hou ~o t&lk ~o uorkforeG 
Manage~®n~ don°t go &bout getting p®oplG ~o tlor~ tog~th®r 
in thG ri,gh~ ~~y 
~ ~ss~ tbG b~G t@ ~o~kfoX"ce 0 °buc~ s~ops ~GrG 0 
~glill~Qr;ant don • ~ listGiln &nci h~vQ iiU!oo @f(i' mAY job 
s~ti$f~ctiofi ~d Gnjoymen~ X oncG h~~ 
A?tGr 2~ JG~s uorking here not ~ lo~ to like no~ ~~h this 
manageiDoot 
Perks ?o~ ~®IDent ioGo fr®® ~ork donG on property 0 done 
durin~ ~ork~ bo~~ 
Manag~®nt b®llben~ on upsetting aork~OX"C® = no ha~ny &t 
&.U. 
'i'oo §lJClil ~lr'iv~tG tlork don® for i!!angement · 
Rel2tions ~nd m®mbers of c®rt&in bQdies get promotioo 
Y:Jh®n uill ~® b® &blG to ~njoy eoud~ to ~ork? 
~~a~®ment aon 9t lis~en to sound judgem®nt of ~orke~ ~ith 
v~st amounts of Gxperienc® 
Too much politics not Gnough negoti~tion 
To~l commdtment o? Ulanagement ·~o ~® Gveryon® 0s li?G 
to~l mse"ey· 
NO s®ns® o~ ·~et up ~d ~o 
Strategy s®~s Ul~re important th&n trust 
failurG ~@ und~X"stand that,und®rlin~s can eon~ribu~Q 
-withou~ thi'e~~s 
~ilurG o? ~®nio~ manag~w~nt ~e r®cognis® ~~t i~diwidU&l£ 
~~t®r 
0 
\ 
' 
Nothin~ ~ 
it~ ~ job 0 b~tt@~ th~~ dol® 
payday 
i~t®resti~~ ~o~k 
proxiMity to ho~® 
~o~king und®~cov®~ 
job S®CY~ity 
good working condition~ 
friendly atMo~ph~r® amongst ~orkforc® .~ 
training and ®ducation 
job satisfaction 
S®lectiong 0 ®ftd 0~ day bU%%®~ 0 
9Friday 4o20°p 0 th® road out 9 p 0Saturday 0 
209 
175 
55 
37 
27 
14 
4 
5 
32 
5 
5 
•' 
\ 
\ 
0 
DEPTFORD = COMMENTS FROM roFREE ANSWERS~ 
DEPTFORD LIKES 
Nothing 
It is a~ job 
&tt~~ than dol~ 
Loc~l 
Fr®i~dly a~wospher® (on shopfloo~) 
Good ~ttitud® of manag®m~nt and ~orkforc® 
Good ~orkin~ conditions 
Job S<9CUi"ity· 
Ovei"tiM~ 
Fl®xibility of holidays 
HelpfUl supervisoi"s 
Management of furthei" education 
C0i"taifi mMount of decisioii making ~llo~ed 
66 
57 
3 
10 
1 
'j 
6 
~ 
1 
1 
~ 
'il 
Only timG I like ~orrld.n~ h®rrG is ~h~m thGi"G ~G 
signs or spii"it ~d C!t~osphGrr® of y~rrd as it ~s 
~ orr 5 years agoo 
p 
•. 
. ~ 
. 
.... 
.. 
·. 
I 
·~-: .-; . ·:-; 
Nothing writt®n clo~ 
Nothing disliked ., ... 
EvC!lrything . =, · · · · · · 
'; 'IL..,.:·: .... 
Bael li!anageoo(\)nt 
Att~ntion of management and supervisor~ 
Bad industriiDl rel~tions·;::- _. .__ . . .·: ~. 
Too -many iil.CUlagers and supervisors · ·: · . ~-· .. 
'i'reatr&d H.ke scl'iooJ. ehildreil.. .. .. , . . 
U&rnings and thrC!lats given too much 
·.._-:. ;'.;.. 
·.:.. --
;.·_ 
~All t&ke no give 9 
No COUllilm'lication between management and -'·· 
13 
!!~ 
9 
3. 
=~ .. 3 
4 
2 
4 
workforce , ... ~ , · .. : - · ...:.· ,_.. ·-:.:,;_; >"\ ~~.::·;~: .·.-. 
M&nagar cheated employees_ ·out_ of !t500 ·: f<·. ·10 ._ ... 
Lotf MOM!.l@ ·- -· . .. c;:: ·' · ~. 2 .~, 
PY.oootioil by 9who ilot what 9 you kilow ·. 4-:, · 
....... _ 
Blame for probl®m~ passed dom::~ to workfox-cr& ·1 - '· 
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DEPTFORD = COMMENTS FROM OPEN QUESTION 
Bad ma."lae;e!Den t 
Bad attitud~ of management and supervisors 
Too many threats and warnings 
QAll take and no give~ 
Too cany supervisors and ma~agers 
v~~a~ement do not like suggestions 
.-""'!-.- . ·- . -·---
Bad/poor organisaiton 
Bad industrial relations . 
¥~nagement perks (especially canteen) 
Lou worale 
Shifting or blame down to workforce 
ahave no faith in companya 
wattitude of men is one of despairw 
No coUli!Iunicati_on 
'Too lou 
Should compare with A and P 
No ~cr.~s·ur ~ncentiv~ 
~~er~ is our £500 
ConcUUons poor 
AmmeniUes 
Speci(ically = No canteen 
Disgusting state of showers and toilets 
lack of overs lls 
Poor safety 
Cole! 
Staff get better sick conditio~s 
than workforce 
~t enough leave· wh~n close r~lativ~ dies 
Should be longer paternity leav~ 
Job 
:·. 
. 
13 
26 
~ 
2 
9 
2 
2 
5 
11 
2 
3 
3 
29 
12 
15 
12 
8 
2 
6 
1! 
2 
6 
2 
2 
2 
1 
No job satisfaction 2 
Little or no secYrity 5 
Equipment unsuitable or inadequate 6 
Not enough training 2 
Contractors 2 
Prep and fab poor 1 
Dislike temporary employment 1 
Fe~l there is no tutu~® for mG as ancillary 1 
worke~ 
wbt enough information 2 
•' 
E1.1p!oyrr.c;nt 
Relatiorus 
~o~l~ likG ~o~G i~fo~IDatio~ o~ co~p&ftyp its 
 tutu~@ m~cl ~ny n~~ o~de~s 53 
Poo~ ~Y~lity ~nd l~ek of ~v&il~bility 
of tool~ ~nd ~chin®~ 11 
Bo~in~ ~ep®titivG ~o~k 
-Not b®in~ ~bl® to d®v®lop n®~ skill~ 
Poo~ p~ospects l®ad to ~p~thy 
QoCo systG~ not ~o~king 
Sae~ng l~ck of st~d&~ds in insp®ction~~ 
~hich caus®s lack of confid®nc® ~hen ~o~king 
~ith o~®~s ~eps ~d h~ving to ~®ply 
'I don 9t kno~v to 90$ of ~ny qu®stions 
~elating to specific standa~ds on tol®~anc® 
Misuse of skills 
Lack of t~~ining 
~esponsibili~y of job tak®n a~ay f~o~ t~~clesmano 
taken ~~y job satisfaction 
Employ®es should be giv®n ~o~® trust to ~o~k 
on thei~.o~ · 
Disa~Gi ~ith interchangability 
Constantly ~ving to ~ov® ®quipment = g~ne~~l 
outlining of jobs );)OOR" 
Inability of company to us® ®~ployeGs skills 
and abilities to ~®at®~ GXt®nt 
- No faith i~ ne~ ~oxokpacks 
Too ~ucil l:"@=t;YOxok 
· ~partments ~o~king ~gainst Gacb oth®~ · 3 
Evegoyon® too conc®~Gd tlith p~od~ctio~~ ~d 
tgnoxoing t~aini~ uhich is tutuxo® of 
shipbuild~ 
~ Run do~ of craft trQd®s 
~t®xo~l sbortag® ~~®V®nt~ job p~o~~ssio~ 
Not ®nousfi h®lp fo~ &ppr®nt1c®~ 
- Too ~y s.1Up®M'iso~s ttno't5 noth~ oX' tbG 
par~i§g~~ ~~~dG ~h®y 0rG ~®apon~ibl® fo~ 
t~t<;;if~l a11oGat1vKA sho~l~ bG s<C~~"'tGl~ @y'f. 
Uould likG ~@ s®® ~~®ffii~ syst®~ leak®~ 
into · . 
Pl&n~ d®p~rt~®nt ~dG~m~@do Pl~G~s sould 
b® tr&in@~ :1!! USQ @f CADCAM 
eo~ssi@n~ d@p~m®nts should b® ~iv®n 
tGchftie£1 st~tu~ 
Uo~'kin~ h®~® ~~ ~ pl®aSUTG = no~ ~ dr~~ 
~c jo~ ~ti~faetio~ 2 
·•.· 
.: ~-
\ 
• ( 
0 • 
.... c:, .. 
;. .. ·· ~ 
CONDX!XONS 
Poo~ ~o~king A~AJ~ions 
Poo~ b®&lth &ncl saf®ty 
Ftuil®s 
Poo~ ~Dl®ftiti®s 
Poo~ vefttilatioft 
Polutioft ift atwosphe~~ 
'ft®cl l®ac:Hn~ 
Poo~ toil~t faeilitiGs 
Poo~ cantean f~cilities 
'roo cold 
No is® 
No faeiliti®s fo~ d~ying ove~alls 
l=lOi"kin~ insid® 
~f®ty ~reatly ignor®d 
~®ntilation not up to standard 
®ogo houses accommodation ~11 completsd 
b®forQ l=lindows put in 
dislike going home scruffy = can 9 t get 
muck from·nands and nails 
bring back coffee machines 
55 
13 
. 1!8 
.• 
17 
2 
9 •. 
10 
.,.. 3 
13 
2 
2 
0 
Xnfo~tion o~u~® job p~ospects 
~m~ o~d®~S 
Gen®M111Y lilOR"@ inforu:mtion t§l'bou~: firm 
COMHEl\ITS 
11 . 
I& 
~y ~oes wana~~went t~ll li®s? L2ss li~s 
•. 
~Y ~n 1 t M~ Welch ®xpl~in points to unions ~d lilen ~ithout cowing ~ith 
th® ut2k® it o~ l®~V®. ita ~ttitucl® 
Why does it tak® th~e® ~eeks to se® pe~sonn®l 
~Y ~o®s manag®w®nt persecut® sick and di~abl®cl 
~ISX'®uS OUT ~500 pound Uthi®V®l:l 9 
Bowb~stic attitud® of company 
What do I hav® to do to get mana~ewent to ~ealiae I a~ a human beingp 
not ~nd~~s~ unfe®ling roboti ~g 
Mo~® ~po~er needed to competQ ~ith oth®~ yax-d~ in cowpletin~ delivery 
dat®s 
What ~re ~nagewent t§ln~ staff x-atios cowp~r®d t~ sho~. floor ~o~k fore® 
Forc0d old jobs Md p~oc1~Hh~re~ by ~ig B~oth®r 
Cowp&ny promis®d th~ou~ ~ W®lch that ~® ~ould b~ ®nyY of shipbuilding 
industry (io®o wo~® ~~®~and bonuses)o H® ax-~ no~ bottow of all 
shipy~rds in ~g® l®a~® and still ~iti~ to~ bonus . · 
~ ~ ~®lsb for hi£ Qffort on our b®~lf 
Lies told by ~agQw®nt re ~g®s and bonus ~hich ~® n®V®r g®t 
&avG hbour 
~na~®ment donut givG & damn about ~orkforo~ 
Mafiag®m®nt = dict&toTs 
Me f~itb in company , 
)( Mf> 'atalch ~oul~ OOVG donG ~®11 in gs· 
MoT® ~X'Ot®etiv~ Gquipm®n~ 
Cont~ctor@ @Osti~ ~o~® t~ tlh®~ tlo~kforc~ ~id job~ ~d th®n it aas 
DiUCil S~~Q~ 
U~t to b® trG~t®~ likG hu~ bGi~ not ~~Q~ 
~o is gGtt~ ~ck b~d@TS ~o~ &lloain~ @Ontr~ctoTs in 
~~o~tad t&lks b®t~QQ~ ~~em~nt ~nd m~n 
Mo~Q t~sti~ rG!&tio~shi~ ~st ®~ist b®t~e®H bo~b sid®s 
~ ... LJr~ _. ~ ~ ~~ D(o-o/ ~ ~ k.'D. 
I,.- f'J u ~ ~ ~, ~If ~ :L.w, ,d.. 
d 
0 
QUESTION 3 
Q~d®~~d Shipbudld~~s is ~co~i~ ~ ~ l~d~~ in i~s ?ielclog 
(eire lea ~h® JaWi!~i" ~.ll.c~ co~sgmKlci!s i&::Ost closely w yowr wist1) 
Agf"ee 0 Disagree 
-
and 2 3 4 and 5 
Pal lion 46 19 32 
Deptford 31 19 40 
N Sands 41 21 29 
•Main office 72 15 12 
Aggregate 46 19 30 
The above indicate a relative split in opinion on this question 9 ~ith a 
majority of three to two amongst thoseholding any opinion that 
SUnderland Shipbuilders is indeed a recognised leader in its field. 
Whilst this is not a particularly high figure~ it does approach half of 
the working population~ and given the low morale indicated elsewhere it 
does seem to indicate that there is still a stf"ong reservoir of pride. 
There are interesting differences b~tween the various geographical 
sites on this question. Pallion Yard and Nor-th Sands express similar 
views on this matterj whereas Deptford Yard has a slight majority in 
favour of this who feel that Sunderland Shipbuilders is not a recog= 
nised leader in its field. Some 8% more than Pallion and 11% more 
than North Sands feel that it is not a recognised leader. The most 
interesting difference is that expressed by those in the main offices. 
It can be seen ff"om these statistics that 72$ of those questioned in 
the main offices felt that Sunderland Shipbuilders is a recognised 
leader in its field~ whereas only 12% felt that this ~as not the case. 
QUESTION 4 
0 S'lmderlmnc!l Shipbmil~e?S clcss ~te liliil.W® ~ ~ image an Eear-sid®o 
Agree Disagree 
1 and 2 3 4 and 5 
Pal lion 50 13 35 
Deptford 53 14 29 
N Sands 55 16 26 
Main office 39 15 46 
Aggregate 49 14 34 
Approximately half of th~ population agree that Sunderland Ship= 
builders do~s not have a good image on ~earside~ and approximately 
one~third disagree. Compared to the ans~ers to Question .3P this 
would indicate that whilst a proportion of the ~orkforce feel that 
the company is a recognised leader in the industryv that its image 
locally is not goodo 
,· _,.., .~ , 
·J ifr"-r...fL ~ { ( . 
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Again there is a difference of opinion between the localities. · The 
@~@~ll ~i~Yr® of ~9$ agreeing that Sunderland Shipbuilgers does not 
~~e ~ ~ood i~ge on ~earsid~ masks the slightly higher'p®rcentage of 
peopl~ ~ithi~ each y~rd ~ho f~~l th&t th&t is the case and the lo~ PGr 
centage of 39$ within th~ main offices who feel that the company has & 
~oor ~ge locally. Indeed» ~ithin the ~in offices a majority of ~6$ 
iftclicate that they feel th® cooop~ny h~s a ~o~ image locally. 
""" Xt is interesting to note that although on other question~ the ~in 
offices have given more positive answers than have thos~ employees in 
th® yards 9 on this question there is a stronger feeling that Sunderland 
Shipbuilders is not a good place to ~ork; ~4% as against 36%. 
~UES'l'ION 5 
g~der~~ Shipbuilder~ is ~ p~etty good ~lac~ to BO~k = X ~~d ~= 
co~nd ~aJ. friend OK" Eil':2iilb3X" of 'fiiY! family to t:rork be~ o ~ 
Agree · Disagree 
1 and 2 3 4 and 5 
Pal lion 16 9 74 
~ptford 17 11 71 
N Sands 11 1 81 
Main office . 36 20 44 
Aggregatl! 18 10 10 
Clear i~dication that the considerable wajority of employees feel that 
this is not a good place to ~orko In other questionnaires ~e have 
carried out» it is possible to observe that whilst there are many 
complaints and grumbles about one?s workplace it is still possible to 
feel that overall it is a fairly good place.to work~ and consaC!uently 
that one would rGcommend it to family and friends. It is in ans~er to 
this question that w~ s~e that the concerns th2t the ~orkforca have go 
particularly deepa 
QUESTION 6 
V~ry successful Not successful 0 
at all 
1 Md2 3 1! and 5 
Pal lion 25 30 41! 
Dsptford 23 24 49 
N Sands <1 24 28 47 
Main office 51 20 27 
Aggregate 27 27 43 
\ 
~ 
Just over & quarter or the population thinking that the company·is 
successfUlp 2 similar proportion unsure about tha situa~ionp and 
··-· ·' -·-~--- · SJO~~tii~~ tmder ra h~lf feeliilg th~t it is not ~:mccessfuL- Oil@ H&y of 
jYdgin~ thQSG rGspons®s is for ~n~gem~nt to dete~ne ho'!:! it thiilk£ 
the Horkforc® ought to have aftswered here. For ~xample if ooanagement 
think the 'l:!orkforce should be aHara that the company is not successful 
~t thQ ooooo®nt 9 then it 'l:!ould be of concer>n t~t 21% still feel it iso 
HoB®~®r if ooanagement f®®l the company is b®iil~ successfUl ~t the 
mom®ntp there Hould be even mor~ concer~th~t ~3% do not s~em to ~ha~® 
th~t ~ie'l:!. Whicheve~ of thes~ is th® most ~~~listie app~aisalp th® 
sp~ead of opinion itsQlf is of sow® concern in th~t there is no clea~ 
pict~e of the current· perform ance of the o~ganisation. Given th~t 
this is the case~ any initi ative or plan taken by wanagewant is bound 
to rec@iV® m mixed res pons~ from these differing opinion bases. This 
~ixed response is likely to militate against the success of any 
initiative. It is important then to establish as far as possible a 
common vie'~:! of the current position • 
.. 
As Bith other questionsp the aggregate answer accords fairly well 'l:!ith 
the individual scores of the yards. The position in the main offices 
is almost the reverse in that half feel that the company is successfUl 
and 27% feel th~t it is not successful. ~~ &re ~learly beginning to 
build up considerable differences of opinion bet'l:!eee~ those employed ~ 
the offices and those employed in the yards. Of those expressing an 
opinion there is a ~jority of 3 to 1 fo~ th~ ~ieH that the company 
does not ha~e a good record in iwpro~ing p~oductivity. On this ques= 
tion the majority o.f those expressing an opinion in the wain offices 
agree with the majority of their colleagues in the yards. Howeverp 
the feeling is less strongi 4~% to 35%. 
QOES1'!0N 1 
~ ~ cil<Ol :VOilll ~ -~~ rco~o£ li"eCCro i£ m ~ro~ 
~li"'01lllc~iwi\Gy&' 
iiery good Not good at all 
1 and 2 3 4 and 5 
Pall ion 18 16 65 
Daptford 19 16 62 
N Sands 18 15 66 
Main office 35 21 44 
Aggregate 20 16 61 
General agreement within the yards that the cowpanyqs record is not 
goodp the ~iew less widely held in the wain offices. 
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QUESTION 6 c 
~ r61@ Y@1!Jl ffi~@ ~<lii®K"blflcll ~iElJmrllOl®Jr>£3 Q ~ill:n®SS ~IrOSp®~~£ @'W®lr' ~Kll® 
1a~ :Vt<!ltrur> coo~ m~llil :U.stt JY~"A' o 
ca-> 
Much better Much worse 
1 rutd 2 3 4 and 5 
Pal lion 20 21 58 
Daptford 16 13 68 
~ Sands 12 19 65 
Main office 30 20 50 
Aggrsga·t~ 20 19 59 
Overall a 3 to 1 majority of those expressing an opinion feeling that 
business prospects will becowe ~orse over the next year. All 
locations agree with this. The-view being held slightly less.atrongly 
in the main officesp with 30% of the main offic~ staff feeling that the 
situation will b~ better in the next yearo 
QUESTION 9 
0~1iliolr' wnagemm1~ cm:t ~ ltrust®d 100 ~ seEWible <i!tOOisions K'oJr> the 
Cowpany 0 S fUt~o0 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
Main office 
Agree 
1 a.."ld 2 
10 
12 
9 
30 
-;) 
.I 
9 
6 
1 
15 
8 
Disagree 
,, 
:md 1:: .. J 
80 
79 
81 
51 
75 
Once againp th® overall figures of 75% who fe~l that ~nagement cannot 
·be trusted to make sensible decisions for the company's future and 13% 
feel that they canp hides differing emphasis between the yardso~o 
agree with other almost totally in that within the yards the figure is 
approximately 80% feeling that management cannot be trusted to make 
sensible decisions and roughly 10% feeling that they canp whereas in 
the wain offices 51% feel that management cannot b~ trusted to make 
sensibla decisions and 30% feel that they cano 
. " ' .~ 
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1 
€lilcl 2 
Equipment b~eakdowns/faults .,ao . 
.. 
Pall ion 39 
Deptford ~5 
N Sands 51 
Main office 17 
.<!. 
.Aggregate 38 
(Quite high voids 'between 7.5 and 15%) 
Special ~ork/rework 
Pall ion 58 
Deptford 46 
N Sands 59 
Main office 57 
Aggregate 55 
Ma ~'·?rials supply problems 
.. Pall ion 57 
Deptford 50 
N Sands 62 
Main office 34 
Aggregates 51 
Bottlenecks 
Pal lion 48 
Deptford 113 
N Sands 50 
Main office 34 
.Aggregate 45 
Low employee performance 
Pall ion 16 
Deptford 20 
N Sands 15 
Main office 32 
a 
Aggregate 19 
0 
16 
15 
17 
17 
16 
14 
14 
19 
14 
14 
10 
13 
12 
15 
12 
18 
20 
17 
20 
18 
14 
8 
14 
16 
13 
IEm!PJ~©J!fffiil~li1l~ 
!K((d~~o©~ 
!$ €111<! 
32 
28 
24 
53 
32 
15 
24 
11 
18 
17 
23 
22 
18 
38 
2~ 
22 
21 
20 
31 
22 
56 
54 
61 
40 
54 
5 
-
: ""'' ... 
;~_ .... ·' .. ;: 
[8? l&tm[9)~©ylffi'il®fiilfr .... · 
~ ffi?®~C§l~D©fiil$ ¢~boOt, lp. ...... 
· .. 0·•1>·!-o'OQ.·~ 
,,.. .. \. ....... f' .. ' 
Poo~ time keeping .,,_-~ 
-'"' 
,. ' • ""!~ 
hllioo o 11 13 64 ....... ··-~ ..,.....,. . """:s' 
~pu·o~d 11 12 60 
M Sands 10 14 67 
~ii?l @X'ficc& ~ 0 20 58 
-· ·~ 
.q> 
~gr>®g~t® Hl 13 62 
NOt ~nou~ p~opl0 
Pallicm 37 13 .l!o 
~ ~ptford 45 9 32 
~ N Sands 44 13 33 
--· 
Main office 49 11 30 
;:-
... 
~ --~ .&Mrept~ 40 12 35 
Inadequacies of supervision 
·o h.ll:iOi! 56 10 26 
D3ptford 42 11 34 
l\!o~th Sands 54 11 26 
Main office ~5 15 30 
.. -
.Aggr~gate 50 11 27 
,: . .... 
............ 
.$nabili ty to adapt to market 
,._f<.~·~_:· -~emand/changes quickly 
-~_:.- ~ :· . :'" ~c: 
--~·. Pall ion 26 16 lf5 
Deptford 27 16 40 
l\1 Sands 26 1q 46 
Main office 18 12 57 
Aggregate 24 16 ,. 45 
Poor training 
PalliOi:l 32 11 44 
Deptford 37 11 38 
ro Smlds 38 'i1 42 
~in offic@ 39 13 37 
D 
Aggregate 35 11 41 
Poo~ p~oductioi:l planning 
h.:!. lion 72 10 13 
Deptford 68 10 16 
N Sands d 74 7 12 
Main office 54 17 16 
J!ggregat® 68 10 13 
Lack of information 
PIDllicm 77 
Deptford 74 
N Sands 76 
Main off'ic® 70 
Aggregate 75 •""' 
7 
i 
7 
11 
0 
i 
[fiil'Uf9J~©y~m 
ffi?te~~Q~©m 
10 
12 
10 
11 
10 
If ue highlight those areas where the majority have e~pressed a cl®a~ 
opinion we can se® that those factors felt to be & m&jor caus® for 
hold~ups in th~ flow of work are in order of importanceg 
Lack of information 
Special work or re~work 
Material supply problems; and 
Inadequacie~ of supervisiono 
.... 
. 
~d those areas where & majority expressed the view that it ~s not a 
~ause are: 
Poor tiMe~keeping; and 
Low employee performance. 
QUESTION 11 
'tfui~h o? ~h~ follom.ng actions 11 if ~tm ~ the Coiiipi!Wy 11 c:llo you th~ 
~oulc:ll help to wake ~~ mnoey? 
Cutting out waste and 
unnecessary expenditure 
Pall ion 
Daptford 
l\1 Sands 
Main office 
Getting everyone (including 
yourself) to work harder 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
Main office 
Aggregate 
d 
Helpful 
1 and 2 
81 
79 
74 
90 
80 
39 
39 
30 
61 
40 
3 
5' 
6 
10 
5 
6 
17 
17 
20 
15 
l\1ot helpful 
4 and 5 
8 
1 
9 
3 
7 
33 
33 
~1 
19 
32 
~~.ct .. 
\ 
fJ 
p 
~ 
~: 
j 
~ 
~ 
~ 
w. 
~ 
~ 
~ 
·:~ 
,, 
-~~· -:_ 
•, 
Increasing amount of work 
· tmioh is sub=eontract®cl 
Pall ion 
~ptfog-d 
N S2nds 
!%\in office 
Ioopro~ing th~ quality of 
ow- t:Jork 
Pall ion 
Daptford 
N Sands 
Main office 
... 
. 
Aggregate 
h.llion 
~ptford 
N Sands 
Main office 
·~ 
"•,.; Aggregate 
: "! ... ·'~ •. 
··.·· ~ · ~caving people more skills and 
tr-aining 
Pallion 
Dapti'or>d 
N Sands 
Main office 
Aggregate 
Getting people to eork better 
together 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
Main office 
d 
7 
'iO 
~ 
7 
7 
53 
'53 
48 
76 
53 
78 
73 
72 
93 
76 
60 
60 
56 
78 
61 
'73 
71 
66 
90 
73 
0 
c:fO 
5 
3 
2 
15 
5 
13 
9 
19 
10 
13 
5 
1 
9 
2 
6 
10 
11 
12 
10 
10 
8 
9 
9 
6 
8 
:·, .-~ 
80 
78 
85 
73 
78 
24 
26 
31 
8 
23 
9 
11 
12 
1 
8 
21 
19 
zq 
9 
19 
•11 
13 
19 
1 
11 
-
t -4' :· 
> 
.. 
.... 
h.:c]·-: • -~ .:-.-.: .. :··;.,;,.: . ... -.. 
Increasing flexibility of 
th® workforce 
~..;~l-~ "'(.~_,· ~I , . •· r. 
. '-
.. 
• t-~- '.- ·• • ~llion. 
XXlptford 
!l2 13 31 
~· 
N Smld5 
~w of'i'ic® 
41 
32 
56 
42o4f">. 
0 
9 40 
14 45 
17 21 
12 36 
In order or importance those areas or action that people support in the 
~jority are~ 
Cutting out waste and unnecessary expenditure 
Getting work done on time 
Getting people to work better together 
Giving people more skills and training; and 
Improving the quality of our work • 
.... 
QUESTION 12 
~ ~ul~ yo~ clesc~i~ ~~~io~s ge~®~ly bet~~ ~e~~t ~d ~~d® 
~o~ ~~ ~de~~d ~pbuilde~s ~~ p~esent? 
Excellent Poo~ 
1 and 2 3 4 and 5 
Pall! on 1 3 95 
Deptford 3 5 89 
N Sands 2 3 89 
Main office 9 10 82 
Aggregate 2.5 4 90 
_A :-c~lly m::J..:J:::ivc c:::p4'cssioo of op.lilion that i:•elat.ious b!dtWt=<::m u&U-'li:o\~E:= 
went and unions are very poor at tbe moment. Some_90% of the popula= 
tion taking that view and even though it is slightly less strongly held 
in the offices 9 still even there 82~ share that opinion. The view is 
most strongly held in Pallion where 95% of those asked expressed the 
view that relations were very poor. 
QUESTION 13 
.. 
~o~ R'BIKiageiien~ ~ eo~tted \!;,c iJgpro~ ixldustwiall ~laltions ixil 
~® futl!JNl 
Agree Disagree 
1 md 2 3 ll ancl 5 
Pall ion 26 6 63 
Deptford d 28 8 62 
N Sands 23 3 72 
Main orrice 38 11 so 
Aggregate 28 1 60 
..... I 
..... 4 ........ ~ 
.·.· 
_. :·.r "'~"- .. ~~- ~ 
.; ·-· 
..... 
. 
Daspite the pessimistic vie~ of current relations something approaching 
,,_OP~M-~ .:...30~ of ~hose ask®d (~md 38$ of thoa@ in 'Ch~ offic~a) ~EPi"®SS®cl th® 'Vi®tJ 
· ~~- · ~h~~ I!Janagew~nt i£1 co!Wd tted to impi"ovin~ inciustroi&l i"®Uiticrns o "ot:J= 
evei"p this leaves an ovei"all 60% of employees feeling that management 
ia Ylot so comwittedo Indeed 72% of those in Noi"th ~nda f~l this ia 
... ~ ~h® C2li:il®o FX"Oi!l thi!;l poaitioY1 9 of COUi"SGp it ~a poasi'bl® to clG:~tec" th® 
l@V®l of suspicion ~nd cynicism t~t their'® t:Jill b@ ~ respons® to &ny 
i:iWl~g®WGYlt inUi&UVG o • c<f!··· 
. -~.-
-~ ~ .•. -=·.···.:. 
QUESTION 14 
Setting ~ork objectives 
clearlY. .;, .. 
Pall ion 
~ptfoi"d 
.PJ Sands 
Main office 
H~lpin~ we to achieve 
my·work objectives 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
tV Sands 
Ms.in office 
Delegating appropriately 
Pall ion 
. Deptford 
N Sands 
"· )~ ~ii! office 
ColiiXIIUnicating 
Pall ion 
·. D3ptforo 
N Sandl!l 
Main office " 
. : .. · /.~: .. ·--~. . _,. 
1 and 2 
38 
41 
29 
60 
40 
30 
37 
28 
52 
33 
30 
36 
25 
50 
33 
30 
-35 
30 
4; 
33 
3 
13 
~4 
18 
12 
15 
15 
w 
14 
15 
16 
11 
19 
17 
17 
11 
1!6 
14 
15 
~2 
Disagree 
4 and 5 
45 
37 
46 
24 
40 
48 
39 
46 -
28 
43 
36 
43 
26 
·'[ 
9 
i .. 
39 0 
52 
130 
46 
33 
~5 
I. 
t 
. 
[Etf ,.[roploymen~ ~-- ,.~ f' . , ·~·~·~?~ . . ·~ . ) ~~it:!~ 
H i ~elatioil~ 
Dealing with poor standards /J;P•'o.,:·'~q 
of work 
Pall ion 32 17 42 
Deptford 34 15 40 
N Sands 30 c., 17 43 
Main office 45 24 34 
.~ 
Aggregate 32 17 39 
Using and developing my 
full abilities 
.. Pall ion 33 9 49 
Deptford 33 16 42 
N Sands 28 15 45 
Main office 47 14 32 
Aggregate 34 12 44 
Furthering my career 
Pal lion 14 10 68 
Deptford 16 10 64 
l\1 Sands 14 8 67 
Main office 32 17 43 
Aggregate 16 10 63 
Motivating me 
Pall ion 22 10 60 
Deptford 26 10 52 
l\1 Sands 20 10 51 
Main office 42 17 35 
Aggregate 24 11 55 
Building teamwork 
?all ion 22 14 56 ~ 
Deptford 26 16 47 . 
~l Sands 19 14 58 . :~'4 
Main office 36 15 41 
Aggregate 23 14 . 52 
Controlling quality 
Pall ion 26 17 46 
Deptford 32 14 43 
N Sands· 24 19 47 
114.ain office 42 19 31 
Aggregate 28 17 43 
-· 
Gatting the ~ork done on tim® 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
Main office 
Aggregate 
Letting me know how I am doing 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
l"l.ain office 
Aggregate 
40 
46 
32 
65 
42 
24 
27 
21 
38 
25 
C) 
13 
13 
17 
13 
13 
7 
10 
12 
. 14 
9 
40 
33 
42 
17 
45 
63 
56 
59 
40 
57 
Looking at the aggregate data for the total population 9 there is no 
item in which the majority of employees fell that their immediate boss 
is doing a good job. The nearest item that achieves this is 9 setting 
work objectives clearly 9 9 where 40% of the population feel that that is 
the case and 40% disagree 9 and secondly 'getting work done on time' 
where 42% of the total population feel that bosses are doing a good job 
here. On the other hand 45% of the total population disagree with 
that. But these two items were the only areas in which the vie~s 
expr&ssed in terms of bosses' performance approached the positive. 
·The following were mentioned by the majority, and in rank order they 
are: 
that immediate bosses are not doing a good job in furthering 
careers 
not letting people know how they are doing 
not motivating; f'!.nt'1 
not building teamwork. 
In li~e with the continuing pattern, opinions expressed in the offices 
are somewhat diffe~ent and here the balance of opinion would see~ to 
indicate that people feel that there are areas in which bosses are 
doing a good job, and they are, in rank order: 
getting work done on time 
setting clear objectives 
helping people to achieve 
priately. 
objectives and delegting appro~ 
0 
On all other items, except 3, the majority of those expressing opinions 
felt that their bosses were doing a good job, although the size of that 
majority was not great, about 10%o The three items whee there was 
agreement within the offices that bosses were not doing a good job 
were, in rank order: 
fUrthering careers 
building teamwork; and 
letting people know how they are doingo 
·u.:• ··rll<.:<) 
Q 
• 
··I 
< 
l 
.:~ 
.· 
It is interesting to note that~ although there are dif~erent opi~ions 
expre~~ed in the offices, the areas of agreement with the rest of the 
colleagues in other yards focus on the man~managernent aspects of 
supeY"iors v ·performance being unsatisfactory. 
QUESTION 15 
CJ 
9:1e ru"e kept llil the dar>k C!bOI.!t things Be ougiilt to !mOI:Jo ~ 
Agree Disagree 
and 2 3 4 and 5 
Pall ion 84 3 12 
l>,;1tford 81 4 14 
N Sands 84 4 9 
Mai r} office 63 9 17 
Agzr :~gate 82 4 12 
A clc.;;.•' u;._.jority, 82% overall 1 expressing the view that people are kept 
in the dark about information. Again, this is held less strongly in 
the main offices but still a considerable majority, 63% to 17%, agree~ 
ing that people are ill-informed. 
QUESTION 16 
Bo~ interested are you in receiving in~oFWation about Sunderland 
Shipbuilders 9 financial position? 
Very Not 
interested interested 
1 and 2 3 4 and 5 
Palliun '(6 9 16 
Deptford 73 9 16 
N Sands 76 7 14 
Main office 83 5 12 
Aggregate 74 8 15 
Overallp 3/4 of the population are interested in receiving financial 
information. This view is general across the yards, but is more 
strongly held in the main offices, where 83% are interested in 
receiving financial infor~ation. 
I fi5b . [mpioymenR 
lQJ ~elations 
QUESTION 17 
no you agree o~ disagree tlith th~ foll~ statements ~elating to 
information on the Companyvs pe~fo~ce given to ewployees? 
Sunderland Shipbuilde~s ~ 
Is not sufficiently honest and 
open in the information given 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
... N Sands 
Jlllain office 
Aggr.egate 
F'ails to put across information 
:- a way which is meaningful 
?all ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
Main office 
Aggregate 
Trlc_, hard but is not success~ 
ful in getting the information 
acr-o;:,s 
i'.., ·. ~ion 
:::::, ~ford 
'; --~nds 
i·hin office 
Aggregate 
Only looks at issues from the 
point of view of management 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
Main office 
Aggregate 
Tries to mislead employees 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
Main office 
Agg~egate 
Disagree 
1 anc'l 2 4 and 5 
..... 
79 5 14 
77 6 12 
79 ~ 12 
74 11 15 
77 5 13 
75 7 13 
76 5 12 
75 7 11 
74 9 15 
74 7 13 
41 11 42 
39 13 11() 
36 11 45 
50 18 29 
41 12 40 
80 3 13 
75 6 14 
78 5 12 
66 15 17 
76 6 14 
72 7 19 
68 8 18 
76 7 10 
44 16 39 
66 9 20 
· ... ~ 
A considerable majority over~ll agreeing that manag~~ent is not 
:u~~:c:~ntly honest and op~n, fails to put infor~~tion acro~s, only 
looks at the management's point of view 9 and two-t~irds of people 
feeling that the company tries to mislead its ecplcye~s. The only 
area of questioning which the e~ployees disagree with the assertion 
madet is the one that management tries hard but is not successful in 
getting information across. Clearly 40~ of the population feels that 
0 it cloesn 1 t try hard at all. 
. .... 
In the main offices the broad spread o~ opinion is si~ilar, the only 
signficant difference being that 39% of employees in the main offices 
do not believe that management are trying to mislead the employees~ 
whereas 44% do. Whilst this is still a majority of those expressing 
an opinion, the view is held less strongly here than in the other 
.. yards. 
QUESTION 18 
Listed .beloB are some common probleiDS Bith company informationo HoB 
tru® do you think each is in your Company? 
Too little information is 
circulated 
Pal lion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
Main office 
Aggregate 
Managers and supervisors 
do not pass information on 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
Main office 
~gregate 
i:11fv1·mation is not exchanged 
between sites/departments 
?all ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
Main office 
Aggregate • 
Very true 
1 and 2 
79 
79 
80 
69 
76 
73 
69 
69 
57 
68 
76 
68 
6g 
66 
71 
3 
8 
8 
7 
14 
a 
11 
11 
10 
19 
12 
10 
13 
13 
13 
11 
Never true 
4 and 5 
9 
8 
11 
16 
10 
12 
12 
15 
23 
14 
10 
, 1 
11 
16 
11 
Information is too complicated 
to '.J~~-er:;:tand 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
Main office 
Aggregate 
Information is too general 
and lacks detail 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
Main office 
Aggregate 
Information is out of date 
when I receive it 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
t-'.ain office 
Aggregate 
The trade union passes informa= 
tion on better than :r:anage:::ent 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
N S2.:1d::: 
Main office 
Aggregate 
36 
35 
34 
23 
34 ,,.,. 
66 
59 
70 
52 
62 
63 
61 
60 
48 
59 
60 
51 
67 
39 
57 
0 
p 
~I [mpioymenft 
QJ ! ~elatiorB§l 
21 
21 
24 
20 
21 
10 
15 
13 
17 
12 
15 
17 
16 
21 
16 
16 
13 
12 
28 
16 
36 
35 
35 
53 
37 
17 
17 
12 
28 
17 
17 
14 
18 
29 
18 
20 
25 
17 
31 
21 
Overall, there is clear support for almost all the assertions made 
except that information is too complicated to understand. Whilst a 
third of the population do feel this is the case, the majority of these 
expressing a view do not feel that information is too complicated. 
When we look at the location responses on this question of complica-
tion9 we see that there is an even split of opinion in Pallion and 
Dept:ord and in the offices 53$ feel that it is not true that infor=a-
tion is too complicated. Another interesting point is that the 
majority in all areas feel that trade unions are better at passing on 
information than management. Having said that, there are differences 
between the locations in response to this; in terms of rank order, 
North Sands show~ 67%, Pallion 60%, Deptford 51% and Main Office 39%. 
This is clearly a period of high anxiety within the industry as a whole 
and also within Sunderland Shipbuilders. At times of anxiety people 
do want to know what is happening to them. They seek information with 
will make them feel better or at least give them some picture of how 
they ~an get out of the~r present troubles. ~owever, for this info~=~ 
.;;-.-: ,. ·. 
···~ 
ation to be acceptedp it is necessary for there to be an atmonphere of 
so~e trust bet~~en tho=e receiving the infor~a~!o~ a~1 th~3e e!'l!ng it. 
One problem with the present situation in Sunderland Shipbuilders is 
that relationship does not appear to exist. 
QUESTION 19 
Notice board 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
!-'ain_ office 
Aggregate 
Your boss 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
Main office 
Aggregate 
The grapevine 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
N S::~nrl~ 
Main office 
Aggregate 
Your trade union 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
Main office 
Aggregate 
Rri P.fing groups 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
l-'.ain office 
Aggregate 
.... 
Important 
1 and 2 
71 
63 
69 
61 
67 
48 
48 
43 
78 
50 
43 
48 
42 
45 
43 
69 
58 
78 
45 
40 
40 
36 
51 
40 
3 
8 
13 
9 
10 
9 
12 
12 
13 
7 
11 
15 
9 
16 
18 
13 
11 
10 
1 
18 
1 1 
12 
12 
15 
14 
12 
Unimportant 
4 and 5 
16 
20 
11 
27 
17 
33 
31 
37 
15 
30 
35 
32 
34 
34 
34 
15 
19 
11 
3.4 
17 
42 
39 
42 
32 
39 
"$h!pbuilding Ne·.J:;: 19 
Pall ion 29 
Deptford 28 
N Sands- 32 
Main o f'fice 27 
Aggregate 28 0 
~ ! [mploymenl 
lQf , Re~ations 
15 49 
12 50 
12 52 
14 59 
14 50 
Overall, the rank order for sources of 1nformation are: 
1. Noticeboard 
2. Trade union 
3. Your boss 
4. The grapevine 
·5. Briefing groups 
6. Shipbuilding News. 
Indeed, ~hereas for. the first five items the majority feel they are an 
importa~t source of information 1 for Shipbuiding News the majority of 
50% as against 25% feel that this is not an important source of inform~ 
ation. This view is held across all locations, but is held more 
strongly in the main offices (i.e. in the main offices there is even 
less support for Shipbuilding News than in the yards themselves). 
Looking at some of the differing answers within the locations, we can 
see that, for example in North Sands, 78% feel that their Union was the 
most important source of informationp followed by the notice board at 
69%, whereas the majority on this site felt that Shipbuilding News and 
the briefing groups were not an important source of information. In 
Pallion yard 71% felt that the notice board was the most important 
source of infcr~tion, following by 69% expressing the view that the 
trade union was important. There is a fairly even split of opinion on 
the usefulness of briefing groups and again a majority questioning the 
usefulness of Shipbuilding News. In Deptford Yard, 63% feel that the 
notice boards are an important source, and 58% the trade unions. 
!nere is an even split of view on the usefulness of briefing groups and 
again a majority questioning the importance of Shipbuilding News. 
Once again in ~;.e ~in officesp the pattern is somewhat different. 
Here the rank order is as follows: 
78% expressing the view that their bess was an important source 
of information 
61% for the notice~oard 
51$ for briefing groups; and 
45$ for the trade union and grapevine as a source of information. 
A rr.a~o!"ity !'le!"e ex;lressi~g support for briefi~g groups, but ag::in an 
even stronger view that Shipbuilding News is not an important source of 
information. 
... 
:;_ 
;.. 
.r .. 
::._·~-~~~~ 
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I 
ou::.::T!oN 20 
~ . !Empioyme111~ 
l'QJ . ~elations 
~Briefing ~oups are a good MaY of getting my question3 about 
:undcrland Shipbuilders anZBeredoQ 
Agre~ Disagree 
and 2 3 4 and 5 
Ci) 
Pall ion 29 a 59 
Deptford 32 13 ..... 52 
N Sands 30 8 57 
Main office 48 12 33 
Aggregate 32 9 52 
Overall about one~third of the population feel that briefing groups are 
a good source of getting questions answered, whereas over a half dis~ 
agree with that view. Within the locations 7 the ~osition is much the 
same in all three y~rds; less than one~third feel that questions are 
answered·through the briefing group system 7 and some between 52% and 
59% feeling that it is not a useful route for getting questions 
answered. In the main offices approximately a half of the population 
feel that it is a useful way and a third disagree. 
QUESTION 21 
Do you read "Shipbuilding 
News"? 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
!-'.ain office 
Is it relevant/interesting? 
Do 
Fall ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
Main office 
Aggregate 
you believe what 
"Shi;:-t;,uildi~g ~1ews"? 
Pal lion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
~a in office 
Aggregate 
is in 
Always 
28 
19 
26 
38 
16 
15 
13 
10 
14 
16 
10 
13 
17 
14 
Sometimes 
59 
60 
65 
55 
59 
62 
55 
64 
80 
62 
67 
63 
71 
74 
66 
17 
24 
18 
8 
17 
Never 
14 
22 
11 
5 
11 
19 
7 
5 
11 
13 
OTJESTIO!I 22 
~rn practice» employees are kept Hell informed by management about the 
current situation as it ~?fects their particular site/department/yardoQ 
Ag::-ee Disagr-ee 
and 2 3 4~nd 5 
.... 
Pall ion 11 8 80 
Deptford 7 9 82 
N Sands 8 8 80 
f-'l.ain office 22 13 65 
Aggregate 11 8 77 
With three-quarters of the population feeling that employees are not 
kept well-informed about the current sit~ation; while this is felt 
less strongly in the main of~ices the~e is still a majority of 65% as 
against 22% expressing the view that this is the case. 
~.QUESTION 23 
~ement is a~re of things that <t5orry people at uq leveloQ 
Agree Disagree 
1 and 2 3 4 and 5 
Pall ion 15 5 79 
Deptford 19 6 72 
N Sands 16 7 74 
}ofain office 27 8 64 
,·~.'::)~~ega te 18 5 74 
.... 
. . ~··: ~-
··r-.r:-<re-quarte~s of the population feel that management is not aware. 
~~{lst this view is held less strongly in the office, it is still a 
Vt~w c~pressed by two-thirds of the population there. 
QU!::S'flON 24 
"My boss is receptive and listens to my ideas and suggestionso~ 
Agree Disagree 
and 2 3 4 and 5 
Pallion 27 15 57 
Deptford 32 18 48 
N Sands 26 14 58 
Main office 62 13 24 
Aggregate 32 15 50 
wbilst the overall position is that half of people feel that their boss 
is not receptive, and a third dov this does ~.ask some differing 
cpi:1ions on d:.rre~ent locations. In both ~:orth Sands and ?allion 
2:~cst 60~ fe~l t~at t~ei~ bess is not r~ceptive, and 26-27% ~eel that 
·+ 
he is. In Dept~ord Yard only 48% feel that their boss is not recep= 
t~ve, and ~2% fe~: t~at he is. In t~e main off!c~s, the oppc3ite view 
is axpressedp in that 62% feel that their boss is receptive and only 
24% disagree. A slight majority of the total population have ~ posi= 
tive feeling at the end of the working dayp whereas 29% do not. How= 
everp in the yardsp in North Sands 41% feel they have accomplished 
something worthwhilep in Pallion 49% feel the0 same wayp and in Deptford 55% feel the same wayp somethin~ over 30% not feeling that way. In 
the main offices however 76% of people ·f~el that they have accomplished 
something worthwhile at the end of the working dayp and only 6% notp 
again ~vidence of a very different atmosphere in the offices as against 
the yards themselves. Whilst the more positiv~ atmosphere of the of= 
flees might be of some comfort to managementp there are inherent prob= 
lems with such differing views of the organisation and attitudes about 
the organisationp in that it may hinder mutual understanding between 
~these different groups. 
QUESTION 25 
0 As ~ !Ddividualp I feel that I have accomplished soooething Borth~ile 
~t th® end of a day 0s Borka 0 
Always Never 
1 and 2 3 4 and 5 
'Pallion 49 16 33 
Daptford 55 14 30 
M Sands 41 21 34 
Main office 76 17 6 
Aggregate 51 16 29 
Evidence that a significant number still feel a sense of achievement. 
Althou~ in the j•<:.rd.:: onc=third do oot g 1n th~e: uffi.ce:s i:.hret:=quarl:.ers 
feel a sense of accomplishment and only 6$ do nota 
QUESTION 26 
ox ~eel ~rsonally responsible foJr> the job I dOo 0 
Always Never 
1 and 2 3 4 and 5 
Pallion 78 e 14 
Deptford 77 9 13 
N Sands 72 11 14 
Main off'ica 92 4 4 
Aggregate 77 e 12 
" 
22 
Overallp something slightly more tr.an three-q~ar:e~s of the population 
feQl personally responsible for the job that they doo The majority 
woves up to 92$ of thos~ in the main offices. As ~ith one or t~o 
earlier questions, this hints at a basic feeling of pride in one 9 s ~ork 
~hich should be a source of strength for the organisation. However if 
this feeling does not have an outlet 9 if peoptr fe~l that their ~ork is 
not ~orth~hile 9 as 29~ overall did feel (as indicated in Question 25) 9 
then it can be a source of some frustrattcn. 
QUESTION 27 
AO ~t extent are you able ~o decide hoH to do your job? 
A great Far too 
deal little. 
and 2 3 4 and 5 
Pal lion 63 11 26 
Daptford 66 11 20 
N Sands 60 16 21 
Main office as 8 6 
Aggregate 65 11 21 
Some two-thirds of the population feel that they can decide how to do 
their jab~ very slightly lower in North Sands and Pallion, and the 
majority moving up to 85% in the main offices. In the yards, between 
20$ and 26$ feel that they are not able to decide how to do their job, 
whereas only 6$ share this view in the main offices. 
QUESTION 28 
A great Far too 
deal little 
1 and 2 3 4 and 5 
Pall ion 27 13 59 
Deptford 26 21 ll9 
N Sands 23 15 60 
Main offic~S 50 17 32 
~regate 29 15 53 
Just over half of the population in total feel that they do not have a 
say in what goes on in their work group; in the yards between 23% and 
26% feel that they do have a sayp but the position reverses in the main 
offices where 50~ feel they have a say and 32~ feel they do noto 
P-
QUESTION 29 
~ ~ch co~trol do you have ove~ output in your Bork group? 
Complete control No cont~ol 
1 and 2 3 4 and 5 
0 
~llio&il 26 lS 58 
33 12 
,,.. 
52 D®ptfop(l 
W Sand® 25 17 54 
Main office 48 16 35 
Aggregate 29. 14 53 
~mething ove~ half the population feeling that they do not have con= 
t~ol over output 9 and just less than 30% feel that they do 9 is pretty 
much reflecting the view of the yards, but again in the main offices 
the situation is reyersed, where 48% feel that they have control and 
35% feel~that they do noto 
QUESTION 30 
~ ~c~ oppnPtunit~ is th~P® ~o ~ici~t® ~ ~®te~ing Bo~k 
mathods an~ proced~? 
A great deal Fa~ too little 
1 and 2 3 4 and 5 
Pall ion 17 11 70 
Daptford 20 . 18 62 
N Sands 14 12 69 
Main off'ice 15 11 50 
Aggregate 20 12 64 
.. ~ 
Overall 9 two=th!rds of the population feeling that they have little op= 
portunity to participate in these areas; in North Sands and Pallion 
that view is held more strongly than overall 9 and in the main offices, 
while people in Question 29 indicated that they can influence output, 
they agree with their colleagues in the yard by 50% to 15% that they do 
not have opportunity to participate in determining methods and proced= 
ureso 
QUESTION 31 
Agree Disagree 
1 and 2 3 4 and 5 
Pal lion 0 19 10 10 
Deptford 75 R1J 12 
re Sands TI 10 9 
Main offic® 84 1 6 
Aggregat® 71 9 9 
~ 
.. ~ 
Ove~ th~ee=qua~t0~S of th® population ~anting mo~e involvement in de= 
cisions affecting their jobs. This view is even more strongiy felt in 
the main offices~ wh@~e & ooajo~ity of 84% ~xpress this opiniono It 15 
not at all contradictory to find ~ position in ~hich people feel that 
they can irtfluence aspects of their ~ork and yet feel that they ~ant 
even morep because that influence is generally seen as a motivating 
factOR". 
QUESTION 32 
In my job I can = 
Learn ne~ things and 
develoP. .. skills 
Pal lion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
Main office 
Do varied and interesting 
.~Oi"k 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
00 Sands 
Main office 
Decide my own pace of ~ork 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
Main office 
Have my vi~~ and opinions 
taken into account 
Pall ion 
Dept foR! 
N Sands 
Main offic~ 
"l'rue no~ 
35 
33 
32 
66 
37 
41 
41 
34 
59 
41 
1 
33 
30 
28 
58 
34 
22 
27 
23 
50 
26 
Not true but 
~ould like 
50 
48 
49 
32 
!!7 
48 
48 
54 
37 
47 
66 
61 
62 
48 
61 
2 
53 
-52 
56 
30 
50 
10 
14 
15 
10 
1 
6 
5 
8 
2 
8 
9 
11 
2 
1 
Not 
interested 
3 
10 
14 
12 
3 
10 
~.<> 
.... 
2~ [8? [M~~@lfliii1l~oW ~~~(d~~@~$ 
Follol:! through tasks to 
cornp!@i.io~a 
hlliofi · 30 57 B 
J:klptforcl 32 51 12 
Nl &Mid£! 28 56 13 
~iil ol'fic® 67 30° 1 
AggregC~.tC2 34 - 51 9 
QUESTION 33 
tlliiclil ©? ~® ?ollo~ f'&cto~rs a\.R"e most iliipo!l"~t 100 :rom- job 
~sa tisfactieliil ~ 
Important Not important 
... 
. 1 and 2 3 4 and5 
Opportunity for promotion 
Pall ion 43 10 41 
Daptford 36 11 42 
1\Y Sands 31 12 51 
~in officra 69 10 21 
Aggregate 42 10 40 
Fringe benefits 9 .e.g subs!= 
dised mealsp social facilities 
Pall ion 67 6 21 
Daptford 63 9 19 
1\Y Sands 76 r 10 
r-t:lin office 46 """ 4" ;.,;; I
Aggy-ega te 64 8 21 
Good holiday/sick pay conditions 
Pall ion 94 2 2 
Deptford 90 3 1.5 
l\l Sands 95 0 1 
Main offic~ 86 5 8 
AggM!lgate 91 2 '2 
Shorter hours of l:!Ork 
~lliolil 81 1 10 
~ptford 76 1 10 
N Sands 83 1 r 0 
Main office 59 1-'3 25 
Aggroegate 16 B 11 
.. t 
. ~.: ~ . . ..... 
'··1 :; : ~~~·;::.~a4·~ f\-:;: ~-~·. ·~ ~; ~ [ED" r [mpiC~y1JiJ1®iil\l . .· .. _··:: ~- ·~~ .. : .. :. ; ... ~ <~·:{!-~~ ·:. p 2i!S lRl~~~~n©~ 
Opportuflities for overtime 
. . ~ . ·;~ · .. .. ~ ....-~· .... · ,. .. /' 
.. 
> 6!8 10 22 hllic:m 
~ptforc! 56 11 25 
N Srutcls 58 15 21 
~w oX'X'ic!E;) 5~ 11 3!8 
'0. 
~!'Q~~Q 59...., 11 2~ 
Good Ufiion repres®ntation 
Pallicm 81 6 10 
~ptforcl 75 6 12 
!!3 Sanc!s 86 7 3 
~ifi office 49 11 28 
Aggregata 75 7 11 
..... 
H~althy.and safe ~orking 
ewr if'orugen t 
P'&llion 95 1 1 
'o D2ptford 92 1 1 
ro Sands 96 0 Oo5 
~in offic~ 90 ~ 18 
Aggz>egatQ 93 1 1 
. 
Regular increases in ~ages 
" Pall ion 95 2 1 
. ~ptt'ord 90 'il 1o'5 
N Sands 95 Oo5 1 
~ixl o ft'ice 95 2 3 
~®gatB· 93 1 1 
r. 
Ertn. pa~nt for effort 
.. - h.llion 92 2 2" 
Deptfotrd 90 1 2 
··: ...a, ... W Scoods 92 1 2 
·.""' ·r .. - Mmin office 92 2 A! . . . ~ ~ 
-- . 
~ ;,.: :: 
···' ~ t 90 2 2 ·--:...•. .... ,,... __ : ega ® 
0 
--
·:. :"~ .::; · .. status/prestige 
P®.lH.Oii 59 12 23 
D3ptfo!Ni 52 15 22 
ro sands 55 13 25 
Main o t'fi.ce "' 66 13 19 
-~ .. 
[8? [m!)il~@ym~m . ··~ [R(~~~~D©Iii1~ 
Ji.ggY'egat® 57 12 22 
Opportunity for leadership 
=\~oF ro~sponsibility . -
. ···~t ·: 
Pall ion 46 11 40 
OeJptfoi"d 39 13 39 
·. r.~ Sands 36 0 15 ~5 
~in off'ic~ 73 10 1!4 
· ... -iF. . 
-. . . 
Aggregate 45 11 36 
Opportunity to learn and 
develop skills 
~ Pall ion 75 1 13 
Deptford 69 'fO 13 
N Sands 70 15 9 
Main. t.>ffice 89 7 2 
Aggregate 73 9 11 
Participation in decision making 
. 
Pall ion 72 10 13 
~ptforod 62 11 17 
N Sands 64 13 16 
Main office 88 6 4 
Aggregate 70 10 13 
Guaranteed job security 
Pall ion 91 2 5 
~ptfoi"d 88 1 4 
N Sands 89 2 5 
Main office 95 2 2 
Aggi"egate 89 2. 4 
Recognition and praise for 
a job well done 
Pall ion 78 7 11 
~ptfOlrd 72 6 14 
N Sands 72 1 15 
Main office 88 1 /;} 
Aggregate 76 7 11 
d 
r~-- )··~·. 
~--~. 
Good working relationships 
PalliOi'i • 
Deptford 
N Sru'lds 
~in office 
Reputatioi'i of th® Company 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
Main office 
Aggregate 
... 
lr allocation of work load 
Pallioil 
· lklptford 
N Sands 
~in office 
Management attitudes 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
Main office 
Common terms and conditions 
for everyone 
Pall ion 
Deptford 
N Sands 
Main offic~ 
93 
85 
86 
98 
90 ,,. 
67 
63 
60 
84 
66 
85 
80 
77 
92 
82 
82 
86 
79 
98 
81 
88 
89 
86 
77 
85 
();) 
2 
4 
3 
0 
2 
13 
10 
11 
·6 
11 
·6 
6 
11 
3 
6 
4 
6 
5 
1 
4 
2 
5 
9 
l!l 
.• 
2 
4 
6 
3 
15 
19 
22 
8 
16 
4 
1 
6 
4 
5 
12 
11 
12 
3 
5 
3 
4 
14 
In rank order~ the factors which are important to job satisfaction are 
regular increase in wagesp and health and safety secondp good holiday 
and sick ~ay joint third» extra paymant for effort and good working re= 
lationships. From the general data 9 the only areas where there is & 
significant body of peoplle not interested are in 9 opportunity for pro= 
motion 9 and 9 opportunity for initiative and responsibility. However 
although there are significant minoritiesp 40% and 36$ respectively~ 
who do not seek these factorsp the ~jority of people would like thes 
opportunitieso Looking at those areas considered not important by the 
main office staffp it is clear that there is far more interest in pro= 
motion and leadership opportunities and less interest in fringe 
0 
... 
b 
~-
O> 
.. 0 
·- ~ fEmLQ~~©yM~~ .. ~ -o ... ... !R?~~~Ri©liil$ 
~ 
benefits~ ®.g. subsidised meals 9 oppo~tuniti®~ fo~ overtiwe 9 union ~e= 
prese~tatio~ a~d sho~ter hours of wo~k. r~terestinglyp i~ the Main 
offices the most favoured respo~se is for good wo~king ~elationshipso 
Again although there do seem to be bette~ ~elationships in the offices 
than ®lsewhere 9 the staff still feel that this is a massively iwpo~ta~t 
&~ea fo~ theoo 9 &nd clea~ly ~alu~ good ~orki~~ ~el~tio~ships. 
-In general 9 it is clear that there is st~o~g evidence of a task=eentred 
culture withi~ Sunderla~d Shipbuilders' obviously i~ an ~rea of this 
kind that may o~ the face of it seem quite p~oper. However it is a 
co~stant theme in organisatio~ development that tasks are achieved 
through and with people. Management ~ometiooes mistakenly take the 
view that they can conce~trate only o~ the taks o~ on the people 9 and 0 --that in hard times they must thereford concentr~te solely on the task 9 
with people=issues coming a poor second. However there is plenty of 
evidence that successfUl companies are those who understand the inter~ 
relatad ·1;1ature of ta·sk~management and people~management P and who real= 
ise that driving fo~ the task at the exp~nse of people=relationships 
does not even deliver good task performancej that far from b~ing mut= 
ually exclusive these things are intertwined. ·A clear a~d comprehen= 
sive management philosophy and strategy for the management of relations 
within th@ yards is an important aspect of recovery for this organisa~ 
ation. 
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